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1 Introduction
An informative introduction should frame the content that follows 
such that the reader is better able to understand the author’s intent and 
fundamental concerns. It should suggest how the work may be looked 
along as well as looked at. The change in preposition is important. This 
book should be understood as an essay on what the intellectual virtues 
of humility and justice look like in discrete areas of bioethical inquiry. 
Looking at it, one will find arguments for and against various claims. 
Looking along it, one should glean why one should take a more epistemi-
cally humble stance when arguing for permissible killing or harming. By 
looking along this essay, one catches a glimpse of how one should weigh 
the evidence and measure one’s credulity on certain bioethical positions. 
For any inquiry, there is the object of inquiry, and the inquirer; both 
receive attention in this book.
Bioethics is a field of inquiry and as such is fundamentally an epis-
temic discipline. It aims to know what the right/wrong action or policy is. 
The locus of attention for this project is on the epistemic significance of 
various developments in moral psychology and contemporary epistemol-
ogy applied to bioethical inquiry. Specifically, this book aims to answer 
the following question: under what conditions is an agent S justified in 
believing that P [an act of killing a human being] is permissible when S 
is the agent of that action? Or more simply, under what conditions is an 
agent justified in believing a proposition ‘it is permissible to kill x’ when 
one is acting on that belief?
The idea of moral risk referenced in my title can be understood in rela-
tion to our typical way of using risk in healthcare delivery. Typically, risk 
is understood as roughly parasitic on cause–effect relations as when we 
say, “there is a risk of nausea and vomiting if you take this drug.” Here, 
risk is understood as a probability that a disvaluable state of affairs might 
occur. The notion of moral risk with which I am concerned pertains rather 
to the very judgment of disvalue (or value). Moral risk is a function of act-
ing on what might very well be an erroneous moral judgment. Hence, the 
first step in this project is to articulate how our moral judgments might err.
Knowing how we make moral judgments can bring into relief why 
certain arguments on various bioethical issues appear plausible to one 
2 Introduction
side and obviously false to the other. This is the first feature of my project 
that aims to make a significant contribution: namely, to cull the insights 
from contemporary moral psychology to highlight the epistemic pitfalls 
and distorting influences on our apprehension of value.
A second contribution of my project is to collate the lessons learned 
from the epistemological literature addressing moral risk (cf. Fantl & 
McGrath, 2009), the nature of presumptions in argument (Freeman, 
2005), and the epistemic significance of peer disagreement (Christensen, 
2011; Elga, 2007) to justify what I refer to as epistemic diffidence on 
numerous bioethical issues. The notion of moral risk and the signifi-
cance of peer disagreement are simple to understand and that they exert 
epistemic effects is clear in many cases (consider the stronger standard 
of evidence for criminal cases versus civil cases). The difficult project is 
explaining why risk and disagreement exert epistemic effects at all.
The first two contributions together justify epistemic diffidence when 
one is considering harming or killing human beings. The cost of being 
wrong that ‘killing a human being is permissible’ is high; it is subject to 
peer disagreement, and it is doubtful that, given the evidence from the 
cognitive sciences, we should be so trustful of our moral intuitions (or 
the post-hoc reasoning justifying those intuitions (Haidt, 2001)). Beliefs 
subject to epistemic diffidence should not be acted upon.
The argument I wish to defend in this book may be understood in 
outline as follows:
1 The belief B that ‘x is permissible,’ where x is an act of intentional 
killing or harming of a human being, is subject to epistemic diffidence. 
(Hereafter, ‘x’ is a variable only for the issues I discuss in this work.)
A belief B is subject to epistemic diffidence if and only if:1
  i B suffers from an undercutting defeater or is unstable (both 
notions explained below),
 ii The justification for B does not offset the cost of being wrong, 
and
iii The justification for B does not discharge the effects of peer disa-
greement.2
2 If B is subject to epistemic diffidence, it would be impermissible to act 
on that belief.
3 Therefore, it is impermissible to act on ‘x is permissible’ where x 
includes the specific actions that I address in this book.
A few points are worth noting about this argument. First, the belief B is 
restricted to those acts of intentional killing or harming that I address in 
this book. I remain neutral as to whether this argument is sound for any 
case of intentional killing or harming either of a human being, or non-
human animal. Second, the dialectical work of the chapters is to justify 
that the epistemic standards or degree of justification needed to permit 
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acting on the belief that ‘x is permissible’ are not met. Third, the dialectical 
work of this book is not to argue that all things considered the beliefs 
that ‘x is permissible’ are false. My argument requires a lower horizon 
of acceptability while also arguing that one should be epistemically diffi-
dent towards acting on such beliefs. This is probably the most distinctive 
aspect of my project. Lowering the dialectical horizon is not done best by 
defending one’s favored theory, and then applying it to specific cases. The 
horizon is lowered partly by focusing on how we form our theoretical 
commitments in the first place. Fourth, the notion of epistemic diffidence 
is, in this work, an epistemological notion. The moral implications of 
it are made explicit in premise 2. As such, Chapters 2 and 3 (summa-
rized below) aim to justify premise 2. The remainder of the chapters aim 
to justify premise 1, substituting in for ‘x’ each issue – whether it is 
abortion, euthanasia, etc.
The project aims to frame both traditional and novel bioethical 
problems in light of the epistemological lessons I highlight. In doing so, 
I argue that a dialectical shift occurs to the advantage of those who take 
a prohibitive stance on the issues discussed.
Chapter 2 aims to answer the question, “How do we typically think on 
moral issues?” The chapter explicates what is called Moral Foundations 
Theory (Graham et al., 2013), which includes four theses: nativism, cul-
tural influences, intuitionism, and pluralism. There are two pericopes of 
the theory I wish to highlight in this chapter. The first is that intuitions 
come first, and moral reasoning comes second. The second aspect of the 
theory that I draw attention to is the explanation for why we have the 
intuitions we do. On this point Graham et al. (2013) highlight the impor-
tance of cultural influences and more subjective motivational influences 
(Kunda, 1990).
Knowing that our intuitions are subject to such influences may under-
cut our confidence in them. An undercutting defeater is a reason for 
thinking that things might not be as they appear (Pollock & Cruz, 1999). 
I see widgets on an assembly line that look red. The foreman informs me 
that they look red because they are illuminated by red incandescent bulbs 
such that they look red whether or not they really are. What the foreman 
tells me is an undercutting defeater to my belief that the widgets are red. 
That something looks red is still a reason for thinking that it is red, but 
an undercutting defeater renders that appearance inert to justify believ-
ing that x is red. Discovering how we morally think and process moral 
information functions in a similar way. Whether or not an action really is 
permissible, my moral intuitions might apprehend it as permissible any-
way given certain facts about how we think morally. The non-alethic 
influences on our moral perception function like the red incandescent 
light bulbs; they give me reason for thinking that the moral world might 
not be as it appears to be.
Another conclusion that follows from Chapter 2 is slightly weaker but 
still sufficient for my purposes. One could say that upon taking seriously 
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the empirical evidence outlined in Chapter 2 one’s noetic system suffers 
no defeater at all, undercutting or otherwise. The evidence does, however, 
render one’s noetic system more easily destabilized by defeaters highlighted 
in later chapters. Consider an analogy with an unruptured brain aneurysm 
(BA). An unruptured BA does not cause any deleterious health effects, 
but the health situation of the person who has one is more easily desta-
bilized. Something as simple as elevated blood pressure can rupture the 
BA. Likewise, the evidence canvassed in Chapter 2 might not cause any 
deleterious epistemic effects, but the justification one has for her beliefs 
is more easily destabilized – even by somewhat weak defeaters such as 
peer disagreement.
So Chapter 2 does not argue for moral skepticism. Chapter 3, how-
ever, acuminates our reasons for epistemic diffidence based on concrete 
dialectical engagements. I argue for a local skepticism based on two fea-
tures of these engagements: the cost of being wrong in one’s judgment 
that a particular action is permissible to perform, and the epistemic pres-
sure that peer disagreement exerts on my moral beliefs. Why there is such 
‘pressure’ is explained with reference to intellectual virtues.
The previous two chapters present an argument for epistemic diffi-
dence in high-stakes cases based on how we typically think on moral 
issues, and the justifiable doubt we should have for our own views in 
the setting of peer disagreement. In contemporary bioethics, however, 
it is far from innocuous and picayune to suppose that the cost of being 
wrong that, for example, ‘abortion is permissible’ is a high-stakes belief 
that justifies epistemic diffidence. To that end, the next two chapters 
argue that the costs in being wrong about the permissibility of killing any 
human being are asymmetrical – the costs are on the side of thinking that 
such actions are permissible. Specifically, the costs of being wrong that 
abortion, or any other act of killing a human being, is permissible are 
sufficient to justify epistemic diffidence.
Chapter 4 argues that you and I are individual human substances that 
come into existence at conception. But do we have intrinsic dignity? Are 
we valuable at every point in our existence? More to the point, is it per-
missible to kill us intentionally? – pollarding away complications such as 
capital punishment and just war. In Chapter 5 I argue that human beings 
do have intrinsic dignity. If you and I have intrinsic dignity at every point 
in which we exist, then a lot is at stake when one considers intentionally 
killing or harming you or me.
The first part of the book argues for epistemic diffidence in relation 
to actions intended to kill or harm human beings. Epistemic diffidence, 
if justified, means that there are insufficient reasons for acting on a belief 
that x is permissible, where x is an act of killing/harming a human being. 
The reason: the cost of being wrong is irrecusable.
The dialectical goal of Chapter 6 is to defend premise 1 substituting 
in for ‘x’ the act of direct abortion. To this end I outline two principal 
arguments in support of direct abortion. I consider in detail the argument 
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from bodily rights (Thomson, 1971; Boonin, 2002). Arguments based 
on personhood (Warren, 1973; McMahan, 2002) are addressed in 
Chapter 4. I argue that none of the arguments exceed a threshold of 
justification that would override the epistemic diffidence we should 
have towards killing human life.
The goals of Chapter 7 are to address the four principal arguments 
used in support of human destructive stem cell research. The four argu-
ments are the argument from twinning (Persson, 2009; and DeGrazia, 
2006), totipotency (Smith and Brogaard, 2003), rescue cases (Sandel, 
2005), and natural loss (Ord, 2008; McMahan, 2007). The conclusion 
in this chapter is the same as in the previous one. I argue that none of 
the arguments exceed a threshold of justification that would override the 
epistemic diffidence we should have towards killing human life.
Pro-euthanasia arguments fall into two broad camps: those that argue 
for the normativity of personal or subjective features of a patient – i.e., 
arguments from autonomy (Brock, 1992; Jackson & Keown, 2012); and 
those that argue for the normativity of objective features – such as the 
avoidance of unnecessary suffering (Rachels, 1986; Jackson & Keown, 
2012). As in the previous chapter, I argue that premises 1 and 2 are true 
when substituting in for x, “euthanasia is permissible.”
In the third part of the book, I turn to address more specific clini-
cal scenarios wherein the values of dignity and autonomy can encounter 
axiological friction. I focus on clinical and research ethics cases where 
the same themes of moral risk arise. The first clinical scenario concerns 
end-of-life decision-making for those patients who suffer suppressed 
consciousness, for example, patients in a minimally conscious state.
My thesis in this chapter is that there exists a disability bias against 
those who may be severely disabled. This is a bias because those who 
become severely disabled rate their own quality of life (QoL) at or just 
slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source 
of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. 
I argue that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the mini-
mally conscious state (MCS). For rather simple means of sustaining an 
MCS patient’s life (for example, tube feeding), the cost of being wrong 
that the patient would not want further support is high. Pair this cost with 
the reason to be skeptical of third-person judgments, and my argument 
suggests not withholding food and water from MCS patients.
The prevailing orthodoxy in terms of competency assessment is to test 
for the presence of certain abilities. Chapter 10 argues that the presence 
of certain abilities is not enough in cases where the patient refuses a life-
sustaining/saving measure that promises to work and does not present 
obviously onerous burdens. In such cases, the push and pull between 
dignity and autonomy is most palpable. I argue, however, that we need 
to know whether the patient has rendered a competent refusal of such 
measures. Whereas the former refers us to test for certain abilities, the 
latter refers us to assess the quality of one’s judgment. I argue that, 
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for competent adults (i.e., intact abilities), who refuse means of saving 
or sustaining their lives with manageable burdens, a higher degree of 
justification is needed to honor such refusals. Unless such justification 
is present, we should have epistemic diffidence for the belief that their 
refusals represent the patient’s stable self.
There are few challenges to research when the subjects are competent 
and the research presents more than minimal risk with no promise of 
direct benefit. The principal reason for allowing such research is that we 
should respect the autonomy of competent subjects. In the final chapter 
I argue that we have additional moral intuitions stemming from com-
mutative justice. I argue that concerns generated by commutative justice 
serve as an additional criterion for assessing permissible research. My 
argument aims to justify having epistemic diffidence for the claim that 
“risky research is permissible because the subjects consented to it.” To 
this end, I highlight our intuitions informing this notion of commutative 
justice and conclude that all human subjects who are exposed to more 
than minimal-risk research should enjoy the same protections as those 
given subjects who cannot consent (e.g., children).
A concluding chapter summarizes the dialectical territory covered. The 
advance this project makes is to mine findings in recent moral psychology 
and epistemology to the effect that even if one achieves widely coherent 
views on an issue that involves moral risk, that is still tenuous epistemic 
comfort. That strikes me as a bold conclusion, but I offer what I see as 
plausible reasons for it. The feature that makes it bold, however, is also 
the feature that makes it ecumenical. I resist placing too many theoretical 
demands on my interlocutors. To take one example, my readers need not 
subscribe to a substance view of the person vis-à-vis the abortion issue 
to appreciate the force of my argument. It is enough for my purposes to 
argue that such a view is plausible enough to set the presumptions of that 
dialectical exchange, and that those who hold such a view can function 
as epistemic peers with whom one may disagree. This is enough, I argue, 
to motivate diffidence in the setting of moral risk.
Notes
1 In making these jointly sufficient and necessary conditions, I am raising the 
bar for my argument. It is plausible that there are weaker conditions such that 
(2) remains plausible as well. The Radiology case (Chapter 3) might illustrate 
how satisfying condition (iii) and (ii) is sufficient to make (1) and (2) true. 
Conditions (i) and (ii) might be sufficient for diffidence if one thinks that her 
beliefs might suffer from one of the biases explained in Chapter 2.
2 If peer disagreement is evidence for one having made a performance error, 
which provides an undercutting defeater, condition (i) is redundant given (iii). 
In some circumstances I would agree. But my virtue interpretation of disagree-
ment’s effects does not entail that disagreement is an undercutting defeater. No 
doubt, (i)–(iii) are related, but my task does not require disaggregating them. It 




The Perception of Value, Persons, and 
Human Worth

2 Moral Inquiry and the 
Apprehension of Value
When we think about moral issues and what is right and wrong, we have 
to address how we apprehend moral values. As such, in the first section 
I discuss the idea of moral perception, particularly how that perception 
is motivated. Moral perception is a cognitive faculty in that it is oriented 
towards generating beliefs, or cognitive contact with moral values.1 As 
with any cognitive faculty, a question in epistemology is whether that 
faculty is reliable. Does it function well? Does it put our minds in con-
tact with the reality it is meant to apprehend? Answering these questions 
meets what’s called the problem of epistemic circularity. The basic idea, 
explained in more detail below, is that we cannot prove the reliability of 
a faculty without using the very outputs of that faculty. We can take our 
faculties to be reliable but we can never prove them to be so. This by itself 
does not justify skepticism, but it does if we have reason for thinking 
that our faculties are in what Bergmann (2004) refers to as a questioned-
source context. The empirical research on moral cognition reveals that 
our moral perception is prey to a number of influences that would render 
them unreliable. Thus, in the second section, I discuss the problem of 
epistemic circularity and in the third section I discuss the evidence for 
distrusting our moral perception. The conclusion reached at the end of 
this chapter is that we have reasons for questioning the reliability of our 
moral perception in certain contexts. The next chapter argues that the 
scope of epistemic diffidence includes judgments on controversial issues 
with high costs in being wrong. One could understand this chapter as 
arguing for diffidence in regard to our moral faculties; and the next as 
imputing diffidence to specific justifications for our moral beliefs.
Motivated Cognition, Attention, and Moral Perception
Cognitive processing is a motivated activity in the sense that it is a goal-
directed activity. This is true for perceptual judgments as well as other more 
extended processing such as scientific inquiry. The evidence of inatten tional 
blindness (Mack & Rock, 2000; Pashlar, 1999) and change blindness 
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(Rensink, O’Reagan, & Clark, 1997) suggests that perceptual knowledge 
cannot be obtained apart from attention. Attention is the directed allo-
cation of cognitive resources to process fully a stimulus, and attentional 
processes are motivated. “The idea that attention is motivated . . . is not 
new in psychology, nor is the view that limbic and subcortical emotional 
processes play a role in directing attention” (Ellis, 2001, 299). Conversely, 
inattentional blindness is the phenomenon of agents not seeing (or hearing) 
what is clearly within one’s visual (or auditory) field and this is because one 
is not motivated to process the stimuli – attention is not directed to process 
the visual/auditory information. Change blindness refers to one’s inabil-
ity to detect rather obvious changes in scenes suggesting that memorial 
encoding requires attention as well. And, attention is a motivated activ-
ity even if it is not a consciously motivated activity (Chartrand & Bargh, 
2002). I defended this view in Napier (2008)2 and it is summarized as fol-
lows. Attention is an act in the sense that there is an allocation of cognitive 
resources, and such an allocation is goal directed. Attention is motivated 
(Ellis, 2001, 2005) and perception depends on attentional resources. Thus 
attention is required for perceptual knowledge. Attention is a function 
of an agent’s motivations. Therefore perceptual knowledge is a function of 
one’s motivations. This view is compatible with and relies on the empiri-
cal fact that much of perceptual processing takes place without conscious 
awareness. Information that ‘makes it’ to consciousness is a function of the 
motivational goals of the agent.
It is, of course, not necessary to grant that all perceptual processing is 
motivated to grant that moral perception is. Moral perception is subject 
to attentional effects and is thereby a motivated activity as illustrated by 
Lawrence Blum (1994).
John and Joan are riding in a subway train, seated. There are no 
empty seats and some people are standing; yet the subway car is not 
packed so tightly as to be uncomfortable for everyone. One of the 
passengers standing is a woman in her thirties holding two relatively 
full shopping bags. John is not particularly paying attention to the 
woman, but he is cognizant of her. Joan, by contrast, is distinctly 
aware that the woman is uncomfortable.
(Blum, 1994, 31–32)
Here are two people who have the same visual abilities, are situated alike 
in the same environment, but only for Joan are the moral aspects of the 
situation salient because she attends to them. Blum remarks that what is 
salient for John is simply that there is a woman who is standing holding two 
bags; what is salient for Joan is that she is standing holding two bags, and 
is uncomfortable. “John misses something of the moral reality confronting 
him” (Blum, 1994, 33) whereas Joan discerns what is morally salient in 
her environment. Blum’s basic point is that there is such a thing as moral 
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perception,3 according to which one is able to have an apprehension of 
value and disvalue in the world. Joan sees what is morally salient in her envi-
ronment, John does not and the difference is likely traceable to differences 
in motivational and emotional dispositions. John suffers an inattentional 
moral blindness if you will. Margaret Olivia Little is explicit on this point. 
She states, “The extent to which one actually cares about and is responsive 
to moral ends . . . has enormous impact on how accurately and reliably one 
sees the moral landscape . . .” (Little, 1995, 123). Of course, the apparatus 
of attention for moral stimuli is different than perceptual stimuli. For per-
ceptual stimuli it may involve eye gaze, whereas for moral content, one may 
need emotional sensitivity (Blair & James, 1995; and Lacewing, 2015) and 
motivations which may be a function of one’s overall ideological orienta-
tion (Haidt, 2012; Gilovich, 1991). Consequently, what we attend to is a 
function of what value commitments we already have; and conversely, what 
we may miss is a function of what we do not value.
I emphasize the idea of moral perception being motivated because 
most of our moral judgments begin with a basic perception of value. 
Moral perception is the faculty that disposes one to apprehend values/
disvalues in one’s environment. There is a priority to moral perception in 
generating our moral judgments. On this point there seems to be much 
agreement. Describing the epistemic deficiencies of a Vulcan (a fictional 
character from Star Trek who reasons well, but has sublimated their 
emotional capacities) David Pizarro writes that “while the Vulcan might 
be capable of making accurate moral judgments based on the applica-
tion of principles, the Vulcan may not always know when a moral event 
is taking place” (Pizarro, 2000, 371). Ishtiyaque Haji recapitulates the 
same idea while commenting on Aristotle’s virtue-theoretic account of 
moral perception. For Aristotle, discernment of moral values in discrete 
circumstances rests with perception (1109b23). Haji explains,
We cannot, for instance, decide whether to help someone unless we 
notice that she is in need, and we perceive that because she is in need, 
she ought to be helped. In this manner, in practical reasoning how 
we perceive the situation has priority over what we decide or what 
choices we make.
(2010, 138)
Nancy Sherman, also commenting on Aristotle, makes a general point 
about the conditions for making moral judgments, and endorses the pri-
ority of moral perception as well. She notes that “an ethical theory that 
begins with the justification of a decision to act begins too far down the 
road. Preliminary to deciding how to act, one must acknowledge that 
the situation requires action” (Sherman, 1991, 29). And recognizing 
that the situation requires action cannot be but the work of perception. 
One may extend the same point to the recognition of a moral principle 
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as being moral. Noticing the difference in content between the princi-
ples ‘do no harm’ and ‘never conclude the consequent when denying the 
antecedent’ is a function of moral recognition.4
My understanding of moral perception shares features with Charles 
Starkey (2006) but departs in instructive ways. Starkey is correct to reject 
definitions of moral perception that focus on the specific contents of 
one’s moral judgments. He eventually defines moral perception as “mor-
ally appraisable perceptual apprehension” (Starkey, 2006, 88). Where I 
depart from Starkey is that he is still trying to define moral perception with 
reference to discrete instances of it, namely, instances of perceptual appre-
hension and not with reference to a cognitive faculty or ability. Moral 
perception on my view is a cognitive faculty, an ability to apprehend moral 
values in one’s environment – it can be reliable or unreliable. Starkey’s 
definition leads him to say, “failing to perceive can be morally appraisable 
and is thus a form of moral perception” (Starkey 2006, 90). It seems clear 
to me, however, that not having a moral perception cannot be a form of 
moral perception. One might criticize another agent for not having a moral 
perception in response to a discrete morally charged circumstance – and 
that criticism itself may be a function of the critic’s moral perception. But 
if we keep straight which agent is having (or not having) the perception, 
not perceiving values in one’s environment when one should is still not an 
instance where moral perception is functioning. Not perceiving a real rab-
bit out in my yard is not a form of visual perception, it is an absence of it.
The Problem of Epistemic Circularity
The reason it is important to highlight the priority of perception is 
because moral perception is a basic source of knowledge. It is a cognitive 
faculty that is basic insofar as moral reasoning depends on it, but moral 
perception does not depend on some other faculty.5 This is not to say 
that in order to apprehend battery on a street corner late one evening I 
do not need functional visual capacities. Of course I do. What it means 
is that for the moral judgment, I need functional moral perception. The 
point is simply that we have numerous cognitive faculties, such as rea-
soning, visual perception, auditory perception, memory, etc.6 When we 
form beliefs, we do so as a function of the cognitive faculty that produces 
that belief type. Without, for example, a visual system like humans have, 
we could not form visual beliefs. Some synesthesiacs can be said to have 
acquired anomalous sensory capacities that dispose them to have beliefs 
about geometrical designs in a nature scene. Without such a capacity, no 
such beliefs could be formed without some additional technical appa-
ratus. So, moral perception is a basic faculty that disposes one to have 
cognitive contact with moral reality.
How could one prove that one’s moral perception is reliable except 
by appeal to the very outputs of that faculty? Any track-record-type 
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argument would involve circularity. To illustrate, we would not rely on 
a person’s say-so that she is telling the truth if it is an open question 
whether she is or not. As Baron Reed (2006, 186) notes succinctly, “no 
customer would ever ask a used car salesman if he is honest.” Taking 
him at his word, when whether he is telling the truth is in question, is 
clearly circular – it begs the very question at stake. The same idea can be 
applied to one’s own justification that her cognitive faculties are reliable. 
One may just assume that they are reliable. My question is what would 
be the justification for their reliability? Take a particular faculty labelled 
F1. Again, Reed explains,
In order to know that F1 is a reliable source of knowledge, S will 
have to use either F1, or another faculty. But if S uses F1 his belief 
that F1 is reliable will be epistemically circular. So, S must instead 
use (say) F2. But S should not use F2 unless she knows that it is a reli-
able source of knowledge itself. In order to come to know this, S will 
have to use F2, or some other faculty. But S cannot use F2 on pain 
of epistemic circularity. And S cannot use F1, without first knowing 
that it is a reliable source of knowledge, which is still in question.
(Reed, 2006, 187)
One can see here three options looming: there is either an infinite regress, 
a circular justification, or we embrace externalism according to which 
what matters is that the faculty is actually reliable, not whether I can 
provide noncircular justification that it is reliable. Though I harbor sym-
pathies with externalism, none of these options is fully attractive. For 
externalism, my beliefs arising from a faculty F are justified if F is actually 
reliable. But as Alston observes, externalism cannot tell us whether or not 
a practice like crystal ball gazing is reliable (Alston, 1991, 148). When we 
are interested in discriminating which epistemic faculties or practices are 
reliable, externalism cannot give an answer. The argument from epistemic 
circularity means only to show that we cannot have any noncircular rea-
son for thinking that our moral perception is rightly attuned. Wholesale 
skepticism does not necessarily follow, but it makes it easier to mount an 
argument for local skepticism since we have no justification for reliability.
Our epistemic diffidence in trusting our faculties/practices becomes 
live when one is in what Bergmann (2004) refers to as a questioned-
source context. “A context in which epistemic circularity is a bad thing 
is one in which the subject begins by doubting or being unsure of [a fac-
ulty’s] trustworthiness” (Bergmann, 2004, 717). Notice, it is not difficult 
to find oneself in a questioned-source context. The reason is that epis-
temic circularity has shown that a person must simply trust her faculties. 
There is no noncircular argument for their reliability. They are viewed as 
innocent, but not for any reason. Of course the deliverances of our basic 
faculties seem correct, but the very seeming that it is correct is based on 
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and is entirely a function of the seeming itself.7 Reasons for challenging 
the reliability of one’s faculty, then, are easy to come by since they need 
not offset any reasons for their reliability.
“Questioned-Source Contexts”
A key idea for motivating epistemic diffidence with regard to our facul-
ties is that I cannot look back upon that by which I look.8 I have to trust. 
The outputs of our moral faculties may look unproblematic to us; but of 
course they would even if they were unreliable. Leibniz gives the exam-
ple of the Caribs – who made their children fat so that they could eat 
them – to illustrate that heinous actions can look unproblematic to the 
one who thinks such actions are permissible (Leibniz, 1996, 92). He also 
relates a story of Honorius, an Emperor of Rome, according to which, 
“when he was brought the news of the loss of Rome, [he] thought they 
meant his hen which was also called ‘Rome’; and that distressed him 
more than the truth did when he learned it” (Leibniz, 1996, 512). Leibniz 
offers Honorius as an example of someone whose moral conscience is 
obtuse. With rare hyperbole, he observes that “[i]f geometry conflicted 
with our passions and our present concerns as much as morality does, we 
would dispute it and transgress it almost as much – in spite of Euclid’s 
and Archimedes’ demonstrations” (Leibniz, 1996, 96). Leibniz goes on 
to diagnose correctly that the causes of becoming morally purblind are 
rooted in our passions, prejudices, and cultural customs (1996, 93).
It is tempting to think that someone else’s moral faculties are pur-
blind if they disagree with us, but the lesson I wish to draw here is to 
consider what things might look like from the one whose conscience 
is obtuse. Again, because we cannot look back upon that by which we 
look, the Caribs’ moral beliefs look fine when viewed through their cor-
rupt moral faculties. Any explanation for such corruption that does not 
refer to the will, one’s self-interests, one’s motivations, and one’s culture 
are likely deficient explanations. In the sections that follow I discuss 
in more detail sources of distortion of one’s moral perception in three 
broad categories: ill-motivations (internal), ill-influences (external), and 
deficient resources (defects).
Ill-Motivations
Moral Foundations Theory (hereafter MFT; Graham et al., 2013) con-
firms several important points I wish to highlight in the material that 
follows. MFT includes four theses: (1) nativism is the view that human 
development enables one to have a sensitivity to value and disvalue. 
(2) Intuitionism is the view that most of our moral judgments result from 
quick and seemingly automatic processing. (3) Cultural learning refers to 
the fact that our initial native template for moral processing is malleable. 
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Just as we are born with a certain set of taste receptors that become more 
sensitive or insensitive to certain flavors depending upon sets of cuisine, 
so too our moral perception can become more sensitive or insensitive 
depending upon culture. For example, our native moral perception may 
not see anything good about loving one’s enemies. Those who do must 
have attuned themselves partly as a function of a moral culture in which 
such a value is recognized. (4) Pluralism is the view that there are numer-
ous values to which we can be attuned.
I emphasize two pericopes of the theory, namely, 2 and 3. MFT holds 
that intuitions come first and moral reasoning comes second.9 Haidt 
(2001 and 2012) provides evidence to the effect that, on moral issues, 
people have an initial intuition on whether an action, event, or person 
is right or wrong. On my view, this intuition is the specific output of 
the moral perceptual faculty. Moral reasoning is typically hired out like 
a lawyer to defend the initial intuition or preconception; we typically 
do not reason as judges (Haidt’s analogy (2001)). What is important is 
that our sensitivity to certain moral values is basic (though malleable). 
The empirical evidence for the basicality of moral perception comes 
from what Haidt refers to as moral dumbfounding. When subjects are 
asked to defend their moral position when confronted with a puta-
tive case of harmless wrongdoing (e.g., masturbating with a chicken 
carcass) subjects are unable to provide justification beyond appeals to 
autonomy (in the case of permissive judgments) or impurity (in the case 
of non-permissive judgments).
Can our moral perception be subject to something analogous to 
inattentional blindness? To the extent that one’s moral perception is a 
function of non-alethic motives, the answer is yes. In what follows, I 
both canvass what motives may function to direct our moral attention 
to non-alethic features, and illustrate their furtive nature. The discussion 
of certain motives and how they can distort one’s moral perception is 
important for justifying that one can be in a questioned source context 
and not know it.
Coherence Motives
A putatively admirable epistemic motive might be the desire for one’s 
beliefs to cohere with one another. In certain epistemic settings, however, 
the motive to maintain coherence among one’s beliefs is a vicious motive.
Roberts and Wood (2008) discuss numerous epistemic vices many of 
which can be traced back to a motive to maintain one’s own beliefs and 
ideas when it would be rational to reconsider those beliefs and ideas. 
For example, they discuss failures of “concern to know” as being vices 
opposed to the virtue of love for knowledge. They describe failures of 
the concern to know as an “insufficient concern for truth . . . that when 
such people are given an opportunity to test their more cherished beliefs, 
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they . . . offer defenses of the beliefs that are weaker than any that these 
people would accept in other contexts” (Roberts & Wood, 2008, 170). 
Epistemic rigidity, which is a vice opposed to intellectual firmness, is 
defined with reference to motives to maintain one’s beliefs when it is 
rational to reconsider them. For example, dogmatism (which is a subspe-
cies of rigidity) is not “just strong adherence to a belief for inadequate 
reasons. It is a disposition to respond irrationally to oppositions to the 
belief” (Roberts & Wood, 2008, 195, emphasis original). Under the 
same heading of rigidity, they describe comprehensional rigidity as an,
inability to grasp theoretical alternatives to one’s own; it is the ten-
dency for the views from other vantage points to look stupid or 
infantile or uninteresting or just opaque. Comprehensionally inflex-
ible is the Freudian who can see no value in cognitive behavioral 
psychology.
(Roberts & Wood, 2008, 204–205)
Motives to maintain one’s own views in the face of rational challenge 
account for a number of epistemic vices. I refer to these motives sim-
ply as coherence motives following Haidt (2001). I begin the discussion 
of motives with a discussion of cognitive dissonance since dissonance 
typically occurs in the setting of a challenge to one’s beliefs.
We generally desire consistency; consistency between each of our 
beliefs, and between our beliefs and actions. When we discern inconsist-
ency between our beliefs or between our behavior and beliefs, we may 
experience what psychologists call cognitive dissonance (CD). Cognitive 
dissonance refers to the discomfort one feels if either (i) she is presented 
with new information that conflicts with previously held beliefs, expec-
tations, or assumptions; or (ii) she discovers an inconsistency between 
a belief and her behavior (Festinger, 1962).10 Because CD involves dis-
comfort leading to certain motivational goals – discussed below – it does 
not occur unless the subject sees the dissonant information as meaning-
ful; for example, the subject is told that her score on an IQ exam is lower 
than the person had previously believed and it matters to her that she 
think of herself as smart. We have a basic psychological drive for con-
sistency – which is a good thing. What is concerning is how we handle 
the perceived inconsistency.
There are three basic responses to such dissonance: (1) ignore the 
dissonant information, (2) find a way to reject the dissonant infor-
mation, or (3) modify one’s beliefs in light of the new information. 
Psychological evidence has shown that in the case where an agent senses 
dissonance between her current beliefs and new information (scenario 
(i)), the typical preference is to maintain the current belief.11 Why? 
Some of our current beliefs have a lot of support going for them, we 
have lived with them, we have acted on them, and we have held them 
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for some time. Fastidiously subjecting each new piece of information 
that apparently conflicts with our current beliefs is not feasible. It is not 
obviously rational either. I am well within my epistemic rights not to 
consider putative ‘scientific proof’ that there is life on Mars or conspir-
acy theories about the Moon landing. However, there are features of 
our beliefs that make them resistant to change. Some of these features 
are epistemically deleterious.
Beliefs with the following properties are typically more resistant to 
change than beliefs without these properties.
a Clear-cut empirical beliefs such as that the sun is shining.
This first category is worthy of some additional comments. 
Immediate empirical beliefs are likely the only type of belief resistant 
to change that is resistant because it is likely true. Empirical beliefs 
acquired through extended scientific study may be less resistant to 
change than ones acquired without extended investigation but they 
may also be subject to more biases.12 The properties that follow are 
likely resistant to change not because they are true.
b Beliefs that are fundamental to our worldview or belief system – since 
changing one or several of them would involve changing a constel-
lation of other beliefs (Roberts & Wood, 2008, 157; and MacNair, 
2009, 39). Furthermore, fundamental beliefs typically implicate the 
person’s self-identity (Steele & Liu, 1983).
c Beliefs that are acquired more recently (MacNair, 2009, 39).
d Publicly announced beliefs, whether shared with friends, family, or 
classmates.
e Beliefs held by one’s peer group (Chaiken, 1987).
f Beliefs which we have acted upon.13
g Beliefs that contribute to one’s self-esteem, self-concept, or self-
identity (Aronson, 1968).14 If we consider ourselves liberal (or 
conservative), we would be more inclined to hold positions that we 
associate with liberal (or conservative) views.
Ignoring dissonant new information is either benign, as in the case of 
claims that there is life on Mars, or it is clearly close-minded, as in the 
case of ignoring evidence that pharmaceutical companies bring to market 
inferior drugs that can harm numerous patients (Garattini & Bertele, 
2007; and Light, Lexchin, & Darrow, 2013). If a person ignores plausi-
ble contrary new information, she may do so to protect her beliefs from 
dissonant new information.
How may we come to reject dissonant new information? Gilovich 
thinks that there are usually three means by which our preconceptions 
exert their epistemic effects on dissonant or preference-inconsistent 
new information. We either “subject inconsistent information to more 
critical scrutiny than consistent information; . . . we seek out additional 
18 Foundational Matters
information only when the initial outcomes are inconsistent with our 
expectations” (Gilovich, 1991, 52), or we weigh or assign meanings to 
new information depending on whether it is inconsistent or consistent 
with our preconceptions.
To illustrate critical scrutiny, Gilovich relates a study on participants 
who were either proponents or opponents of the death penalty (Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Subjects were presented with (fictitious) studies 
showing that there is a deterrent effect on homicide rates in states with 
the death penalty, and studies showing that there is not a deterrent effect. 
Additionally, they read criticisms of both sets of studies. Both groups 
read both types of studies, critiques, and responses to those studies. For 
the study that presented evidence consistent with the participant’s view, 
the participant noted that it was a well-conducted and important study. 
For the study that presented evidence inconsistent with the participant’s 
view, the participants spent more time considering the critiques, and they 
remembered more of the facts presented in preference-inconsistent stud-
ies. Both features indicate that more cognitive resources were devoted 
to reviewing the opposing view (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Because par-
ticipants accepted agreeable views without too much critical assessment 
and rejected disagreeable views after extensive reflection, participants 
became more convinced that their view was right. And this was so even 
after having been presented with empirical evidence that in its entirety is 
ambiguous. The culprit is a cognitive motivation aimed not at getting the 
truth, but at preserving one’s preconceptions.15
The final result of the critical scrutiny is to diminish the evidential 
force of the new dissonant information. This is called disconfirmation 
bias (Edwards & Smith, 1996). What is important to note is that the 
motivation informing this end is to preserve one’s preconceptions. And 
viewed from the inside, subjects thought that they were being objective 
and rational – they reviewed the critiques and responses to each study and 
had a very coherent set of reasons for their position. As Lord, Ross, 
and Lepper point out, however, their cognitive sin “lay in their readiness 
to use evidence already processed in a biased manner to bolster the very 
theory or belief that initially ‘justified’ the processing bias” (Lord, Ross, 
& Lepper, 1979, 2107).
Similar results can be seen in studies on divorce and child care.16 
Divorced couples viewed the harm that divorce may have on children as 
significantly less than never-divorced couples. A similar difference was 
noted between divorcees who initiated the divorce and those who did not 
(Moon, 2011). Bastardi, Uhlmann, and Ross (2011) enrolled couples all 
of whom initially viewed daycare as inferior to at-home childcare. There 
were two groups according to whether they planned on using daycare or 
did not plan on it. Those who planned on using daycare were referred 
to as the conflicted group since they viewed it as inferior. Couples were 
exposed to ambiguous evidence according to which one study suggested 
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the superiority of daycare, and another study suggested the superior-
ity of home care. All subjects read both studies. On a nine-point Likert 
scale (1 = daycare far superior, 9 = home care far superior) the conflicted 
group dramatically changed their attitudes from a mean of 7.72 to 4.89. 
Across 18 subjects this is a dramatic change in attitude and this after only 
reading one study in favor of daycare! There was virtually no change in 
attitude among the unconflicted group (7.89 to 7.17). Clearly, coherence 
with one’s desires and planned behavior heavily influenced the beliefs 
one would hold.
The second means does not require further explanation; the third, 
however, does. What does “weighing” new information look like? To 
illustrate, Rachel MacNair relates a story of a nurse who is describing her 
first experience with a late-term abortion.
I was watching the doctor struggle with the cannula, trying to pull it 
out . . . I didn’t understand what the resistance was all about. And I 
was very alarmed and all of a sudden the doctor pulled the cannula 
out and there, as I was at the woman’s side, I looked down at the 
cannula and there was a foot sticking out. I will never forget the feel-
ing I had in my chest as the doctor pulled the cannula out . . . This 
sounds terribly cavalier, I suppose, but within about a month, like 
everything else we do after a while, it just becomes pretty routine and 
it has never bothered me since then.
(MacNair, 2009, 60)17
The new information here is the experience of abortion as the dismem-
berment of a human being or, more simply, a destructive act.18 The 
experience appeared to be weighed less than the belief that abortion 
is part of one’s work or that it is a necessary evil. Whatever evidential 
force the experience should have had was discharged by a preferential 
weighing of one’s beliefs against the experience. This preferential weigh-
ing is common. Abortion doctor Don Sloan notes, “I don’t think there’s 
anyone doing abortions who hasn’t wished at some point that the situ-
ations creating the demand for them wouldn’t just go away” (MacNair, 
2009, 73).19 With the settled preconception that abortion is permissible, 
the nurse and Dr. Sloan weighed the dissonant information of dismem-
bering a human being less than the weight of being employed, or doing 
a perceived necessary evil.
The motivation for coherence is usually a good epistemic motivation. 
It can lead us away from the truth, however, if we take our starting 
beliefs as infallible data that are recalcitrant to revision. Of course, some 
beliefs should be immune to revision (e.g., torturing children for fun is 
wrong), and some should not be. Deciding which ones to put on the 
exam table requires the intellectual virtue of justice (and phronesis), dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
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Self-Identity/Self-Interest Motives
Robin Hanson asks us to consider the reliability of our moral intuitions 
informed as they might be by one’s self interests.
Consider, for example, the moral intuition that slaveholders should 
protect slaves from freedom because slaves are incapable of man-
aging such freedom well. Or consider the related intuition that the 
upper class in a given society should rule due to its superior educa-
tion and intelligence. Such intuitions are widely suspected of being 
mere fronts for self- and group-interest, even when they seem to be 
quite sincerely felt.
(Hanson, 2002, 160)
Can Hanson’s worries be broadened beyond the obvious example of a 
slaveholder? The answer is yes and, in explaining why, I wish to illustrate 
two key points: the first is to argue that our self-interests can distort our 
perception of moral reality, and, more importantly, I wish to illustrate 
how these motives function furtively. It is hard to get ‘out of ourselves’ to 
reflect on the epistemic effects of our self-interests.
One important category of beliefs that are under the aegis of our self-
interested motivations are beliefs about ourselves. “One of the most 
documented findings in psychology is that the average person purports to 
believe extremely flattering things about him or herself – beliefs that do 
not stand up to objective analysis” (Gilovich, 1991, 77). I shall refer to 
this as a self-esteem bias, but it is a broader category than the more famil-
iar self-attribution bias. One important self-esteem bias is the belief that 
one is objective and open-minded. Kunda remarks that “people moti-
vated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to 
construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade 
a dispassionate observer” (Kunda, 1990, 482–483). But, she continues, 
the construction of a justification is done by selecting only confirming 
evidence for their preconceived view. The person who creates such con-
structions thinks she is being objective and thorough.
One of the more important points to note is that these biases are not 
moderated by IQ. Numerous studies confirm that the esteem bias operates 
even for those who think they may be ‘above’ such influences. The first 
type of study concerns the my-side bias. My-side bias is the evaluation or 
generation of evidence aimed to confirm one’s prior opinions or assump-
tions.20 The basic experimental paradigm asks subjects of varying degrees 
of education (high school to graduate) or IQ (low to high) to generate or 
evaluate arguments on both sides of an issue. For generating arguments, 
their initial opinions on the issue were recorded and their arguments were 
scored for the number of points made and what conclusion the argu-
ments were meant to support. The researchers discovered that higher 
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IQ students were able to think of slightly more arguments than lower IQ 
students on belief-consistent arguments, but the higher IQ group did not 
differ from the lower IQ group in terms of offering counter-arguments to 
their own opinion. That is, all of the subjects were dismal in generating 
counter-arguments to their own opinions. “Although IQ correlated sig-
nificantly with my-side arguments produced without prompting . . ., its 
correlation with other-side arguments was nonsignificant and negative” 
(Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991, 95). Perkins, Farady, and Bushey 
conclude, “in effect, people invest their IQ in buttressing their own case 
rather than in exploring the entire issue more fully and evenhandedly” 
(Perkins, Farady, & Bushey, 1991, 95). Stanovich, West, and Toplak 
replicated these experiments and concluded that the “magnitude of the 
my-side bias shows very little relation to intelligence” (2013, 259).
Self-identity biases are a preference for positions that are identity-
consistent, and a strong antipathy for identity-inconsistent positions. 
Evidence of self-identity biases comes from automatic activation of ste-
reotypes and/or negative heuristics. Iyengar and Westwood (2015) found 
that negative attitudes across ideological convictions (liberal v. conserva-
tive) far exceeded other negative stereotypes on the basis of race (see also 
Brandt et al., 2014). That is, liberals viewed conservatives and vice versa 
far more negatively than how, for example, Caucasians view African-
Americans and vice versa. Although the researchers did not measure 
response times, it is well known that emotions facilitate early selective 
attention and subsequent processing (Vuilleumier, 2005). It is also well 
known that the stronger the negative association, the easier it is to adopt 
additional negative associations, and the more motivated one is to avoid 
the stereotyped person (Kunda, 1999). Likewise, negative associations of 
an ideological position makes it easier to disagree with it (Iyengar and 
Westwood, 2015) in an uncharitable and simplistic manner (Graham, 
Nosek, & Haidt, 2012). Graham, Nosek, and Haidt conducted a study 
where they asked liberals (and conservatives) to answer a moral question-
naire in two conditions: (a) authentically and (b) as if they were answering 
as a member of the out-group would answer. The subjects were instructed 
to be as accurate as possible. The evidence was clear though surprising 
to some. They note that the “largest inaccuracies were in liberals’ under-
estimations of conservatives’ Harm and Fairness concerns, and liberals 
further exaggerated the political differences by overestimating their own 
such concerns” (2012, 10). For example, liberals believed (falsely) that 
conservatives do not believe that justice is an important feature of society 
or that defenseless animals should not be hurt. This evidence is consist-
ent with most in-group/out-group studies in that negative stereotypes and 
false heuristics cloud one’s perception of the out-group.
The conclusion to draw from these studies and from the Caribs is that 
our moral perception may be unreliable and that, if it were unreliable, we 
would not know it. Our moral perception can see everything except the 
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‘eye’ by which it sees. Biases are equal opportunity inhabitants and are 
probably more dangerous for higher IQ people who can generate more 
arguments on ‘their side’ of an issue.
Ill-Influences
The motives previously mentioned have adaptive purposes but can be 
epistemically devastating. There are other external factors that influence 
one’s moral perception.21 I have divided the discussion here into influ-
ences from close associates and influences from culture.
Friendship and identification with a community are good things, and 
our cognitive apparatus has and should conform to these more social 
goals. Imagine how unpleasant a person would be if she or he had no 
motivation to fit in or to agree with at least a subset of one’s community. 
Haidt (2001) summarizes, however, the studies on belief formation as 
showing that our desire for agreement with others exerts strong effects 
on which beliefs we adopt. Haidt mentions several examples. The basic 
experimental paradigm is that subjects are told that they will interact 
with another person and what that other person’s views are on an issue; 
or they are given a description of that person’s personality. When they 
are expected to discuss a certain moral issue with that person, the sub-
jects’ beliefs on the issue become more homogenous with those of the 
interacting person with no effect for non-interacting persons (Chen & 
Chaiken, 1999). When they are expected to interact with the other per-
son, they rate the personality description corresponding to the interacting 
person as better than descriptions of non-interacting persons (Darley & 
Berscheid, 1967). More generally, Haidt notes that the desire to harmo-
nize with those close to us is so strong that the “mere fact that your friend 
expresses a moral judgment against X, is often sufficient to cause in you 
a critical attitude toward X” (Haidt, 2001, 821).
What is particularly worrisome about this latter fact is that such 
uptake of beliefs from others can happen automatically and without con-
scious deliberation (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; and Ditto, Pizarro, & 
Tannenbaum, 2009, 311–312). For example, rude versus polite behav-
ior can be induced unconsciously by exposing subjects either to words 
related to rudeness, such as ‘impolite’ or ‘obnoxious,’ or to words related 
to politeness such as ‘respect’ or ‘considerate.’ The subjects were told this 
was a semantic test. After that portion of the test was done, subjects were 
placed in a situation in which they could either behave in a rude fashion 
or a polite fashion. “Results show that significantly more participants 
in the rude priming condition (67%) interrupted the conversation than 
did those . . . in the polite condition (16%)” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, 
894). The evidence from unconscious priming paired with the evidence 
that our opinions typically follow those with whom we associate, sug-
gests that our moral judgments can be a function of belonging and not 
the cold hard truth of the matter.
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Regarding the influence of culture, we can return to MFT. Graham et al. 
note that “the moral foundations [of an individual] are not the finished 
moralities, although they constrain the kinds of moral orders that can be 
built” (Graham et al., 2013, 65). The idea is that we can acquire modules 
according to which one gains a sensitivity to other values or, conversely, 
a culture can restrain what sensitivities one may develop.
Graham et al. give the example of Hindu children who are taught 
to bow to elders and in religious worship. The Hindu greeting namaste 
means something like, “I bow to the divinity in you.” By the time Hindu 
children enter adulthood, these salutary gesticulations translate into 
beliefs about who one honors and respects in the community. Graham 
et al. observe that “this knowledge is not just factual knowledge—it 
includes feelings and motor schemas for bowing and otherwise show-
ing deference” (2013, 64). A child raised in secular America will have 
no such experiences, and consequently no sensitivity to respect or honor 
certain people in society. Haidt relates how after immersing himself in 
such a culture – specifically the Orrisans – he came to apprehend better 
the values that his hosts apprehended. He states,
I had read about Shweder’s ethic of community and had understood 
it intellectually. But now, for the first time in my life, I began to feel it. 
I could see beauty in a moral code that emphasizes duty, respect for 
one’s elders, service to the group, and negation of the self’s desires.
(Haidt, 2012, 102)
Haidt’s conversion illustrates nicely both the foundational aspect of 
one’s intuitions and the malleability of our moral modules in light of 
the surrounding culture. One can acquire a sensitivity (or insensitivity) 
to other sets of values.22 Haidt’s is a case of acquiring a moral sensitivity 
by participation in practices indigenous to a moral culture that empha-
sizes community and human dignity (“preciousness,” as Raimond Gaita 
notes, discussed further in Chapter 5).
Vetlesen (1994) discusses at length how one’s moral perception can 
become insensitive by analyzing the moral psychology of moral failings. 
Vetlesen is concerned with limning the epistemic state of the perpetrators 
of the Holocaust. His analysis centers on the idea of psychic numbing, 
which is characterized by a lack of empathy and emotional insight to 
the woe of one’s victims. Numbing is achieved, according to Vetlesen, 
through ideology, technology, and bureaucracy, all of which were a func-
tion of National Socialist culture. I focus on ideology as that is the feature 
indicative of cultural influences on one’s moral perception.
Nazi ideology aimed to undercut empathy. Nazi doctors could adore 
and love their children and at the same time be numb to the suffer-
ing and destruction of Jewish children. A necessary condition for such 
a contradiction is a culturally accepted ideology in the background 
that engaged in what Vetlesen calls boundary drawing. The boundary 
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drawing characteristic of eugenic and utilitarian ideologies was able to 
distinguish what is in truth indistinguishable. In general, through the 
educational system, laws, and customs, all societies prescribe
a particular way of drawing boundaries between moral and non-
moral objects to its members . . . Against the background of this 
most general feature, a given society will encourage its members to 
observe that the desired and thus allegedly “correct” way of drawing 
boundaries is this one particular way.
(Vetlesen, 1994, 193)
Importantly, when a society draws such lines, perception is affected.
Perception – here a boundary exists, and this is what it contains – 
is not a spontaneous making of the individual. Far from arising 
de novo . . . perception is taught to individuals . . . Accordingly, 
society awaits and readily rewards or condemns individuals’ dis-
played ability to adopt society’s way of seeing as their way of seeing.
(Vetlesen, 1994, 194)
What our moral attention is directed to, and thus what values we can 
apprehend, is a function of the cultural and, importantly, ideological 
assumptions we may have.
Empirical evidence for Vetlesen’s reflections comes from cross-cultural 
studies on perception. Park and Kitayama (2011) summarize studies on 
East Asian and American subjects (representing cultures that emphasize 
interdependent relations and independence respectively). Both cohorts 
were presented with visual scenes involving focal objects (e.g., air-
planes) and a background (e.g., sky). Tracking eye saccades, both groups 
focused on the objects, but around 400ms after presentation Asian sub-
jects divided their saccades between background and object, whereas 
American subjects continued exclusively on the objects. In a comparison 
task, a scene with object-background was presented and then a second 
exposure was done with the background changed. American subjects 
were dismal at detecting the background changes but Asian subjects were 
exceptional at it. Conversely, Asian subjects did not perform as well as 
American subjects in identifying changes in the focal objects between 
scenes. Consequently, culture affects what we perceive, by directing our 
attention to different aspects of our environment. If it can do this for 
emotionally neutral and morally irrelevant stimuli, moral stimuli requir-
ing various emotional and attentional sensitivities would seem much 
more dictated by culture and background ideology.
The effect of boundary drawing on one’s perception cannot be overstated 
given its effects and its subtlety. It is tempting but incorrect, however, to 
understand Vetlesen or Park and Kitiyama as calling for wholesale moral 
skepticism. We are not like victims of The Matrix regarding our moral 
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beliefs. We are, however, challenged by these comments to at least consider 
our moral beliefs with hesitation – especially our moral beliefs that rely on 
boundary drawing.
Defects
Perceptual knowledge requires categorization. When I correctly perceive 
a chair, I have the concept chair. If I am to recognize a moral situation 
correctly and comprehensively, I need to have the conceptual and emo-
tional resources necessary for understanding the issue. I say emotional 
resources as well, as illustrated in cases like John and Joan above. John 
may understand what being compassionate involves, but he does not see 
the suffering in the discrete circumstances – or if he does, he does not see 
the suffering as bad. One needs what Joan has, both to see the discomfort 
and to see it as bad. Conversely, the psychopath will not see suffering 
as bad due to a deficiency in her emotional resources. So, even if psy-
chopaths have the concept of suffering, and can discern correctly that a 
person is suffering, they will not see it as bad. Psychopaths have a defect 
in their faculty of moral perception.
The kind of defect I have in mind here is like the notion of percep-
tual rigidity discussed by Roberts and Wood (2008, 202ff). Perceptual 
rigidity “is a defective perceptual disposition, but it is compatible with 
20–20 vision and perfect hearing. The deficit of versatility is categorial 
or conceptual . . . one’s perceptual acuity is stuck within certain catego-
ries, outside of which one is ‘blind’ or ‘deaf’” (2008, 202). Roberts and 
Wood relate the research by Bruner and Postman (1949) according to 
which subjects were asked to identify playing cards, some of which were 
normal and others anomalous (e.g., red seven of spades, black ten of 
diamonds). After very short exposures (28 ms), normal cards were cor-
rectly identified, but anomalous cards were also identified as normal with 
no hesitation (e.g., the red six of spades was seen as black, or the spades 
was seen as a heart/diamond). Bruner and Postman call this perceptual 
process “domination,” according to which a percept is made to fit the 
agent’s established perceptual categories. As I will explain immediately 
below, something like this happens in moral perception as well. Whereas 
the causes of perceptual rigidity on moral issues likely include motiva-
tional sources and/or emotional deprivations, I wish to emphasize the 
possible linguistic sources of this defect here.
William Brennan begins his book Dehumanizing the Vulnerable: 
When Word Games Take Lives with the following observation,
The power of language to color one’s view of reality is profound. 
In many instances, the most significant factor determining how an 
object will be perceived is not the nature of the object itself, but the 
words employed to characterize it.
(Brennan, 1995, 1)
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Brennan spends the remainder of his book empirically supporting the 
importance of language. In the field of bioethics where the ethical treat-
ment of human beings is a principal concern, the question with language 
is whether it is being used to distort moral reality through marginalization 
or boundary drawing. Important for the argument at present is that when 
perception draws boundaries, that perception itself is a function of the 
very schemas/categories which constitute the boundary-drawing ideology.
An interesting display of how descriptions draw boundaries comes 
from the libel case of Dr. Carolyn Brown. Dr. Brown was a doctor who 
performed abortions in Anchorage, Alaska, and she was suing pro-life 
protesters for libel. The reason: they noted that the procedures she used 
were so “horrible”23 that her own nurses refused to cooperate. She took 
the stand in court and was questioned by one of the attorneys for the 
protestors. She noted that she refers to the unborn human being as a 
baby when the mother wants the baby; but she refers to it as a fetus if 
the mother indicates an interest in abortion (see Brennan, 1995, 79). 
Brennan comments, “When the occupant in the womb is wanted, he or 
she is called ‘a baby’; when unwanted, it is called ‘a fetus’” (Brennan, 
1995, 79). Here is an example of perceptual rigidity according to which 
the doctor continues to see the objects of abortion in dehumanizing con-
cepts, but those who are wanted are seen without boundary drawing.24 
More recently Gómez-Lobo and Keown (2015) observe that, outside the 
context of abortion, we typically use terms such as “child” or “baby,” 
rather than “fetus,” when discussing the pre-born. “For example, we 
naturally say that a woman has ‘conceived a child,’ and we ask a preg-
nant woman ‘how is the baby doing?’ Not ‘how is the fetus doing?’” 
(2015, 51). Not only can dehumanizing language be used to draw 
boundaries, but, on the abortion issue in particular, the use of dehuman-
izing language is discriminatory as it is not used elsewhere.
Conclusion
Because the data presented here is rather diverse, it may be helpful to end 
this chapter with an example that embodies the principal points made 
above. Michael Depaul (1993) considers a fictitious character named Jay – 
a young, zealous, and impressionable man who has a romantic view 
of warfare whereby war is good because it supplies a theater in which 
courage, honor, and bravery are realized. Jay has never been in a war 
but he watches numerous movies which glorify the valor and triumph 
associated with it. He converses frequently with the “old-timers” at the 
local American Legion listening attentively to their stories of triumph 
against improbable odds. Depaul observes that “Jay is rather naïve. The 
experience . . . that grounds his view of war is very narrow; none is first 
hand, and the rest is exclusively of reports, essays, novels, and films that 
romanticize warfare” (Depaul, 1993, 149). His experience is limited, 
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and his motivations to identify with a soldier’s courage and triumph 
exert enormous epistemic effects – this is due in part to his emotion of 
admiration (Zagzebski, 2012) and the ideology he has accepted from 
his elders.
Suppose Jay goes off to college and encounters arguments for very 
strict conditions for going to war, conditions that initially strike Jay as 
overly restrictive and pointless. Jay reacts somewhat like the subjects in 
the death penalty studies reacted. Jay reads materials that rebut these 
stricter conditions – an illustration of my-side bias and coherence motives 
in general. As a result, Jay’s romantic view of warfare now takes on 
deeper and more philosophically sustained support. Suppose Jay encoun-
ters a moral principle that appears plausible, but it suggests that warfare 
is subject to strict conditions. Because Jay’s starting intuition and precon-
ception is that warfare is good, this starting intuition wins out in cases of 
conflict with unqualified principles.
If the professor who teaches Jay tries to dislodge Jay’s commitment to 
his romantic views by showing him emotionally charged accounts of the 
collateral damage caused by war, Jay remains unmoved because his sche-
mas representing warfare include valor and honor in the face of extreme 
sacrifice. He sees the sad costs of war, but not as bad; rather, he sees them 
as necessary sacrifices. If he feels pity, he weighs that evidence against the 
good goals of warfare – similar to how Dr. Sloan and the nurse reacted 
to abortion. His moral perception is such that when you show him bodies 
of dead children, for example, he acknowledges that this is bad, but it is a 
harsh reality outweighed by other goals such as defeating an evil enemy. 
Jay has a set of beliefs which have the following properties: (a) he has 
well-developed philosophical arguments against the non-romantic view 
of warfare, and (b) a host of positive arguments for his view. (Of course, 
these positive arguments rely on premises that are only plausible against 
the backdrop of his other beliefs.) Lastly, (c) Jay has an explanation for 
why his opponents arrived at the beliefs they have – he has a hermeneutic 
of suspicion. They have their beliefs because they have ulterior motives 
or are not really concerned about the real issues at hand – similar to 
how polarized disputants stereotype the out-group (Graham, Nosek, & 
Haidt, 2012). This last feature allows Jay to avoid seriously considering 
his opponents’ view further since he thinks that they are the ones with 
distorting motives.
Clearly, Jay’s belief system regarding the ethics of warfare is dismal. 
Notice, however, that he has a widely coherent set of beliefs on the issue, 
complete with counter-arguments and a hermeneutic of suspicion of his 
opponents. The principal problem with Jay’s belief system is Jay. He con-
ducted his inquiry as a function of coherence motives. His self-identity 
and schemas shape and condition his moral perception such that he does 
not see the moral realities of warfare in their proper light. He does not 
necessarily reason badly; he sees badly. So, as illustrated, there are various 
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biases that can distort our ability to see and think clearly on ethical issues, 
these biases do not announce their presence, and they do not discriminate 
in terms of IQ.
The purpose of this chapter is to motivate the position that our moral 
per ception suffers an undercutting defeater or that beliefs produced by it 
are more easily destabilized. How so? If there is a moral phenomenology – a 
‘what it’s like’ to apprehend a state of affairs as valuable (or disvaluable) – 
that phenomenology would be the same whether or not that state of affairs 
really is valuable (or disvaluable). More succinctly stated: I could be wrong 
about the true value of a putative human being, for example, and things 
would look just the same nonetheless; just as the widgets would look red 
even if they were not.
The conclusion reached is that we need to be skeptical of our precon-
ceptions and our initial responses to moral argument. Why? Our moral 
perception is fragile in that it is susceptible to distorting influences – not 
all of our motivations, emotional sensitivities, and uses of language are 
ordered to obtain the truth. I am not suggesting that we hold with suspicion 
our judgment that torturing cats is wrong. Rather, the evidence suggests 
that we are in a questioned source context on issues involving rational 
disagreement. In the next chapter I discuss why the scope of epistemic dif-
fidence is local and not ubiquitous. This localizing involves a discussion of 
peer disagreement and moral risks.
Notes
 1 The phrase ‘cognitive contact’ is from Zagzebski’s (1996) helpful definition of 
knowledge as involving cognitive contact with reality. The notion of cognitive 
contact remains neutral about whether this contact is mediated by propositions 
or experience. See Sayre (1998) for extensive discussion of the latter option.
 2 My view shares features with Ellis (2005) and Noë (2004).
 3 Throughout I hold that moral intuitions are specific outputs of moral percep-
tion where moral perception is understood as a faculty. See further discussion 
below.
 4 See Chappell (2008) and Audi (2013) for further discussion. Chappell 
explores the boundaries of moral perception nicely and there appears to be 
little disagreement in the literature concerning her project.
 5 This is not to say that moral perception is not multi-modal. The emotion of 
compassion, for instance, may be required to see the suffering of others as 
bad; the emotion of anger may be required to see injustices, etc. To illustrate 
the idea of basicality, a psychopath who has deficiencies in empathy simply 
does not apprehend the suffering of others as bad. And there is really no 
way to get her to have such an apprehension without some form of rational-
emotive therapy or something else. This hardly entails, however, that all moral 
perception is reducible to the emotion of empathy. The point in the text is 
only about the basicality of moral perception.
 6 The question of individuating or identifying faculties is viewed by some as a 
hopeless endeavor. The idea is that whether a faculty turns out to be reliable 
or not depends not on the faculty type per se, but on the beliefs we include in 
the reference class. For example, if we include only human perceptual beliefs 
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formed at long distances in sub-optimal conditions, we are not going to judge 
perception to be reliable; and vice versa for short distances under optimal 
conditions. So, how we carve up the perceptual faculty determines whether 
we would find the faculty reliable. My question in the text is logically prior 
to the task of individuating faculties: how could we justify reliability at all, 
however we carve up the faculty in question?
 7 While I think that phenomenal conservativism (PC) is correct, PC does not 
affect what Alston or Reed or many others are saying who think that epis-
temic circularity is a live problem. Phenomenal conservativism tells me that 
my belief p is prima facie justified if it seems to me that p. The problem of 
epistemic circularity concerns the reliability of one’s faculty that produced the 
belief. A crystal ball gazer could be prima facie justified in believing p (which 
results from ball gazing) because it seems to her that p. But this does not tell 
us much. If she wants to say that crystal ball gazing is a reliable method for 
discovering reality because it seems to her that p is true, and p is produced by 
ball gazing, she is using the very outputs of the faculty to justify the reliability 
of that faculty.
 8 This is from an observation by E. F. Schumacher (1977, 44), “everything can 
be seen directly except the eye through which we see. Every thought can be 
scrutinized directly except the thought by which we scrutinize.” His point 
is similar to mine in this chapter, namely, that one’s moral evaluation of the 
world is a function of one’s presuppositions, and those presuppositions are as 
basic as they are difficult to critically assess from the agent’s own view.
 9 There is not wholesale agreement on exactly what an intuition is. Haidt (2001) 
considers intuitions as a type of cognitive process that delivers its results 
immediately and automatically (without conscious effort). Sabine Roeser 
(2011) thinks that intuitions are beliefs that are not based on or justified by 
other beliefs – if they are justified they are non-inferentially. My belief that it 
is wrong to torture children does not need another belief to support it to make 
it rational for me to believe it. Others seem to think that intuitions, and moral 
intuitions in particular, are a type of perception or apprehension of value/
disvalue (Chudnoff, 2013). As illustrated by the example from Blum (1994) in 
the text, I prefer to think of moral perception as a faculty that enables one to 
apprehend value/disvalue, and an intuition is a specific output of that faculty. 
Such intuitions are usually accompanied by a non-inferential belief, but not 
necessarily so. An abortion worker may apprehend certain abortion proce-
dures as destructive bloody messes (Roe, 1989), but judge them as morally 
permissible (the example is from MacNair, 2009, discussed below).
 10 Some theorists appear to describe the dissonance as possibly resulting from 
a perceived inconsistency between two or more beliefs that the agent already 
holds – call this condition (iii). I do not think this is a separate category from 
(i) because appreciating the inconsistency will be a new belief. Suppose p and 
q are contradictory propositions. Suppose I believe both p and q. I will not 
believe that I believe contradictory beliefs until I also believe that p entails 
not-q. The proposition ‘p entails not-q’ is the new information consistent with 
scenario (i). Of course, if I already believe all three and consider them in 
working memory, I have far deeper problems than mere cognitive discomfort! 
So (iii) is an empty category.
 11 Lord et al. observe that “there is considerable evidence that people tend to 
interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs” (Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979, 2099).
 12 Because scientific study is extended and involves many steps, a practitioner of 
science is justified in having a little intellectual humility. But this is not always 
so. See Staley (2004).
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 13 Cooper and Fazio (1984) showed that dissonance is aroused only when one 
engages in a dissonant behavior freely. In general, conditions b–f are sub-
species of condition g – dissonance typically is not aroused unless there is a 
perceived incoherence within the self, and the items that are dissonant matter 
to the individual.
 14 Aronson’s observations (1968) suggest that coherence motives and self-esteem 
motives may overlap and may even be co-extensive since the effects of CD 
only appear when there is a perceived inconsistency with one’s self-concept. 
I would still urge a third category covering cases of self-interest. Examples 
are not hard to find. Coffee drinkers and non-coffee drinkers were presented 
with evidence indicating that caffeine was associated with higher incidences 
of cancer or cardio-vascular disease. As expected, coffee drinkers were more 
critical of such studies than non-coffee drinkers. I doubt the motivation 
informing such reasoning had to do with self-esteem, but rather with their self- 
interests, particularly their interest in enjoying the pleasures of a morning 
drink. Self-interest motives are meant to cover motivations for power, pres-
tige, and pleasure; see Kunda (1987).
 15 The opposite effect occurs in cases of attitude alignment. Attitude alignment 
occurs when relatedness motives are activated – discussed below.
 16 I thank Michael Rota for drawing my attention to these studies.
 17 Quoted from Gianelli (1993).
 18 Kathleen Roe (1989) studied abortion clinic workers’ own conceptions of 
their work doing abortions. In open-ended interviews, 77% of the workers 
described abortion as a “destructive act.”
 19 Quoted from Sloan and Hartz (1992), 248.
 20 As I have characterized it, my-side bias is a species of a coherence motive in 
so far as it functions in such a way as to bring about coherence (Baron, 1995). 
But it is also activated by self-esteem motives in so far as we have an interest 
in thinking we are correct, or smart. In any case, I wish not to gripe about 
sharp divisions between these motives because such divisions do not affect my 
argument and these motives are often confluent in human behavior. I make 
these divisions for pedagogical reasons – to order the information into some 
pattern.
 21 Another word of caution regarding taxonomy. External influences such as 
that we experience from friends, associates, or the broader culture, can be a 
function of one’s desires or motivations to fit in with or identify with a social 
group. So, personal social motives can make the influence of associates and 
culture operational.
 22 Given Haidt’s description, it appears that acquiring a sensitivity to other sets 
of values requires open-mindedness and participation in certain practices.
 23 The procedure used was prostaglandin abortions for second and third trimes-
ter pregnancies. Infants can be born alive with this procedure, but are usually 
killed in utero via lethal injection.
 24 This is dehumanizing because the human being at the fetal stage is clearly liv-
ing. Prior to animation, Frankenstein is at most potential life, nascent human 
beings are at least actual life.
3 Epistemic Justification, Peer 
Disagreement, and Moral Risk
The previous chapter argued that given what we know about how our 
moral perception can function, the possibility of being morally purblind 
is a live option. By live option I mean to say that it is a skeptical hypoth-
esis that needs to be addressed since there is no noncircular reason for the 
reliability of one’s moral apparatus. I argued that our moral perception 
is subject to the visual analog of inattentional blindness insofar as it may 
be a function of non-alethic motives which direct our moral attention to 
non-salient features. On the other hand, I observed that certain moral 
judgments, e.g., that torturing children for fun is wrong, are not suspect. 
This chapter, then, acuminates the focus of epistemic diffidence regard-
ing one’s moral judgments. The punchline is that judgments that involve 
disagreements with one’s epistemic peers and involve a high cost in being 
wrong, are the foci of epistemic diffidence.
To this end, I discuss first the epistemic relevance of peer disagree-
ment. I argue that the epistemic effects of peer disagreement (if any) 
result from an agent’s alethic motivation to conform her inquiry to cer-
tain intellectual virtues. If I moderate the credence in my belief p when I 
discover that a putative peer conscientiously believes ~p, it is because I 
want to avoid dogmatism. Conversely, if I maintain my belief in the set-
ting of a putative peer disagreement, it is because I want to avoid being 
epistemically flaccid. The intellectual virtues explain whatever epistemic 
effects disagreement exerts on one’s own beliefs.
The second section addresses the epistemic effects of practical risks. 
I argue that when a belief has a high cost in being wrong if one were to 
act as if it were true, the justification for acting on such beliefs are more 
sensitive to defeaters.
To appreciate the integrity of discussing both issues in one chapter con-
sider the following example. Suppose you are a radiologist looking at a 
chest graph and you see localized tumescence in the lower lung lobe. You 
diagnose the patient with pneumonia. You have reviewed chest graphs like 
this before and your past record in diagnosis has been accurate. To your sur-
prise you discover that your colleague, also an expert radiologist, reviewed 
the same chest graph and diagnosed the patient with pulmonary fibrosis. 
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The latter interpreted the tumescence as interstitial tissue. Suppose that the 
drugs involved in treating fibrosis versus pneumonia are significantly dif-
ferent and involve widely divergent risk profiles. Giving a patient drugs for 
pneumonia when she really has fibrosis exposes the patient to significant 
risk of harm or death and vice versa. The cost of making a mistake is high. 
On this point Richard Rudner noted long ago,
[O]ur decision regarding the evidence and respecting how strong is 
‘strong enough’, is going to be a function of the importance, in the 
typically ethical sense, of making a mistake in accepting or reject-
ing the hypothesis. . . . How sure we need to be before we accept a 
hypothesis will depend on how serious a mistake would be.
(Rudner, 1953, 2)
Finding out that your colleague arrived at a different judgment should 
give you pause in how you treat the patient. Acting on the belief that the 
patient has pneumonia has a high cost in being wrong such that it is more 
easily threatened by defeaters – in this case, your peer’s disagreement. 
Your belief that the patient has pneumonia should be held with epistemic 
diffidence. Suppose further that there is not a more fundamental way to 
resolve this diffidence. The basis of the diagnosis is a perceptual judgment 
behind which one cannot peek or get more fundamental information.1 At 
this point, the disagreement appears basic and incorrigible. Amplified as 
such, the example illustrates how disagreement with a peer concerning 
a belief B can undercut one’s justification for acting on B. Call this the 
Radiology Case.
The Epistemic Effects of Disagreement: Dogmatism  
and Flaccidity
Why does peer disagreement motivate epistemic caution in the Radiology 
Case? More generally, why is peer disagreement epistemically signifi-
cant at all? How does someone else’s belief affect the justification for 
my own beliefs?2
In the Radiology Case, you come to hold your own diagnosis with 
caution. A plausible starting point for explaining why is that you believe 
that your colleague has epistemic credentials like your own, e.g., simi-
larly attuned perceptual abilities (Myles-Worsley, Johnston, & Simons, 
1988). But this is not enough to justify why one should hold the diagnosis 
with caution. For one could just as well use one’s own belief that B as an 
argument that one’s interlocutor’s epistemic abilities are not operating 
properly on this one issue. Prior to discovering the disagreement, you 
believed that your colleague had similar epistemic abilities as you. But 
upon realizing the disagreement you have a choice to make. You could 
infer from, ‘she has similar epistemic credentials as me,’ to, ‘I should hold 
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my diagnosis with caution.’ But you could also infer from your belief 
that the patient has pneumonia to questioning whether your colleague’s 
epistemic abilities are functioning properly in this one case. You are not 
forced by any standard of rationality to hold constant the belief that your 
colleague is an epistemic peer.
If we have the intuition that a peer disagreement exerts epistemic 
effects, a plausible explanation for why is that we want to avoid dogma-
tism. David Christensen notes that the motivation behind a conciliatory 
stance to disagreement is “to prevent blatantly question-begging dismiss-
als of the evidence provided by the disagreement of others” (Christensen, 
2011, 2). Using my own beliefs to argue that others are not epistemic 
peers can amount to an egotistical privileging of my own beliefs simply 
because they are my own.3 Michael Huemer calls such a position “agent 
centeredness.” Huemer notes, that “[a]gent-centeredness seems to call 
for a kind of epistemological egotism . . . Each agent seemingly must say, 
‘my experiences, considered as such, are prima facie better indicators 
of reality than the experiences of others’” (Huemer, 2011, 24). On this 
view, how things seem to other conscientious agents provides me with lit-
tle to no prima facie justification. While I think Huemer is right to reject 
epistemic egotism, with its implicit embrace of dogmatism, the appeal is 
merely to our sympathies with not wanting to be dogmatic. But why is 
being dogmatic in this sense so wrong? Labeling a position dogmatic does 
not argue for why it might be wrongheaded. The next few paragraphs 
articulate those reasons. This is an important step in my argument since I 
consider epistemic diffidence to be an intellectually virtuous response to 
certain contextual features of one’s inquiry; one of those features is peer 
disagreement.
The previous chapter argued that the problem of epistemic circular-
ity (for proving the reliability of our cognitive faculties) entails that our 
inquiry and reliance on our faculties must proceed on trust. For Linda 
Zagzebski, however, trust is not a fallback position after seeing that no 
proof for the reliability of one’s faculties is possible. “Before we reflect 
upon the justification of our beliefs or the reliability of our faculties, 
we already trust ourselves and our environment” (Zagzebski, 2012, 42). 
For Zagzebski, epistemic self-trust is a starting point for any reflective 
activity, including the activity of discovering that the reliability of one’s 
faculties cannot be proven. But this fact leaves us in the epistemically pre-
carious position of not being able to prove that our faculties are reliable. 
The better part of wisdom is to use them in epistemically conscientious 
ways. Zagzebski defines epistemic conscientiousness as “the quality of 
using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to get the truth” 
(2012, 48). Importantly, she notes that conscientiousness is required 
particularly in cases involving extended inquiry whereby the evidence 
must be interpreted or handled carefully. She notes, “she [an agent] trusts 
evidence in virtue of her trust in herself when she is conscientious, not 
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conversely. Her trust in herself is more basic than her trust in evidence” 
(2012, 49). For Zagzebski, judging whether E counts as evidence for P 
requires a prior trust in myself, namely, that I am being conscientious in 
assessing whether E counts as evidence for P.
Whether a piece of data counts as evidence for P, however, requires 
interpretive work. States of affairs do not carry labels indicating that for 
which they are evidence. Borrowing an example from Longino (1979), 
suppose my daughter has red spots on her stomach and I come to believe 
that my daughter has measles based on that fact. Clearly, however, red 
spots alone do not indicate anything. I need background medical knowl-
edge to infer from red spots to the presence of measles. Prior to modern 
medical knowledge, red spots may have been taken as evidence for any 
number of things other than measles.
It follows that arriving at some of our beliefs is not a function of 
evidence leading directly to a belief that P,4 but it is a result of us inter-
preting, assessing, weighing, and/or inferring from evidence to beliefs. 
It is because cognitive processing can be extended over time and on a 
complex matrix of information that one has reason for thinking that one 
may make a mistake. So, when confronted with someone who I initially 
think is a peer and she disagrees with me, I suffer a defeater to my belief 
that I have handled the evidence well. Clayton Littlejohn expresses the 
point this way, “the fact that you disagree is a reason to think that you 
and Tilda [a putative peer] were out of your depths or that one of you 
suffered from a performance error” (Littlejohn, 2013, 170). And since 
you cannot provide a non-circular justification for why your faculties 
are functioning reliably in the dispute, a disagreement is undischarged 
evidence for a performance error.
This idea is confirmed by the cases used to support Conciliationism – 
the view that I should suspend or lower credence in beliefs about which 
there is known peer disagreement. Following Lackey (2010), cases moti-
vating the steadfast position – the denial of Conciliationism – are cases 
where the beliefs are virtually self-evident; viz. cases of perceptual rec-
ognition under epistemically ideal circumstances (e.g., good lighting, 
close proximity) or well-rehearsed memorial beliefs. Cases motivating 
the conciliatory position are cases of extended inquiry requiring numer-
ous inferences and/or the weighing of apparently relevant information. 
Lackey reflects on the bill calculation case (Christensen, 2007), which 
involves doing complicated mental math to determine the distribution 
of a restaurant bill between five people given that the bill total is a large 
decimal number. The hypothesis that I have made a mistake becomes live 
when I encounter someone for whom I conscientiously believe has similar 
abilities as me and comes to a different conclusion.
We are now in a place to explain why dogmatism is an intellectual 
vice. One cannot prove the reliability of one’s faculties but must trust 
and use them as conscientiously as possible. Moving from evidence to 
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belief can be a complicated matter and requires using one’s faculties in 
the best way one knows how to satisfy the desire for truth. If there are 
others for whom I conscientiously believe are using their faculties in a 
conscientious manner, I believe well to accept their beliefs at least as 
prima facie justified. The reason is that I should treat like cases alike. If 
I trust the deliverances of my own faculties, I believe well by accepting 
the deliverances of others who have the same faculties and for whom 
I believe are using their faculties conscientiously. Zagzebski notes, 
“[w]hen I am believing conscientiously, I come to believe that many of 
them [other persons with similar cognitive endowments] are just as con-
scientious as I am when I am as conscientious as I can be” (Zagzebski, 
2012, 57). So, if I trust the deliverances of my own inquiry because 
I believe that I am conscientiously using my epistemic faculties, I have 
no reason not to trust others when I come to believe that they too are 
conducting their inquiry conscientiously. “I cannot consistently trust my 
own faculties but not those of others” (Zagzebski, 2012, 56). Epistemic 
egoism is irrational, and, therefore, so is dogmatism. I cannot privilege 
my own beliefs simply because they are my own, since the reason I trust 
the deliverances of my inquiry are duplicated when I conscientiously 
believe that others are conscientious in their inquiry.5 I might believe 
that others are not conscientious in their inquiry, but I cannot justify that 
position with reference to the beliefs in dispute without circularity.
Another argument against dogmatism can be generated by appealing 
to common-sense intuition. This might be an odd claim since our start-
ing intuitions are typically on the side of intellectual autonomy. But I 
suggest that we have equally strong intuitions supporting the idea of tak-
ing seriously disagreements with putative peers. Consider a species of 
disagreement which occurs in intra-personal conflict. Suppose I believe, 
plausibly enough, that knowledge is true justified belief. I then discover 
a Gettier-type counterexample to knowledge as true justified belief. Two 
or more of my beliefs are now in conflict. I suspect that, among philoso-
phers, this is a common enough occurrence to proceed without further 
description. Notice that when one discerns the conflict, the phenomeno-
logical grip on each belief usually lessens. We become cautious towards 
both beliefs.6 We may even hold both beliefs based on plausible reasons 
and have exercised our faculties in equally conscientious ways in forming 
them. It also seems plausible that in analyzing my own inquiry certain 
aspects of it will be opaque to that reflection. The same lessons apply to 
inter-personal disagreement; I may not have access to every epistemically 
relevant feature of my interlocutor’s inquiry, and yet they may provide 
reasons for their beliefs. In both inter- and intra-disagreement, then, the 
same epistemic features may be present which prompt holding one’s dis-
puted beliefs with caution or lessening one’s credence in them.
So, using my own belief as a premise in an argument that my inter-
locutor’s epistemic faculties are not reliable is dogmatic and dogmatism 
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is inconsistent with both epistemic justice and common-sense intuition. 
The basic idea is that, with respect to the belief that is in dispute, one 
has reasons for thinking that she has made a mistake in cases involving 
extended inquiry on complex information7 and my interlocutors appear 
to be using their epistemic faculties in conscientious ways. Imagine the 
other radiologist in the Radiology Case responding to your judgment 
saying, “you must be wrong because it appears to me that there is inter-
stitial tissue!” While there is no disputing what the other’s appearances 
are, inferring from them to “you must be wrong” ignores how things 
appear to you. Consider an intra-personal version of this: after discern-
ing that there is tumescence, you entertain the possibility that it might 
be interstitial tissue instead of inflamed tissue. You would hold both 
interpretations with diffidence.
Objections
In reviewing the literature on disagreement, it appears that there are at 
least two ways to mollify the negative character of dogmatism. Jennifer 
Lackey (2010) considers what she refers to as the “modified bill cal-
culation case.” As above, you are dining with four other friends, you 
agree to a 20% tip and to evenly split the bill, which is a large decimal 
number. Suppose you do the calculation in your head. You discover the 
disagreement, and then proceed to do the calculation on paper several 
times. Lackey observes that as your degree of confidence goes up, the 
more implausible it is for you to revise your belief (by suspending or 
lessening your credence in it). On this modified bill case, I think Lackey 
is correct. Lackey is quick to note, however, that even high confidence 
is not enough to justify asymmetry.8 She states that, while one’s con-
fidence may be quite high, it cannot be the only epistemic feature that 
justifies your remaining steadfast. If it were, “this would have the con-
sequence that the hyper-dogmatist – who is supremely confident in all 
of her beliefs – is never rationally required to adjust her doxastic states 
in the face of ordinary [peer] disagreement” (Lackey, 2010, 317). For 
Lackey, the additional feature we need is that the belief is, actually, very 
well-justified.
For Lackey, then, one avoids dogmatism by actually being very well 
justified in a belief that is in dispute. Whereas I find sympathy with 
Lackey’s intuitions on the cases she discusses, I do not think that her 
arguments succeed in mollifying what is bad about dogmatism. That the 
belief is well justified must be accessible from the agent’s own point of 
view. For the question ‘what disagreement rationally requires?’ has typi-
cally been understood as a question to specific agents given what that 
agent believes.9 Being very well justified is assessed by the agent herself. 
But this does not avoid the hyper-dogmatist riposte. So long as being 
‘very well justified’ is assessed from the subject’s own point of view, one 
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can easily stipulate that she has the better justification than her inter-
locutor. Consider Jay, introduced at the end of Chapter 2, who upon 
reviewing his justification for a romantic view of warfare concludes that 
he is very well justified. He may be, and I described him as being so, 
but that hardly justifies him in setting aside the judgments of those with 
whom he disagrees. He has reasons in the form of peer/superior disagree-
ment for doubting the veridicality of his inquiry.
Related to this point about subjective justification are Lackey’s com-
ments on “personal information” (Lackey, 2010, 318).10 For Lackey, 
personal information can function as a symmetry breaker in putative 
peer disagreements. Personal information can mean either one of two 
things. First, it can mean that, in forming my belief, there are many 
tacit features, such as a phenomenological experience that cannot be 
adequately communicated verbally, or “massive amounts of evidence 
accumulated over many years that I couldn’t possibly remember, or data 
acquired from various sources in contexts that I am unable to articulate” 
(Lackey, 2010, 312). Personal information could also mean the results of 
my self-reflection on how I thought about, for example, the calculation 
of the bill. That is, it can involve a meta-level monitoring of my thinking. 
The former notion of personal information highlights the possibility of 
tacit justification; the latter highlights a monitoring procedure for how I 
arrived at my beliefs.11 Tacit justification would purportedly add to my 
justification, monitoring merely checks the genesis of my belief.12
Personal information understood as tacit justification would count 
as a symmetry breaker only if those tacit elements in fact add to one’s 
justification for the disputed belief. But the tacit component of one’s 
cognition could just as easily include, unbeknownst to the agent, ill moti-
vations, non-alethic cultural influences, or other non-alethic influences 
canvassed in the previous chapter. I agree with Lackey that there are tacit 
components to human cognition (Polanyi, 1962, chs 5–7), but I do not 
agree that all such components are alethic in nature. So, I do not see that 
personal information understood as tacit elements is sufficient to count 
as a symmetry breaker since one cannot assume that it is veridical.
Furthermore, monitoring my procedures for arriving at my beliefs 
does not necessarily function as a symmetry breaker, especially when 
I am simply rehearsing my justification. The very agent who is doing 
the monitoring might be duplicating the biases that led to having just 
those beliefs in the first place. Consider again my-side bias discussed in 
Chapter 2; when we rehearse our justification for B, we typically focus 
only on our side of the argument. Consider also Jay who may recalculate 
his moral reasons for a romantic view of warfare and meta-monitors 
the history of his inquiry. One notable fact is that this meta-monitoring 
would be done from the agent’s own perspective. And, as noted in the 
last chapter, our moral eyes can see everything except the eye by which 
we see. So, of course Jay’s inquiry is going to look veridical to him 
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since he is the one doing the monitoring. Recall also that the epistemic 
problem was not with Jay’s justification, but it was with Jay. Thus, 
meta-monitoring can be just another way of maintaining an illusion of 
objectivity. On any plausible interpretation of what Lackey means by 
personal information, then, it is not sufficient to function as a symmetry 
breaker in cases of ordinary peer disagreement.
Adam Elga (2007) proposes that remaining steadfast could be justi-
fied if one discovers that the beliefs in dispute begin to metastasize into 
numerous other beliefs. Elga holds to what he refers to as the “equal 
weight view” (i.e., Conciliationism) according to which, in the setting 
of known peer disagreement, parties should suspend or lower the cre-
dence in their beliefs that are in dispute. Elga admits that acting on such 
a view leads to what he calls “spinelessness” since the view appears to 
recommend flaccidly giving up your beliefs and not sticking to your guns 
(notice the connotation of an intellectual vice). Since spinelessness is 
intuitively an intellectual vice, it looks like Conciliationism recommends 
being intellectually vicious. Elga thinks, however, that Conciliationism 
can avoid such a consequence.
He considers an example involving Ann and Beth who have opposing 
views on the abortion issue. They have both considered the issue for the 
same amount of time, they have access to the same facts, and they appear 
to be equal in intelligence. Elga thinks, however, that neither Ann nor 
Beth should lower their credence in their respective beliefs and that this is 
consistent with Conciliationism.
Ann (or Beth) can use reasoning independent of their disagreement 
about abortion to justify remaining steadfast on those very beliefs. If Ann 
and Beth discuss claims closely associated with the abortion issue (such 
as views on human nature) and find that they disagree on each one of 
them, Ann (or Beth) can use their respective disagreements on these other 
issues as an argument that the other has made a mistake on the abortion 
issue. Elga states that,
[b]y Ann’s lights, Beth has reached wrong conclusions about most 
of these closely related questions. As a result, even setting aside her 
own reasoning about the abortion claim, Ann thinks it unlikely that 
Beth would be right in case the two of them disagree about abortion.
(Elga, 2007, 493)
Elga claims that Ann (or Beth) can set aside their reasoning about the 
abortion issue without setting aside their reasoning on other allied issues. 
And, if Ann and Beth disagree on these other allied issues, they can use 
these other disagreements to argue that the other is not a peer on the 
abortion issue.
There are two ways to understand Elga’s argument in terms of what 
justifies Ann (or Beth) remaining steadfast while assuming Conciliationism. 
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The first is to understand the inference as moving from the discovery that 
the other person disagrees with you on many issues to the claim that the 
person must be wrong on the target issue. On this first reading, what is 
justifying you in remaining steadfast is the number of propositions about 
which you disagree. But this understanding entails several odd results. 
Presumably, Conciliationism remains intact if Ann and Beth disagree 
only on a few other issues. If so, then my beliefs do not suffer a defeater 
when I encounter someone who shares radically different beliefs than 
mine, but they do when my interlocutor shares similar beliefs as mine. 
This is the wrong result. Would not each of my beliefs in the numerous 
disagreement case suffer a defeater on Conciliationism?
To see why, consider a concrete set-up. Suppose I believe that abor-
tion is permissible. I also hold to a psychological account of the person 
which is, roughly, the position that you and I do not come into existence 
until our mental capacities are exercisable – i.e., after most abortions 
take place. And I hold that account based on intuitions in response to 
brain transplant cases. My interlocutor thinks that abortion is impermis-
sible and holds to an animalist account of the person – we are essentially 
human animals. This account is based on the too-many thinkers prob-
lem and an error-theory for our transplant intuitions (these issues are 
discussed in Chapter 4). Elga would have us believe that, prior to dis-
covering that my interlocutor holds to an animalist account, my belief in 
abortion suffers a defeater. After discovering that my interlocutor is an 
animalist and can provide a coherent network of beliefs which mutually 
support a negative judgment on abortion, my beliefs retain their justifica-
tion and escape unscathed because of the number of our disagreements. 
This is the wrong result since the more one faces coherent and articulate 
reasoning, the more one’s beliefs should be challenged.
The second way to understand Elga’s justification for remaining 
steadfast is not the number of disagreements but the quality of those disa-
greements. So, suppose Beth comes to hold not-p, and not-p is supported 
by Q, R, S, and together they form a coherent system which realizes 
wide reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1979; Rawls, 1971); and Ann has 
a coherent network as well. Understood as such, there are two sets of 
problems. The first pertains to the development of one’s widely coherent 
view and the second to the finished product.
In developing one’s views in accordance with what reflective equi-
librium recommends, I may start with an intuition on an action or case 
description and proceed to formulate moral principles that would explain 
my intuition on such actions or cases (Kelly, 2008). But suppose we are 
confronted with a conflicting idea: for example, I believe that abortion 
is permissible based on a psychological account of the person, but I may 
also find intuitively plausible the key premise in the too-many thinkers 
problem. According to D. W. Haslett (1987, 306 ff.), I have what he 
calls an “adjustment decision” to make. I could either modify my belief 
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that abortion is permissible or find a way to rebut the too-many thinkers 
problem. How one makes these adjustment decisions, however, can be 
problematic. Haslett explains,
All coherence considerations enable us to decide is that the one or 
the other must be chosen, they do not enable us to decide, definitely, 
which one. . . . Because of the lack of any clear-cut guidelines for 
governing these decisions, reflective equilibria are extremely “under-
determined” by their starting points.
(Haslett, 1987, 310)
The problem is that, when it comes to making adjustment decisions, they 
are surprisingly unprincipled and arbitrary. The quality of the justifica-
tion, then, depends upon whether these decisions were made with alethic 
motivations and in light of what really are the best reasons. The point to 
make is that the quality of one’s justification can justify ‘sticking to one’s 
guns’ only if the development of an agent’s wide equilibria was itself an 
intellectually virtuous inquiry; and assessing the latter involves looking 
beyond the quality of coherence one’s belief may enjoy.
If we just consider a widely coherent view itself, we still do not have 
a good justification for sticking to one’s guns. The problem is simply 
to point out that one can have a comprehensive and coherent network 
of moral beliefs that is outrageous. The neo-Nazi view might be logi-
cally coherent but fails to reflect moral reality. Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001) give the example of the “Pirates’ Creed of Ethics” (2001, 400), 
which is logically coherent but morally outrageous. Any coherence the-
ory is subject to some species of the no-contact-with-reality objection, 
according to which one can have coherence but no belief in the network 
reflects reality. If quality justification is defined with reference to coher-
ence, and coherence is subject to the no-contact-with-reality objection, 
we still do not have a symmetry breaker with strong enough epistemic 
credibility – certainly we don’t if both Ann and Beth have coherent views.
A final problem with Elga’s proposal is the following dilemma. If I am 
justified in inferring from our disagreement on other issues to the belief 
that my disputant is not a peer on the target issue, then the relevance of 
these other issues is not independent of the reasoning one may invoke 
on the target issue. If they are not independent, it appears circular to 
use them to break the symmetry on the target issue. For then, the jus-
tification J for the target issue Ti (e.g., abortion) can now become the 
disputed claim. At this stage in the dialectic I can either use my belief 
that Ti to discharge the dispute about J, use J itself, or a further justifica-
tion for J, J-J. The first two options are obviously circular, and nothing 
prevents the third (i.e., J-J) from becoming the focus of a third-tier dis-
pute, and so on. For each justification, I have no non-circular reason for 
discharging the epistemic weight of my putative peer’s belief or I transfer 
the axis of disagreement to further justifications. If these other issues are 
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independent, I cannot infer from our disagreement on them to the claim 
that my disputant is not a peer on the target issue.
One may object to my reflections so far by arguing that, if coherence is 
a sufficient condition for being rational and how one responds to disagree-
ment is a question of how that response satisfies standards of rationality, 
then having achieved wide equilibrium suffices to discharge the effects of 
disagreement. Coherence can function as a symmetry breaker for discrete 
beliefs within rival networks of equilibria. In response, peer disagreement 
is not an undercutting defeater to one’s justification for B specifically, but 
a defeater to one’s belief that she has not made a performance error while 
constructing her wide equilibrium. It is a defeater directed to the faculty 
or agent who has the beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. A coherent view 
on romantic warfare, for example, cannot itself discharge the defeater 
from one’s peers who disagree.
Elga has not given us a good justification for mollifying what is bad 
about dogmatism. Metastasized disagreements do not suffice. The cor-
rect response to the spinelessness objection requires being clear about 
what it is to be spineless.
Spinelessness is understood in this context as a vice, a defect in 
one’s intellectual character – as is dogmatism. In this regard, Elga is 
right that, if Conciliationism entails being spineless, one should reject 
Conciliationism. Recall, however, that the reasons for Conciliationism 
were that rejecting it looks like one is being dogmatic. The values at 
stake in this debate make essential reference to the intellectual virtues 
and vices. But being virtuous or avoiding vices is not subsumed under 
an exceptionless epistemic principle or position such as Conciliationism 
or steadfastness.13 The elixir for spinelessness is to throw oneself in the 
messiness of the intellectual life and discern as best as one can – while 
seeking to inculcate alethic motivational patterns – the reality confront-
ing one. Principles are not the right tool to solve the problem; aiming 
to inculcate the relevant virtues are. One avoids spinelessness by being 
intellectually courageous; one avoids dogmatism by being intellectually 
humble and just; and one avoids both at the same time by being practi-
cally wise, i.e., phronesis. This is not to parry from providing principles 
governing one’s rational response to disagreement,14 but are reflections 
concordant with the messiness and difficulty of discerning moral reality.
So the explanation for why disagreements exert epistemic effects in 
circumstances involving extended inquiry, or inquiry that exercises the 
upper limit of human cognitive capacities, is that resisting those effects 
is dogmatic or otherwise vicious. And I have rebutted arguments to the 
effect that dogmatism is tolerable in certain of these cases.
Summary
We can now appreciate the following argument for why disagreement 
with a peer can justify diffidence. Being dogmatic is a deficiency in treating 
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my interlocutor justly. In the face of a putative peer disagreement, I cannot 
simply ignore the fact that my interlocutor believes not-P when I believe 
P, and I have no evidence (other than the dispute about P) to believe that 
my interlocutor was not conscientious in forming her belief that not-P. 
So did my interlocutor assess the evidence for not-P correctly? Who has 
the requisite epistemic credentials? Answering this question cannot use the 
very belief in dispute as a justification that the other does not have the 
credentials. Consider just how tight the circularity is: you would discharge 
the first-order dispute, viz., your interlocutor’s belief that not-P, because 
she does not realize credential C. And credential C is the correct creden-
tial because P is the right belief! One could use one’s justification for P to 
moderate the epistemic effects of peer disagreement. But then the same dia-
lectical schema is iterated for each justification. Al believes P on the basis of 
J1, Bob believes not-p on the basis of ~J1. Now the dispute is about J1; and 
so on for whatever supporting beliefs J1 or ~J1 enjoy in their respective 
noetic networks. For each belief that is in dispute, that belief cannot itself 
be used to justify that you are, but your interlocutor is not, conscientious.15 
Given the problem of epistemic circularity for the reliability of our own 
faculties, we do not have direct access to whether our inquiry is veridical. 
So, disagreement with a putative peer is evidence of a performance error, 
and this defeater cannot be discharged by the very belief in dispute without 
another epicycle of circular justification.
Of course, this is only a schematic argument that is not meant to apply 
to every disagreement. Again, the guiding heuristics are to avoid dogma-
tism and flaccidity. Kelly (2013) offers an example of Moorean rejections 
of revisionist metaphysical reflection – e.g., those who think that tables 
and chairs do not exist. The arguments for the nonexistence of tables and 
chairs are not obviously false. But a Moorean committed to common 
sense says that tables and chairs clearly do exist, therefore there must be 
something wrong with the arguments for their non-existence. If Moorean 
rejections are rational and being dogmatic precludes being rational, then 
Moorean rejections cannot be dogmatic. But they recapitulate the basic 
schema noted in the previous paragraph. The lesson learned is not that 
the schematic argument is inert, but that dogmatism and flaccidity are 
intellectual vices, specifically a defect (dogmatism) and an excess (flac-
cidity) of intellectual justice towards my interlocutors. Intellectual justice 
requires giving my interlocutors their due relative to the circumstances as 
the virtuous person would determine.
The epistemic effects of peer disagreement are a function of being 
intellectually virtuous (or vicious).16 Ignoring the epistemic credentials 
of my interlocutor is dogmatic in certain contexts. Conversely, revising 
or exchanging my beliefs every time I discover that they are in dispute is 
epistemically flaccid (Roberts and Wood, 2008). It would be epistemically 
flaccid to change my beliefs on human cannibalism simply because someone 
endorses, for example, the custom of the sea. Finding the mean in compli-
cated intellectual discourse is a work of phronesis and epistemic justice.
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Moral Risk, Presumption, and Burden of Proof
Whereas peer disagreement exerts symmetrical epistemic effects,17 the epis-
temic effects of costs or risk in being wrong plays favorites. Suppose Arien 
and Irving enter a Starbuck’s with the intention of buying some brownies. 
They are very hungry and could use a good dose of glucose. There are two 
baskets of brownies, one labeled ‘made with peanut flour’ and the other 
labeled ‘no peanut flour.’ Suppose Irving has a severe nut allergy and has 
forgotten his Epi-pen. Before making their choice, they notice that another 
patron who is overwhelmingly busy with children, inadvertently returns 
a peanut brownie into the non-peanut basket (they saw the child take it 
from the peanut basket, but this was unnoticed by the parent). Arien grabs 
a brownie from the ‘no peanut’ basket because he does not like the taste of 
peanuts. Irving, however, thinking that these are open baskets and other 
customers (or employees who stock them) can make the same inadvert-
ent mistake the parent did, refuses to buy a brownie without checking 
further. Arien’s actions seem perfectly rational, as do Irving’s; even though 
they have the same intentions, same evidence, and are situated in the same 
environment. What makes Irving’s refusal to buy a brownie rational is 
that, for him, the effects of being wrong in acting on the judgment that 
‘this brownie from the no-peanut basket does not have any peanut flour 
in it’ are drastic – death or severe hypoxia. Furthermore, the risks appear 
asymmetrical. There are no equally drastic effects in buying a safer option, 
except that Irving had his heart set on a brownie.
The case illustrates the epistemic relevance of risk. But what exactly 
is risk doing? There are basically three distinct though related epistemic 
roles that risk might play.
1 Risk might be considered relevant in adjudicating who in a dialecti-
cal exchange bears the burden of proof. The basic idea is that if risks 
are not symmetrical, the proponent of the riskier position – the posi-
tion that if one is wrong involves greater harms – bears the initial 
burden of proof. Suppose the position bearing the greater risk of 
harm in being wrong is a judgment of permissibility. The proponent 
of impermissibility enjoys a presumption in favor of her position and 
does not need to argue for it – initially. Defendants in the court of 
law, for example, enjoy a presumption in favor of not guilty; the 
plaintiffs must prove guilt. Call this the burden of proof role.
2 A risk in being wrong about P might make P more sensitive to defeat-
ers. Quite independent of whether or not the proponent of P bears 
the burden of proof, one could say that a higher risk in being wrong 
about P renders P more easily undermined by counter considera-
tions. Consider the Radiology Case again. In this case, the risks are 
symmetrical and yet the evidence for P (or not P) is epistemically 
destabilized simply by the say-so of another epistemic peer. Call this 
the sensitive to defeater role – or simply the defeater role.
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3 A risk in being wrong about P renders one’s action on the basis of P 
immoral (or insufficiently justified). On this understanding, the rel-
evance of risk has less to do with the epistemic standing of my belief 
that P, and more to do with my moral responsibility to consider the 
potential harms in being wrong about P. But this understanding can 
be split into two separate positions. On the one hand, cases where 
we have the intuition that it would be irresponsible to act on P are 
used to justify the claim that risks in being wrong about P can render 
one’s action based on P as wrong (Reed, 2012) whether the agent 
knows P or not. On the other hand, cases where we have the intui-
tion that it would be wrong/unjustified to act on P justifies thinking 
that the agent does not know P to begin with (Fantl and McGrath, 
2009). The latter position holds that knowledge is subject to prag-
matic encroachment, the former holds that knowledge is immune to 
pragmatic considerations, but our moral responsibility is not. For 
both positions – discussed in more detail below – a risk in being 
wrong about P can render acting on P morally unjustified. In some 
cases, we might know that P but not enough to justify acting on it – 
acting on it may be deemed careless or negligent. Call this the bar of 
justification role, or simply the justification role.
In complicated dialectical exchanges where risk is relevant, there is no 
reason to think that only one role is functioning. It is not my task, then, 
to specify which role, but to argue that 1, 2, and/or 3, is functioning. I 
focus on the burden of proof role throughout only to streamline the pres-
entation and to avoid cumbersome and protracted qualifiers.
For the purposes of illustration, let’s consider the burden of proof role 
in more detail. In arguments, presumptions fix which propositions bear 
the burden of proof. To presume a claim means that discussants will 
accept the initial plausibility of that claim. There may be good reasons 
for the presumption: Irving’s observation of the misplaced brownie is 
enough given the risks he would bear, even though it is statistically very 
unlikely he would select a peanut brownie. Irving, then, takes Mislabeled 
as a starting point. Nicholas Rescher comments that “a presumption is 
not something that certain facts give us by way of substantiating eviden-
tiation: it is something that we take through a lack of counter evidence. 
A presumption is more akin to a theft than a gift” (Rescher, 2006, 6, 
emphasis original). Consider an analogy: I take my perceptual beliefs to 
be veridical and I am justified in holding my basic perceptual beliefs 
unless I have reason to doubt their reliability. By presuming the veridi-
cality of my perceptual experiences, I create a burden of proof on those 
who wish to challenge that veridicality. Suppose I am informed that 
I have been hit with a painless blow dart that, unbeknownst to me, affects 
my vision. Notice that, even if it were true, I would need some evidence 
before I just suspend my perceptual beliefs – to do otherwise strikes me as 
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epistemically flaccid. I would need to believe my informant after she cites 
a few examples of error, for example. The point is that presumptions 
stand so long as there are no positive reasons against them. This explains 
how presumptions function, but what are they?
James Freeman (2005) claims that in normal discourse between two 
interlocutors, a proponent and a challenger, what gets presumed is going 
to depend upon the stage of the dialectical exchange. For example, prior 
to seeing that the parent misplaced the brownie, neither Arien nor Irving 
had a reason to presume Mislabeled. Add the evidence of misplace-
ment and the stage of the dialectic advances to a point where, for Irving, 
Mislabeled is presumed and not-Mislabeled incurs a burden of proof.18 
The notion of presumption, then, should consider the development of a 
discussion and the crucial interchanges that can occur. As such, Freeman 
(2005, 29–30), defines presumption relative to a challenger, a proponent, 
and a dialectical interchange.
There is a presumption in favor of a statement S at a point p in the 
dialectical exchange for the challenger C of that exchange if and only 
if C is obliged to concede S at p.
There is a presumption in favor of a statement S at a point p in a 
dialectical exchange for the proponent P of that exchange if and only 
if P has answered all the challenges against S at p.
(2005, 29–30)
If a challenger has no reason to object to S, given certain assumptions 
about our intellectual obligations, it is plausible to suppose that the chal-
lenger ought to presume S at p. Conversely, if a proponent has answered 
all the objections to S at p, nothing stands in the way of presuming S at p. 
The key idea is that presumptions are statements for which it is broadly 
rational to accept without explicit argument or positive reasons for them – 
relative to an interchange of a dialectic.
Notice that for Irving (after seeing the misplacement) the inquiry into 
the proposition non-Mislabeled is aimed at rather high epistemic goals. 
Irving is not concerned merely with whether non-Mislabeled is plausi-
ble enough to justify further inquiry. His goals are to discern whether 
it is certainly true; he should not eat a brownie unless he has done so. 
When we speak of a burden of proof, what counts as proof depends on 
the goal. If the goal is to justify further inquiry on an idea that initially 
strikes one’s interlocutors as implausible, my burden is lighter than, for 
example, justifying that the idea is true. In this book, meeting the burden 
of proof must give one reasons for thinking that the proposition in ques-
tion is true.
What justifies distributing presumptions unequally between a propo-
sition and its denial is the cost in being wrong in settings where the costs 
are asymmetrical – a possible exception is noted below. Whether the 
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ladder I am about to climb on is safe (to do some trivial work on my 
house) inherits a burden of proof. Aijaz, McKeown-Green, and Webster 
note that,
[i]nsofar as we are interested in how sensible it would be to climb 
my ladder, there is an attitudinal burden on anybody who takes it 
that my ladder is safe, but no burden on anybody who takes it that 
it is unsafe.
(Aijaz, McKeown-Green, & Webster, 2013, 269)
Prior to seeing the misplacement, Arien and Irving would distribute the 
burden of proof equally between Mislabeled and not-Mislabeled. Upon 
seeing the misplacement, the cost in being wrong about non-Mislabeled19 
becomes immense for Irving, the effect of which is that Mislabled is pre-
sumed and the burden of proof is on not-Mislabeled. Thus, the costs 
in being wrong about P are relevant for indexing the burden of proof. 
It is not my view that the cost in being wrong changes the amount or 
strength of one’s justification for or against P. For example, suppose 
Irving’s evidence for non-Mislabeled includes the barista telling him that 
he just stocked the baskets and that the parent’s inadvertent misplace-
ment is very likely the only one. These are still reasons, maybe even good 
enough reasons, for thinking that eating a brownie from the no-peanut 
basket is safe. The moral risk does not change their status as reasons.
How might the three roles function together? Because of the cost in 
being wrong, the burden of proving non-Mislabeled raises the strength 
of justification (role 3) required to justifiably act on it. And the burden of 
proving non-Mislabeled is incurred because Mislabled is more sensitive 
to defeat (role 2) given Irving’s health status.20
A burden of proof may exist even in cases where the costs in being 
wrong are high and symmetrical – i.e., no matter what belief you act 
upon (P or not-P) there are serious costs to being wrong. The Radiology 
Case might be an example of this but I prefer to understand that case as 
a case where risk is functioning as 2 or 3. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
the burden of proof be evenly distributed in cases of high, symmetrical 
cost. However, I do not consider in this book actions for which there 
are symmetrical costs between action A and not-A, and doing one or the 
other is morally required.21
It is important to note how my view differs from both the precaution-
ary principle (PP) and uncertainty arguments based on risk, and how it 
relates to pragmatic encroachment. To count as a PP, several conditions 
are necessary (Kramer, Zaaijer, & Verweij, 2017): (i) a harm condition 
according to which there is a possible harm to doing an action; (ii) an 
epistemic condition according to which there is a probability that the 
harm will occur; (iii) an action plan that guides actions in light of (i) and 
(ii); and finally (iv) a judgment about the force of the action plan. It is often 
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assumed that the harm and epistemic conditions are met, disagreements 
concern the shape and scope of what condition (iii) outlines. That is, the 
precautionary principle tells us that when there is a relevant probability 
of harm in doing action A, one needs to think about other harm-reducing 
actions or choose not to do A. On the issues I discuss, however, it is not 
obvious that the harm condition is met – that is the argumentative role 
of the chapters that follow. Furthermore, the specific content of the epis-
temic condition I endorse is not identical to typical formulations of the PP. 
Typical formulations will emphasize a quantifiable threshold of probabil-
ity for x (a harm) happening. My view is much more parsimonious in that 
epistemic diffidence is a function of (i) taking seriously our moral process-
ing apparatus (Chapter 2), (ii) in discrete dialectical contexts involving 
peer disagreement on issues that tax the upper limit of human capabilities, 
(iii) with serious injustices that would result in being wrong when acting 
on ‘it is permissible to intentionally harm or kill Y.’ The third feature 
allocates who has the burden of proof; thus, the justification for acting 
on such judgments requires meeting a higher threshold of justification. 
Epistemic diffidence does not follow simply from observing that there 
are moral risks to being wrong about A, one must assess the respective 
justifications for and against A.
Likewise, my view differs slightly from uncertainty arguments. Dan 
Moller (2011) rightly supposes that there are three vectors by which we 
assess whether the risk in being wrong in P would render acting on P 
wrong. Those vectors are: the reasons for being wrong about P; the grav-
ity of the wrongdoing in acting as if P (if P were false); and the cost in 
not acting on P. David Boonin’s (2002) criticism of uncertainty argu-
ments in defending abortion is that, in assessing the risk of being wrong 
about P, one is being asked to set aside all of one’s reasons for P.22 Of 
course there is a probability that the pro-choice position, for example, 
could be wrong. But the probability of being wrong applies to any other 
moral claim such as that the grass in my lawn does not have moral status. 
“Numerous arguments . . . have been offered in defense of the claim that 
nonhuman animals, and even plants or ecosystems, have the same right 
to life that you and I have” (Boonin, 2002, 314). Given the arguments, 
Boonin supposes that one cannot honestly be certain that such claims are 
false. If they were true and we acted as if they were false, we would do 
serious wrong. So, Boonin understands uncertainty arguments to entail 
the following advice: when one is not certain that P is morally permissi-
ble, one should act as if it is morally impermissible; one should not mow 
her lawn (2002, 315), eat meat, or even drive (since driving causes a high 
incidence of roadkill).
Boonin is right that, on a probabilistic understanding of moral risk, 
uncertainty arguments “must insist that the mere fact that an argu-
ment for one conclusion convinces you while arguments for a contrary 
conclusion do not, is not in itself a good reason for you to act on that 
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conclusion” (2002, 323). On this understanding of uncertainty arguments, 
they appear to require an agent to give equal weight to another’s view 
if there is a high cost to being wrong about your own, even if you do not 
find the other’s view remotely plausible. Giving equal weight seems to vio-
late epistemic integrity, and it fails to acknowledge that a person might 
have good reasons for his belief even if being mistaken about that belief 
would have drastic moral consequences.
It should be clear that, on my view, the epistemic effects of moral risk 
are not co-extensive with how uncertainty arguments understand them 
to be. Suppose I act on P believing it to be true and I know that being 
mistaken about P would involve killing an innocent person unjustly. 
Assume that I’m deeply concerned about not killing people. Uncertainty 
arguments would tell me that I should not act because of the grave conse-
quences of being wrong about P. My position is that it may be permissible 
for me to act, but the burden of proving that it is permissible to act is on 
me. Not-P enjoys a presumption in its favor. So, my view is more parsi-
monious in this sense: I do not look simply at the lack of certainty paired 
with the drastic consequences of being wrong. Rather, the cost in being 
wrong sets who has the burden of proof, but this burden can be met by a 
proponent of P if she discharges challenges to P. Furthermore, in assess-
ing the epistemic effects of high-stakes, my view requires analyzing the 
strength of one’s justification for P since doing so is required to assess 
whether the burden of proof is met. Far from setting aside one’s justifica-
tion, my view requires a fine-grained analysis of it.
On a related view, I should distance my position from what Elizabeth 
Harman refers to as Uncertaintism. Uncertaintism is the view that one’s 
moral credences, the confidence with which one holds her moral beliefs, 
are relevant for determining how an agent should act (Harman, 2015, 
53–54). On Harman’s understanding, Uncertaintism is making merely a 
subjective moral claim that an agent is morally responsible only for what 
the agent believes; “Uncertaintism implies that being caught in the grip 
of a false moral view is exculpatory” (Harman, 2015, 57). I agree with 
Harman that a false moral view is not exculpatory; but I disagree that 
anything I say herein entails such a view. (I don’t think Uncertaintism 
entails such a view either since being “relevant” to how we should act 
does not entail being sufficient for determining how one should act.) 
A false moral view is not exculpatory once one takes into account the 
frailty of our moral faculties (Chapter 2), the disagreements we encoun-
ter with conscientious interlocutors, and the high cost in being wrong 
about some of our beliefs. If, in adjudicating the epistemic status of 
one’s own beliefs, one ignores any of these three features, one is being 
epistemically unjust.
Pragmatic encroachment is the view that knowledge claims are sen-
sitive to non-epistemic factors such as an agent’s practical interest in 
not being wrong (thus, pragmatic factors encroach upon knowledge 
attributions). Whether an agent knows P depends in part on the agent’s 
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interest in avoiding the costs in being wrong about P. The standard cases 
used to illustrate pragmatic encroachment are the bank cases (DeRose, 
1992, 913).23 In case A, Kermit and Piggy are driving home on a busy 
Friday evening. Kermit has just been paid and he is considering depos-
iting the check in the bank that night. But as they drive past the bank 
they notice that the lines are exceptionally long. Kermit proposes wait-
ing until Saturday morning to deposit the check, having remembered 
that the bank was open on Saturday several weeks ago. Piggy mentions 
that many banks are closed on Saturdays. Kermit continues to believe 
(suppose rightly) that the bank will be open on Saturday, relying on his 
memory of the moderately distant past. Case B is just like case A except 
that Kermit and Piggy have a very important mortgage payment that 
will be withdrawn automatically over the weekend and their account 
is insufficient without the deposit. If they do not deposit the paycheck, 
they will be evicted from their home. Kermit recalls that the bank was 
open on Saturday several weeks ago, and Piggy mentions her potential 
defeater to that belief. Does Kermit know that the bank will be open 
on Saturday in case B? Many authors have the intuition that Kermit 
does not know in case B, but he does in case A. The explanation is 
that the cost in being wrong that the bank will be open on Saturday in 
case B is too much to rely simply on memory of the moderately distant 
past. Banks could change their hours, it could have been opened on a 
Saturday just once a month, etc.
Cases involving practical costs can be interpreted in at least three 
different ways. First, one could say that Kermit does not know that the 
bank is open in case B, but he does know in case A. Second, he does not 
know in either case. Third, he does know in both cases but, for case B, 
he needs to be certain that the bank is open on Saturday to be justified 
in acting on that belief. On this third interpretation, knowledge does 
not require certainty, but he needs to be certain that the bank is open 
on Saturday because of the costs in being wrong in case B. All three 
interpretations grant that, in case B, Kermit’s justification is below a 
threshold sufficient to justify the act of waiting until Saturday to deposit 
the check (see Reed, 2012).24 The strength of justification sufficient for 
knowledge comes in degrees; and one can meet that threshold before 
meeting the threshold of justification required to justify acting. In cases 
involving high costs in being wrong, there is not enough epistemic jus-
tification to justify acting on p, but there may be enough to justify 
knowing that p. Reed’s assessment of high-cost/low-cost dyads is that 
both “subjects have the knowledge in question, but only the subject 
with low stakes is rational to act on it” (Reed, 2012, 471). Reed and his 
critics agree that, in high stakes cases, an agent is not justified in acting 
on his beliefs with the strength and kind of justification ascribed to him. 
That agreement is the content of role 3, the justification role. I do not 
need to take a position on whether knowledge attributions are sensitive 
to pragmatic factors.
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Discussion of pragmatic encroachment invites the question whether 
moral risk should be understood as subjective or objective given the prob-
lem of indifference. Return to Leibniz’s example of the Caribs. Suppose 
a member of this society had a coherent set of beliefs which justified 
their heinous actions. It seems wholly implausible to suppose that there 
is no longer any cost to being wrong about their judgments that pediatric 
cannibalism is permissible. Of course there is a cost to being wrong; and 
a huge one at that. The most one can say is that members of the soci-
ety do not themselves think that there is a cost to being wrong, or they 
think that their justification has met the higher epistemic bar that such 
costs set. But the idea that there’s not a moral risk at all simply because 
they are certain that their judgment is permissible doesn’t seem right. 
Everyone should agree to the following conditional “if your [a member 
of the Caribs] moral judgment is false, you would be engaged in seri-
ous wrongdoing.” Hence, the presence of a moral risk does not require 
subjective epistemic agreement.
Conclusion
At the very incipient stages of one’s inquiry, one may believe P with some 
justification.
Regarding this initial entry point for one’s beliefs on a subject matter, 
Chapter 2 outlined certain non-alethic sources which can obfuscate our 
moral perception. Reasons for thinking that such sources are operant 
in the formation of one’s belief gives one reason for thinking that the 
belief is a result of a questioned source. Suppose, however, I continue my 
inquiry to defend P, much like the subjects in the Lord, Ross, & Lepper 
(1979) death penalty study conducted their inquiry.25 Here, I think I am 
acquiring supportive justification, but only by instantiating certain non-
alethic motives which inform my inquiry.
I was clear in Chapter 2, however, that ubiquitous skeptical conclu-
sions do not follow simply from the observation that some of our beliefs 
might be the result of non-alethic sources.26 Rather, in this chapter, I 
specify the properties of the beliefs we should hold with diffidence. What 
kinds of beliefs may result from a questioned source?
The points in this chapter answer this question as follows. The risk in 
being wrong in P sets a higher burden of proof or bar of justification on 
P, or belief in P becomes more sensitive to defeaters (i.e., the bank might 
be closed, you saw only one brownie get misplaced). If a burden of proof 
is incurred, it requires a detailed assessment of one’s justification for P. 
Importantly, such justification will be undercut by whatever justification 
there is that P is a function of a questioned source. The reason is that, if 
S judges that S has met the burden of proof, S is using the very faculty 
she may have reason for questioning. And, S has reasons for questioning 
its reliability in certain settings of peer disagreement. Peer disagreement 
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on issues that exercise the upper limit of human capacity gives one reason 
for thinking she has made a performance error. The intellectually vir-
tuous person would tailor her doxastic commitments according to an 
honest assessment of this possibility for her and others. This assessment 
would involve epistemic humility regarding one’s own capacities vis-à-vis 
the domain/issue in question, and epistemic justice in regard to others’ 
inquiry on the domain/issue in question.
Many of the issues discussed in this book involve intentionally kill-
ing human beings. If one thinks that doing so is permissible, there is a 
high cost in being wrong about such a judgment. But that itself is not 
a theory-neutral assessment of the dialectical situation in contemporary 
bioethics. The next two chapters argue that killing human beings at any 
stage in their development is a morally risky activity. The next chapter 
considers arguments to the effect that you and I come into existence 
early enough to be killed by abortion or embryo-destructive research, 
and in cases of covert or suppressed consciousness. And the chapter that 
follows argues that such killing is morally problematic. The two chap-
ters taken together set the burden of proof on those who think that such 
killings are permissible.
Notes
 1 Suppose that a lung biopsy is not indicated given how small the abnormality 
is and that a transbronchial scope will not go deep enough into the alveolae 
where the abnormality resides.
 2 To avoid confusion below, I should be clear about my view since it is not 
co-extensive with current positions. I do not think peer or even superior dis-
agreement should lead to suspending my belief or lessening my credence in 
it in all cases. So, I do not endorse Conciliationism as it has typically been 
understood. Following Jennifer Lackey (2010, 302), Conciliationism (and its 
corollary Steadfastness) have typically been understood as conjoined with a 
Unity thesis according to which the epistemic effects of peer disagreement are 
the same in all circumstances. I reject the Unity thesis largely on the grounds 
Lackey canvasses. Though, for reasons I address below, I do not hold to her 
justificationist view full stop. Thomas Kelly (2008 and 2013) recommends 
understanding peer disagreement as one piece of one’s total evidence. For 
Kelly, encountering peer disagreement may involve no belief revision at all, 
since one’s total evidence may still rationally support one’s original belief. It 
could also justify reducing one’s credence in the disputed belief, suspending 
the disputed belief, or changing the disputed belief. For my purposes in this 
book, my virtue account is compatible with Kelly’s in that beliefs with a high 
cost in being wrong are more sensitive to defeaters. Peer disagreement in the 
setting of high costs in being wrong injects enough reason for caution, even 
on the total evidence view.
 3 The fact that we are agents with a distinct will means that we can only take 
responsibility over our own epistemic house; my beliefs are mine, not some-
one else’s. The implication of this rather banal observation, however, is that 
some privileging of my own beliefs must occur and it would be quite virtuous 
for me to do so. What is bad about dogmatism is that the privileging is done 
simply because my beliefs are mine.
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 4 This is true on matters that involve interpreting a complicated set of data 
or on matters that involve perspicuous perception as in the Radiology Case. 
Also, my point here is compatible with whatever position one takes on what 
evidence is, propositions vs data. Whether one holds that evidence is the prop-
osition ‘red spots on the stomach’ or the data of there being red spots, one still 
needs medical knowledge to infer that measles is present.
 5 Nathan King (2012) argues that, though disagreement might exert epistemic 
effects, we would never know it because one would need to compare, side by 
side, the character of one’s own inquiry with the putative peer. But we do not 
have access to how another person processes his information. I only add to 
this that if biases do not announce their presence, as argued in Chapter 2, we 
might not have exhaustive access to the quality of our own inquiry either.
 6 Of course, one may also double down by arguing for one belief and provid-
ing an error theory for the other. My point in the text is consistent with this 
response since one would not feel the need to inquire further and provide such 
reasons if both beliefs were not initially recognized as plausible.
 7 The conditions under which I think disagreements exert epistemic effects 
are cases involving inquiry that exercise the upper limit of human cognitive 
capacity. So, extended inquiry on complex information is one species, but 
looking at X-rays and interpreting ever so subtle deviations from the norm 
are also cases even though the latter is not properly an extended inquiry.
 8 A symmetry breaker (or a justification for asymmetry) is a term Christensen 
uses to refer to one’s own justification that one’s interlocutor is not a peer. 
It is a justification for thinking that one’s own belief has superior epistemic 
credentials compared with one’s disputant. For Conciliationism, the sym-
metry breaker must be independent of the specific beliefs in dispute so as to 
avoid circularity.
 9 Michael Depaul notes that “having rational beliefs . . . is a matter of one’s 
beliefs conforming to one’s own standards, that is, of believing what one 
would take to be true upon reflection. Rationality is, therefore, subjective and 
correctly explicated along internalist lines” (Depaul, 1993, 74).
 10 Lackey is explicit that she is externalist with respect to justification. I am set-
ting this aside since the question regarding peer disagreement is how one may 
rationally respond, and epistemic rationality has typically been understood as 
internalist; the subject is held responsible for how things look from her own 
epistemic point of view.
 11 Lackey’s comments suggest that there might be a third notion of personal 
information according to which the agent is simply confident and has justi-
fication for her beliefs. But I do not see how this can be a symmetry breaker 
since one’s interlocutor can realize those features just as well. This might not 
be a plausible understanding of the modified bill calculation case, since basic 
math problems are calculable by those of modest intelligence. Persistent dis-
agreement about the shared amount starts to look like an idealized case of 
disagreement and one we would likely not encounter. But it does seem a plau-
sible understanding of ordinary disagreements on complex issues requiring 
extended inquiry, such as discussed in this volume and in the Radiology Case 
which exploits our intuitions on needing refined faculties in order to discern 
the domain correctly.
 12 Monitoring would not likely add to my evidence for the following reasons. 
First, monitoring cannot yield the conclusion that my faculties are reliable 
since that would be circular. The monitoring would have to take my evi-
dence as its principal object. There are two options in this regard: I could (a) 
recheck whether evidence e in fact supports p, and/or (b) recheck whether I 
have considered all relevant evidence. Option (a) is not going to add to the 
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stock of evidence I already have, but it might take it away. That leaves (b). But 
what counts as relevant evidence is a function of my background theoretical 
commitments (again, see Longino, 1979). So, the threat of circularity looms, 
which would not add to my overall evidence.
 13 See Bryan Frances’s (2014) work, which is a survey of cases which push and 
pull our intuitions in different directions. No principle manages to capture 
our intuitions on all cases.
 14 See Chapter 10 (n. 5) for a brief discussion on the relationship between intu-
itions on cases and principles.
 15 Kelly (2013) gives a case of a Holocaust denier who is ignorant of the justi-
fications most of us have for the Holocaust having occurred. But this is not 
a counterexample directed against all epistemologists who think that peer 
disagreement exerts a defeater for one’s own belief (e.g., Thune, 2010). While 
there are problems in identifying whether my interlocutor is a peer, exposure 
to relevant facts is often mentioned as a necessary condition and it is verifi-
able (see King, 2012). In any case, Kelly’s example illustrates the fundamental 
difference between our positions on disagreement. When confronted with 
an astonishing belief or report, Kelly’s approach is to add up the evidence 
he has. That evidence will wash out whatever epistemic effect peer disagree-
ment may have, especially in cases where one’s interlocutor subscribes to an 
unconventional belief. My position is that when confronted with astonishing 
beliefs, a focus on the evidence I may have is myopic. One needs to consider 
whether further inquiry is just in the circumstances. Holocaust deniers and 
smoking-causes-cancer deniers are easy cases to reject without further inquiry 
and are not counterexamples to my view. Clearly, however, not all astonishing 
reports or unconventional beliefs should be rejected with exclusive reference 
to one’s own evidence and inquiry. Coady (1992, 190 ff.) gives an example 
of a mariner’s astonishing report that turned out true, but when the mariner 
sent his findings to the journals in his field, they rejected them without com-
ment. Given the context and information provided by Coady, the editors were 
clearly closeminded and handled the new report unjustly. And yet, they did 
exactly what Kelly’s total evidence view recommends. So, in focusing on the 
virtues, my account considers our reliability, motives – alethic or otherwise – 
etc., in assessing our own and others’ inquiries. I do not focus merely on the 
evidence for p.
 16 In understanding peer disagreement via the virtues I avoid the self-defeat 
objection to Conciliationism. Conciliationism recommends lowering my cre-
dence in a belief about which I know to exist peer disagreement. This includes 
my belief in Conciliationism itself for which there are those who disagree. 
My virtue approach recommends taking an attitude towards others’ belief- 
forming mechanism that satisfies intellectual justice. Compatible with my 
view is also Elga’s (2010) response to the self-defeat objection.
 17 Unless the disagreement is with an epistemic superior, but even here there are 
counterexamples (see Frances, 2014).
 18 It is true that Irving carries with him a background burden of proof for any-
thing that he ingests, namely, he must be sure it does not have peanuts in it. 
But because presumptions are a type of cognitive attitude towards propo-
sitions, Irving cannot presume Mislabeled (whose propositional content is 
contextual) until he walks into the Starbucks and sees the arrangement.
 19 Henceforth, the locution ‘cost in being wrong about P’ and semantically simi-
lar phrases should be understood to include an agent acting on P, or acting as 
if P were true.
 20 Suppose Irving does not witness any misplacement but considers Mislabeled 
because of a general but flimsy suspicion of quality control measures. I am 
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inclined to think that Irving may still take a brownie. Suppose instead that 
Star Confectionery (a subsidiary of Starbucks) made the news that morning 
because it mislabeled its brownies with a customer experiencing anaphylactic 
shock. With this little evidence of which Irving is aware, he should have a 
muffin. These permutations illustrate the defeater role of risk.
 21 For example, I do not discuss what is called vital conflicts (Rhonheimer, 2009) 
in OB/GYN practice in which one has an exclusive choice between saving the 
mother by ending a wanted pregnancy prior to viability or letting both die. 
I harbor doubts, however, that we have obligations in tragic dilemma cases. 
We do not have an obligation to act against significant goods. Since tragic 
dilemmas practically require acting against a significant good, we do not have 
an obligation to act one way or another in such cases – though acting one way 
or another may be permissible.
 22 On this point I think that Moller should be understood as avoiding Boonin’s 
critique given his first vector. But Moller does not tell us how one should go 
about assessing the quality of those reasons – in fairness, that was not his 
stated task anyway.
 23 Much has been written on pragmatic encroachment. For book-length treat-
ments, consult Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Stanley (2005). Important 
article-length work not discussed here is Guerrero (2007). Guerrero and 
I share numerous intuitions; my disagreement pertains almost exclusively to 
his discussion of abortion.
 24 Reed’s position avoids the problem of indifference according to which I can 
get knowledge simply by caring less. Though there are plausible rebuttals to 
this problem (Coss, 2018), avoiding this dispute with no other intuitive costs 
is philosophically economical.
 25 Kelly (2008) thinks that what is epistemically suspect about what the subjects 
did is that they privileged the initial evidence they were exposed to in support 
of their beliefs. Kelly rightly observes that the order in which one accrues her 
evidence should not matter epistemically; what matters is apportioning one’s 
belief to the total evidence.
 26 On this point I am opposed to Sinnott-Armstrong (2008, 2006) because my 
skeptical conclusions are more parsimonious and local. But even if Sinnott-
Armstrong is correct, so much the better for the sub-conclusion in this book, 
namely, that many of our practical judgments are subject to epistemic diffidence.
4 Persons and Human Beings
The previous two chapters attempted to limn an answer to the question 
‘how should we conduct our moral inquiry?’ The rough answer is that 
we need to be epistemically virtuous to counteract the motivational dis-
positions that can distort our moral perception and to prevent reasoning 
like a lawyer instead of a judge (Haidt, 2001). Global skepticism does 
not necessarily follow, but local skepticism does when I am confronted 
with a putative peer who disagrees with me on an issue where there is 
a high stake in being wrong and the issue exercises the upper limit of 
human cognitive capacity. Again, I need to be epistemically virtuous 
to avoid dogmatism and flaccidity. Moral risk indexes the burden of 
proof (among other roles). This chapter and the next descend into the 
periphery of bioethical discourse and together argue that the burden of 
proof is set on those who think that killing human beings is permissible. 
I address in this chapter what is a human being and when does one come 
into existence. The next chapter addresses whether human beings have 
intrinsic dignity.
This chapter covers the topics of substance and personal identity. Any 
review of a standard encyclopedic entry on either topic will reveal that 
they are both complex issues with enormous bibliographies. Therefore, 
choices are made throughout in terms of what points/arguments I address 
in more detail and not everyone will agree with such choices. Views I 
choose for consideration, however, are standard. The level of justifica-
tion reached in this chapter aims only to show that, given the current 
articulation of standard views, the burden is set on those who think that 
it is permissible to kill human beings – even those ‘at the margins.’
In the next section I make explicit some common-sense intuitions 
about human substances, and from such observations build a plausible 
case that you and I are essentially human animals. If this view is correct, 
I explain in the second section why you and I come into existence likely 
before we develop exercisable psychological capacities. In the third sec-
tion I explain arguments in favor of a psychological view of the person. 
In the fourth section I assess these arguments.
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Human Beings and Substances
You exist now, you did in the past, and hopefully you will exist in the 
future. Through time you have undergone and will undergo numerous 
changes. The features and qualities that would accurately describe you 
when your mother held you in her arms are quite different than the ones 
that accurately describe you now. But you exist throughout all these 
changes. What are you then? You cannot be identical to those features 
that accurately describe you (whenever), since many of them may not 
accurately describe you at different times. This rather commonsensical 
thought is where we begin.
A plausible answer to the ‘what are you?’ question is that you and I 
are human animals/substances. What does this view mean? To say that 
you and I are substances connotes the idea that each of us is an individual 
entity. Traditionally, the language used was ‘primary’ substance, exam-
ples of which include individual entities such as Fido, Felix, Oscar, you 
and I.1 A primary substance is an individual entity. Furthermore, primary 
substances have a nature, or, more accurately, a way of being (which 
includes its characteristic powers, developmental pattern, and morphologi-
cal features). Traditionally, the nature or way-of-being is referred to as a 
secondary substance since its existence as a concrete thing is parasitic on 
the existence of a primary substance. Examples of secondary substances 
include, canine, feline, hominoidea, and Homo sapiens. Henceforth, what 
I mean by substance is a human primary substance, unless otherwise noted. 
And the term substance is interchangeable with ‘an entity’ or ‘a thing.’
The language of primary substance may be foreign but it captures some 
common-sense intuitions about individual entities, especially human 
beings. Each substance has features, such as being bi-pedal, having blond 
hair, black skin, being smart, quick witted, etc. A substance and its fea-
tures differ in an essential respect. Substances can take on contraries of 
various features; the features themselves cannot without loss of identity. 
You can have blond hair at one time, and black hair at another. But black 
hair cannot be white hair without ceasing to be black. Relatedly, a sub-
stance can exist through changes in its properties and relational features.
The idea that I can take on the contraries of features and survive 
changes in properties (broadly construed) might suggest an understand-
ing of substance as a metaphysical pin cushion into which pins (i.e., 
properties and relations) are inserted and exchanged. That is not how 
to understand the substance view. There is no characterless bearer of 
characteristics. If substances are characterless and you and I are not char-
acterless, then you and I cannot be substances.
The idea to abandon is that a substance is a characterless bearer of 
characteristics. One may think that we are required to endorse this idea 
in so far as substances have properties but are not identical to those 
specific properties, and the instantiation of those properties depends 
upon the existence of the substance (this latter conjunct is explained 
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below). It would seem to follow that a substance is wholly different 
from its properties – a characterless bearer of characteristics. To clarify, 
a substance can never be without properties or relations. To say that a 
substance can survive changes in properties and its relations does not 
entail that a substance is something entirely without any properties or 
relations. It just means that I am not identical to any specific cluster of 
properties or relational features. Justin Broackes comments,
When one squashes a ball of clay, something that was round now is 
flat; the clay has ‘lost its roundness’, not in the sense that one item 
(the roundness) has been detached from another (the clay); but only in 
that the clay was a certain way, is now another way . . . [I]t ‘lost’ one 
property only as it ‘gained’ another—the clay was always of one shape 
or another, and, in general, things are always one way or another.
(Broackes, 2006, 149)
It is true that a substance is not identical to any one of its properties or 
even to the complete set of properties it has at a given time. In fact, it is 
not of the same ontological type as any of its properties since a substance 
is not a property at all. But this claim hardly entails that substances exist 
without having any characteristics or properties; for any concrete-spatio-
temporal continuant is a certain thing.
However, some changes are substantial in the sense that they change 
the nature of the thing. A shorthand way of describing this fact is to 
say that substances can have both accidental and essential features. If 
a table were not extended it could not be a table – being extended is an 
essential property of table. Notice, however, that a table is not identical 
to the property being extended. An even more trivial example is being 
alive. If you were not alive, you could not exist. Being alive is an essential 
property of you.2 An essential property is a property a thing must have 
in order for it to exist. But this does not entail that an essential property 
is unique. Crawford Elder (Elder, 2005, 4 ff.) tells us that chromium has 
an atomic number of 24. But suppose it also had the unique distinction 
of being mined in parts of Africa. The property of coming-from-Africa 
would still be an accidental feature of chromium. Chromium could have 
been mined elsewhere and still be the metal that it is. If a piece of metal 
had an atomic number of 79, we know it cannot be chromium; it must be 
gold. You and I have essential and accidental properties.
Care should be exercised in understanding the phrase ‘you and I have 
essential properties.’ Given the definition of essential property, the fol-
lowing count as essential properties (Plantinga, 1974, 60):
a Being self-identical.
b Being either a prime number or something else.
c Being alive if one is an organism.
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These are all properties that any existent thing has. Any existent thing 
is either a prime number or something else. Every existent thing has the 
property of being identical with itself. Essential properties, then, do not 
necessarily tell us anything about the thing that has those properties. 
More generally, since I cannot be a property (properties are existentially 
dependent upon things), I cannot be an essential property. Essential 
properties do not necessarily tell us what I am. To be sure, I can have 
an essence, so long as the term ‘essence’ is understood not to refer to a 
property, feature, or part of me, but to what makes me be the thing I am 
(Oderberg, 2008a).
I have been speaking of properties and features. The next intuition is 
that we are not a mere collection or aggregate of properties and features. 
When Felix the cat gets up and walks out of the room, the property of 
walking, of being black, of being quadrupedal, of having a tail 13 in. long, 
and of weighing 5 lb. etc., do not all get up and walk out of the room.3 
Rather, Felix, a black quadrupedal cat of such and such size, weight, and 
morphology, walks out of the room. We are individual beings, but we 
have multiple parts. You have the capacity to think, to be aware of your 
environment, to eat, to move, etc. Likewise, most of us have arms, legs, 
brains, a functional nervous system, organs, etc. We have both physi-
ological components (organs and limbs) and metaphysical components 
(psychological powers or capacities, and a specific nature – we are not 
dogs, cats, or horses – we are human beings). You possess a multiplicity 
of both physical and metaphysical components. How then should we 
understand ourselves as being one thing?
Consider a methane molecule. Hydrogen and carbon are its component 
parts. But methane is not hydrogen plus carbon plus some metaphysical 
glue that bonds them together. Rather, methane is a unified whole whose 
parts we can abstract away mentally and identify individually as hydro-
gen and carbon. Likewise, a lemon is not made up of yellowness plus 
fruit plus sour plus some metaphysical glue. Rather, a lemon is a fruit 
that is colored yellow, is sour upon taste, etc. In general, a substance is 
“not color plus shape plus weight. It is a colored, shaped, heavy thing” 
(Scaltsas, 1994a, 151). The chief problem with understanding substances 
as being aggregates of parts is that the unity of the whole is left unex-
plained. Theodore Scaltsas explains the problem as follows:
Consider any complex whole, such that the parts constitute a sin-
gle whole, not as a heap but like a syllable is a single whole. Then 
the whole cannot be identical to the aggregate of its parts. The rea-
son why is that if we disperse the parts, we still have the aggregate 
of the parts but we do not have the whole any more. This shows that 
the whole is over and above the aggregate of the parts. But it cannot 
be over and above the aggregate of the parts by an element that is 
like the parts, because then the same argument would apply again. 
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The new aggregate (of the parts plus the extra part that is supposed 
to turn the original aggregate into a substance) is preserved when 
its parts are dispersed. But the substance is not preserved when the 
parts are dispersed.
(Scaltsas, 1994a, 64)
If we disperse hydrogen and carbon, we no longer have methane, but we 
do have a hydrogen molecule and a carbon molecule. Co-present parts do 
not equal a unified whole.
The questions that needs answering, then, are twofold, ‘what makes 
this thing be the kind of thing it is?’ and, antecedently, ‘what makes this 
thing be one thing?’ To know the nature of a this (a particular substance), 
we need to have already identified the this. For Aristotle, the notion of a 
substantial form answers both questions:4
And this is the substance of each thing (for this is the primary cause 
of its being); and since, while some things are not substances, as 
many as are substances are formed in accordance with the nature of 
their own and by a process of nature, their substance would seem to 
be this kind of nature, which is not an element but a principle.
(Aristotle, 1941, 24–31, emphasis mine)
A substantial form is that which makes a thing be the thing it is, for 
example, a horse, a cat, a human being. It explains why the powers of a 
thing are in fact characteristic or prototypical powers, i.e., why a human 
being cannot see like a bat, and vice versa. Patrick Toner observes that an 
entity’s substantial form explains why it has the capacities it has, why it 
develops those capacities and not others, when it is supposed to develop 
those capacities, “and it accounts for why we think it tragic for a baby to 
be born without an upper brain, and why we do not think it tragic when 
a tulip lacks an upper brain” (Toner, 2011, 69).
The key role that substantial form plays in making one thing a unity is 
not so much to explain how many things can make up a single thing, but 
rather how the many things cease being many (Scaltsas, 1994b, 109). 
It is important in this regard to understand that substantial form, for 
Aristotle, is not a distinct constituent along with the other physiological 
or metaphysical parts of the human being. Rather, the identity of those 
parts and powers as being parts and powers of one thing is dependent 
upon the substantial form. A finger separated from the human being is 
no longer a finger, insofar as it no longer functions as one. Similarly, 
the hydrogen molecule and the carbon molecules do not retain their 
independent identity when they are parts of methane. Their doing so 
would invite the idea that methane is simply a hydrogen molecule meta-
physically glued to a carbon molecule. But that is clearly false. Rather, 
the parts of an organic whole are re-identified in accordance with their 
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function in the whole. The substantial form, then, is not one among 
many relata. In fact, there is no relation between substantial form on 
one hand and whatever else on the other. The substantial form does not 
relate parts to one another; it re-identifies those parts as contributing 
to the functionality of the whole. ‘Re-identification’ means that we can 
abstract by a mental act the different components of the unified whole, 
but we cannot mistake the object of our abstraction as having independ-
ent identity in the thing of which it is a part. We can abstract away 
mentally and identify individually the parts of carbon and hydrogen, but 
this separation has no corresponding reality in methane. Those parts are 
re-identified as methane in the concrete particular.
These reflections apply equally well to metaphysical parts. So, if one 
thinks that human beings are composites of soul and body, one may be 
right if this is understood as a mere abstraction. There is no correspond-
ing relation of soul (or a psychological power such as consciousness) 
and body (or functional brain) in res. When one thinks about the soul 
of Leibniz, one is no longer thinking about some independently identifi-
able thing in Leibniz; just as thinking about the properties of hydrogen 
does not involve thinking about some independently identifiable thing 
in methane.
To summarize, you and I are one thing. What makes us one thing, 
though with many parts and powers, is a substantial form. The substantial 
form makes us be the kind of thing we are, including our developmen-
tal trajectory (discussed below), specifying powers (e.g., rationality), and 
characteristic properties (e.g., morphological features such as bipedal). 
Explaining this view further, P. M. S. Hacker illuminates saying, “if it is 
a living being, its morphological features, characteristic organs, pattern 
of development, and characteristic modes of behavior are non-derivative 
properties of the creature, and are determined by the nature of the organ-
ism which it is” (2010, 43, emphasis added). Michael Loux makes a 
similar observation:
Kinds . . . cannot be reduced to properties. It is, of course, true that 
in virtue of belonging to a kind [such as human being], a concrete 
particular will possess many properties. . . . Aristotelians will con-
cede all these facts; what they will deny is that a plant’s belonging 
to the kind geranium can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of its 
possessing these properties. As they see things, it is because it belongs 
to the kind that it possesses these properties and not vice versa. The 
kinds to which concrete particulars belong represent unified ways of 
being that cannot be reduced to anything more basic.
(Loux, 1998, 119–120)
We may appeal to such properties and attributes to discover or know 
what kind of thing it is, but the properties do not make the thing be what 
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it is, its nature does. The explanatory arrow moves from the nature to the 
entity’s specifying powers.
Our powers, features, and qualities are all ontologically dependent 
upon the existence of the substance – on the entity that has or possesses 
these powers, features, and qualities. Having blond hair cannot exist 
without an entity that has blond hair. But that same entity can exist 
without blond hair. The substance Felix was born and weighs 5 pounds, 
but none of Felix’s properties were born or weigh 5 pounds. Another way 
to think about this notion of dependence is to consider the distinction 
between subject and predicate. Both Fido and Rover are dogs. As such, 
‘is a dog’ is predicated truly of Fido and Rover. But neither Fido nor 
Rover can be predicated of anything else. Fido is not a feature or quality 
of something else.
Substances are concrete, individual things as opposed to abstract 
universals. A mathematical number is abstract; you cannot bump into 
a prime number; but you can touch, bump, see, and point to in space 
and time a concrete object. In this respect, substances are continuants, 
they occupy space, and endure through time. Because substances endure 
through time, they should be distinguished from events or instances. 
And because they are particular, they are not universals. (Universals are 
abstract things that are multiply realizable such as redness, risibility, or 
powers such as rationality.) Powers and properties do not exist, at least 
not concretely, except with a substance that bears such powers and prop-
erties. The power of rationality does not think; but a human being with 
that developed power thinks. Typically, only concrete entities can do 
concrete activities. The power of rationality is not a concrete thing, but 
an abstraction from the thing that has rationality. The power of thinking 
cannot exist without a thinker. Likewise, actions do not exist without 
agents. In general, one cannot build a concrete particular by metaphysi-
cally gluing together abstract universals. A set of abstract properties is 
itself abstract. This is not to say that abstract things do not exist. All that 
is said here is that abstract things do not exist as concreta. A psycho-
logical capacity considered in itself is an abstract thing. A psychological 
capacity of me is concrete. But its status as concrete is wholly dependent 
upon me existing. The implications of these points are enormous and are 
noted below and in later chapters.
This intuition, namely, that we are concrete spatiotemporal continu-
ants, seems quite strong, so much so that it is stronger than the intuition 
that we are identical to a certain set of psychological properties (for 
example, having certain thoughts, beliefs, and intentions). Suppose that 
one’s thoughts, beliefs, and intentions were reducible to neurological 
correlates. And suppose that we were able to develop synthetic neurons 
and populate them with specific propositional content – per impossible 
on my view.5 We could then create a cyborg with your exact thoughts, 
beliefs, and intentions. If this is too far-fetched, consider brain fission 
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cases. Stroke patients, when they have a stroke to one hemisphere, retain 
most of their thoughts, beliefs, and intentions. And we know from sei-
zure patients that severing the corpus callosum is not life-threatening. It 
is conceivable, then, to take one half of your brain and place it in a decer-
ebrate but functional body. There is now another human being that has 
your exact thoughts, beliefs, and intentions. And yet, you are not identi-
cal to (i.e., the same human being as) this other human being.6 And one 
very natural way of explaining this intuition is that you still occupy this 
concrete spatiotemporal line of existing and that other human being over 
there is occupying a different concrete spatiotemporal line of existing.
A substance does not admit of degrees. Either Fido exists or he does 
not. Of course, Fido can become smarter, more obedient, more mature, 
i.e., develop from puppy to adult. The qualities or features of Fido admit 
of degrees, but not Fido himself. After all, we can always ask, what is it 
whose features are possessed more or less?
Lastly, it is intuitively plausible that infant, toddler, child, juvenile, 
and adult can refer to one and the same human being. As such these are 
called ‘phase’ concepts; whereas human being is a substance concept. 
The important point to observe about phase concepts is that you survive 
the transitions from one phase to the next. You were an infant and 
you were a toddler, etc. Conversely, you are not now the toddler you 
once were because you are not now a toddler.
In summary, there are four desiderata that an account of human sub-
stances must meet. These include accounting for: (1) our individuality, 
though we share properties with other persons, (2) a person’s substan-
tial unity, we are not heaps or aggregates, even though we each have 
many parts (Scaltsas, 1994a, 59–96); (3) our identity through change; 
and (4) our characteristic way of being—we are not eagles or horses. 
With these desiderata in mind, human persons are (i) particular (ii) enti-
ties (iii) that have developmentally indexed causal powers, specifically 
rational ones, and (iv) they have a certain nature. Characteristic (ii) is 
meant to highlight that persons are things, not states, properties, or 
even powers. Characteristic (iii) is meant to indicate that when an entity 
develops a species-specific power, no new entity comes into existence. 
To do so would identify the new entity with a power, and this would 
be a categorical error. Characteristic (iv) is meant to highlight the fact 
that there is no bare thingness, but that things have characteristic states, 
properties, and powers. We have certain powers, qualities, and features 
but we are not identical to them. The expression of rationality (however 
one may define this power) can be evidence for being a person, but you 
and I cannot be identical to either the power of rationality or its exercise. 
We are spatio-temporal continuants that endure through changes in our 
powers, qualities, and features. The argument for these claims depend on 
two intuitions, one phenomenological and the other conceptual. When I 
think a thought and then communicate that thought to others, it is one 
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and the same thing that does thinking and the communicating. When I 
think about running and then run, it is the same thing that thinks and 
runs. Conceptually, you and I are concrete entities; powers, capacities, 
and properties are themselves abstract. You and I cannot be identical to 
a power, but we can have a power.
When Do You and I Come into Existence?
Devin Henry (2005) asks us to imagine a paper cup lying on the side of 
the road. After a few months that cup will have broken down into its 
constituent parts. It will be, after a while, merely pieces of paper and no 
longer a cup. But then imagine that these pieces of paper suddenly organ-
ize themselves into another paper cup, or even a lampshade. Suppose 
further that this amazing feat happens with surprising regularity. Paper 
particles organize themselves into paper cups. Henry’s thought experi-
ment is meant to direct our attention to how amazing self-organization 
is. It is precisely this property of self-organization that is evinced by 
embryogenesis. Not only are early-stage organisms self-organizing, but 
they also hit their mark – the embryo seems to “know exactly what it 
wants to be” (Henry, 2005, 8). So, the embryo organizes itself, not in 
any direction whatsoever, but in a very controlled and precise endpoint, 
namely, the mature form of its nature. In explaining how this can be, 
one must avoid two errors. The first error explains these features with 
reference to a self-conscious homunculus inside the embryo who directs 
development. A second error might explain self-organization and devel-
opmental success at the expense of maintaining the unity of the entity 
that develops. The importance of obeying this unity constraint can be 
seen by considering the development of an embryo’s organs including 
her digestive tract and reproductive organs. By definition, the organism 
is now a fetus; but it is still the same human being that persists through 
this change. Developing all my organs did not give rise to another entity. 
So, any explanation of self-organization and developmental success 
must explain why it is one and the same thing that is doing the develop-
ing. If not, one wonders whether an explanation for development has 
really been offered.
Mechanistic views will account for the development in terms of the 
biochemical matter causing ever more higher levels of organization, 
complexity, and powers.7 But for Aristotle, order at any lower level of 
material order cannot cause ever higher levels of organization. Jonathan 
Lear remarks that, “What is needed in addition is form as a basic irreduc-
ible force – a developmental power” (Lear, 1988, 39). The substantial 
form is not merely the mature adult form of an organism, it is certainly 
not another part such as a homunculus, and it is not reducible to genes as 
on genetic determinism; but it is that which accounts for why the organ-
ism is what it is and develops as it does. Again, Lear is on point,
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[I]t is a force in the organism for attaining ever higher levels of organ-
ization until the organism achieves its mature form . . . the idea that 
the order which exists at the level of flesh would be sufficient to gen-
erate the order required for human life was as absurd for Aristotle 
as the idea that the order that exists in a pile of wood would be suf-
ficient for the pile to turn itself into a bed.
(Lear, 1988, 39–40)
In explaining this view, Aristotle often exploits analogies with artifacts 
and craftsmen. The analogies are apt insofar as they tell us what it is to 
come into being and in virtue of what. The difference between artifacts 
and natural objects is that natural objects have their cause internalized. 
Nature is an inner principle of change and rest, making the thing be what 
it is. A thing’s form is what this nature is. It follows that a natural object 
has its form from its beginning (Lear, 1988, 17).
If you and I are individual entities with a nature/form, you and I exist 
when that entity does. Development does not introduce new entities; 
when you develop arms, legs, fingerprints, and psychological powers, 
other things do not come into existence. Reaching a developmental mile-
stone does not change the nature of that which reaches it. Mathew Lu 
recently states the point as follows,
The relevant issue here is that any (putative) potential must belong 
to a substance with a particular nature. To say that a particular 
substance has a potential to develop in some way is not to make a 
prediction about the future, but to make a claim about that thing’s 
nature right now.
(Lu, 2018)
As a human being develops through the embryonic, fetal, neonatal, etc., 
phases, it develops rational abilities. To say otherwise is arbitrary. One 
can distinguish among exercising a capacity well or poorly, actually exer-
cising a capacity, possessing an immediately exercisable capacity (that 
awaits a decision to exercise it), possessing a readily exercisable capacity 
(such as once impediments are removed—one wakes up, the fog of alco-
hol wears off, and so forth), and possessing a remote capacity (such as 
the ability to learn Icelandic after a lot of effort), and possessing a very 
remote capacity (such as the zygote’s ability to grow a brain and body 
that can learn Icelandic). To insist that any of these capacities except the 
last divides a human substance from a non-human substance is arbitrary.
The plausible intuition is that development does not change the iden-
tity of the thing that develops. Why not? The change is internal in the 
sense that the human being causes its own changes with a view towards 
survival, growth, and maturation of its prototypical powers. A tree does 
not develop into a bookshelf; but a sprouted platanus orientalis seedling 
develops into a voluminous mature tree. A Polaroid picture of a jaguar 
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develops from a brown amorphous smudge into a visibly clear repre-
sentation of the jaguar (Stith, 2014). Blank film does not develop into 
anything. The second idea is that development into ever more mature 
stages is indicative of a nature/form actually being present. This is not 
to suggest backward causation in which a mature human causes the 
immature human to develop. Rather it is to suppose that purposeful-
ness exists in things, and the truthmaker for why this thing is the way 
it is and develops the way it does is its formal nature (Pruss, 2013). A 
mature organism of its kind manifests more species-typical powers than 
its immature counter-part; but those powers/capacities express what kind 
of organism the thing is, but do not cause or make that organism be what 
it is. Those powers are ontologically dependent upon the substance, not 
vice versa. Consider the maturity from infant to adult. Significant cogni-
tive and bodily changes take place of one and the same thing. The end 
towards which x develops, tells us what x is all along. The human being 
at the embryonic stage is not a potential person but a person who is 
developing potencies.8
Persons are not Human Beings
In this section I consider an alternative view to the substance view. There 
are numerous alternatives, but the one I pick is a function of its popu-
larity, philosophical persuasiveness, and relevance to healthcare ethics 
issues. For lack of a better term I will refer to the alternative view as the 
‘functional brain view.’ This view focuses on the fact that you and I have 
exercisable psychological capacities. The idea that I exist, or could exist, 
without any exercisable capacity for consciousness or rational thought 
strikes proponents of this view as counterintuitive. One proponent of this 
view is Jeff McMahan. McMahan focuses on consciousness stating that,
The corresponding criterion of personal identity is the continued 
existence and functioning . . . of the same brain to be capable of 
generating consciousness or mental activity. This criterion stresses 
the survival of one’s basic psychological capacities, in particular the 
capacity for consciousness.
(McMahan, 2002, 68)
And elsewhere he says,
We begin to exist when the fetal brain develops the capacity for 
consciousness, which happens sometime between twenty-two and 
twenty-eight weeks after conception, when synapses develop among 
the neurons in the cerebral cortex. Only after the development of the 
capacity for consciousness is there anyone who can be harmed, or 
wronged, by being killed.
(McMahan, 2007, 186)
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The view entails that persons (functional brains with exercisable psy-
chological capacities) and human beings (living human organisms) are 
distinct things.
More recently, Campbell and McMahan have clarified their view to 
avoid the too-many-thinkers problem – discussed below. They emphasize 
having an exercisable capacity for consciousness as a necessary condition 
for being a person but capture this condition in terms of a functional 
brain. Functional brains and mere brains are different substances that 
never overlap or share matter:
[F]unctional brains and mere brains are never temporally or spa-
tially coincident, but . . . the matter that composes a functional brain 
comes to compose a mere brain when the functional brain loses the 
capacity to generate consciousness. On this view, the functional 
brain is not a mere brain in a functional state. It is one substance 
with a certain set of identity conditions that include the retention of 
the capacity for consciousness, and the mere brain is a different sub-
stance with a different set of identity conditions that do not include 
the capacity for consciousness.
(Campbell & McMahan, 2010, 290, emphasis added)
The intuitive argument for this view is straightforward. You and I are 
essentially persons. Persons are those beings who can exercise psycho-
logical capacities (which may include self-consciousness or cognition). 
Human beings do not necessarily exercise psychological capacities, 
such as human beings at the embryonic or fetal stage or those in a per-
sistent vegetative state. It follows that persons and human beings are 
different kinds of things since they have different persistence conditions. 
Therefore, you and I, if we are essentially persons, are not human beings. 
We may be constituted by human beings (Baker, 2000) or be parts of 
human beings (McMahan, 2002, 92ff.), but we are not the same thing as 
a human being.
Of course, the key premise is the second claim, i.e., persons must be 
able to exercise psychological capacities. The chief support for the func-
tional brain view comes from various thought experiments, namely, the 
brain transplant (BT) examples and the dicephalic twin example.9
These examples aim to highlight the intuition that we are not identi-
cal to our bodies, but rather to our psychological capacities rooted in a 
functional brain. The strategy in each example is to envision someone 
without corporeal properties while leaving one’s psychological capacities 
intact and ask if one still exists. If the answer is ‘yes’ then our existence 
is dependent upon having exercisable psychological capacities. Having 
just those capacities would seem to be essential to who we are. Here is 
McMahan’s rendition of a BT example:
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One’s entire brain is extracted and transplanted into the body of 
one’s identical twin, who has just suffered brain death and whose 
brain has been removed. One’s brain is appropriately connected to 
the nerves in one’s twin’s body, so that after the operation a person is 
revived in one’s twin’s body who is fully psychologically continuous 
with oneself as one was before the operation. Most people believe 
that one would survive this operation and would continue to exist in 
what was formerly the body of one’s identical twin.
(2002, 20)
Suppose that Jack’s brain is transplanted into John’s former body. The 
intuition is that Jack continues to exist because where Jack’s thoughts, 
beliefs, memories, desires, and feelings go, there he goes also. Certainly, 
if we were to ask the person post-transplant what his name is, his inter-
ests are, his beliefs are, etc., he will answer each question exactly as Jack 
would have before the transplant (Shoemaker, 1963, 23–24). At the very 
least, McMahan has established that a condition for one person being 
identical to another person at a later time must include psychological 
criteria.
Once a largely psychological account of the person is motivated, 
McMahan moves on to motivate specifically an “embodied mind” 
account.10 For McMahan, the specific contents of one’s psychology – her 
beliefs, memories, etc. – are sufficient but not necessary for being a per-
son. Considering cases of deprogramming, whereby a person loses her 
specific memories and beliefs such as with progressive dementia, suggests 
that the person is not thereby destroyed. Demented patients are often still 
aware of their surroundings. In this regard, the embodied mind account
stresses the survival of one’s basic psychological capacities, in par-
ticular the capacity for consciousness. It does not require continuity 
of any particular contents of one’s mental life. This allows that one 
may survive the deprogramming of one’s brain and that one contin-
ues to exist throughout the progress of Alzheimer’s disease, until the 
disease destroys one’s capacity for consciousness.
(McMahan, 2002, 68)
Summarizing the account, McMahan notes that,
There need be only enough physical and functional continuity [of the 
brain] to preserve certain basic psychological capacities, particularly 
the capacity for consciousness. This, I believe, is a sufficient basis for 
egoistic concern; it should, therefore, be a sufficient basis for iden-
tity, other things being equal.
(McMahan, 2002, 69)
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Functional continuity is defined as “the retention of the brain’s basic 
psychological capacities” (2002, 68); and physical continuity requires 
“either the continued existence of the same constituent matter or the 
gradual, incremental replacement of the constituent matter over time” 
(2002, 68).
I find this a very elegant presentation, and it receives some support 
from our intuitive judgments in response to the BT and deprogramming 
examples. I do not, however, think we should accept it as an account of 
what we are.
There is an interpretive issue when assessing McMahan (2002) and 
Campbell and McMahan (2010). Following the lead of (2010) one 
might say that, if the functional brain thinks my thoughts and I think my 
thoughts, it follows that I am a functional brain. Eric Olson (2007) notes 
that, so long as there are no other candidates for something thinking my 
thoughts, it would follow from Campbell and McMahan (2010) that I 
am a functional brain. Olson observes,
[b]ut isn’t it obvious that I think in the strictest sense? Surely it 
couldn’t turn out that it is something other than me that thinks my 
thoughts . . . It follows that I could not be anything other than my 
brain. If the true thinkers of our thoughts . . . are brains, then we 
must conclude . . . that we are brains.
(Olson, 2007, 79)
Whereas in McMahan (2002) it appears that he is more concerned 
not with the ‘what are we?’ question but with the persistence question of 
personal identity. Let me explain.
As observed by Olson (2017), there are different questions when 
one discusses the metaphysics of persons. There is the ‘what are we?’ 
question which asks what is necessary and sufficient for being a person. 
More specifically, the ‘what are we?’ question may turn to ask what 
is it (e.g., a property, feature, or fundamental ontological status) that 
distinguishes persons from non-persons? The answers to the ‘what are 
we?’ question may be wholly different from the persistence question. 
The persistence question asks ‘what is it for one person at time t1 to per-
sist through to time t10?’ The persistence question presupposes that the 
relata are already identifiable persons – it asks what it is for one thing to 
persist as a person. Olson further specifies a third question pertaining to 
what kinds of evidence are relevant for answering one of the questions 
already noted. For the persistence question, one might ask, “What evi-
dence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one 
who was here yesterday?” (Olson, 2017). The evidence question has to 
be distinguished from the other two. Again Olson explains:
What it takes for you to persist through time is one thing; how we 
might find out whether you have is another. If the criminal had 
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fingerprints just like yours, the courts may conclude that he is you. 
But even if that is conclusive evidence, having your fingerprints is not 
what it is for a past or future being to be you.
(Olson, 2017)
For example, proponents of the substance view might say that the evi-
dence for identifying whether S is a person will refer to S’s DNA and what 
we know empirically about things that have such and such DNA. Or they 
will say that having human parents is evidence for being a human being 
since like produces like. But no proponent of the substance view will say 
that you and I are DNA codes or, worse, that you and I just are our par-
ents! Having a certain DNA is an empirically informed marker for being 
a substance with a rational nature as is human patrimony. (Relatedly, 
critics of the substance view conflate that view’s answers to the evidence 
question and the ‘what are we?’ question. Thus they often misunderstand 
the view to involve the claim that you and I just are things with a specific 
DNA or members of the kind Homo sapiens.11)
The present interpretive issue is that, in using BT examples to moti-
vate McMahan’s position, one is led to believe that the key concern is 
to answer the persistence question. As Olson notes, the “usual question 
[in personal identity] is when a person picked out at one time is identical 
with a person picked out at another time” (1997, 77). And the chief con-
cern for the substance theorist is to answer the ‘what are we?’ question. 
As such, there may be no disagreement between McMahan and me once 
we index our reflections to their respective questions. I explain below 
why I think one should accept as correct McMahan’s commentary on the 
BT examples as illustrating what criteria are sufficient for persisting. I 
argue that they do not motivate a plausible answer to the ‘what are we?’ 
question. (McMahan’s claim quoted above (2007) about when you and 
I come into existence presupposes that you and I are essentially minded 
beings. Whether this can be argued for is addressed below also.) The task 
for now, then, is circumspection in identifying how that view differs from 
the substance view on the question of ‘what are we?’.
The substance view holds that each of us is identical to a human ani-
mal, there is no other thing that is a person and to which you and I are 
identical. If one wants to use the term ‘person’ to refer to one’s psycholog-
ical properties or powers, and ‘human being’ to refer to one’s corporeal 
properties or features that is innocuous enough. But just as identifying 
hydrogen or carbon are abstractions from methane, so too with person 
and human being. The human substance is one concrete continuant that 
has both psychological and corporeal aspects.12 Understood as an answer 
to the ‘what are we?’ question, the functional brain view denies this. 
Human beings and persons are different things that may not even share 
the same biological matter (e.g., your body, brain, cells, tissues).13
It is not McMahan’s view that you and I are phase sortals. You and I, 
on his view, are substances whose existence essentially depends on having 
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exercisable psychological capacities. The key claims, then, that separate 
the functional brain and substance views are the following propositions 
about persons:
(Cap): You and I are persons at t iff you and I can exercise psycho-
logical capacities at t.
Proponents of the functional brain view accept (Cap) – for capacity. 
Proponents of the substance view deny that exercisable psychological 
capacities are necessary for you and I to exist. What is necessary is that 
you and I are rational animals, and being a rational animal requires 
having a nature that disposes one to have or develop rational capacities. 
Relevant to this point, Ronald Tacelli and Stephen Schwarz observe a 
distinction between being a person and functioning as one. One can be a 
person before one is able to manifest the developed psychological func-
tions of persons. For them, it is the nature that makes you be the thing 
you are, not the functioning of a developed power. They say that “there 
is development and the gradual unfolding of a nature – your nature – 
bit by bit in time. But the nature is always actually there, controlling its 
own development” (Schwarz & Tacelli, 1989, 93). I concur, and we can 
stipulate this view as follows.
(Concreta): S is a person at t iff S is an individual with a rational 
nature at t.
Given my comments above on nature (or substantial form), what makes 
us be the kind of entity we essentially are is that the matter composing our 
respective bodies is informed by the same kind of substantial form which, 
among other things, endows us with the potency for rational thought.14 
So the distinction between the two views is whether it is enough for you 
and I to exist that we are individuals with a rational nature, or must we 
be able to exercise rational capacities.
Critique of the Functional Brain View
Following Snowdon (2014), there are three arguments against the view 
that you and I exist only when an exercisable capacity for consciousness 
exists. I discuss here the first two as they form a coherent unit. Snowdon 
gives us two reductio ad absurdum arguments, the target assumption is 
that a person P is not identical to a human being H. On the functional 
brain view, you and I are persons, but ‘human being’ refers to one’s body. 
The first step in Snowdon’s argument is to suppose that P has both psy-
chological (P is conscious) and physical features (P has a body). It also 
seems plausible enough to suppose that H has physical features. But does 
H also have psychological features? Snowdon answers as follows,
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[I]t seems that H can see its environment, can reason, remember, 
talk, and think of itself. This all seems true because it is, quite simply, 
obvious, and also a necessary part of our explanation of the success-
ful interaction of the animal H and its environment.
(Snowdon, 2014, 93)
Continuing with this line of thought, it also seems obvious that human 
beings talk, communicate, walk, and run. Human beings can see, feel 
pain, hear, and smell. A human being has the same brain and neurologi-
cal system as the person appears to have. A human being’s successful and 
adaptive behavior in her environment is explained best by her being able 
to perceive, think, desire, and intend. These are all psychological abilities. 
Olson states the point as follows.
The psychological-continuity view implies that that animal is not 
identical with you. Yet the animal would appear to be rational and 
intelligent. At any rate it has a normally functioning adult nervous 
system. It is physically indistinguishable from you. It has the same 
surroundings and history. What more does it take for a thing to be 
able to think? What could prevent the animal from thinking?
(Olson, 2002, 190)
The punchline is this: the psychological abilities and states of H seem 
to be the exact same abilities and states of P. “It appears to follow that 
if ~(P = H) then there are two [different] things which are leading the 
same psychological lives located at a certain place, and that seems 
absurd” (Snowdon, 2014, 93). Likewise, Olson concludes that “there 
would appear to be two rational, thinking beings within your skin: a 
person with psychological identity conditions, and an animal with 
non-psychological identity conditions” (Olson, 2002, 190). The func-
tional brain view, therefore, entails an absurdity. If two things share 
the same physical and psychological features, we would expect them to 
be the same thing not two different things.
Snowdon’s second reductio argument grants for the moment that on 
this view persons are identified with certain psychological capacities 
or states. If what makes the difference between S coming into being 
and not being is having a capacity for consciousness (McMahan, 2007, 
186), S is a brain with an exercisable capacity for consciousness. But 
human beings have certain psychological capacities and states too since 
they have the same functional brain as the person does. So, human 
beings with psychological capacities are candidates for being persons as 
well. But if the person is not identified with a human being, then there 
must be two persons where we thought there should only be one. And 
this is absurd for several reasons mentioned by Snowdon. I’ll mention 
one he does not address. The consequence that there are two persons 
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suggests that ‘person’ is multiply realizable. Recall, however, that there 
cannot be two Fidos or two Rovers. You and I are concrete individuals. 
An individual entity cannot be two at the same time and in the same 
respect. The substance view does not face the too-many-thinkers prob-
lem because it does not reify one’s exercisable psychological capacities 
into a separate thing.
Snowdon’s reductio arguments serve as defenses of a key premise 
(premise 3 below) in a broader argument for the identity of you and me 
to human beings at every stage in which we exist. The emphasis here is 
meant to argue that you and I come into existence before the onset of 
exercisable psychological capacities. I call this the Unity Argument, and 
it follows closely Olson’s argument (1997 and 2002).
If the functional brain view is correct, human being and person are 
two different things, specifically, if you and I are essentially persons, you 
and I come into existence sometime after conception when our brains 
become functional enough to generate conscious states. We can ask what 
happens to the organism at the fetal stage when it experiences the onset 
of consciousness? There are only two options: either it dies or it lives. It 
does not die for three reasons. There is no corpse,15 organisms do not die 
because they gain abilities as a result of their natural developmental pro-
cesses,16 and our intuitions on pre-conscious harms.17 It must, therefore, 
live. But if ‘human being’ and ‘person’ are distinct entities, the person 
at the onset of consciousness exists, and the human being continues to 
exist. There are now two things in the same space at the same time. It is 
precisely here that Snowdon’s reductio arguments rebut the plausibility 
of this suggestion. The brain view must suppose that the person is a dif-
ferent part, such as the functional brain, and the human being is the rest 
of the body. But Snowdon’s arguments show that this is absurd since the 
human being has every right to say that it has a functional brain, and the 
person has every right to say that it has a body. Here is the argument in 
detailed outline:
1 If the human being at the fetal stage (hereafter fetus)18 ≠ me, then I 
came into existence sometime after conception.
2 If I came into existence after conception then either the fetus dies or 
continues to live.
3 Neither is it the case that the fetus dies nor does it continue to live. 
(The defense of this premise is made explicit below.)
4 Therefore, it is not the case that I came into existence after concep-
tion. (From 2 and 3, MT.)
5 Therefore, it is not the case that the human being at the fetal stage is 
not identical to me. (From 1 and 4, MT.)
6 Therefore, I am identical to the human being that existed at the fetal 
stage. (Negation rule applied to 5.)
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Defense of premise 3:
(3a) If the human being at the fetal stage died, then it died because ‘it’ 
gained an ability to think, and this ability is the working out of the 
fetus’s self-directed development, and there is no corpse.
(3b) It is not the case that things die when they gain an ability and 
this ability is the working out of its developmental program, and 
there is no corpse.
(3c) Therefore, the fetus did not die. (From 3a and 3b.)
(3d) If the human being at the fetal stage continues to live (and he/
she is not the same thing as me), then there are two different things 
with the same physical (this body) and psychological features (this 
thought/intention).
(3e) It is absurd to think that two different things can have the same 
psychological and physical features. (Snowdon’s arguments can-
vassed above.)
(3f) It is not the case that the fetus continues to live. (From 3d and 
3e, MT.)
(3g) Therefore, it is not the case that the human being continues to 
live and it is not the case that it dies. (From 3c and 3f, Conj.)
Premise 3: Neither the fetus lives nor does it die. (From 3g, DM.)19
Premise 1 is an assumption given the functional brain view. Premise 
2 is an exclusive disjunction given premise 1. Premise 3 is the key prem-
ise and is defended in the arguments running from 3a–3g. Premises (3d) 
and (3e) are the only premises open to dispute – important objections to 
premise 3b are addressed in previous footnotes. Premise (3e) is defended 
above via Snowdon’s reductio arguments. Premise (3d) is committed to 
the idea that if the existence and persistence conditions of two things A 
and B differ, A and B must be different things.20 On the view that I come 
into existence after my human being does, human being and person have 
different persistence conditions and are, therefore, two different things 
on such a view. An important assumption supporting (3d), however, is 
the idea that the human being shares the same psychological properties 
because the human being also has a functional brain. This entitles it to 
have psychological properties on the assumption that material organic 
things with a certain type of neurological configuration can think.
McMahan thinks that his account does not entail that there are two 
thinkers when there should only be one. We should understand the rela-
tion between ourselves and our organisms as a relation of part to whole, 
not a constitution relation. McMahan gives several examples to illustrate. 
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When a limb on a tree grows, the whole tree is said to grow. The limb 
(the part) grows, and (the whole) tree gets bigger in virtue of the limbs 
growing. It is not absurd to say that there are two things that are growing, 
the limb and the tree. The tree is not constituted by the branch (cut the 
branch and the tree still exists), but the branch is certainly part of the tree. 
Likewise, the horn in my car makes a noise, but the car makes a noise in 
virtue of the horn making a noise. “In the same sense in which the tree 
grows because its limb does, and in which the car honks because its horn 
does, my organism may be said to think, feel, and perceive because I do” 
(McMahan, 2002, 92). And he states that these “analogies help elucidate 
the sense in which there are two conscious entities present where I am. 
My organism is conscious . . . only by virtue of having a conscious part” 
(McMahan, 2002, 93).
It is important to understand the desiderata McMahan needs to meet 
in responding to the Unity Argument. He needs to tell a plausible story in 
which all the following commitments make sense: I and my organism are 
not the same kind of thing; there are not two thinkers where there should 
only be one; and radical dualism is untenable. (Radical dualism would 
hold that the organism has no psychological properties and he rejects this 
position.) McMahan wants to hold that my organism has psychological 
properties but only in virtue of having me as a part of it.
The following dilemma will show that McMahan fails to avoid the 
absurdities that the Unity Argument highlights. The cornerstone of 
McMahan’s response is that there exists a relation between me and my 
organism and that the psychological properties of my organism are had 
in virtue of me.
The ‘in virtue of’ relation can be understood in two different ways. 
Consider the following two propositions:
(Causal): the airplane moves in virtue of the engines.
(Mereological): the engines fly in virtue of being a part of the airplane.
On the causal understanding, the airplane moves in virtue of the engines; 
i.e., the engines cause the airplane to move. On the mereological under-
standing, the engines fly only because they are attached to the airplane. 
Without the empennage and wings, the engines cannot go airborne. 
Applied to persons and their organisms we can say the following. On a 
causal understanding of the ‘in virtue of’ relation, my organism is caused 
to think by me every time I think. This suggests that my organism has 
psychological states and properties every time I think – thus avoiding 
radical dualism. It is agreed, however, that my organism is not the same 
thing as me on the embodied mind account. Since I have psychological 
states and properties, it follows that there are two different things that 
have the same psychological states and properties. When I cause my 
organism to think, it thinks. But what does it think? Presumably, it thinks 
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the very same things I do. But if my organism and I are two different 
things, McMahan must still grant 3d.
Suppose that the ‘in virtue of’ relation is understood as mereological. 
My organism thinks only because I (the thinker) am a part of the organ-
ism. Does my organism have any psychological properties if we imagine 
it without the thinking part? Either it does or it does not. If it does, then 
what psychological properties does it have and why be so sure that it 
cannot be a person? If it does have psychological properties, where are 
the corresponding psychological powers? Armstrong observes that all 
properties bestow a power (active or passive). He says “it is only in so 
far as properties bestow powers that they can be detected by the sensory 
apparatus or other mental faculty” (1980, 45). Now we can ask whether 
the organism has the property of being a thinker. If it does then it would 
have the power to think. On the supposition that organism O and person 
P are different things, there would be two thinkers. Hence, the too-many-
thinkers problem remains.
If it does not have psychological properties, i.e., being a thinker, then it 
would not have the power to think. On this latter supposition the organ-
ism would not have any psychological states, properties, or powers, and 
this is to court radical dualism of which McMahan rightly rejects. What 
generates the problem for the mereological interpretation is that being 
a thinker or being conscious is something a thing either possesses or it 
does not.
So, if the ‘in virtue of’ relation is understood as causal, McMahan is 
still committed to a key premise in the Unity Argument. If the ‘in vir-
tue of’ relation is understood as mereological, he is implicitly committed 
to radical dualism, which he explicitly rejects. Either way McMahan in 
(2002) fails to meet the required desiderata.
As noted above, Campbell and McMahan (2010) have clarified their 
view to address directly the too-many-thinkers problem. They deny that 
you and I are at all spatially coincident with our respective organisms. 
You and I are identical to functional brains according to which “when 
the brain irreversibly loses the capacity to generate consciousness, we 
cease to exist” (2010, 289). The functional brain, on their view, is 
“one substance with a certain set of identity conditions that include 
the retention of the capacity for consciousness, and the mere brain is a 
different substance with a different set of identity conditions” (2010, 
290). So, if our functional brains lose the capacity for consciousness, 
we go out of existence. This offers a response to the too-many-thinkers 
problem because that problem is generated only on the supposition that 
there can be thinking animals. Campbell and McMahan’s revised view 
denies this.
What might be the initial problem with this view? A functional brain 
is a mature brain that has developed the requisite synapses, the proper 
functioning of which can generate consciousness. It should be pointed out 
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here that although we know what neurological architecture is sufficient 
for generating consciousness, we cannot say what is necessary except 
that some level of neurological organization is required (Howsepian, 
2011). Let’s suppose, then, that an immature brain is one that is not 
able to generate consciousness because it has not developed the requisite 
organization – whenever that might be. On the functional brain view, the 
mature brain (Bm) is not identical to the immature brain (Bim).
For the functional brain view, Bm ≠ Bim because Bm is capable of 
consciousness and that functionality defines it as a different substance 
with distinct identity conditions from the mere brain. Campbell and 
McMahan must suppose that Bm and Bim are necessarily different 
because they are different things – just as chromium can never become 
gold. So, we should understand this claim symbolized as follows, P: □ 
(Bm ≠ Bim). To falsify P all one needs to show is that it is possible that 
Bm is identical to Bim: ◊ Bm = Bim. It appears easy enough to do so. If it 
is possible that the development of an entity does not change the identity 
of that entity, then P is falsified. Since it is possible that development 
of an entity does not change its identity, namely, development does not 
change the what that it is (Stith, 2014), then P is falsified. I should note 
that the BT experiments described above do not justify holding that it is 
necessarily the case that Bm is not identical to Bim. The intuition is that 
once Jack’s brain matures, his capacities, thoughts, beliefs, etc., serve as 
reliable evidence for tracking Jack through time and change. Nothing fol-
lows about whether or not Jack could have preexisted the actualization 
of consciousness.
The Unity Argument aims to show that there are good reasons against 
dissociating human beings and persons. In what follows I argue that there 
are no persuasive reasons for the dissociation. In this regard I return to 
the BT experiments and address the lessons learned from them. My aim is 
modest in what follows, which is to show that the balance of plausibility 
is on the side of the substance view, enough to set the presumptions noted 
later on abortion and embryo-destructive research.
Critique of the BT Experiments
The intuition that Jack survives is wholly dependent upon there being 
a continuity of Jack’s thoughts, beliefs, and intentions. McMahan 
rightly notes that we should resist thinking that Jack is identical to a set 
of thoughts, beliefs, and intentions for we can easily imagine that Jack 
exists, believes, or thinks something different from what he does. We 
might appeal to Jack’s beliefs as evidence that the person he is persisted 
through the brain transplant operation. So far, we learn that BT examples 
motivate what counts as sufficient conditions for one person at t1 being 
identical to another person at t2. McMahan is sensitive to this train of 
thought, which is why he exploits the deprogramming example. What is 
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necessary for being the same person is the persistence of one’s functional 
brain which must include an exercisable capacity for consciousness.
But which one of the thought experiments motivates the intuition 
that the persistence of exercisable psychological capacities is necessary 
for being a person? Neither the brain transplant example nor the depro-
gramming example invite us to have the intuition that having exercisable 
psychological capacities is an essential feature of being a person. If Jack 
were to suffer deprogramming of the specific contents of his mental life 
but retain a capacity for consciousness, we would say that Jack still 
exists. But this too seems only to support a sufficiency condition – if Jack 
retains his exercisable capacity for consciousness he still exists. We might 
have the intuition that Jack ceases to exist if he permanently loses this 
capacity – for example, if Jack suffers whole-brain death. But there is no 
disagreement between psychological accounts and the substance theorist 
on that claim.
Maybe the thought experiments are not meant to motivate neces-
sary conditions at all; rather, reflection on the meaning of terms does 
that. Mary Anne Warren (1973) suggests this when she says that “I con-
sider this claim [that persons must have consciousness and a developed 
capacity to reason] to be so obvious that I think anyone who denied 
it . . . would thereby demonstrate that he had no notion at all of what a 
person is” (Warren, 1973, 56, emphasis added). The intended use of BT 
examples may not be to motivate necessary conditions for being a per-
son. The real reason why psychological criteria are necessary for being 
a person is because of one’s own intuitions on what ‘person’ means. For 
the purposes of my overall argument in this book, it is enough to observe 
that such basic intuitions on what counts as a person are rebutted by 
the intuitions highlighted in the too-many-thinkers problem. There is no 
privileged status that one’s semantic intuitions should hold after exploring 
the conceptual consequences of those intuitions.
The chief lesson I wish to convey, however, is that the intuitions 
the BT examples generate are innocuous. We already know prior to the 
BT examples that the developed human brain supports consciousness. 
That Jack survives due to a continuity of his psychological powers is an 
interesting observation but fails to motivate a specific view of personal 
identity. Most views on personal identity will grant that continuity of 
one’s psychological powers is a sufficient condition for personal identity. 
When Sydney Shoemaker first proposed the BT example, he observed 
that the intuitions it generates are consistent with materialist concep-
tions of persons. The behaviorist could accept the transplant intuition 
and yet maintain “that all the properties of persons can be regarded as 
physical properties (behavioral dispositions and so forth) and that there 
is therefore an important sense in which persons are material objects” 
(Shoemaker, 1963, 26). And we may suppose that the intuitions we learn 
from the BT examples are consistent with a Cartesian dualism. The only 
78 Foundational Matters
conclusion that follows is that psychological continuity is a sufficient 
condition for remaining the same person. Nothing in the BT examples, 
however, entail that human beings just are functional human brains.
BT Examples as Arguments against the Substance View
I have argued that the BT examples do not motivate the functional brain 
view on personal identity. But maybe the BT examples are not arguments 
for this view but rather arguments against other views, like the substance 
view. If the intuitions the BT examples invite us to have cannot be accom-
modated by the substance view, then the functional brain view wins by 
default. So, can the substance view accommodate the intuitions that the 
BT examples invite us to have?21
For the substance view, an entity has a nature, i.e., a substantial form 
that makes that entity be the kind of thing it is with the proto-typical 
powers of that kind. When we transplant Jack’s brain into John’s (for-
mer) body, we only know it is Jack that wakes up after the transplant 
because he can tell us what Jack thought, believed, and intended prior 
to the transplant. The intuition that Jack still exists is readily explained 
by the persistence of his psychological powers. Such persistence is suffi-
cient for personal identity on the substance view. The brainless body left 
behind differs from the human embryo in that the former cannot develop 
psychological capacities, but the latter regularly does.
A proponent of the substance view can concur with all these obser-
vations in so far as there is a continuity of Jack’s psychological powers 
and these are sufficient for personhood. The only twist is that on the 
substance view, powers do not exist without a concrete substance that 
realizes these powers. What is important for the substance view is that 
those powers themselves, in this entity, need explaining. The reason this 
entity has such capacities in the first place is that it has a rational nature. 
The nature of a substance S explains why S is the way it is, develops the 
way it does, and has the capacities it does. As Lear remarks, “‘The why’ 
is an objective feature of the world; it is that about which we ought 
to be curious if we wish to understand a thing” (Lear, 1988, 26). In 
the BT experiments, the concrete substance is Jack, not a psychological 
power. And we know it to be Jack because he shares his thoughts – i.e., 
the evidence question. The conclusion that Jack’s existence requires an 
exercisable capacity for consciousness rooted in a functional brain sim-
ply does not follow. Jack is not a functional brain, he is an entity with 
a functional brain.
At the very least, the intuitions we have in response to the BT examples 
are not exclusive motivations for the functional brain view. The substance 
view would agree that it is in fact Jack who wakes up post-transplant, 
and it would explain that intuition simply by noting that there is a conti-
nuity of Jack’s powers characteristic of a developed human being.22
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The difference between substance and functional brain accounts of the 
person should not be understood as the former emphasizing bodily conti-
nuity and the latter emphasizing psychological continuity. Both accounts 
recognize that to be a human person, rationality is essential. The differ-
ence is that for the substance view, why S is the way S is, and develops 
the way she develops, is metaphysically fundamental. S’s formal nature 
is the principle of change and development, and makes S be the kind 
of thing S is, i.e., a rational entity. The explanatory arrow moves from 
the thing’s nature to the capacities it develops and has. The functional 
brain view privileges the actual exercise of psychological powers; the 
substance view privileges the entity that has those powers.
What is the ontological status of the decerebrate body once the brain 
has been removed? On the substance view, it no longer exists as a human 
being. It undergoes a substantial change in virtue of permanently losing 
those powers prototypical of human beings. Does this concession entail 
that the substance view is a functional brain view after all? The answer is 
no. Whereas you and I are not capacities, you and I may go out of exist-
ence if we permanently lose certain capacities.23 What you and I are on 
the one hand, and what functional potencies the loss of which serve as 
evidence for death on the other, are two different ontological categories 
for the substance view. If I permanently lack a heart rate, one may infer 
that I am dead; but I am not identical to a heart rate.
The differences between the substance and the functional brain views 
become more apparent when we consider issues at the beginning of life. 
The substance view is compatible with the functional brain view that 
Jack is John, and that the reason for thinking so is because there is a 
continuity of his psychological capacities. But sharing these convictions 
does not entail that persons do not come into existence until they can 
exercise rational activity. For the substance theorist, development does 
not introduce other distinct entities as its species-specific powers become 
exercisable, nor does it destroy the immediately preceding entity. It is even 
plausible to suppose that for any thought experiment which exploits our 
intuitions on adult persons, the substance theorist can agree with the func-
tional brain view and psychological accounts more generally on almost 
every detail and with the explanations for our intuitions (i.e., where the 
rational capacities go, there the person goes also). But the substance theo-
rist can admit all of this while rejecting the idea that the development of 
an entity involves the coming-to-be of another distinct entity.
Regarding the overall argument in this book, the principal problem 
with the BT and dicephalic twin thought experiments is that they under-
determine the positions on practical matters (e.g., abortion) that many 
proponents of the functional brain view think are permissible. A popu-
lar argument for the permissibility of abortion is to argue that unborn 
human beings are not persons. The notion of ‘person’ is a psychologi-
cal one according to which a person is identified with having a set of 
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psychological capacities: i.e., self-consciousness. As we have seen, this 
position is motivated by these thought experiments. Neither experiment, 
however, provides exclusive motivation for a psychological account; the 
functional brain and substance views are on epistemic par vis-à-vis these 
experiments. The lessons learned from such experiments are compatible 
with alternative accounts of the person: accounts which do not entail that 
unborn human beings are not persons. Consequently, the functional brain 
view is underdetermined vis-à-vis its use as a justification for permissible 
killing (Napier, 2015). (By underdetermined I mean that there is a view 
that is on par with its motivations that does not provide a justification for 
killing.) This argument assumes that all human beings, however nascent, 
should not be intentionally killed. To this premise we turn.
Notes
 1 There may be non-living primary substances, e.g., Zeus. The emphasis 
throughout is on living ones since my concern is bio-ethical.
 2 Two clarifications. First, the example of being alive stretches the notion of 
property beyond what I think is plausible, but my skepticism does not affect 
the main point in this chapter. Second, if post-mortem survival is possible, this 
claim might need more parsing such as understanding ‘you being alive’ post-
mortem as requiring a bodily resurrection (see Eberl, 2009).
 3 This example and several others mentioned here come from Scaltsas, 1994a.
 4 The notion of form is synonymous with a thing’s nature. A thing’s nature 
makes an entity be the kind of thing it is with its characteristic powers (for 
humans, rationality), developmental pattern (embryo–fetus–infant–, etc.), and 
morphological features (heart, lungs, bipedal, etc.). So, by form I do not mean 
merely shape or figure.
 5 See Plantinga (2007 and 2006). I am inclined to think that something like 
belief transfer is either irrelevant or impossible. It is true that you and I can 
have the same belief in terms of its propositional content. Both of us can 
believe that ‘it is raining outside.’ But it is unintelligible how you can have my 
belief that it is raining outside. If what gets duplicated is simply the content, 
we did not need a thought experiment to tell us that. If what gets duplicated 
is my belief, we are asked to imagine the incoherent.
 6 Throughout this chapter, I understand X is identical to Y as X is the same 
thing as Y. I should also note that I am assuming Wiggins’s defense of absolute 
identity (2001, chs 1 and 6).
 7 For why Aristotle’s teleological views are compatible with modern biology, 
see Austriaco (2004).
 8 See Napier (2015, 670 ff.) for a reply to McMahan’s dilemma (2002, 11 
ff.) for substance accounts of the person. See Henry (2008) and Bertalanffy 
(1952) for why the account I describe here is neither preformationist nor 
epiphenomenalist. See Tollefsen (2011) for further commentary. See Burke 
(1996) for why the potential for development as understood here is not sub-
ject to counterexample from parthenogenesis.
 9 For my analysis of the dicephalic twin example see Napier (2015, 666ff.) and 
my website for supplementary materials on this book.
 10 “Embodied mind” is McMahan’s term, but his view is a species of psychologi-
cal accounts in so far as McMahan makes having an exercisable psychological 
capacity an essential feature of being a person.
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 11 Examples include Warren (1973, 53) and Boonin (2002, 23ff); though, to 
Boonin’s credit, he surveys other more faithful understandings.
 12 It may be the case that the notion of person has greater extension than the 
notion of human being. That is, it may be the case that there are alien life 
forms or rational parrots that manifest rational capacities (which is suffi-
cient evidence for believing that they are persons) but they do not have the 
same morphological features or developmental trajectory as human beings 
(and therefore are not human substances). Likewise, McMahan’s Superchimp 
(2002, 147) receives a genetic enhancement after birth which enables it to 
develop rational capacities parallel to the trajectory of normal human infants. 
His handling of this case invites further clarifications made below about dis-
tinguishing the ‘what is it?’ question from the evidence question.
 13 I say “may not” to respect the diversity within psychological accounts of the 
person (i.e., Baker, 2000).
 14 For further defense of these claims see Garcia (2008) and Oderberg (2008a).
 15 The relevance of there not being any corpse is that we are concrete embodied 
entities. Because the dilemma involves whether the organism at the fetal stage 
dies or lives, the relata are both organisms. When organisms die, they typically 
leave behind corpses or at least we can discern an absence of functional-
ity. Neither is the case for the organism post consciousness. It is irrelevant 
to point out potential counterexamples of the following sort: if persons are 
identified with psychological capacities, and the brain loses its capacity to 
support psychological capacities the person would die without leaving behind 
a corpse. What is the error? The issue is not whether a person understood psy-
chologically would leave behind a corpse – of course it would not. The relata 
of the dilemma are organisms, so changing the kind of relata changes whether 
there being any corpse is relevant. Closer in relevance is nuclear annihilation 
of an organism. But this is not a counterexample either because annihilation 
is something more than mere death.
 16 Tooley’s kitten (1972, 60ff.), which receives a serum that causes it to develop 
rational capacities, seems to cease being a cat when it gains those rational 
capacities. This is not a counterexample since injecting a serum is not a natu-
ral developmental process. Another potential counterexample might be the 
extraction of a totipotent cell from the 4-cell embryo. Suppose the cell begins 
development qua human organism. Here it appears that the cell dies because 
‘it’ acquires an ability to function as a multicellular organism. I think that 
it is correct to say that the totipotent cell ceases to exist when an organ-
ism begins to exist. But the counterexample is not available to the embodied 
mind account of persons which grants that persons are parts of bodies – i.e., 
the organism continues to exist. To other theorists (possibly Lowe, 1991), I 
would say this: the gaining of an ability is not evidence that that thing which 
gained the ability has died. Granting that the person can come into being 
when an ability becomes actualized does not entail that the body the person 
now inhabits dies. Put another way, there is no reason to suppose that the 
evidence set for persons coming into being is identical to the evidence set for 
thinking that the pre-conscious organism dies.
 17 Suppose a pregnant woman abuses drugs and as a result the child that is born 
suffers serious cognitive defects. If the organism dies, then how can the harms 
caused by the illicit drug use persist? Presumably, the deleterious effects of 
the drug use affected the organism prior to consciousness. So if it died, there 
are no grounds we have for saying that the child was harmed by the mother’s 
drug use. But clearly he was.
 18 Locutions such as ‘the fetus’ can be confusing. Properly speaking, the fetus 
refers to the human being at the fetal stage of development. It is a phase 
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concept much like infant, toddler, juvenile, etc. So, every occurrence of ‘fetus’ 
should be understood as ‘human being at the fetal stage.’ It would be too 
cumbersome and with no gain in clarity to state the latter for every occur-
rence of the former. On this same point, the symbol = should be interpreted 
per Wiggins (2001) as ‘the same substance as’ and ≠ as ‘not the same.’
 19 DeGrazia (2005) and Boonin (2002) would agree with me to this point. They 
hold that you and I come into existence either at conception or shortly there-
after, but we do not have a right to life at every point in our existence. Our 
moral views differ as will become apparent in Chapters 6 and 7.
 20 I do not discuss Baker’s constitution views (2000 and 2005). This is a decision 
based strictly on space. See my website for supplementary material.
 21 In what follows, I am indebted to Hershenov (2011, 469ff and 2008a, 491ff.).
 22 In anticipation of our discussion on abortion, I should also observe that the 
BT examples do not motivate a view that you and I come into existence only 
when we develop exercisable psychological capacities. That Jack survives the 
transplant after he has developed psychological powers (in virtue of a con-
tinuity of such powers) does not entail that he does not exist prior to the 
development of those powers. If, for example, the nature of an entity is not 
identical to the exercisable capacities it has but to the thing that develops 
and has those capacities, BT examples tell us nothing about when you and I 
begin to exist. I suppose that in order to motivate ‘beginning’ intuitions, one 
might consider brain transplants at the fetal stage of existence. I doubt the 
plausibility of such a project. Consider abortion survivors who were severely 
injured by the attempted abortion. They survive, but with lifelong disabilities 
and injuries. The intuition is that such abortion survivors were harmed by the 
abortion. But if they were harmed by the abortion, they must have existed 
when the abortion was attempted. Genetic manipulation of a gamete is not a 
counterexample to this if we keep straight the kinds of harms suffered. I can 
be harmed by congenital malformations to my father’s sperm prior to my 
existence. But I cannot suffer battery prior to existing.
 23 PVS patients are not dead on my account for several reasons, one of which 
is the possibility of covert consciousness (see Owen, 2013, and Monti et al., 
2010). So, even on psychological accounts, one cannot be sure that they do 
not exist as persons.
5 Human Dignity
The reflections so far support the view that you and I are essentially 
human beings. We develop certain capacities in accordance with the 
developmental plan prototypical of our species – but we are doing 
the developing. One might say correctly that we have the potency for 
consciousness as soon as we come into existence, since we are at that 
point the kind of thing that self-develops to the point at which that 
power is exercisable. Though we are not identical to our capacities, it 
is correct to say that we have such capacities. You and I no more come 
into existence when we developed the capacity for consciousness than 
an eagle comes into existence when it flies away from its nest for the first 
time. The key question confronting us now is whether you and I have 
dignity or inherent worth whenever you and I exist? Can you and I gain 
or lose inherent worth?
There are at least two difficulties facing any commentator on the 
notion of human dignity. The first is that it is questionable whether 
human dignity picks out a single property or feature that makes humans 
worthy. Pre-theoretical intuitions indicate that there are any number of 
things, properties, or features that are valuable about the human person. 
This suggests that human dignity might be a covering concept that func-
tions like the notion of justification in epistemology. In epistemology, 
what counts as a justified belief varies widely. Some say that a justified 
belief requires having been produced by reliable cognitive faculties, by 
properly functioning faculties, or by acts of intellectual virtue, or that 
it must have adequate grounds, etc. Each of these properties of a belief 
(e.g., adequate grounds, produced by a reliable faculty, etc.) picks out 
a valuable property or feature of what we want in our beliefs. They are 
as Alston (2005) notes, epistemic desiderata. But rather than thinking 
that justification is reducible to any one property or feature, justification 
should be viewed as an umbrella concept which includes any number 
of epistemic desiderata the realization of which helps us attain truth. It 
is implausible to suppose, for example, that a justified belief must have 
adequate grounds and any other property (such as being reliably formed) 
is completely irrelevant.
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A similar line of thought applies to dignity. Those commenting on 
dignity – broadly construed – have widely divergent views on what marks 
or ‘grounds’ human worth (Sulmasy, 2008; Dworkin, 2013; Lee & 
George, 2008; McMahan, 2002) and a similar diversity regarding what 
moral injunctions follow from such worth (Rosen, 2018, 100ff.). What 
each proposal identifies is one aspect of human worth, like looking at a 
majestic mountain from different sides and altitudes. Human worth is 
spherical, if you will, and any inquiry into its nature and scope requires 
orbiting it and appreciating the different aspects of it. It is not false that 
human beings are rendered worthy in virtue of having interests, but that 
is not the only aspect of our worth. Instead of thinking that our worth is 
grounded in any one property or feature, we should see it as an umbrella 
concept that covers several aspects of our value. In what follows I wish to 
take the reader around the mountain and orbit the human person to piece 
together a more comprehensive view of our worth. In so doing, my treat-
ment emerges as much more ecumenical than accounts that focus on any 
one property or feature because my treatment does not deny that those 
features are valuable. The present account pays attention to our irre-
placeable value and preciousness – explained below. So, whereas human 
worth functions as an umbrella concept; for my purposes here dignity 
refers to our irreplaceable value and preciousness. My focus distinguishes 
my project from related discourses on well-being, welfare, and happiness 
(see pages 101–103 below).
A second difficulty in thinking about dignity specifically is how to 
frame the inquiry from the start. Typically the metaphor of ‘grounding’ 
is used to frame the discussion. What grounds human dignity?1 What 
makes a person have human dignity? In virtue of what does a person have 
dignity? The terms ‘grounds,’ ‘makes,’ and ‘in virtue of what?’ invite the 
idea that the worth of a person is based on something else that makes the 
person worthy. As such, the metaphor of grounding, etc., invites answers 
that attempt to pick out a property or feature of the human person. If 
one assumes such a starting point, a human person may not have the 
‘right’ property or feature. As such the very way in which the question is 
asked presupposes that it is possible for a person to lose or gain dignity 
specifically and moral worth generally. The metaphors of grounding or 
making, then, assume controversial answers to important questions right 
from the start; and they necessarily constrain the answers we can offer 
to the question.
Change the metaphor and one changes the trajectory of inquiry. This 
can be seen more clearly on the issue of organ donation. Consider the 
following way in which we can understand the ethics of organ donation: 
how can we increase the supply of organs without violating a stakehold-
er’s rights? By focusing on rights, answers to the question are already 
constrained and the inquiry focuses on what rights there are. We can 
increase the supply by any means that do not violate a stakeholder’s rights. 
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This may include any number of options from selling one’s organs to 
routine salvaging post-mortem (Delaney & Hershenov, 2009). Notice 
how differently one thinks about the issue if we ask the question the fol-
lowing way: how can we love our community better? When the notions of 
love, the common good, and gift are central features of the ethical frame, 
a different set of answers are brought into relief.
In what follows, I avoid asking the question about what grounds human 
dignity since that invites answers in the form of properties or features, 
which the person may gain or lose.2 The question already presupposes 
that dignity is an accidental feature of you and me, and not inherent 
in the fact that we are. By asking the question that way one presupposes 
that a human being could exist without having dignity, an incredible 
assumption to make at the start of one’s inquiry.3 Furthermore, the end 
result of such an inquiry cannot but place dignity in the wrong place, 
namely in the properties or functions of the person but not in the person. 
Following Brewer (2009) and Gaita (2004) I avoid phrasing a starting 
question at all and instead focus on narratives and certain emotive states 
as a way to shine a light onto the preciousness and irreplaceability of the 
human person. In this way, the metaphor of orbiting the person is more 
apt to describe my procedure.
Two Tasks and a Note on Method
Suppose I believe that it is wrong to do x on a human being in circum-
stance C. Suppose I explain my moral intuition by grounding it in the 
notion of intrinsic dignity. For example, the reason why it might be wrong 
to rape a patient in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is because human 
beings have inherent worth that does not go away simply because she or 
he is unconscious. My interlocutor has a choice on whether to agree with 
my intuition and explanation, or to disagree with either one or both. For 
the latter disjunct, she could reject the notion of intrinsic dignity and hold 
that it is permissible to rape PVS patients if they are in fact permanently 
unconscious. She could agree that it seems impermissible, but our intui-
tions on such a case are subject to an error theory.4 As such, our intuition 
that the action is immoral does not support the idea that the patient 
really has intrinsic dignity. Third, she could explain our intuition that it 
is wrong with reference to the rape being a violation of the patient’s ideal 
interests. Finally,5 she could say that it is a case of harmless wrongdoing 
much like it would be wrong to disrespect a dead person’s body – no one 
is harmed, but it is a wrong action nonetheless. All explanations except 
the first are consistent with the intuition that it is wrong to rape a PVS 
patient but explaining why does not necessarily involve invoking intrinsic 
dignity.6 If this were our dialectical situation, adjudicating our disagree-
ment would be onerous indeed, but this hardly entails that dignity is not 
in truth the best explanation (see Diamond, 1982).
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One subtext of my argument in this chapter is to suggest that the 
dialectical situation is not as intractable as I have just described. The pri-
mary tasks in this chapter are to motivate through narratives and certain 
emotive states (e.g., grief, remorse, etc.) the presence of dignity in every 
human being. The second task is to argue that those accounts of human 
worth that focus on having certain exercisable abilities or interests do 
not rebut or challenge the account of dignity that I offer in this chapter. 
They only function as rebuttals or challenges if they claim that human 
worth is only a function of having certain exercisable abilities or inter-
ests. The arguments for this ‘only’ clause are, however, insufficient and 
recapitulate the problems of a monistic account of justification. As such 
the presence of intrinsic dignity in every human being is a much more 
ecumenical position than has previously been recognized.
The method used to get to this conclusion is through narrative and 
reflection on certain emotive states. A satisfactory defense of why such 
a method will deliver the promised epistemic goods I leave to Stump 
(2010, chs 2 and 3), Nussbaum (1990, chs 2 and 5), and the discus-
sion on acquaintance knowledge in Roberts and Wood (2008, 50ff.) and 
Baldwin (2003). Presently, I follow Gaita’s work (2004) because it incor-
porates these methods in his account of human dignity (i.e., preciousness 
and irreplaceability). Gaita illustrates this method nicely quoting from 
Simone Weil, “if I light an electric torch at night out-of-doors I don’t 
judge its power by looking at the bulb, but by seeing how many objects it 
lights up” (2004, xxx). His point is that saintly love, his term, performs 
this function of lighting up the inherent worth of those around us. This 
is clearly not a method by which one picks out properties or features, but 
it is meant to attune one’s own moral perception to the person. Another 
way to understand the difference in methods is that the typical approach 
focuses on propositions about value, but the focus revolves around prop-
ositions, not persons. What narratives and emotive states offer is to shine 
a light on the human person in order to see our preciousness and irre-
placeability in vivo, so to speak.
But there is another advantage to providing narratives as a means of 
contact with the values to which those narratives point. As pointed out in 
Chapter 2, we are not detached observers who reflect without any poten-
tial brumous influences on our ability to see value. We judge something 
as good or bad because we resonate with it or we have lived our lives in 
light of such values. But the faculty by which we assess value may need 
sharpening. Narratives and reflecting on emotive states can function as 
acuminating our perception of moral value (see Little, 1995).
Dignity: Three Aspects
Whatever has dignity has at least three aspects to its worth. First, things 
with dignity have inherent worth, which means that a thing has this worth 
whether the thing believes it or not. Assuming human beings have dignity, 
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human beings have a worth that does not go away when we become sick, 
disabled, or even unconscious. It does not go away in the grips of suicidal-
ity. Remy Debes observes that “Human dignity, if it exists, and whatever 
else it may be, isn’t something that must be earned or bequeathed” (Debes, 
2009, 47). Similarly, Gómez-Lobo and Keown (2015) entertain an anal-
ogy between eyesight, intelligence, and one’s life. Eyesight is inherently 
good even if I come to see horrible things, intelligence is inherently good 
even if I come to believe falsehoods, and I am inherently good even if I 
come to experience bad things. Thus, a person’s inherent worth is not 
affected by the quality of the person’s life experiences, it is unearned and 
not bequeathed by other human persons. The love lost teenager, though 
depressed and possibly suicidal, retains inherent worth. Inherent worth 
grounds why a suicidal patient’s assessment of his own worth can be false.
Having inherent worth is not a gradable worth; it only captures the 
intuition that our worth is an objective feature.7
Second, human dignity entails having equal worth, which means that 
your worth is the same as any person’s worth no matter what their or 
your social position is. This is not to say that relative to some measures, 
certain people in society are more important. Triage protocols in the set-
ting of a pandemic give preference to health care workers, police officers, 
and fire fighters. On my view the notion of dignity should capture the 
idea of equal worth across all things that have dignity. The claim about 
equal dignity is simply that it would be equally wrong to insult a police 
officer as much as it would be to insult a homeless person; or to murder 
a health care worker as much as to murder a patient. The virtue of com-
mutative justice for Thomas Aquinas or the emphasis on impartiality in 
modern moral theory assumes this very feature of dignity. Focusing on 
properties and features of the person do not figure in our thinking on jus-
tice and fairness. In fact, we avoid indexing a person’s worth with respect 
to them; racism and sexism are examples.
If all human persons did not have equal worth, treating them impar-
tially or in light of commutative justice would not make sense. Dignity 
plays no favorites. Leon Kass has an instructive observation about the 
equal worth of human life applied to medicine.
In clinical medicine, a primary ethical focus is on the need to respect 
the equal worth and dignity of each patient at every stage of his or her 
life—regardless of race, class or gender, condition of body and mind, 
severity of illness, nearness to death, or ability to pay for services 
rendered. Defenders of human dignity rightly insist that every patient 
deserves . . . equal respect in speech and deed and equal considera-
tion regarding the selection of appropriate treatment. Moreover, 
they also rightly insist that no life is to be deemed worthier than 
another and that under no circumstances should we look upon a fel-
low human being as if he or she . . . deserves to be made dead.
(Kass, 2008, 300)
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Pairing these two features of human dignity together supports the intui-
tion that human dignity explains a number of our moral intuitions 
including why discrimination, of any sort, is wrong; why murder and 
rape, of any one, are wrong; and even why arrogance or hubris towards 
anyone is wrong.
The latter two are interesting in that other accounts of human worth 
cannot explain why these attitudes are wrong. For example, the value 
of autonomy cannot account for why arrogance is wrong since it is not 
obvious that being arrogant would necessarily involve a deprivation of 
one’s own autonomy or that of others. Suppose I simply harbor an arro-
gant attitude towards others but never act on it in ways that limit their 
autonomy. If our worth were wholly exhausted by having autonomy, 
it would seem permissible to act on my arrogance towards those who 
really are compromised in their autonomy, e.g., the mentally disabled, 
the socially disenfranchised, etc. Similar things can be said about inter-
ests. It would not violate someone’s interests to think of them as inferior 
to you. In fact, if we focus on interest-satisfaction as being solely valu-
able, not acting on one’s arrogance or hubris would violate the other’s 
interests if the other had interests to be treated in inferior ways, e.g., a 
dwarf consenting to being thrown for amusement or a prostitute. Such 
a result is deeply counterintuitive. Dwarf-throwing and prostitution are 
cases of someone consenting to be treated as inferior but a violation of 
interests cannot account for why the arrogance of the throwers and the 
exploitation by the ‘Johns’ is immoral.
There is a third aspect of dignity according to which you and I are 
precious and our worth is irreplaceable. This aspect will take longer to 
explain but represents the distinctive features of Brewer’s (2009) and 
Gaita’s (2004) projects. In what follows I consider, in order, remorse, 
grief, and love as vectors by which we can apprehend someone’s irre-
placeable value and preciousness.
Remorse, Gaita argues, shines a light onto the irreplaceable worth of 
the one who has been wronged. We can see this in a backhanded way 
by first considering whether the typical explanations for wrongdoing in 
modern moral philosophy capture precisely what the remorseful person 
responds to. We cannot imagine the remorseful person responding, with-
out parody, as
What have I done? I have violated the social compact, agreed behind 
a veil of ignorance. What have I done? I ruined my best chances of 
flourishing. What have I done? I have violated the rational nature in 
another? What have I done? I have violated the ideal interests of an 
autonomous agent.8
Such responses border on parody if they are meant to account for the 
content of a person’s remorse. Rather, the remorseful person comes to 
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have a lucid grasp of having wronged a person. And what a remorseful 
person understands as wrong need not be reducible to harm, but could 
involve, as with a repentant arrogant person, a lucid realization that oth-
ers are fundamentally equal to oneself.
The nature and etiology of this lucid realization can be seen clearly 
regarding a woman who regrets her abortion. I deliberately choose a 
controversial example to illustrate the point that the lucid realization is 
in some sense basic – one cannot argue to it, but rather from it – and it 
bypasses mockery. As recounted in Abby Johnson and Kristin Detrow’s 
(2016) book The Walls are Talking: Former Abortion Clinic Workers 
Tell Their Stories, one worker recounts her experience with a patient 
whom she names Angie. Angie was in her mid-30s and had shown up 
for her ninth abortion procedure. As recounted, the clinic workers were 
disturbed not only that this was her ninth abortion, but also with Angie’s 
levity and rather picayune manner with which she conducted herself. 
Angie was such a seasoned veteran that she refused any sedation for her 
procedure and conversed with the doctor throughout it, at one point 
saying “be careful down there Doc. I might want to have children one 
day” (Johnson & Detrow, 2016, 72). Angie seemed proud of her indiffer-
ence and jovial manner, which made even the veteran abortion workers 
uncomfortable. After the procedure, Angie asked to see the remains say-
ing “I’ve had it done so many times, I might as well know what it looks 
like” (Johnson & Detrow, 2016, 74). Apparently, Angie had not asked 
for this before. The worker proceeded to the “products of conception” 
lab, located the thirteen-week-old baby, arranged the pieces, and placed 
the remains on a table next to Angie’s recliner for her to see. As recounted 
by the worker,
When her eyes traveled to the container, she gasped sharply, and 
for the first time since she had arrived, Angie was utterly silent. A 
few moments later her entire body shuddered and gooseflesh was 
raised on her smooth brown arms. When she reached out her hand 
to touch the baby, I tried to pull the dish away. She grabbed my 
wrist and stopped me. We were both silent for a few moments as she 
continued to stare at the contents of the dish. I stepped back, Angie 
fell forward to her knees, her fingers still wrapped around my wrist. 
The other girls in the recovery room began to take notice, and my 
discomfort level rose exponentially . . . She remained frozen on the 
clinic floor. “That’s a baby,” she said, barely audible at first. “That 
was my baby,” she said. Her volume steadily increased as a torrent 
of words poured from her mouth.
(Johnson & Detrow, 2016, 75)9
The feeling of remorse for Angie, who had no prior pro-life sympathies, 
corresponded to a lucid grasp that the remains in the dish was her child. 
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‘What have I done? I have killed something with weak psychologi-
cal unity relations’ hardly captures the content of Angie’s remorse. 
What Angie’s remorse lit up for her was the preciousness of her child. 
Whether Angie’s remorse is apposite will have to be settled below 
(Chapter 6). What is uncontestable is that Angie saw her baby, and this 
from someone who, seconds before, considered abortion rather per fun-
ctory and beyond moral critique. One should not be too quick to discount 
or invalidate Angie’s perceptions.10
Gaita’s point in analyzing remorse is to bring into relief the fact that 
various accounts of wrongdoing on offer in contemporary moral theory 
border on parody. The principal reason why is because “the individual 
who has been wronged and who haunts the wrongdoer in his remorse has 
disappeared from sight” (2004, xxii). The preciousness of the individual 
is lit up by the remorse of having wronged him or her. The argument 
here is that remorse is a common emotion that is apposite in many cases. 
If the object of remorse turns out to be the preciousness of the person, 
remorse functions as a periscope by which one glimpses human worth.11 
We might be submerged in a theory of rights, or in a time-relative inter-
est account, but remorse lights up the worth of this human being in ways 
untouched by these theories. Talbot Brewer observes that if we were to 
express our remorse by saying “what have I done? I have killed a sentient 
being capable of forming and pursuing long-term projects and commit-
ments” (2009, 172) we have given a response that borders on parody.
A potential contender to Gaita’s reflections might be interest accounts 
of harm. As Beauchamp and Childress (2001, 148) observe, “These argu-
ments [for what counts as wrongdoing] suggest that causing a person’s 
death is morally wrong, when it is wrong, because an unauthorized inter-
vention thwarted or set back a person’s interests.” At issue is not whether 
we feel remorse. The challenge is to argue that the remorse or regret is a 
function not of some nebulous preciousness of the person, but simply a 
function of having violated the person’s interests.
In reply, the interest accounts of harm and wrongdoing fail to avoid 
parody or are simply counterintuitive. Consider friendship or parent-
ing in which the growth of the friendship or parent–child relationship 
requires, at times, confronting and even thwarting the interests of the 
friend/child. When we do not try to dissuade a loved one from a wrong-
headed decision and the friend/child is injured or significantly harmed 
from it, we feel apposite remorse precisely because we did acquiesce to 
their interests.12 In such a case remorse cannot be understood as lighting 
up the value of someone’s interests – quite the opposite. The only way 
to avoid such a result is to argue that the friend and parent in such cases 
ought not to feel remorse. That would be a counterintuitive position. 
Again, consider a penitent murderer who appreciates the wrongness of 
her actions. If the object of her remorse is expressible as having coun-
tervailed the interests of another, she has missed the moral reality of her 
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action. Whereas, if she understands her actions as having killed him, “I 
have eliminated his existence,” we should be content with her response as 
being accordant to the gravity of her offense. So, in many cases, remorse 
lights up the individual preciousness of the one wronged.
Consider next, grief. Brewer (2009, 174) observes that “mature grief 
at the death of a loved one involves an awareness . . . that nothing could 
represent a compensation for what has been lost. Consolation might 
be possible, but compensation is not.” We do not mourn the loss of a 
person’s capacities, properties, or features. A person might be risible, 
gregarious, and affable, but we do not mourn the loss of risibility, gre-
gariousness, and affability. Nor is it necessarily the case that we love 
the person because of those features. “But grief is not just a generic pro 
attitude towards an irretrievable entity with a certain set of natural prop-
erties; grief lights up its lost object as having had a very particular sort 
of value” (2009, 176, emphasis mine). Brewer’s point is that the object 
of grief cannot be a property or feature of the person, but must be the 
person herself. Grief presupposes that something of value has been lost, 
not just the absence of good experiences. It follows that grief lights up the 
individual preciousness of the person.
Finally, consider love. When someone loves me, he does not love a 
feature or a property of me, but he loves me.13 Gaita recounts a story 
from Primo Levi who relates the story of his last days in Auschwitz when 
Russian artillery rounds could be heard in the distance. After years of suf-
fering, liberation was a few weeks away. One of the prisoners below his 
bunk was named Ladmaker. Ladmaker was a 17-year-old Dutch Jew who 
suffered from typhus and scarlet fever in succession, and a cardiac anom-
aly was developing. Additionally, because of his sickness and malnutrition 
he was bedbound and formed bedsores such that he could only lie on his 
stomach. He was always hungry, in spite of his fevers, and no one in his 
compound could understand Dutch which made caring for him difficult. 
One night, Ladmaker crawled out of his bed in an attempt to make it to 
the latrine. He was so weak, he fell to the ground sobbing in despair and 
pain. Levi then tells us how a bunkmate named Charles responded.
Charles lit the lamp . . . and we were able to ascertain the gravity of 
the incident. The boy’s bed and the floor were filthy. The smell in 
the small area was rapidly becoming unsupportable. We had but a 
minimum supply of water and neither blankets nor straw mattresses 
to spare. And the poor wretch, suffering from typhus, formed a ter-
rible source of infection, while he certainly could not be left all night 
to groan and shiver in the cold in the middle of the filth.
Charles climbed down from his bed and dressed in silence. While 
I held the lamp, he cut all the dirty patches from the straw mattress 
and the blankets with a knife. He lifted Ladmaker from the ground 
with the tenderness of a mother, cleaned him as best as possible with 
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straw taken from the mattress and lifted him into the remade bed 
in the only position in which the unfortunate fellow could lie. He 
scraped the floor with a scrap of tin plate, diluted a little chloramine 
and finally spread disinfectant over everything, including himself.
(Gaita, 2004, xvi)
Gaita observes that Charles’s actions could be classified as supereroga-
tory, which they were. But the goodness of the action is not exhausted by 
the concept of duty, or supererogation. It is not exhausted either by the 
consequences of the action, namely, Ladmaker’s comfort to the extent 
that he could possibly be comforted. An SS officer could have provided 
such comfort but still think all along that Ladmaker should die in the gas 
chambers. What Charles did was act tenderly towards another human 
being in the midst of extreme hardship and suffering. “Goodness, won-
der, purity, love” (Gaita, 2004, xvii) are concepts that better capture the 
moral landscape than concepts that describe Charles’s actions as beyond 
duty, or results in good outcomes, or satisfies Ladmaker’s interests. “The 
wonder of what Charles did is that he responded fully to Ladmaker’s 
degradation . . . while affirming Ladmaker’s undiminished humanity” 
(Gaita, 2004, xix, emphasis mine). Narratives like the one Levi hands 
down to us invite us to see through affliction and disability to the irre-
placeable worth of the sufferer. What did Charles see? To what did he 
respond? A plausible explanation is that he saw clearly that the suffering 
of Ladmaker was bad; but with greater acuity he saw that Ladmaker 
retained inherent worth. Speaking specifically about affliction, Simone 
Weil makes a similar observation; seeing the other’s value – to love the 
afflicted without condescension – is a “miracle greater than walking on 
water” (Weil, 1968, 172). Weil and Gaita are urging us to look more 
closely at the irreplaceable person as being animated with inherent value 
while at the same time immersed in affliction or disability.
What is it to condescend? Loving the afflicted without condescension 
involves apprehending the inherent worth of the person despite the bru-
mous effects of the person’s sufferings or ‘low quality of life’ as we say. 
Conversely, to condescend involves the following.
To look on a life as one in which it is unintelligible that there should 
be meaning is to see it as empty of what is distinctively human. It is 
worse than merely to see it as empty of goods and opportunities . . . If 
we find it unintelligible that anything could matter to someone living 
such a life, then we cannot think that any evil done to him, or by him, 
can go deeper with him.
(Gaita, 2004, 194)
This is not to say that condescension is not understandable. In response 
to patients experiencing terminal delirium, for example, it is tempting to 
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see nothing but their affliction. However, like Ladmaker, and many oth-
ers, there exists someone with undiminished humanity.
The reason this insight is a “miracle” for Weil is because it requires 
such perspicuous moral acuity. Loving the afflicted and disabled without 
condescension involves not having the thought that the afflicted would 
be better off dead or not having been born at all. Reflecting on Saint 
Theresa of Calcutta’s work, Gaita notes that her compassion “expressed 
the denial that affliction could . . . make a person’s life worthless” (Gaita, 
2004, 202). Such a love without condescension invokes wonder for Gaita 
and is miraculous for Weil not merely because the actions are meritori-
ous, supererogatory, admirable, or that they issue from good motives or 
intentions. “The wonder which is in response to her [Saint Theresa] is 
not a wonder at her, but a wonder that human life could be as her love 
revealed it to be” (Gaita, 2004, 205). What Charles’s actions and Saint 
Theresa’s life advert us to is just how valuable those persons are about 
whom their loving activities were oriented. There is an adaequation 
between Saint Theresa’s love for the afflicted and the beloved’s precious-
ness. Her love reveals to us what might have been obfuscated otherwise, 
namely, the depth and comprehensive value ‘still remaining,’ if you will, 
in the afflicted and disabled. Saint Theresa’s love reveals that her patients 
were “fully our equals” (Gaita, 2004, xiii). Saintly love performs a rev-
elatory role. Certainly, saintly love provides fodder for philosophical 
reflection on moral heroism and supererogatory action. But it would 
be cutting the inquiry short if we stopped there. Saintly love is meant 
to sharpen our own moral acuity. “Sometimes we see that something is 
precious only in the light of someone’s love for it” (Gaita, 2004, xxiv). 
Recounting stories of love is primarily meant to have us see more lucidly 
what the lover sees.
What is it, then, that has dignity? Quite simply, you and I do. 
Endorsing a similar view but defending it by other means, Patrick Lee 
and Robert George remark that, “all human beings have real dignity 
simply because they are persons” (2008, 411). So long as we exist, 
we are precious, irreplaceable, inherently valuable, and equally worth-
while. What then is the relationship between dignity and our existence? 
Following Gloria Zuniga, I hold that dignity and the person are a 
two-item Sachverhalte. Zuniga, following Wittgenstein, “describes 
Sachverhalte as thinkable configurations of objects that stand in a 
determinate relation to each other . . . A speck must have some color, 
a tone some pitch, and an object of the sense of touch some hardness” 
(Zuniga, 2004, 122). Dignity is in the person as pitch is in a tone or 
hardness in an object of touch. Our inherent worth may be absent only if 
we do not exist. Though the object and its hardness are not identical, so 
too having worth is not identical to existing – the two are co-extensive 
but not co-intensive. One cannot be found without the other. Certain 
valuable functions, such as reasoning, and taking an interest in certain 
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projects and plans, are valuable. And those who are able to engage in 
such functioning are certainly valuable. But the dignity of the person 
cannot be localized to actualizing a function or property. Dignity is, 
rather, a dimension of the individual person.
We should be careful in saying, however, that you and I have inher-
ent dignity because we are individuals with a rational nature. There are 
at least three ways to understand the ‘because’ in such a claim. First, 
‘because’ can be understood as referencing a cause, as in ‘Joe hit a 
homerun because he hit the ball hard.’ ‘Because’ may also reference an 
explanation as in ‘Neo took the red pill because he wanted to get out 
of the Matrix.’ Finally, ‘because’ may delineate a more comprehensive 
understanding of a thing as when we say that this child will develop 
functional rational capacities because it is a human being; this piece of 
metal is gold because it has atomic number 79; and x boils at 212 degrees 
at sea level because it is H2O. The relationship between, for example, 
having atomic number 79 and being gold is entirely unlike the relation-
ship between hitting a ball and scoring a home run. One might say that 
discourse on moral status uses ‘because’ in the first or second senses as in 
‘this person has moral status because she takes an interest in continued 
living.’ Having an interest causes or explains why she has moral status. 
On my view, dignity is something that we have because of what we are, 
not because of what we can do.
Arguing for this claim cannot be done by asking what is it that ‘makes’ 
us have dignity since doing so already assumes that you and I could exist 
without it; such a question assumes a bifurcation between properties or 
functions that are valuable on the one hand and persons on the other. 
The argument for my claim proceeds by tuning our moral antenna to the 
moral frequencies, if you will, that dignity sends out. Such tuning requires 
recapitulating narratives and reflecting on certain emotive states – on 
the assumption that certain emotions are ways of apprehending value 
(Pizarro, 2000; Little, 1995; Zagzebski, 2004). Properties, functions, 
and the capacity to take an interest in x are all abstract and impersonal, 
Ladmaker is not. Narratives and reflection on emotive states bequeath a 
knowledge of persons as worthy.
Discharging Misunderstandings
There are several misunderstandings of this view of dignity that I should 
address before relating it to alternatives. The first misunderstanding is 
that human dignity as I understand it here is specieist which, to some, is 
just as bad as being racist or sexist. Properly understood, an account of 
human dignity according to which all human beings have inherent and 
equal worth can be perfectly compatible with a view that all nonhuman 
animals have inherent and equal worth as well. One can say where dig-
nity is without saying where it isn’t. Thus, in giving an account of human 
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dignity, one is not necessarily tied to a project of comparing the worth of 
human beings in relation to other nonhuman beings.
Consider another misunderstanding. Jukka Varelius says,
Possessing the same moral status assumedly entails possessing the 
same basic moral rights . . . as the doctrine of human dignity entails 
that all humans have the same moral status, denying that all humans 
have the same basic moral rights would seem to be incompatible with 
endorsing the doctrine of human dignity.
(2013, 91)
The idea is that if human beings have inherent worth at every develop-
mental point in our existence, we must have the same rights at all points 
in which we exist. But we can easily think of counterexamples to such a 
claim; for example, infants do not have a right to vote, but they would 
on this (mis)understanding of human dignity.
Why is this a misunderstanding? (It would not be a misunderstanding 
if we focus on the notion of basic moral rights. But the typical coun-
terexamples offered by proponents of this claim do not suggest this 
interpretation, e.g., voting.) Inherent dignity can ground or explain why 
we have certain moral rights; and even why we all have the same moral 
rights – the infant has the same right not to be intentionally killed as you 
and me. But it does not follow that it would be immoral not to fulfill 
certain rights (the same cannot be said for violating someone’s rights). 
For example, two conscious healthy patients may have an equal right to 
health care, but it may not be immoral to withhold health care from one 
of them in a triage situation involving scarce resources.
The misunderstanding results from a failure to distinguish between 
having the same rights and being such that one’s rights can be violated. 
The latter pertain to the conditions under which my rights can be violated. 
For example, both a PVS patient and a conscious patient have a moral 
right not to be raped; and both satisfy the conditions for violating that 
right, namely, insofar as you exist, you should not be raped. The same 
goes for slander, battery, and any number of violations. However, both 
a temporarily comatose patient and a healthy patient have a right not to 
be lied to, but only the healthy patient satisfies the conditions for violat-
ing that right, since being lied to requires an active ability to form (false) 
beliefs. So, some rights require certain abilities to be ‘online’ in order to 
ground claims in which one’s rights are violated. With this distinction in 
hand (and it is not ad hoc as indicated by the lying example) we can obvi-
ate most putative counterexamples. A person can have inherent and equal 
dignity as anyone else, and this dignity can ground one’s moral rights; but 
certain violations of those rights depend upon the development of one’s 
species-typical powers. Of course, the right not to be intentionally killed 
is violated precisely when one is killed. The violation does not depend on 
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whether you can experience your own dying or whether you can form an 
interest against it (as illustrated by the Meiwes case, see Chapter 11).
Varelius also asserts (2013, 91) that having equal and inherent human 
dignity would entail that patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) 
or even PVS patients would have an equal claim to receiving healthcare 
as less seriously injured patients, but they clearly do not. I agree, but 
nothing pernicious to my account of dignity follows. We do not list MCS 
patients on transplant waiting lists, and we do not in virtue of the fact 
that they will not benefit from a replaced organ as much as someone who 
is more functional. We do not list certain conscious adult patients either, 
whom Varelius considers to have full moral status. For example, we do 
not list patients in heart failure over a certain age (suppose 65) on heart 
transplant lists, but this hardly entails that heart failure patients over 65 
do not have inherent dignity, much less does it permit intentionally kill-
ing them. We do not list such patients for similar reasons for why we do 
not list MCS patients: they would likely not benefit as much from the 
replaced organ or there are contra-indicating comorbidities.14
A related misunderstanding holds that, on my view, patients need 
to be kept on life support at all costs. Suppose Joe is in a permanently 
unconscious state. According to some, such an existence is “no better 
than death” (Goldman, 2010, 77). If Joe’s life retains dignity, as propo-
nents of this view understand dignity, we should have to say that we keep 
him alive at all costs.
In response, it is important to make a distinction between two differ-
ent moral claims in such examples. One could say that continuing to live 
in an unconscious state is not valuable, or one could say that Joe has no 
dignity. The first claim does not entail the second. I can have the moral 
intuition that Joe should not receive any further aggressive life-support 
measures as he is in a permanently unconscious state. But this concession 
hardly entails that Joe no longer has dignity. There are many conscious 
patients for whom we judge that further aggressive measures would not 
be morally warranted but they have dignity on anyone’s view.
To be sure, we think it sad and grieve the fact that Joe is in an uncon-
scious state partly because he ought not to be in such a state. We do not 
mourn the fact that a tulip is not conscious, but that is because of the 
kinds of things tulips are. We do mourn the fact that Joe is in a perma-
nent unconscious state because of who Joe is, namely a human being. The 
fact that we mourn that Joe is in a permanently unconscious state indi-
cates that he has suffered an injury or an assault on who he is by nature.15 
We should resist inferring from our mourning that Joe has no worth at 
all; my view holds that our mourning is a sign that we are countenancing 
Joe’s dignity. We do not grieve the absence of consciousness per se, but 
that Joe has lost consciousness. Again, the various states, abilities, and 
capacities of a person are parasitic on the person. We do not mourn their 
absence but mourn because the person is deprived of them.
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A further misunderstanding of the position that all humans have dig-
nity is to understand it as saying that there is something morally special 
about being a “member of the species homo sapiens” (Douglas and 
Savulescu, 2009, 310), or that having a certain genetic code is worth 
conferring (Warren, 1973, 53; Brown, 2007), or that having a natural 
capacity to reason is the worth-conferring feature (Stretton, 2008, 795). 
I consider these misunderstandings together since they make a species 
of the same error. To see this consider Stretton’s understanding of what 
he thinks is Patrick Lee’s position (which is similar to my own). Stretton 
grants that, “all human beings are equally human beings, just as all dogs 
are equally dogs. But it does not follow that the natural capacities of all 
humans, or all dogs, are precisely equal” (Stretton, 2004, 272). From 
this general observation Stretton offers the following riposte. “Since 
natural capacities for higher mental functions exist in substantially vary-
ing degrees, and since the right to life, on [Lee’s] view, arises from such 
capacities, therefore . . . the right to life must also exist in substantially 
varying degrees” (Stretton, 2004, 273). What is the error?
On the position I am advocating, natural capacities and having a cer-
tain DNA are markers or indicators of what kind of thing something is. 
The subject of value is not a genetic code, nor is it even having a capacity 
to reason. The subject of value is a person, you and me. Consider a spe-
cies of the same error though directed against my interlocutor’s position. 
My interlocutor might say that having the capacity for consciousness 
is what ‘confers’ worth. Suppose I offer the riposte that there is noth-
ing morally significant about P 300 event-related potentials (which is 
the putative neural marker for visual consciousness (Rutiku, Aru, & 
Bachmann, 2016)), local gamma band responses (another marker for 
consciousness (Aru & Bachmann, 2015)), or the presence of synapses 
(McMahan, 2007). Clearly, such responses would not understand the 
position so much as mock a strawman. So too would understanding my 
position as locating our inherent worth in the markers or evidences for 
knowing what kind of thing you and I are.
Nevertheless, there is something morally relevant about membership 
in a class. I treat my daughter radically different than I treat my dog. I 
love my daughter best by not treating her as a dog – suppose my dog, in 
spite of training, attacks children in the neighborhood. It would not be 
obviously immoral to put him down, but it would be obviously immoral 
to kill human beings for battery. I have no spat about eating sustainably 
caught fish, but I would never eat a human, sustainably caught or oth-
erwise. More generally, I love something best by loving it as the thing it 
is. We all have this intuition I might add. If I set as my summum bonum 
money making, I have loved something (an instrumental good) in radical 
disproportion to how my will should be oriented to money making – 
what kind of thing it is does not warrant such intense love. Christopher 
Kaczor offers several examples on this point.
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[O]nly those in the class of living beings can have a right to life, 
only those in the class of sentient beings can have a right not to be 
tortured, and only those in the class of intelligent beings can have a 
right to education.
(Kaczor, 2013, 19)
Membership in a kind is morally relevant.
In any case, the riposte that there is little moral relevance to being a 
‘member of a kind’ works both ways. There isn’t anything particularly 
morally significant about an interest being satisfied: we would need to 
know what the interest is about, and an interest qua interest (abstract uni-
versal) is not especially important either (Lemos, 1995, ch. 2). Moreover, 
there is little especially important about a capacity for consciousness (qua 
universal) in the absence of a subject who realizes that capacity. There 
is, however, something enormously morally important about you, me, 
Ladmaker, and any other individual person. If my interlocutor asks ‘in 
virtue of what are you and I morally important?’ she has already assumed 
that you and I can exist without having dignity.16
One final misunderstanding of my view is rooted in James Rachels’s 
famous and influential distinction between being alive and having a life 
(similar to the distinction in contemporary clinical ethics between life 
itself and quality of life). He states that “to be alive is to be a functioning 
biological organism . . . Human beings not only are alive; they have lives 
as well” (Rachels, 1986, 24–25). He then proceeds to understand that 
human dignity – what he refers to as sanctity of life – places the worth of 
the human being in merely being alive.
The sanctity of life can be understood as placing value on things that 
are alive. But it can also be understood as placing value on lives and 
on the interests that some creatures . . . have in virtue of the fact that 
they are the subjects of lives.
(1986, 25)
Rachels criticizes the view that being alive is a basis of inherent value as 
follows.
From the point of view of the living individual, there is nothing 
important about being alive except that it enables one to have a life. 
In the absence of a conscious life, it is of no consequence to the sub-
ject himself whether he lives or dies.
(1986, 26)
Rachels thinks that it follows from these claims that we should be con-
cerned primarily about lives, and only secondarily about things with life.
Though Rachels’s views are addressed in Chapter 8, I note here why 
his view is not a competitor to mine. The distinction between being alive 
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and having a life is not exhaustive. If having a life means some sort of 
narrative, then I could have many lives. I could have made numerous 
different choices in my life and would have lived a radically different 
narrative, but I would still be me. This point is rather simple: I am not 
identical to a particular set of experiences or narratives. Likewise, if being 
alive means simply a functional biological organism, then Ladmaker was 
not merely alive. But he also suffered much and so, on Rachels’s view, 
his narrative life was horrible. But on my analysis above, there is more 
than just Ladmaker’s functional body, and Ladmaker is not identical to 
a specific set of experiences or narrative. There is also Ladmaker who 
is precious and that life is irreplaceable (Zagzebski, 2001; Meilaender, 
1998). Narratives and interests are not irreplaceable. We can conceive of 
different subjects having the exact same experiences as Ladmaker, and 
Ladmaker having a wholly different set of experiences had he not been 
seized by the Nazis.
With her usual insight, Linda Zagzebski sets out to answer why we 
might think that persons are inherently valuable. Along the way she moti-
vates why Rachels’s dichotomy is false. She takes as a starting assumption 
Kant’s notion of dignity which,
implies two different things. One is that anything that has dig-
nity is more valuable than any number of other things that have a 
price. . . . The other is that things with dignity cannot be compared 
in value to anything else. . . . That means that we can never make up 
for the loss of a thing with dignity by replacing it with another or 
even many others.
(Zagzebski, 2001, 402, emphasis mine)
On the assumption that persons have dignity, she goes on to find in vir-
tue of what persons have these two features of worth. Zagzebski is right 
when she notes that any account of irreplaceable worth cannot refer to 
any shareable property such as having a capacity or having a certain 
nature. “Surely we love and value other persons primarily because they 
are who they are, not because they have the capacity to love us or other 
persons” (Zagzebski, 2001, 411). Further on she notes,
If someone is irreplaceable in value, I assume that means that if we 
lose her, no one else, no matter how similar to her, can replace her. 
That must mean that part of her value comes from something about 
her that nobody else has.
(Zagzebski, 2001, 413)
And that something is, on Zagzebski’s account, simply the subject herself 
as an incommunicable being. What has irreplaceable value is the incom-
municable subject herself, you and me. When a person dies, something of 
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irreplaceable worth is lost, and the loss of this worth is not dependent upon 
or reducible to the loss of ‘joys, achievements,’ etc. The value of a person’s 
plans and projects borrow their value from the person who realizes them. 
The plans and projects do not matter in a way that is not dependent upon 
the fact that the person matters. “To take substance as primary for ethics is 
to take the person—the person as she really is—as the main end, or one of 
the most important ends, of moral activity” (Chappell, 2004, 72).
Kenneth Henley, too, motivates these intuitions by noting that we love 
and care for someone not strictly in virtue of their qualities or character-
istics, but we love the person. We would “in at least some cases deny that 
caring for that individual consisted just in valuing those characteristics. 
Sometimes we value the individual as an individual, and we would not 
accept as a replacement even an exact duplicate” (Henley, 1977, 345). Our 
worth as persons must include, as a desideratum, our irreplaceable worth.
Does the view of life as merely an enabling good capture the worth we 
have as individuals? The answer is clearly no. If Jones’s life is merely an 
enabling good, the only things of intrinsic worth are the joys, achieve-
ments, and pleasures that one experiences while being alive. But this 
position has counterintuitive results. Here again, Henley is on point,
The ending of a human life [on the enabling view] could rationally be 
considered a loss only in so far as it carries with it the deprivation of 
joys, accomplishments, and pleasing or useful characteristics – all of 
which are in principle replaceable.
(Henley, 1977, 346)
But this would make it irrational to mourn the person’s death since there 
would be “no reason to mention in the description of the losses the indi-
vidual who would have had the valued items” (Henley, 1977, 346). If life 
is merely an enabling good, the badness of death reduces to the absence 
of the joys, experiences, and functions that the individual no longer can 
have. Reference to the person being dead drops out. But that is the prin-
cipal reason for our lugubrious reactions to death. We do not mourn the 
absence of Joe’s experiences, we mourn the absence of Joe. The result 
here is counterintuitive because we clearly do value individuals as indi-
viduals and, if someone were to die, the description of the loss would 
refer essentially to that person and not specifically to the cessation of 
pleasures or accomplishments. Thus, the irreplaceable person is neither 
identical to a mere body, nor to a biography in Rachels’s senses.
Alternatives: Interests and Autonomy
In this final section I address putative competitors to the claim that all of 
us have intrinsic dignity in virtue of being human beings. The view I offer 
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locates the inherent dignity of the human person in the person. Putative 
competitors to my view either locate the source of value in the person’s 
abilities, or, more accurately, in the exercise of those abilities, or the view 
is not a competitor upon analysis since it is simply referring to a differ-
ent dimension of human worth – a different angle on the mountain if 
you will. The chief problem with the former option is that it locates our 
fundamental value in a specific functional ability, and not the thing that 
has the ability.
A rather clear statement to the effect that autonomy is the only value 
to consider comes from Taylor (2016).17 For Taylor acting autonomously 
is a sufficient condition for achieving a person’s well-being.
The link between the value creating approach to analyzing autonomy 
and the protection or promotion of her well-being should be clear: 
insofar as a person is autonomous if she is acting to satisfy those pro-
attitudes that are truly her own and thus whose satisfaction would 
create value for her, then she will be acting to protect or promote 
her well-being. A person with BIID [body-identity integrity disorder], 
for example, would, if the strong desire to amputate his left leg that 
existed in his motivational set was truly his own, promote his well-
being by having it amputated.
(Taylor, 2016, 99, emphasis added)
It seems that on Taylor’s view, S choosing x entails that x promotes or 
protects S’s well-being.
It is hard to see how this view can be true, or it is not a view about 
whether human beings have inherent worth. In charity, I interpret Taylor 
according to the latter disjunct, discussed below. To defend why the for-
mer disjunct should be discarded consider the following argument. Either 
I cannot be mistaken about what constitutes my well-being or I can be. If 
I can be, then me willing x is not sufficient for promoting my well-being. 
If I cannot be mistaken, anything I choose for myself is congruent with 
my well-being. This includes suicide and cutting off one’s healthy limbs 
or other choices that might stem from delusions, psychosis, or a person-
ality disorder. These are examples of people who can be mistaken about 
what is good for them.
It will not do to retort that such patients are not rational or are not 
competent since the only argument for why they are not is that they 
are willing something that is not good for them. And the criteria used 
for judging what is ‘good for . . .’ are objective criteria. We know, for 
example, that a patient suffers from anorexia nervosa when that patient 
refuses to maintain enough nutritional intake due to a distorted body-
image. And a sufficient amount of nutritional intake is not a function of 
what the patient chooses to consume, it is an objective feature for that 
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patient’s body type, metabolism, and size. So, if they are not competent, 
and yet they are making a choice that is “truly one’s own,” it must be 
because of objective features about their choice, namely, that choice does 
not redound to the person’s well-being.18 If they are competent, then why 
treat them? Why even try to dissuade them for on one interpretation of 
Taylor’s view, that would be encouraging them to act contrary to their 
well-being? Clearly, however, it is permissible to dissuade and treat such 
patients, and help them will what is truly good for them.
Importantly, this ‘desire-satisfaction theory’ also seems to fall prey 
to the following peculiarity: if S desires for his well-being to diminish, 
i.e., desires to be unhappy, then, if he succeeds in bringing about the 
object of his desire, his well-being will increase. But it increases by being 
unhappy.19 It is rather simple to avoid this peculiarity: either admit that 
‘getting what we want’ doesn’t always fulfill us or accept the Aristotelian 
dictum that a person wills what appears to produce happiness – viz., it is 
impossible to desire what is understood as contrary to one’s happiness. 
Both options depart from the desire satisfaction theory. The first for obvi-
ous reasons. The second because many desire what is objectively contrary 
to their well-being apart from how things may appear. Consequently, 
satisfying one’s desires does not entail well-being.
According to the second disjunct, Taylor or those who may follow him 
are not addressing the same question as I am in this chapter. In defense of 
this, note the change in language from dignity to well-being.20 Answers to 
the question whether S has well-being will refer to things like a happiness 
quotient, health, fortune, etc. (see Haybron, 2008). Referencing these 
items indicates that well-being refers to the ways in which one might 
flourish (Koch, 2016, 8ff.). But dignity focuses our axiological reflec-
tions on the one who is (or is not) flourishing. Furthermore, a thing’s 
well-being may be understood unidimensionally, e.g., a person’s physi-
cal or spiritual well-being; but the same unidimensionality makes little 
sense when discussing dignity (e.g., physical dignity?). Conversely, my 
plants may be said to fare well, but they do not have dignity. So, dignity 
is not unidimensional when referred to a specific person, but it is likely 
that not everything that exists has it. We might say that dignity is not 
unidimensional but is indexed to the agent herself; but also it may not 
be predicated of all species types. Disaggregating happiness and dignity 
can be done along similar lines. Roughly, happiness refers to an achieved 
state, whether a specific state of mind or as applied to one’s narrative 
life. Again, dignity on my view refers to the value of the one who is (or 
is not) happy. A PVS patient and Ladmaker may not be able to be happy 
(the former due to loss of function, the latter due to circumstance), but 
both have dignity on my view. Though more can be said, these distinc-
tions and the edges on which they are made is enough to illustrate that 
Taylor and possibly others (Steinbock, 2009) are not competitors to my 
view on dignity since they are focused on the question of how one may 
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flourish, or on what are the constituents of a flourishing life. But they do 
not appear focused on whether the entity that is flourishing (or not) is 
precious or has irreplaceable worth.
Conclusion: The Ecumenical Nature of Dignity
Implicit in what has preceded are the reasons why I think my understand-
ing of human worth is much more ecumenical than other discussions. At 
most stages in the above dialectic, I have granted that various features 
such as interests, autonomy, a quality life, are all valuable things – suitably 
qualified and in context, e.g., interest satisfaction qua interest appears 
neutral at best. I have not encountered an argument, however, for why 
interests, or autonomy, or a quality life are necessary conditions for hav-
ing preciousness or irreplaceable worth. Ladmaker lacked a quality of life, 
but at no point did he lose his preciousness. When we orbit the human 
person and catch a glimpse of the person’s worth through the periscopes 
of remorse, grief, and love, a more pluralistic view emerges. Human dig-
nity is not incompatible with the values of fulfilling one’s interests, or 
acting autonomously, but our worth is hardly exhausted by these as well. 
Given the parasitic nature of having interests and possessing the capac-
ity for autonomous action on being a person, it is the incommunicable 
and irreplaceable individual that is the most fundamental subject of value. 
Dignity is the value that the concrete individual has.
More specifically, I suggest that after having entertained various nar-
ratives and in reflecting on emotive states, intentionally killing Ladmaker, 
you, me, or any other innocent human being is prima facie wrong.21 Such 
killing would end our existence. The moral principle that it is wrong to 
intentionally kill an innocent human being22 is provisionally exception-
less (putative counterexamples are addressed as we proceed, particularly 
in Chapter 8).
James Rachels thinks that in accepting this principle one is begging the 
question. If we have not already decided that abortion or euthanasia are 
impermissible, “then we would have no reason to affirm” (Rachels, 1986, 
69–70) the principle that it is impermissible to kill innocent human beings.
On this point Rachels misunderstands the dialectic. The moral princi-
ple is accepted on two more fundamental ideas: (a) a moral principle is 
only as strong as the goods it aims to protect or promote. The principle 
I am accepting as provisionally exceptionless aims to protect the good of 
our lives. Our interests and desires are not unqualifiedly good, our choices 
might be downright bad, but you and I can never be bad (Fagerberg, 
2010; Meilaender, 1998). (b) The exceptionless quality of one’s strongest 
moral principles is justified by one’s commitment to nondiscrimination. 
Limiting the scope of the moral principle requires argument. We do not 
reason from ‘it is impermissible to kill me, and there is no apparent mor-
ally relevant difference between me and my colleagues, my neighbors, and 
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my fellow citizens, etc.’ to ‘it is impermissible to kill all human beings.’ 
Rather we start with an open scope on principles that aim to protect such 
important goods. The one who wants to limit such protections needs to 
argue for such limitations. Neither of these commitments requires already 
deciding on euthanasia or abortion.
Notes
 1 The emphasis could just as easily be placed on ‘human’ as ‘What grounds 
human dignity?’ The emphasis is no longer on ‘something else,’ but rather on 
‘what it is to be’ human.
 2 For this reason, I do not consider the voluminous literature on ‘moral status’ 
to overlap with my concerns here since the former typically asks what ‘confers’ 
moral status. The text adumbrates why this starting point is unwarranted.
 3 Brown (2007, 593ff.) is one instance where this assumption is made without 
apparent defense. He saddles his interlocutors with the problem of an explan-
atory gap according to which one must argue that “biological properties” or 
“species identity” explains why something has moral status. To even think 
there is a gap must make the assumption I note in the text.
 4 Error theories aim to explain why our moral intuitions can be so strong yet 
with no corresponding moral fact.
 5 I do not mean for these examples to exhaust the number of rejoinders. The 
point in the text is not what to think about dignity, but how to think about it.
 6 I happen to think that all such explanations are execrable and resemble 
Beauchamp and Childress’s commentary on the Pirates Creed of ethics. This 
creed they say, “is a coherent, carefully delineated set of rules” meant to gov-
ern the Pirates’ relationships to one another and to their spoils. “This body 
of substantive rules and principles, although coherent, is a moral outrage. Its 
appeal to ‘spoils,’ its awarding of slaves as compensation for injury, and the 
like involve immoral activities” (2001, 400). Likewise, thinking that it is per-
missible to rape PVS patients or thinking that it is not permissible but explain 
that judgment with reference to abstractions like ideal interests avoids the 
moral reality confronting one. For discussion see Diamond (1995, 23ff., chs 
13 and 14).
 7 It is consistent with this claim that two different kinds of things can have 
inherent worth but differ in terms of how worthy each item is, e.g., a human 
being versus a tree or non-human animal. But it is not gradable within the 
human family.
 8 Adapted from Gaita (2004, p. xxi).
 9 We are led to believe from this story and other accounts of abortion workers 
that abortion clients are not told the facts of prenatal development. For an 
extended analysis of remorse and the possible psychic mechanisms preventing 
one from experiencing it, see Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1975).
 10 To the riposte that many others do not react like Angie, it is apparent from 
the workers’ stories that showing the women the remains was a violation of a 
protocol which is typical across abortion clinics.
 11 In exploiting the metaphor of a periscope, I am suggesting two ways of con-
sidering the epistemic effects of remorse. It might be that one is submerged, so 
to speak, in a theory and the remorse allows one to glimpse the moral reality 
which the theory had occluded. Or, if moral perception is theory laden we 
might say that the remorse introduced a new datum or intuition that does not 
sit well with one’s current theories or beliefs (on analogy with anomalies as 
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understood by Kuhn (1996, ch. 6)). Therefore, one must bring about a new 
and different ‘reflective equilibrium’ that takes account of the new datum. 
Whatever we may assume to be the background epistemic position, remorse 
has the same epistemic effect. Thanks to Ben Richards for pointing out these 
different interpretations.
 12 Ideal interests do not help since the one who is wronged has then ‘disappeared 
from sight’ since ideal interests might not be held by anyone; they are not 
necessarily occurent interests.
 13 See Vlastos (1973, 30ff.) who critiques Plato’s view of love along the lines I 
address in the text.
 14 Varelius also constructs a rescue case to illustrate the limited value of MCS 
patients. Rescue cases are dealt with in Chapter 7.
 15 The subject of dignity is Joe, the explanation for why he has dignity is because 
of what he is, how we know what he is, is by way of various markers such as 
exercised rational capacities, DNA, or human patrimony.
 16 For further related clarifications see Lee (2004) and Chappell (2004).
 17 For the brief discussion that follows, I’m setting aside treatment of why 
autonomy is a value. I am doing so because I think it is obvious why it is a 
value; I argue simply that it is not the only value, and that it is not a necessary 
condition for having dignity.
 18 Adding conditions such as full-knowledge or ideal agent conditions to handle 
such counterexamples does not help the monist view of autonomy either. What 
prompts the addition of such conditions is our intuition that such choices are 
bad and yet are chosen. The features that make them bad are independent 
from the feature that they are chosen. See Murphy (1999).
 19 I thank Ben Richards for drawing my attention to this peculiarity.
 20 This paragraph relies heavily on Peter Koch (2016, 4ff.).
 21 Denying this intuition might not be a sign that my method is defective, but 
that my interlocutor’s conscience is not yet attuned to the values at stake. 
Certainly one can provide an objectively good argument that fails to con-
vince, or a poor argument that does convince. Moral knowledge is a function 
of one’s basic moral sensitivities (see Chapter 2). On these points I follow 
Diamond (1995), Anscombe (1958, 17), McDowell (1997, 157ff.), Blum 
(1994), Little (1995), and Depaul (1993, 137–186).
 22 For further defense and commentary, see Gómez-Lobo (2002). My own view 
is that moral principles are only as good as the goods they aim to protect or 
promote. Apprehending the gravity and plausibility of a principle, then, is 
parasitic on a clear apprehension of the goods at stake. Of course, a principle 
may be exceptionless because the goods at stake should never be destroyed. 
I believe this for certain goods, but it is not necessary to defend this view. 
My concern in this chapter is primarily epistemic. Therefore, my procedure 
moving forward is to entertain whether there are good reasons for killing or 
harming persons in light of its prima facie impermissibility.

Part II




The penultimate chapter argued that you and I are essentially human 
substances. I argued that this position avoids the too-many-thinkers 
problem and that it accommodates our intuitions on brain transplant 
thought experiments. Such intuitions are not, then, exclusive motivations 
for psychological accounts of persons. As such, the view that you and I 
are human substances is plausible and there are few theoretical costs to 
holding this view. The previous chapter highlighted the view that human 
worth is multidimensional, which includes having inherent worth. Views 
that are more unidimensional (focused exclusively on autonomy or inter-
ests) identify sufficient conditions for why it may be wrong to kill one of 
us; but these are not necessary conditions. So, thinking that autonomy 
and interests are important values is consistent with thinking that inher-
ent human dignity is also a sufficient reason for not killing someone.
This chapter represents our first practical issue that the previous ideas 
may illuminate. The aims of the chapter are to answer the following ques-
tions. What is abortion? Why might one think that it is impermissible? 
Why might one think that abortion is permissible? After giving plausible 
answers to these questions I conclude with the argument for epistemic 
diffidence applied to the act of abortion.
What is the Act of Abortion?
Assessing the moral quality of a human action requires knowing what 
the action is, and why it is done. Concerning a definition of abortion, a 
plausible starting point is that it is the intentional killing of an unborn 
human being. To avoid any aura of begging questions, some time is given 
explaining it.
There are at least two key terms in the definition of abortion: intention 
and human being. Discussed in this chapter are those actions in which 
the agent intends, i.e., sets out as one’s goal, to end the life of an unborn 
human being. The idea that abortion is an intentional killing can be seen 
from the perspective of the person performing one. If one were to ask 
a doctor who is performing an abortion what she or he is doing,1 the 
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answer must refer to the goal of ending the life of this human being. If 
the child survives, as some do,2 the abortion is typically documented as 
a failed or unsuccessful abortion indicating that the goal of the abortion 
is to end the life of the human being. Of course, a doctor performing an 
abortion may not understand his action as one of intentional killing of 
a pre-born child, or unborn human being. For this and other reasons, if 
abortion were immoral, it may be that many abortion-performing doc-
tors are non-culpably ignorant of that putative fact (Fagerberg, 2010, 
144–145).3 As discussed in this chapter, abortions are cases of intention-
ally ending the life of a human being. Actions taken in which the child’s 
death is not the aim (e.g., salpingectomy in cases of ectopic pregnancy, 
or other species of vital conflicts (Rhonheimer, 2009)) are not considered 
in this chapter.
The second key term is that an abortion kills a human being. On this 
point there appears to be some confusion. Eugene Mills, for example, 
thinks that conception involves the oocyte changing from unfertilized to 
fertilized. He states,
Review some sex education materials; watch, via microscope, the fer-
tilization of an egg. You see an unfertilized oocyte—the one-celled 
human egg. A sperm approaches and, after traversing the corona 
radiata and zona pellucida, contacts the egg’s cell wall. The sperm 
breaches that wall, enters, and dissolves, discharging its contents. The 
breach in the cell wall is immediately sealed. The most natural descrip-
tion of these events is that you’ve watched one egg become fertilized, 
not the annihilation of one organism and the creation of another.
(2008, 328, emphasis added)
Mills’s observations invite the question whether the sperm or the oocyte 
each are different cell types from the zygote.
To avoid arbitrary decisions on distinguishing cell types, two criteria 
are used: composition and behavior.4 Cells with different composition 
will have different genetic composition and gene expression, and differ-
ent proteins will be produced, etc. Behavior refers to the developmental 
pathway that an organism manifests, which is largely a function of hav-
ing a different composition. Maureen Condic states,
When cells are classified into specific types, differences in either com-
position or behavior are the bases for all scientific, as opposed to 
arbitrary, distinctions. If, for example, scientists were to propose that 
during embryonic development a novel cell type exists between a 
neural crest and a sensory neural progenitor cell, they would have 




Different organisms will develop along different developmental path-
ways and will be composed of different molecular components. Such is 
the case between zygote and unfertilized oocyte.
Furthermore, we need to distinguish between a human cell and a 
human organism. On this distinction Nicanor Austriaco notes that 
a cell cannot survive on its own and requires a human organism for 
its existence.
Even when severed from the organism and isolated in a tissue culture 
dish, the human cell relies upon a human organism, either the sci-
entist or the lab technician, to maintain the appropriate laboratory 
conditions it needs to live. In contrast, the human organism is self-
sustaining and able to survive as an independent entity throughout 
its lifespan.
(2002, 664)
The importance of this second step (distinguishing cell from organism) 
is that at issue is whether the behavior and composition of the zygote 
distinguishes it from the unfertilized oocyte and whether the zygote 
is an organism. If you and I are human organisms, and the zygote is 
not, you and I cannot be identical to a zygote. Austriaco’s observations 
however, indicate that the zygote is an organism. In addition to having 
independent existence and the ability for self-repair, two other important 
properties that organisms possess but cells do not are growth and devel-
opment (Richardson, 2000). Growth refers to the size and maturation of 
the organs in the organism itself. Development refers to the organism’s 
ability to have its distinct parts ordered to the end of species-specific 
maturation. This includes not just survival, but also development of 
species-typical abilities. This is exactly what we see with the human being 
at the zygotic stage; we see growth and development, not the behavior of 
a stand-alone cell.
Understood as such we can see why Mills’s description of the events 
of fertilization is accurate but insufficient. He is right to point out that 
the sperm and oocyte “contact the egg’s cell wall” (Mills, 2008, 328). 
More technically, the membranes of these two cells fuse forming the 
zygote5 which now has molecular material from both sperm and egg. 
The ‘egg’6 now has a different biochemical composition than what it had 
prior to the sperm dispensing its DNA into the egg. Condic notes that 
“because the zygote arises from the fusion of two different cells, it con-
tains all the components of both sperm and egg, and therefore the zygote 
has a unique molecular composition that is distinct from either gamete” 
(2008, 3). This new molecular composition initiates a series of changes 
in the newly formed zygote, namely, chemical modifications are made to 
the zona pellucida which prevent fertilization by more than one sperm 
(except in the case of triploids). The significance of this is that the new 
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zygote loses a key property that the unfertilized oocyte7 had, namely, 
the ability to be fertilized. Since the zygote cannot have that ability, we 
can say that there is a different organism in virtue of its not having a 
defining potency of the oocyte. Second, the zygote manifests potencies 
associated with coordinated growth and development, self-repair, and 
sustained metabolic activity. Some might say that the organism does not 
come into being until syngamy, but that would ignore the coordination 
necessary to even make syngamy possible (Condic, 2008, 7 ff). Each of 
these behaviors is not indicative of the gametes alone – the unfertilized 
oocyte dies within 24 hours, and the sperm dies within 1–5 days; but 
the new living system may live on for 70 to 80 years. “Clearly, then, 
the prior trajectories of sperm and egg have been abandoned, and a new 
developmental trajectory—that of the zygote—has taken their place” 
(Condic, 2008, 3).
The Moral Analysis
Arguments for the Impermissibility of Abortion
Arguments for the impermissibility of abortion are a combination of 
scientific facts about the development of human beings, the fact that 
abortions are intentional killings from the perspective of the agent, and 
an ethical claim about the inherent worth of each individual human 
being. What remains to explain is what this ethical claim is and whether 
its scope includes unborn human beings.
The relevant ethical claim pertaining to abortion is the idea that it 
would be wrong to intentionally kill you (Gómez-Lobo, 2007). The 
moral prohibition against being killed is one of the most basic moral 
commitments we have about our fellow human beings. Whereas it is not 
wrong to drive on the right-hand side of the road in America as opposed 
to England, it is wrong everywhere to be intentionally killed. Children 
do not have a right to vote, but they have a right not to be killed even if 
they cannot understand the propositional content of a moral right or a 
future of value. The idea here is sensible: we should be protected against 
acts that eliminate our existence. Any weakening of the moral protection 
against being killed requires justification. The onus of proof is on those 
who would either reject this as an ethical claim altogether or limit the 
scope of its applicability.
So let’s understand the ethical claim as the claim that it is impermis-
sible to kill (henceforth intentionally is understood) any human being 
and you are a human being. Gómez-Lobo summarizes the point this way.
To claim inviolability now is a shorthand way of saying that it would 
be morally wrong to deprive me of my life, and to deny inviolability 
at earlier stages would be a short-hand way of saying that it would 
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not be morally wrong to deprive me of my life. However, my life is 
the same life, indeed, it is I, at both points in time. A claim of invio-
lability now and lack thereof in the past would indeed behave like 
P—“it would be wrong to kill me”—and not P—“it would not be 
wrong to kill me.”
(Gómez-Lobo, 2007, 314)
Limiting the scope of the moral claim involves a practical contradiction. 
To avoid it, one must show that there is some feature about a sub-set 
of human beings which makes it permissible to kill them. Such features 
are discussed in the next section. It is enough to observe that the argu-
ment depends on arguments already presented. The penultimate chapter 
argued that you and I exist throughout development and maturity – 
and that includes our development prior to birth. The previous chapter 
argued that you and I have inherent worth. Since the ethical claim is that 
it would be wrong to kill me (or you) it would not matter when that kill-
ing takes place in our life span for that act to be impermissible. In this 
sense, the pro-life position is non-discriminatory.
The pro-life argument can be summarized as follows:
1 Abortion is the intentional killing of an unborn human being.
2 Intentionally killing a human being is impermissible.
3 Therefore, abortion is impermissible.8
Premise (1) is plausibly true. Premise (2) is plausible given the arguments 
already presented and a non-discriminating application of the ethical 
claim to all human beings. The dangers of boundary drawing as pointed 
out in Chapter 2, among other considerations discussed in this chapter 
on pages 121–129 below, set the onus of proof on the argument for limit-
ing the scope of the ethical claim.
Arguments for the Permissibility of Abortion
Any chapter-length treatment of the abortion issue must make decisions 
on which ideas or arguments receive attention. A comprehensive discus-
sion is not possible. Readers familiar with the abortion issue will likely 
disagree with the arguments I choose to address or ignore but that is 
expected. To be clear about which arguments I am selecting for attention, 
a brief conceptual map is necessary.
Arguments for the permissibility of abortion are split into two broad 
categories: (I) the no-person strategy and (II) the person-but-lacks 
x strategy. The former class of arguments argue that unborn human 
beings are not persons and non-persons may be killed. Different argu-
ments are presented for what counts as a human person but, for all of 
them, unborn human beings – especially at the embryonic or zygotic 
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stage – are not persons (Warren, 1973 and 1992). The latter class of 
arguments typically grant that unborn human beings are persons in an 
ontological sense (Degrazia, 2005) – they may grant the truth of the 
claim ‘my mother first felt me kicking when I was 18 weeks old.’ But 
proponents of (II) argue that unborn human beings lack some morally 
important feature the lack of which makes it permissible to kill us even 
if we are already born (Singer, 1979) or only prior to birth (Degrazia, 
2005, 290). Two types of features have been proposed: interests and 
bodily rights (Boonin, 2003; Thomson, 1971). So, under category II, 
there are two different claims. (IIa) Unborn human beings typically do 
not have the capacity to take an interest in continued living. Therefore, 
they do not have a right not to be killed. Such interest-based arguments 
typically entail the permissibility of infanticide (McMahan, 2002) since 
infants lack the ability to conceptualize themselves as existing into the 
future; however, Degrazia (2005, 290ff.) demurs. (IIb) Bodily rights 
advocates argue that during pregnancy the unborn human being does 
not have a right to further use of the mother’s body.9 On this strategy, 
the permissibility of infanticide does not follow since the emphasis is on 
the bodily right of the mother. Once born, the child is no longer in the 
body of the mother.
With this map in mind, I address IIb. The first strategy was addressed 
in Chapter 4. I pretermit treatment of IIa for at least two reasons. Such 
criteria (e.g., interests) were addressed in the previous chapter. The 
basic riposte is that having an interest in continued living is a sufficient 
reason not to kill the person, but there is no good argument for why 
having such an interest is a necessary condition for impermissible kill-
ing. Second, the claim that interests are necessary falls prey to plausible 
counterexamples – the implications of this point are discussed in the 
concluding section.
Unborn Children are Persons but Lack Bodily Rights
Judith Jarvis Thomson was likely the first philosopher to put forth a 
plausible and compelling argument for the conclusion that even if unborn 
human beings are persons in the full moral and ontological sense, it is still 
permissible to end a pregnancy by means of a direct abortion. The reason 
is that having a right to life does not entail a right to the use of another’s 
body. The key premise in support of this conclusion is the idea that preg-
nancy is viewed as the mother’s body providing life support to the baby. 
If one thinks that it is permissible to withhold life support from patients, 
an intuition most people should grant, then it is permissible to withhold 
life support (i.e., one’s body) from the baby.
Thomson’s argument centers on her “famous violinist” example. The 
purpose of the example is to construct a case in which it is intuitively 
plausible that a person with a full right to life may be allowed to die. 
Here is how she describes the case:
Abortion 115
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed 
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He 
has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of 
Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and 
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have . . . 
kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was 
plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poi-
sons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital 
now tells you, “. . . To unplug you would be to kill him. But never 
mind, it’s only for nine months . . . .” Is it morally incumbent on you 
to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if 
you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it?
(Thomson, 1971, 56)
Most will agree that there is no moral obligation to remain plugged into 
the violinist (but also that it would not be impermissible to continue 
being plugged in). If the violinist has a right to life, how is it permissible 
to unplug yourself from him? On Thomson’s view, having a right to life 
does not entail having a right to another’s body. Thomson states, “I am 
arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee having either 
a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of 
another person’s body” (Thomson, 1971, 56).
From the example and the intended conclusion, we can piece together 
Thomson’s argument as follows.
4 If a person F is dependent upon another person’s body M to live and 
M does not consent to or want F to be dependent upon her, M has 
no obligation to support F.
Premise (4) is supported by the violinist example. The generalization 
from the violinist case to ‘for any M and F’ is mediated by paying atten-
tion to the feature of being a world-famous violinist. If it is permissible 
for me to unplug myself from this valuable person, certainly it is for 
any other instantiation. Furthermore, consider an analogy with organ 
or blood donation. It may be laudable for me to donate my blood or a 
paired organ, e.g., kidney, to save the life of another. But no one else 
has a right to take my blood or kidney from me without my consent. 
The next premise simply pinpoints the relevant feature of an unwanted 
pregnancy using F for fetus and M for mother.
5 An unwanted, unborn person F is dependent upon M’s body to live.
From (4) and (5) it follows that,
6 Therefore, unless M consents to or wants F to be dependent upon 
her, M has no moral obligation to support F.
If we want the conclusion that an abortion is permissible from what 
has been stated so far, we need to make precise at least one more claim.
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7 If M has no obligation to support F, then it is morally permissible for 
M to have an abortion.
8 Therefore, if F is unwanted by M, it is morally permissible for M to 
have an abortion.
This argument has been subjected to extensive criticism (Hershenov, 
2001; Kaczor, 2011; Finnis, 1973). Despite an attempted reboot (Boonin, 
2003, ch. 4; and Manninen, 2010), it remains a dubious argument 
(Eberl, 2010; Trotter, 2010; Beckwith, 2007, ch. 7). Notably, as B. Jessie 
Hill (2010) points out, courts routinely permit doctors to perform cesar-
ean sections on women to save the child and, in some cases, to save both. 
So, the law does allow disruptions in one’s bodily integrity to preserve 
significant goods, i.e., the life of the child. And in the cases it does, that 
justification can be duplicated to justify seriously limiting elective abor-
tions. Even so, briefly recapitulating the dialectical development of this 
argument and its defeaters will motivate the argument from epistemic 
diffidence.
Reply to the Bodily Rights Argument
There are at least two points to consider in response to Thomson’s 
argument. First, the violinist example is not analogous to abortion and 
pregnancy. And, second, if the mother has bodily rights, so does the 
baby. I explore these points in turn. There are at least two important 
disanalogies: one pertaining to abortion itself, and the other pertaining to 
pregnancy and parenthood. David Boonin (2003, 3) appears to agree that 
finding analogies with abortion and/or pregnancy is a delicate task. He 
states that “the moral problem of abortion is difficult because it is unu-
sual” and its unusualness is a function partly of the unique relationship 
between mother and child, and the incipient development of the child.
To make the violinist example analogous to abortion, not only must 
I unplug myself, but I must dismember and kill the violinist. When we 
change the violinist example to comport with actual abortion procedures, 
our intuitions are that it is not permissible to dismember and kill the vio-
linist. David DeGrazia appears to concur, noting that current “methods 
of abortion involve killing the fetus” and that “it is . . . dubious that you 
may kill your child in order to avoid the burden . . . of providing assis-
tance that you have caused her to need” (2005, 285). So, the example, 
when made analogous to abortion, no longer supports the conclusion 
Thomson wants.
The same idea applies to the organ donation example. I may refuse 
to donate my blood or kidney to a person in need, but it is a radically 
different act if I were to proceed to dismember and kill that person. In 
most abortions, the goal in view is to end the life of the unborn human 
being. The target or aim of an abortion is the death of the unborn child. 
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The problem here might be illuminated if we keep in mind that neither 
Thomson nor Boonin are framing their arguments from the perspective 
of the abortionist who is performing the abortion. From such a perspec-
tive the abortionist is intending to destroy the baby even if the mother is 
double-minded about her decision or is decidedly opposed to the abor-
tion but feels pressured into it.
Some philosophers have granted these points and note that the violin-
ist analogy works only for cases of hysterotomy, namely, cases in which 
the unborn child is not dismembered or directly attacked but is instead 
removed or prevented from implanting. Boonin explains, “in both of 
these cases [i.e., hysterotomies], abortion seems simply to be a means by 
which a woman who has been providing needed life-support to the fetus 
she is carrying can effectively discontinue her provision of such support” 
(Boonin, 2003, 193). The bodily rights argument can still function as a 
defense of abortion but only for those methods that remove the unborn 
child. DeGrazia concurs, noting that such an argument justifies “abor-
tion in only a small range of cases” (2005, 285).
But even this pollarded position is mistaken. Consider an infant 
neglect case.10 Suppose a woman gets pregnant prior to modern abor-
tion methods. When the child is born, she neglects giving him or her 
any sustenance. The child dies. Here there are at least three analogies 
with Thomson’s case: (a) The child is unwanted; (b) s/he is unwanted 
because of the burdens of caring for and keeping the child alive; and (c) 
the mother withholds sustenance leading to the child’s death. Ancient 
methods of infant exposure and modern-day cases of intentional neglect 
are clearly immoral. Furthermore, there do not seem to be any morally 
relevant differences between being dependent upon someone’s body ver-
sus their behavior (see note 9).
Boonin claims that unplugging yourself from the violinist is not mor-
ally different from a hysterotomy, and neither is morally different from 
the infant neglect case. He states, “surely a person who fails to feed a 
hungry infant allows it to die and does not kill it” (2003, 199). On his 
view, when you unplug yourself from the violinist you are allowing the 
violinist to die, likewise when you intentionally neglect to feed a hungry 
infant. If the former is permissible, so is the latter.11 It is clear, however, 
that intentionally neglecting a hungry infant is impermissible.
Before continuing, the previous point is important in appreciating the 
argument from diffidence. If the defense of abortion rights depends upon 
granting the intuition that it is permissible to intentionally neglect infants, 
the argument from epistemic diffidence becomes that much stronger. For 
consider the dialectical exchange up to this point: we start by granting the 
intuition that it is permissible to unplug yourself from the violinist. We 
then observe that, even if this is permissible, the permissibility of inten-
tionally killing an unborn child does not follow. The problem is simply 
to find analogies between two radically different contexts of relationship, 
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namely, the pregnancy-mother-child-intentional killing context and the 
stranger-bedbound-letting-die context. Once we come remotely close to 
identifying an analogy, namely, hysterotomy, we lose the intuition that 
such an act is permissible. This was illustrated by the infant neglect case. 
As quoted above, Boonin seems to grant that Thomson’s argument entails 
the permissibility of infant neglect. Now we can ask whether it is more 
plausible than not to suppose that it is permissible to neglect infants? The 
weight of plausibility is on the side of impermissibility – the burden of 
proof is hardly met. The epistemic situation here would be like Irving 
taking a brownie from the ‘no-peanut’ basket after he sees several people 
moving brownies from the ‘peanut’ basket to the ‘no-peanut’ basket, the 
only difference being that it is not Irving’s life but his own child’s life who 
has the same allergy.
To this point, I have been challenging premise (7) because the violinist 
analogy is not applicable to abortion procedures themselves. The sec-
ond class of disanalogies I noted pertained to pregnancy and parenthood. 
Regarding these analogies we turn to assess premise (4).
Premise (4) states that our obligations to support the lives of others 
is discharged if the lives of others depend on our bodily functioning and 
we did not consent to this dependence. Consider consent first. Our obli-
gations to others do not depend on consenting to them. If I come upon 
someone who is bleeding profusely and will die without a ride to the 
nearby hospital, I should drive her there, even if my new car seats get a 
little dirty (Unger, 1996). If my only sibling and his wife die in a freak 
car accident leaving behind my niece and nephew needing care, I am obli-
gated to care for them. If a desperate new mother leaves her recently born 
child at the hospital, someone has an obligation to care for that child. It 
may not be you or me, but the child is owed care and love. What these 
examples show is that consent is not a necessary condition for having 
an obligation toward another. Rather, our moral obligations to others 
are a function of the goods we ought to protect and promote (Goodin, 
1985). Because an individual’s life is such a great good, her protection 
from violence or assault on the one hand and help in leading a flourish-
ing life on the other are so important. This was precisely the argument in 
the previous chapter, namely, dignity is not reducible to promoting this 
or that particular good but it adjures or importunes a moral regard for 
the person herself.
What might strike us as attractive about the violinist analogy is that it 
captures our intuitions on autonomy. But there are any number of other 
values in the vicinity such as caring for the vulnerable, the defenseless, and 
the voiceless. Moral obligations can come upon us even if they are not cho-
sen. Consider that, instead of being plugged into a world-famous violinist, 
you are plugged into your own child. To unplug oneself in this setting is 
being a bad parent (Pruss, 2017). Coming to be a parent generates obliga-
tions (Prusak, 2013). On this point Schwarz and Tacelli are right.
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So imagine a child – a baby boy – who is being raised by his mother 
alone. The mother, we agree, has certain special obligations. But why 
is that? Why does she, and not some other woman, have these obli-
gations to him? There can be only one answer: Because she, and 
not some other woman, conceived him; because she is the biological 
mother.
(1989, 83)
Schwarz and Tacelli are creating a contrast case, “why does she and not 
some other . . .?” to bring into relief our intuitions that the parents of a 
child inherit special moral obligations and enjoyments. The parent–child 
relationship cannot be compared without obfuscation to a stranger-type 
relationship. Don Marquis (2010) argues correctly that pregnant women 
are mothers to their unborn children. Since all mothers are parents and 
parents have special duties of care towards their children, pregnant 
women have special duties to care for their unborn children.
That parents have duties to their children is true even if the pre-born 
child may have no right to the mother’s body. Hugh McLachlan supposes 
that even
if no one [else] had a right to our bodies or a right to a particular per-
formance from them, we might still have duties regarding our bodies. 
We might have a duty to keep our bodies healthy even if no one [else] 
has a right that our bodies are healthy.
(McLachlan, 1977, 202) 
If I am a vowed religious person, for example, I incur a duty not to do 
violence to anyone including an aggressor. So, I have a duty not to harm 
such a person even though the aggressor who would be harmed by my 
just defense has no claim on me not to defend myself. Duties to one’s 
child might be one-sided in this respect: we may have a duty to the child, 
even if the child does not have a claim on us. For all of what Thomson 
and Boonin argue, it may still remain contrary to duty qua parent to kill 
an unborn child.
So it is true that bodily support is morally relevant; but it is morally 
relevant in that it generates a moral orientation aimed to ensure the good 
of the child. A pregnancy that is not wanted does not discharge our obli-
gation not to kill human beings, just as caring for orphaned children may 
be unwanted and burdensome, but that does not justify harming them.
I turn to consider the second point, namely, that Thomson’s argument 
grants that the unborn child is a person. As such he or she has bodily 
rights as well (Kaczor, 2011, 151ff.). Recall that Thomson’s argument 
grants that the unborn child can have a right to life but not a right to 
the bodily support of the mother because the mother has bodily rights. 
But if the mother has bodily rights because she is a human being, and the 
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unborn child is also a human being, it would follow that the unborn child 
has bodily rights as well. And now we have the necessary ingredients for 
the following argument:
 9 All human beings have bodily rights.
10 If a being has bodily rights at all, they include a right not to be 
dismembered or directly killed. (Assumption.)
11 An unborn child is a human being (granted by Thomson).
12 Therefore, an unborn child has bodily rights (from 1 and 3).
13 Therefore, an unborn child has a right not to be dismembered or 
directly killed (from 9 and 10).
14 Abortion is the dismemberment and direct killing of an unborn 
human being (factual description of most abortion procedures).
15 Therefore, an unborn human being has a right not to suffer an 
abortion.
Premise (9) is plausible since being a human being is sufficient for having 
bodily rights and premise (11) is granted by Thomson. Premises (10) and 
(14) are very plausible. The other statements are conclusions that follow 
from the premises. The basic point of the argument is this: human beings 
have bodily rights because all human beings are embodied. Since even 
unborn human beings have bodies, it would come as a shock to find out 
that they did not have bodily rights. And it would come as a shock to find 
out that of the bodily rights we do not have is a right not to suffer bodily 
dismemberment.
There are two objections to this bodily rights argument. First, the 
argument only applies to those abortion procedures that dismember or 
directly attack the unborn (e.g., D&E). The argument does not seem to 
apply to procedures that remove the unborn from the mother’s womb 
(e.g., hysterotomy). The reply is to recall what we learned with the infant 
neglect case, namely, that intentionally omitting to provide a person with 
sustenance in order that the child die is just as wrong. One need not 
directly attack the body of a child to treat him disrespectfully. Neglecting 
his needs is just as wrong. The same can be said for the unborn. Location 
inside the womb versus outside does not discharge or eliminate a parent’s 
obligations to their child. And the burdens of childrearing do not justify 
intentionally omitting care in order that a child die. I am not suggest-
ing that bearing a child in one’s womb is not different from caring for a 
child already born; but those differences do not justify a moral difference 
between killing the unborn child on the one hand and the born child on 
the other.
A second objection is to deny premise (9) by arguing that you and 
I are essentially persons, understood according to the psychological view 
described and analyzed in Chapter 4. But this is not a plausible reply 
to premise (9) even if one holds such a view. If you think that you are 
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essentially a person and you understand personhood in psychological 
terms, that still does not entail that your body does not have bodily 
rights. A bodily being can still have bodily rights even if it may not be 
a person at the time it has those rights. The proponent of the psycho-
logical view would have to argue that we have bodily rights only when 
we are persons. But the clause ‘only when’ is challenged by rather sim-
ple counterexamples such as raping PVS patients (Watt, 2000) or doing 
risky medical research on nonconsenting comatose patients. So again, 
the weight of plausibility is on the side of premise (9).
In the remaining sections of this chapter I explain and defend the 
argument from epistemic diffidence in more detail.
The Argument from Epistemic Diffidence
Indexing the Burden of Proof
The moral risk of being wrong sets who has the burden of proof. For 
Irving (introduced at the end of Chapter 3), the cost in being wrong that 
the brownie is not made with peanut flour is enormous. The presumption 
is in favor of Mislabeled and a corollary is that non-Mislabeled bears a 
burden of proof because of the greater cost in being wrong. Consider, 
then, the following proposition:
(p): Abortion is permissible.
Suppose that S is an OB/GYN and believes (p), acts as if (p), and is 
mistaken about (p). S would perform a gravely immoral action. If the 
pro-life argument is correct, the child is voiceless, powerless, and is killed 
where the child should be the safest, i.e., the mother’s womb. (I am self- 
consciously using affective descriptions to capture the gravity of the 
moral costs, if the pro-life position is correct.) Abortion requires preter-
mitting the moral stance one should have towards human vulnerability. 
(One might be tempted to add the likelihood of fetal pain but killing 
is not wrong because it is painful or, conversely, permissible because it 
is painless). Now suppose that we quantify across all S’s in which they 
mistakenly believe (p) and act on it. The consequences here are clearly 
enormous, namely, the unjust killing of millions of vulnerable and innocent 
human beings.12
This is enough to motivate the weight and kind of risks; but who bears 
those risks? For the issues of abortion and embryo-destructive research, it 
is the nascent human being.13 Why is this relevant? Suppose I am out hik-
ing with my daughter and we happen upon what looks like a deep creek. 
I want to dive in for a swim but I am uncertain of its depth. Whereas I 
might be justified in risking it myself, to ask my daughter to jump in first 
is risible. The point is that delegating risks to others looks prima facie 
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haughty, arrogant, or cowardly. Being clear about who bears such risks 
further elevates the bar of justification needed to justify acting in spite of 
such risks.
Consider the negation of (p) and its moral risk.
~(p): Abortion is not permissible.
Suppose S believes ~(p), acts as if ~(p), and is mistaken. Does S perform 
a gravely immoral action? If S is an OB/GYN and acts on ~(p) by refus-
ing to perform an abortion, S has not done anything wrong, and this is 
so for any S. Acts of omission are wrong only if we ought to have acted. 
But to say that an abortion ought to be performed would commit a deon-
tic fallacy for no one has argued that an elective abortion is obligatory. 
Furthermore, some abortion rights advocates concede the legitimacy of 
conscience rights.14 If S is the mother and mistakenly believes ~(p) she 
does not perform an immoral act either since there is nothing wrong with 
continuing a pregnancy. Ted Lockhart remarks that not having an abor-
tion is considered morally permissible by most parties (2000, 53) and 
possibly heroic in some circumstances as depicted in the movie Precious 
(2009). Giving birth to a baby is not morally problematic; ending the life 
of the baby is.15
Suppose S is an OB/GYN except that we quantify across all OB/GYNs. 
And suppose again that, for all S, S believes ~(p), and acts on it, and 
is mistaken, thus, they refuse to perform any abortions. According to 
Boonin the burden that is symmetrical to widespread killing is the “unjust 
burdening of women with unwanted pregnancies” (2003, 322). In the 
following sections I consider three arguments for symmetry: the unjust 
burden of unwanted pregnancies, social consequences of mass refusal, 
and constraint on choice. I argue that none count as symmetrical burdens.
Pregnancy Itself as an Unjust Burden
The argument that bearing an unwanted pregnancy is a moral cost obser-
ves that incurring an unwanted burden is unjust. An unwanted pregnancy 
is burdensome. Therefore, an unwanted and burdensome pregnancy is 
unjust.16 One might locate the ‘burden’ in the fact that it is unwanted or 
in the bodily effects of pregnancy or both. Where the burden is located 
does not matter for my critique; what matters is the claimed connection 
between being an unwanted burden and being unjust.
Not all unwanted burdens are unjust. Let’s agree that a wanted preg-
nancy that is viewed as burdensome is not an unjust burden. An unwanted 
pregnancy that is viewed as burdensome is also not an unjust burden – 
at least not without assuming that all unwanted burdens are unjust. 
Certainly not all are. A mother may choose to continue an unwanted 
pregnancy for other reasons, e.g., to place for adoption, and few think 
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that this is immoral, unjust, or that one is obligated not to place for adop-
tion. I may not want to care for my brother and sister-in-law’s children 
upon their deaths in a freak accident, but that unwanted burden is not an 
unjust one. Examples abound of unwanted burdens which are not unjust 
simply because they are not wanted.
Of course, some unwanted burdens are unjust, e.g., slavery. But even 
here, the reason for the injustice has more to do with the violation of 
human dignity than in the fact that a slave’s labor is burdensome.17 One 
would have to argue that some unwanted burdens are unjust and that 
unwanted pregnancies are in that class of unjust burdens. Doing so, 
however, would have to import a premise which specifies that unwanted 
pregnancies have a moral property that unjust burdens share and that 
such a property makes or justifies that burden as unjust. Since that 
moral property cannot be the property of being unwanted (per argu-
ments above, that is insufficient), one must search elsewhere. A candidate 
property is not immediately obvious. To see why, consider one possible 
candidate such as the lack of moral status in the unborn child. The lack 
of moral status in the child doesn’t make bearing a pregnancy unjust – 
for then all pregnancies would be unjust. Thus, for x to be unwanted and 
burdensome does not provide any reason for thinking that x is unjust.
One might argue instead that even if continuing a pregnancy is not 
unjust, preventing one from ending it is unjust, assuming neutrality on 
(p). In response, consider what would make the prevention unjust. To 
recapitulate motifs previously noted, the source or reason for being an 
injustice cannot be a function of the pregnant state being unjust, since 
it is permissible to continue with a pregnancy. Another possible source 
might be that it is preventing a person from willing to end the pregnancy. 
I concede that this is a cost, but it is not symmetrical in gravity with the 
costs in being wrong about (p). If what is being willed to end is not itself 
a bad thing (i.e., pregnancy), preventing someone from ending it does not 
appear to be a grave evil. Suppose it is permissible to eat Chilean sea bass 
(suppose they have made a slight comeback from being endangered) but 
that it is also permissible to continue a moratorium on harvesting this 
fish. Because I am a cautious restaurant owner, I prevent you from order-
ing any. It is permissible to serve and not to serve this fish. Preventing you 
from ordering any due to false caution may be a cost in being wrong, but 
it is hardly a grave matter. Consider the point more generally: when we do 
not know what x is, there is nothing morally significant about willing x. 
This is because we do not know what x is. When we add that what is 
being willed is ending something for which it is both permissible to end 
or continue, preventing one from ending it (analogous to not serving 
the sea bass) does not compromise significant goods. The point is that 
preventing someone from willing that which is permissible, even if erro-
neously, does not compromise significant goods, when the other option 
is also permissible.
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If abortion is actually permissible and S is prevented from procuring 
an abortion then the cost in being wrong about abortion is this: one is 
being prevented from doing what is permissible. If, however, abortion 
is not permissible and S is allowed to procure an abortion, the cost in 
being wrong is this: one is allowed to do that which is obligatory not 
to do – namely, to intentionally kill you or me at a nascent stage in our 
existence. So, although Boonin may be right to say that there is a cost in 
being wrong, his argument does not justify a symmetrical cost.
Maybe the injustice is not a function of one’s will and pregnancy, but 
a function of one’s will and access to a medical procedure. One might say 
that, if all OB/GYNs refuse to perform abortions, this would be depriv-
ing many pregnant women of a medical procedure to which they are 
morally entitled. On the assumption that ~(p) is erroneous, the objective 
moral risk in performing an abortion would be nil and preventing one 
from getting an abortion would be an unjust restriction on one’s bodily 
and autonomy rights.18
Two points attenuate the weight of autonomy risks. First, it is doubt-
ful that one has an autonomy right for a particular medical procedure. 
Even if a person has a right to health care, it does not necessarily follow 
that a person has a right to a particular procedure. Even if I were to have 
cancer, I do not have a right to ipilimumab if it were contraindicated. I 
do not have a right to a procedure that will compromise my health. So, if 
I have a right to health care, I still do not have a right to a specific proce-
dure. Of note, abortion is the only procedure in all of medicine declared 
a constitutional right (Forsythe, 2013, 10).19 Without being viciously cir-
cular, the point stands that there is no right to elective procedures.
Second, even if one were to argue that a person has a right to a pro-
cedure, the justification for that right would have to be a function of the 
goods of health and welfare that are at stake. The procedures would have 
to be clearly beneficial. (The riskier the procedure, the more inclined we 
are to say that preventing access to it is not unjust.) But if continuing a 
pregnancy is not itself either immoral or an illness or a disease, then a pro-
cedure that ended pregnancy would not necessarily cause a state of health 
or welfare. Ending cancer brings about the good of health, because cancer 
is a disease; but if pregnancy is not a disease, ending it does not necessarily 
bring about the good of health (cases of vital conflicts aside). Of course, on 
the assumption that abortion is permissible, ending the pregnancy would 
be consistent with health. What we need to generate intuitions that the 
unavailability of a procedure is immoral is that the procedure bequeaths a 
benefit not otherwise accessible. Since pregnancy is not itself a disease, end-
ing it cannot itself be considered a promotion of health or welfare.
A more fundamental problem with understanding the ‘burden of preg-
nancy’ as a symmetrical moral risk is that it is irrelevant when we consider 
the empirical evidence. Mothers who choose abortion experience a higher 
incidence and gravity of regret than mothers who choose to continue their 
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pregnancy (Fergusson, Horwood, & Boden, 2009). The psychological 
cost of having an abortion versus continuing a crisis pregnancy is on the 
side of abortion. This evidence suggests that bearing an unwanted preg-
nancy does not have the devastating psychological sequelae that ending 
it does. Second, the typical burdens mentioned by mothers seeking abor-
tions include interference with education or career, or not being able to 
afford the baby (Finer et al., 2005). Notably, these burdens occur after the 
child is born.20 Pregnancy itself is rarely referred to as being a burden that 
initiates seeking an abortion.21 This evidence suggests that ‘the burden of 
pregnancy’ is an empty moral risk in the sense that few seeking an abor-
tion consider it a sufficient justification for having one. I will agree that 
restricting access to a medical procedure that is morally permissible has 
moral costs. My argument to this point is that these drawbacks are hardly 
symmetrical with the costs of being wrong about (p).
Social Consequences as Moral Risks
Continuing with the assumption that S is quantified across all OB/GYNs 
who refuse to perform abortions, other consequences might be social 
such as overpopulation. But this too does not justify a moral risk that 
is symmetrical with the risk of mistakenly believing (p) and acting on it 
quantified for all Ss. We do not solve overpopulation concerns by kill-
ing off enough people to the point of sustainability. The reason why 
is because that is a morally horrible solution. We would rather work 
to distribute resources as best we can (or should), even if the effects of 
overpopulation persist. This indicates that if forced to choose, we would 
rather avoid mass killing than avoid overpopulation.
Referring to broad social consequences to identify the burden of proof 
has other problems associated with it. To be clear, at issue is identifying 
who has the burden of proof in light of the objective moral risks at stake. 
In this regard, it is instructive to look at parallels with slavery (Willke, 
1984). Pre-Garrison justifications for slavery noted the socio-economic 
consequences of abolishing it (Eltis, 1987). But the idea that the aboli-
tionists bore the burden of proof is not justified simply by referencing 
the bad social consequences that might follow. Those consequences are 
not necessarily the moral risks at stake with continuing the institution of 
slavery, but are practical effects given contextual features. Thus, even if 
it were true that abolishing slavery would lead to serious socio-economic 
consequences, it would do so only by assuming as constant pre-Garrison 
practices, institutions, and economic systems. The abolitionist could eas-
ily observe that the burden of proof then shifts to proponents of those 
very practices and institutions that, when paired with the abolition of 
slavery, lead to the bad consequences. The point is this, when confronted 
with bad consequences of abolition given contextual features, we have 
a choice. We can use the bad consequences as reasons against keeping 
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constant those features or as reasons against abolition. We can see in the 
slavery case how ridiculous the latter option is.
Formally, the same dialectical situation faces the abortion issue when 
indexing the burden of proof. Abolition of abortion might lead to what 
we all agree are bad social consequences, but only if we assume as con-
stant certain institutional policies or common behaviors. The burden 
of proof then rests on why one would hold as constant those policies 
and behaviors that, when paired with the abolition of abortion, lead to 
bad social consequences. Suppose that the abolition of abortion when 
paired with current institutional policies leads to discrimination against 
pregnant women in the workplace. There is nothing about the absence 
of abortion that causally entails such discrimination, the institutional 
policies do so. But such discrimination is a reason to change the policies 
rather than to continue to permit abortion. At least, there is not a morally 
neutral argument to hold as normatively constant those policies.
An example of a behavior might be sexual promiscuity. If abortion 
were not available, this would be a reason for tailoring one’s sexual deci-
sions to avoid crisis pregnancies for oneself or one’s partner. Persons who 
choose chaste lives do not report serious psychological dysfunction, thus 
there is little risk to avoiding the ‘need’ for abortion at all. Whereas disa-
greement exists as to whether a promiscuous lifestyle leads to disvaluable 
psychological sequelae, there is agreement that those who choose chaste 
lives do not suffer dysfunction (Nettleman, Ingersoll, & Ceperich, 2006; 
Armour & Haynie, 2007).
So, just as the abolitionists for slavery did not assume a burden of 
proof simply because its abolition would lead to bad consequences, so 
too all OB/GYNs who refuse to perform abortions need not assume a 
burden of proof.22 Any bad consequences that might follow do so because 
of certain practices, behaviors, and institutions about which there is no 
normative reason for holding as constant. Therefore, we do not have a 
reason for thinking that serious moral risks would follow from all Ss 
refusing to perform abortions specifically. The burden of proof remains 
on the proponent of (p).
Constraint on Choice as a Moral Risk
Thomson (1995) appears to think that the risks in being wrong about 
(p) or ~(p) are asymmetrical with more risk in being wrong about ~(p). If 
successful, her argument shifts the burden of proof onto a pro-life argu-
ment. Her argument is succinctly stated as follows.
First, restrictive regulation [of abortion] severely constrains women’s 
liberty. Second, severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed in 
the name of considerations that the constrained are not unreasonable 
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in rejecting. And third, the many women who reject the claim that 
the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception are not 
unreasonable in doing so.
(Thomson, 1995)
The value of liberty paired with some notion of ‘not unreasonable’ are 
taken by Thomson to set the dialogical burden on the pro-life argument. 
If Thomson is right, any pro-life argument for which it is reasonable to 
reject one of its premises is enough to permit someone to act as if the 
argument is incorrect. I hope to show that her argument is subject to 
reasonable rejection.
Because I refer to specific premises in what follows, enumerating her 
argument is necessary.
A Restrictive regulation of abortion severely constrains women’s 
liberty.
B Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed on the basis of 
arguments that the constrained might reasonably reject.23
C Some of those who might be constrained reasonably reject arguments 
for the restriction of abortion.
D Therefore, restrictive regulation of abortion should not be imposed.
Premise (B) as stated by Thomson refers to the women who might be 
constrained by restrictive abortion policies. And it says of them that they 
might be reasonable in rejecting pro-life arguments. It is not clear what 
counts as being reasonable for Thomson: is it coherence, justification 
with no known defeaters, reliably formed belief, etc? Aside from these 
details, one can understand why a woman faced with a crisis pregnancy 
would find abortion as an attractive option. If reasonability is defined as 
means-end reasoning, those facing crisis pregnancies would be reason-
able in considering abortion. But this is not what Thomson needs for 
her argument. I might fail to appreciate the weight of the reasons for 
a coercive taxation policy – because I have an interest in keeping my 
own hard-earned dollars. But that would hardly justify the state in not 
imposing such a taxation policy. Premise (B) needs to say that pro-life 
arguments can be rejected based on reasons that are objectively plausible. 
To motivate why, imagine the following parody of Thomson’s argument 
understood without this objective feature.
A1 Restrictive regulation of slavery severely constrains slaveowners’ 
liberty.
B1 Severe constraints on liberty may not be imposed based on argu-
ments that the constrained might reasonably reject.
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C1 There are those who reasonably reject arguments for the restriction 
of slavery.
D1 Therefore, restrictive regulation of slavery should not be imposed.
Notice, all I have done is swap out abortion for slavery in this parody. 
(Notice also just how unpersuasive the argument would be if we included 
the original ‘not unreasonable in rejecting’ criterion.)
Maybe Thomson understands ‘reasonable rejection’ objectively in 
the sense that opponents to restrictive abortion policies have objectively 
good reasons for their position. So, her argument from risk must include 
the following conditional or one trivially different.
 • (O1) If there are objective good reasons for opposing restrictive 
abortion measures, abortion should be allowed. (‘Allowed’ because 
in premise (B) reasonable rejection is said to justify non-imposition.)
The chief problem is that this conditional does not consider 
whether there are objective reasons for endorsing restrictive abor-
tion policies. Suppose those reasons are good ones. For example, 
if true, the idea that human beings maintain their ontological iden-
tity through development qua persons would be a good reason for 
restricting abortion access. Conversely, if true, the idea that unborn 
human beings are not persons would be a reason for opposing 
restrictive abortion measures. It is in this setting of good objective 
reasons on both sides that one mounts a moral risk argument. Again, 
to avoid Boonin’s challenge (Chapter 3) one cannot set aside the jus-
tification one has for one’s beliefs or for others’ beliefs. So, we should 
understand the key conditional as follows.
 • (O2) If there are good objective reasons for both opposing and 
endorsing restrictive abortion policies, abortion should be allowed.
Once we have captured the dialectic on abortion accurately, (O2) is 
hardly apparent. If the objective reasons are good ones on both sides, it 
simply does not follow that abortion should still be allowed. (Consider 
the counterintuitive ring of a hunting version of O2: if there are good 
objective reasons for opposing and endorsing restrictive hunting prac-
tices, unrestricted hunting practices should continue).
That pro-life arguments inherit the initial dialogical burden would fol-
low only if the liberty involved in exercising this choice (the choice to 
have an abortion) is a value that outweighs all other value considera-
tions (i.e., the values referred to by the arguments for restrictive policies). 
But that axiological claim is neither obvious nor true. Furthermore, how 
would one argue for such a claim? We do not endorse the killing of our 
children even if taking care of them severely restricts our individual liber-
ties. The value of our liberty is circumscribed. Importantly, the value of 
that liberty does not itself justify a moral difference between born and 
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unborn children, since that would be irrelevant. The value of an abortion 
choice is parasitic on the arguments for a moral difference, and therefore 
it is a value that is neither independent nor can it be presumed. So, the 
life of one’s child functions as a value the elimination of which can be 
considered a significant error; and that value putatively trumps the value 
of one’s choices.
Finally, there is an equivocation on the notion of liberty between 
premises (A) and (B). The value of liberty referred to in (A) is the putative 
value of making this choice for abortion – restrictive regulation would 
prohibit making this choice.24 Conversely, premise (B) is plausible only 
when ‘liberty’ is taken to refer to one’s capacity to make choices.
Now consider the counterintuitive ring of understanding premise (B) 
as: severe constraints on one’s specific choices may not be imposed on the 
basis of arguments the constrained might reasonably reject. We do this 
all the time and justifiably so (see 45 CFR 46 Sub-part D). For example, 
environmental regulation constrains our choices, but those who are con-
strained (i.e., the energy industry and those who own Hummers) might 
have coherent reasons for rejecting these constraints. Rephrasing premise 
(A) is even less intuitively persuasive. Consider, “restrictive regulation 
of abortion severely constrains women’s capacity to make choices.” 
Whatever restrictive regulation of abortion does, it certainly does not 
impugn one’s ability to make decisions. So, when Thomson claims that 
restrictive abortion policies “severely constrain women’s liberty,” an 
equivocation is being made between (A) and (B). Two different values are 
being conflated: the value of having free will at all, namely, the capacity 
to make choices and the value of this specific choice.
But more needs to be said about how the two values, the value of a 
specific choice and the value of the capacity to make choices, can come 
apart. Consider a pregnant woman and her liberties and freedoms. 
Presumably, simply being pregnant does not “severely constrain one’s 
liberty,” at least not in a way that would ground some moral prohibition 
on getting pregnant. Granted, parents have to make different choices than 
non-parents. But parents clearly retain the capacity to make such deci-
sions. And, although the specific choices are different between parents 
and non-parents, they are no less valuable. So, if premise (A) is plausible, 
it is likely that premise (B) is not, because premise (B) is plausible only 
when we consider the value of liberty per se, qua capacity, and not the 
value of this or that specific choice, and vice versa if (B) is plausible.
The Argument for Diffidence
In the preface I outlined the skeleton of the argument from epistemic 
diffidence. What is important is to see the pattern of argumentation 
since the argument from epistemic diffidence makes reference to various 
justifications J, and J is subject to numerous substitution instances. 
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Starting at the very top of the dialectic, the belief in question is that 
abortion is permissible.
16 Belief (p) is subject to epistemic diffidence.
17 If belief (p) is subject to epistemic diffidence, it should not be acted 
upon.
18 Therefore, (p) should not be acted upon.
There are three features of beliefs that make it subject to diffidence: 
peer disagreement, undercutting defeaters, and failure to meet the bur-
den of proof. As noted in Chapter 3, confronting peer disagreement 
should prompt us to question whether one has made a performance 
error on an issue that exercises the upper limit of human abilities. 
I shall assume that the practical issues discussed herein do so. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that one has committed a performance error is, for the 
intellectually conscientious, a plausible hypothesis. Chapter 2 explains 
in detail the various ways in which one’s moral cognition can execute 
a performance error. So, in the setting of peer disagreement I have rea-
son for thinking that my moral cognitive faculties are in a questioned 
source context. To the riposte that these reflections apply equally to 
the proponent of ~(p), the proponent of (p) is the one who bears the 
burden of proof. The moral costs for S in being wrong about ~(p), 
whether quantified or not, are not symmetrical as argued above. Thus, 
in the setting of high stakes, one’s justification for (p) is more sensitive 
to defeaters.
The defense of premise (16) is distributed across the different strate-
gies (I, IIa, and IIb) and key claims constituting them. Consider first the 
no-person strategy addressed in Chapter 4. One branch of the dialectic 
is something like the following: (a) the psychological view entails that 
there are two thinkers in one human being; (b) abortion is permissible 
only if the psychological view is true; (c) there are not two thinkers in 
one human being (the Unity Argument). Therefore the psychological view 
is not true. Therefore, abortion is not permissible. Of course, there are 
other branches of the dialectic, but, for the moment, I focus attention on 
(a) and (c) – abandoning (b) abandons the no-person strategy. Let J refer 
to any proposition that putatively justifies either ~(a) or ~(c). For example, 
I considered McMahan’s part-whole distinction to justify ~(a). I argued, 
however, that his ‘in-virtue-of’ relation fails to satisfy his own desiderata 
for an explanans on either a causal or mereological interpretation. We 
can iterate this lesson such that for any substitution instance of J, there is 
a plausible rejoinder from an epistemic peer, or J does not, upon inspec-
tion, function as a justifier at all (see Chapter 4 on why BT experiments 
are under-motivating). Given the current dialectical state of the debate, 
therefore, the typical substitution instances for J are subject to peer disa-
greement, plausible rejoinder, or do not function as justifications at all. 
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An intellectual conscientious agent would see that the burden of proof for 
J is not met given the claims discussed so far. Therefore, premise (16) is 
true on the no-person strategy.
Turning to Thomson/Boonin’s argument, a dialectic similar in form 
to the previous paragraph emerges. Consider premise (9) of the bodily 
rights argument. Let J be any proposition that would justify ~(9). Any 
substitution instance for J considered herein is subject to either peer disa-
greement, plausible rejoinder, or does not function as a justifier at all. 
Suppose J is the claim that the bodily rights argument still permits hyster-
otomies. But that argument met the counterexample from infant neglect.
Before concluding, it is important to observe that this argument avoids 
Boonin’s objection to risk arguments,25 since premise (16) is defended by 
reviewing the justification for (p). Specific substitution instances for J are, 
on analysis, subject to peer disagreement, are implausible, or are irrel-
evant. The specific justifications for (p) do not meet the higher burden of 
proof for acting on (p).
Conclusion
Backing away from the details of practical arguments, there is a broader 
epistemic lesson in which the lessons of Chapter 2 are applicable. Both 
Boonin and McMahan (arguably the best defenders of abortion rights) 
endorse reflective equilibrium (RE) as a method for constructing moral 
justification. In a revealing passage, McMahan considers explana-
tions for human worth and goodness distinct from his egoistic concern 
account. Other accounts, such as the Harm-Based Account, have the 
consequence that “it would be terribly bad if the fetus were to die 
instead” (McMahan, 2002, 78). He immediately observes that “most 
of us believe that the death of a human fetus is not a terrible tragedy” 
(2002, 78, emphasis added). McMahan reflects on the dialectic to this 
point and observes correctly that he is appealing to his own intuitions 
about the badness of fetal demise to defend his account of egoistic 
concern, and yet,
[i]n the next chapter I will invoke this claim in order to defend these 
same intuitions. Although there is a certain circularity here, I do not 
believe that it vitiates either the defense of the claim or the defense of 
the intuitions. In epistemology, it is widely accepted that coherence 
among beliefs sometimes strengthens the case for thinking that each 
belief is justified.
(McMahan, 2002, 78)
Boonin also observes correctly that RE begins by accepting our moral 
intuitions on certain action types, intuitions that may appear strong to 
the one who has them. We then construct moral principles to explain 
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and collate our moral intuitions (Rawls, 1971, 20, 48–51). Considering 
counterarguments allow us to make various adjustments within our 
system of beliefs, thus the sobriquet equilibrium. But there is an impor-
tant problem. When confronted with apparent counterexamples to our 
moral principles, we have two options. Boonin states, “[o]ne option is 
to revise our proposed theory so that it produces the ‘correct’ answers to 
some of the questions it initially got ‘wrong.’ . . . The other option is 
to abandon or revise some of our initial judgments” (Boonin, 2003, 11). 
But there is nothing other than the agent’s own intuitions that dictates 
which option one takes. One’s adjustment decision is arbitrary in this 
sense (Haslett, 1987). Furthermore, as pointed out by Depaul (1993), 
any coherence method in epistemology is subject to the no-contact-with-
reality objection. One can have a widely coherent view that is morally 
wrong, as illustrated at the end of Chapter 2 with the example of Jay. 
These two problems, the arbitrariness of adjustment decisions and no-
contact-with-reality, suggest that coherence is tenuous comfort to those 
who take seriously the risks in being wrong on issues that involve killing. 
The only way to break out of the circle is to take seriously peer disagree-
ment. Considering the arguments canvased to this point, one should be 
epistemically diffident about (p).
In concluding this chapter, I extend some reflections from Sophie-Grace 
Chappell (2011). There are two distinct but mutually coherent ways in 
which inquirers approach the issue of abortion (Chappell discusses per-
sons). We can either take an impersonal approach or an interpersonal 
one. For unborn human beings, we might think that this thing has no 
value yet and in order to have value it must be able to function in a sort 
of way. Or we might think that this thing is the beginning of a particu-
lar human life and this was what I looked like at that nascent stage of 
development. The former might look at early human beings as things, 
the latter as developing individuals. These approaches function like Jay’s 
commitment to a romantic view of war, or Joan’s empathic sensitivity to 
the suffering of others. Moral perception is not analogous to having an 
eye vis-à-vis visual perception, rather it is constituted by our fundamental 
moral commitments, emotional sensitivities, and motives that interpret 
and process moral information in a complex moral world. Not having 
the interpersonal orientation will mean not detecting the values having 
such an orientation disposes one to detect – similar to inattentional blind-
ness in visual perception (see Chapter 2). In settings of peer disagreement, 
on difficult matters with a high risk in being wrong, the justification for 
abortion suffers epistemic diffidence.
Notes
 1 For descriptions of various abortion procedures by a former abortionist, see 
Anthony Levatino, “Abortion Procedures: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Trimesters.” Available 
at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=CFZDhM5Gwhk, accessed 2/15/2018.
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 2 See www.theabortionsurvivors.com, accessed 06/17/2019.
 3 This point is confirmed by the narratives of those abortion doctors and 
clinic workers who leave the industry. See Johnson and Detrow, 2016; and 
numerous other shorter narratives compiled by Sarah Terzo at clinicquotes. 
com, available at: http://clinicquotes.com/category/former-abortionists-speak, 
accessed 5/31/2018.
 4 The material presented in this section is heavily dependent upon the work of 
Condic (2008, 2013). There and Austriaco (2002).
 5 By ‘zygote’ here I mean a human organism in the single-cell stage of devel-
opment. Understood as a phase sortal, I effectively dodge Mills’s reductio 
argument outlined on p. 335ff which considers the zygote simply as a 
single-cell. Mills’s argument attempts to show that the zygote is not identical 
to the embryo. Understood as an organism in the single-cell stage dodges 
the reductio.
 6 I put in quotation marks the ‘egg’ because Mills is right that on the view I 
endorse “Eggs never become fertilized” (2008, 328). They can be fertilized, 
but not become fertilized. By never “becoming” fertilized, Mills means that if 
a thing is an unfertilized egg, that same thing cannot survive to be a zygote. To 
be fertilized, however, merely acknowledges that the oocyte can receive sper-
matic contents. Once the increase in calcium occurs and cyclin-B is dissolved, 
the organism cannot be fertilized. It loses an essential property of being an 
egg. The egg, qua egg, does not survive the successful fertilization event.
 7 Following Condic (2008), the language of fertilized egg commits a categorical 
error. If the egg is fertilized it is no longer an egg. It is correct however, albeit 
redundant, to say that the egg is unfertilized.
 8 This argument follows the form offered by Patrick Lee (2010).
 9 For what it is worth I do not see how this position avoids infanticide either. 
Born infants still require the behavior of one’s parents to provide her or him 
with food, comfort, warmth, etc. In a sense, whether a person is dependent 
upon another’s body versus her behavior does not seem to matter morally. So 
if dependence upon another’s body justifies neglect, so does dependence on 
one’s behavior.
 10 Thanks to Mike Rota and Michael Degnan for various cases introduced in 
this section.
 11 Boonin may think that, if there is a morally relevant difference, it is not a func-
tion of the killing–letting die distinction (2003, 199ff.). But, if Boonin grants 
that it is impermissible to neglect infants, and he appears to do so, he needs to 
explain why the features that make such neglect impermissible are not dupli-
cated in the case of hysterotomy. Features such as personhood or interests 
might be candidates, but then it is no longer a bodily rights argument.
 12 I do not consider S qua mother who mistakenly believes p (or ~p), because, as 
noted previously, mothers do not perform the act of abortion.
 13 I am setting aside risks to the mother (Reardon, 2018) or the health care 
staff (Roe, 1989; and MacNair, 2009) who are performing or assisting in the 
abortion. Of course, adding such risks adds more weight to the risks in being 
wrong about (p).
 14 Some do not respect conscience rights (Savulescu and Schuklenk, 2017). As 
noted in the text, the abortion rights arguments canvassed so far yield a judg-
ment of permissibility. For discussion see Kaczor (2013) and my website for 
supplementary materials.
 15 It is irrelevant to retort that in some cases it would have been better that 
this or that child had never been born. Such judgments are based on dubi-
ous quality of life judgments and are only justifiable, if at all, after a life has 
gone poorly.
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 16 One could modify the modality of the premises to ‘an unwanted burden can 
be unjust.’ This modification would render the premises much more plausible, 
but the conclusion would be innocuous, namely, ‘an unwanted and burden-
some pregnancy can be unjust.’ It would be innocuous for two reasons. That 
it might be possible for an unwanted and burdensome pregnancy to be unjust 
does not argue for symmetry since being wrong about (p) would involve an 
unjust killing. Second, the mere possibility of an injustice occurring does not 
index a notable cost in being wrong for the reasons Boonin highlights, and I 
endorse, as discussed in Chapter 3 on pages 46–49.
 17 Suppose, for instance, that the same type of labor is done but the laborer is 
compensated justly for it. The laborer may still be treated unjustly, but not 
because she or he is compensated justly.
 18 Thanks to Matthew Braddock for urging me to consider this objection.
 19 Specifically, it is a negative right, meaning that the state cannot preclude 
access, but it is not a positive right which would require the state to guarantee 
access. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for further specification.
 20 This point is made by Kelsey Hazzard in the documentary The 40 Film.
 21 The cited reason closest in content was “physical problem with my health” 
(Finer et. al., 2005, 113). This was cited only by 12% of the respondents and 
we are not told which problems they were. For example, there is a difference 
in burden between experiencing headaches and having pulmonary hyperten-
sion which might become life-threatening in the setting of pregnancy.
 22 Of note, my argument about costs in this section gains even more plausibil-
ity if the position at issue is merely that there should be stricter criteria for 
performing an abortion (relative to current US law), not abolition.
 23 The change from ‘not unreasonable in rejecting’ to ‘reasonable in reject-
ing,’ or its cognates, is motivated by charity. Not being unreasonable is a 
weak epistemic state. Coherence is not even a requirement for ‘not being 
unreasonable’ in believing B since it only requires that B is not incompat-
ible with my network of other beliefs N, but may also not be supported by 
them either – as would be involved if B were coherent with N. Not being 
unreasonable in believing B, then, is compatible with believing B for no 
reason whatsoever – just so long as one has no reasons against B. On this 
understanding, the dimwitted Nazi can be ‘not unreasonable’ in believing 
the stupid things she does. Such an epistemic state would render (B) initially 
implausible. In the interest of charity, then, Thomson must have in mind a 
stronger notion such as being reasonable in rejecting B which requires some 
support relation with a coherent network of other beliefs N. Thus, even if 
there are reasons for rejecting restrictive abortion policies, I still wish to 
argue that permissive abortion policies should not be presumed. As such, I 
am setting the bar higher for my argument not Thomson’s.
 24 I leave aside the implausibility of such a restriction counting as ‘severe’ when 
only one choice among several is being prevented. Consider how severely 
our field of choices is limited when obeying jus in bello criteria for just war. 
Consider how severely our field of choices is limited when conducting ethical 
research on human subjects. Severe restriction of one’s choices is morally inert 
without a moral analysis of the choices in question.
 25 The key idea behind Boonin’s objection is that risk arguments require setting 
aside one’s justification.
7 Human Embryonic Destructive 
Stem Cell Research
Stem cell research is best classified under the heading of regenerative 
medicine. Stem cells have the capacity to renew themselves and, under 
certain conditions, differentiate into specific cell types such as heart tissue 
or kidney tissue (NIH, 2016), thus regenerating organ function. Sources1 
of stem cells can be divided into two basic categories. The first comprises 
sources that involve destroying a human organism to extract the cells 
(e.g., ‘leftover’ embryos from IVF clinics or embryos purposely created 
by IVF or other technologies such as cloning). The other category com-
prises sources that do not involve the destruction of any human organism 
(e.g., reprogrammed somatic stem cells).2 The medical promise behind 
stem cell research for either source is to repair organ dysfunction. On the 
assumption that disease or damage typically results in organ dysfunction 
due to cellular breakdown, injecting the right kind of stem cell into, for 
example, heart tissue, can rejuvenate the functioning of the heart (Patel 
et. al., 2016). Pluripotent stem cells can differentiate into most other types 
of cells such as neural, heart, liver, or kidney cells, etc. Research with 
cells from nondestructive sources (commonly but erroneously referred to 
as ‘adult’ stem cell research)3 may use the patient’s own stem cells to reju-
venate an organ that is not functioning optimally. Clinical applications 
using nondestructive sources of stem cells are quite common with over 75 
diseases able to be treated or managed with such cells (Charlotte Lozier 
Institute, 2017). Furthermore, using such sources can bypass immune 
rejection issues that affect the use of embryo destructive sources. The rea-
son is that nondestructive sources often use the patient’s own stem cells, 
carefully-matched donors, or those whose compatibility appears not so 
essential: for example, umbilical cord blood stem cells (Laughlin et al., 
2001; Ziegner et al., 2001).
What is the moral issue with using stem cells from destructive 
sources? A common understanding is to ask whether human beings at 
the embryonic stage may be included as “full members of the moral 
community” (Humber & Almeder, 2004, v), or whether they have full 
moral status which would afford them the “same rights, claims, and 
interests as ordinary adults” (Douglas & Savulescu, 2009, 307–308). 
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Both ways of understanding the issue are incorrect. Even if one does 
not consider all human lives as morally equal, it is a separate question 
whether it is permissible to perform lethal research on human subjects. 
The research ethics tradition was developed largely in response to serious 
ethical infractions that were committed in the name of advancing medi-
cal knowledge (LaFleur, Bohme, & Shimazono, 2008; Coleman et al., 
2005). Consequently, human research subjects have enjoyed the focus of 
ethical protections even if we might think it is permissible to kill human 
beings for other reasons: for example, prisoners on death row.4 This is not 
(necessarily) a case of schizophrenia in our moral tradition. The stricter 
conditions on research subjects follows in part from an honest recogni-
tion that our moral perception can be obfuscated when one is driven to 
find cures or significantly reduce suffering. The history of research ethics 
abuses is clear: dehumanizing research subjects is a distinct possibility in 
the setting of entrenched desires to make scientific advancements.5 Even 
if one thinks that capital punishment is permissible, one could still con-
sistently oppose killing prisoners for research purposes (Mitford, 1974; 
NCPHSBBR, 1975). This is also the case with pre-born human beings 
who may not be subjected to research known to be harmful (45 CFR Part 
46. Sub-part B) even though abortion is legally permitted. The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research observes that “the woman’s decision for abortion 
does not, in itself, change the status of the fetus for purposes of [research] 
protection. Thus, the same principles apply whether abortion is contem-
plated” (NCPHSBBR, 1975, 66; see also Napier, 2009). The idea is to 
treat equals equally. If we protect pre-born children who are wanted from 
harmful research, the same applies to those not wanted. Our choice does 
not affect the basic status that grounds their protection from research-
related harms. So, the issue is not simply about full moral status and/or 
protection from harm in other contexts, but about whether all human 
beings should enjoy protection from destructive research.6
There are, however, certain facts about human development between 
conception and implantation that some argue would permit destroying 
nascent human beings. There are basically two categories of arguments. It 
can be claimed that nascent human beings are not individuals, at least not 
in the sense that you and I are individuals. It would follow that you and 
I cannot be identical to those human organisms that would be destroyed 
for research purposes – killing one of them would not be killing one of 
us. I address two tokens of such arguments, namely, the twinning and 
totipotency arguments. The second category of arguments challenges 
whether those human organisms that would be destroyed for research 
purposes are at all worthy, or have non-instrumental value. For these 
arguments, it may be the case that you and I are numerically identical to 
our existence at the embryonic stage, but we would not have acquired 
any worth yet – at least, not enough worth to protect us against being 
killed for potentially beneficial research. Arguments from rescue cases 
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and natural loss are tokens of this strategy. Following the format of the 
previous chapter, I critically evaluate these four arguments in turn, and 
then canvas my argument from epistemic diffidence. I conclude that the 
judgment that young human beings may be killed for research purposes 
is subject to epistemic diffidence and therefore should not be acted upon.
The Twinning Argument
The twinning argument aims to show that the embryo is not an indi-
vidual, and since only individuals can be proper subjects of protection, 
embryos may be killed for research purposes. Considered at its most 
generic level, the twinning argument comes in two steps (Khushf, 2006). 
The first step is a statement of empirical fact about human embryos, 
namely, that up to 14 days from conception, an embryo can divide into 
two embryos. This fact is referred to as twinning (or fission). The second 
step is a claim about what the possibility of twinning means concerning 
the ontological status of the pre-twinned embryo.
Let Z refer to a zygote and E to an embryo just prior to the twinning 
event at t1, and O1 and O2 refer to the embryos that result from twin-
ning at t2. There are basically three options regarding the identity of E, 
O1, and O2. First, E is numerically identical to O2, and O1 is the result 
of asexual reproduction (or vice versa for E = O1). Second, E is an indi-
vidual human being who dies at twinning and is not identical to either 
O1 or O2. Third, E is not an individual but is the matter out of which the 
individual organisms O1 and O2 arise.
With this picture in mind, consider the following formulation of the 
twinning argument from David DeGrazia:
Until about two weeks after conception, an embryo can divide into 
two . . . Arguably, then, the [embryo] is not yet uniquely individu-
ated in the sense that whether it, and it alone, will develop into a 
single human organism has not been determined.
(DeGrazia, 2006, 51)
The conclusion of this argument is that E is not a “uniquely individu-
ated” organism. The argument in outline seems to be as follows:
1 It is possible that E divide or twin resulting in two different 
organisms.
2 If it is possible that X divide or twin, then X is not an individual 
organism.
3 Therefore, E is not an individual organism.
Premise (2) is the key premise but it is false; for if X is not an individual 
organism prior to twinning, then what is it that undergoes twinning? 
Twinning presupposes an organism that undergoes twinning: it is 
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certainly identifiable as that organism which will undergo twinning. As 
David Oderberg has noted,
It is easy to show that it [the organism prior to twinning] would be 
an individual simpliciter. For an individual is definable as an entity 
which is a countably distinct instance of the kind of which it is a 
member. And an embryo younger than fourteen days, even if we 
know it is going to divide, is clearly a countable instance of the kind 
‘human embryo.’ In respect of a woman only one of whose ova has 
been fertilized, the answer to the question posed within fourteen days 
of conception, “How many embryos is she carrying?,” is “One”.
(Oderberg, 1997a, 274)
The human embryo, even prior to fission, is a countable organism of 
some sort. I can point to it and say ‘that is a human embryo.’
One might suppose, however, that the pre-twinned embryo is consti-
tuted by numerous cells but is not itself an identifiable organism. Consider 
Robert Nozick’s Vienna Circle example (1971, 32ff.) according to which 
different members of the Vienna circle fled to different countries during 
World War II but carried on their intellectual activities for the duration 
of the war. The example invites the question whether the pre-twinned 
embryo should be considered more like a group than an individual.7
Simply because something divides does not entail that that which 
divides is a group. Consider a contrast case for comparison. The nine-
banded armadillo always has quadruplets, i.e., their embryos are supposed 
to twin. If one’s development were like that, I harbor the intuition that 
the embryo prior to twinning is not an individual. But the human embryo 
is not supposed to twin, certainly not like the nine-banded armadillo.8 
The human embryo is oriented to maturity as an individual, and twin-
ning is an anomaly.
Furthermore, this ‘group’ supposition fails to explain why we have the 
intuition that when the embryo develops past the 14-day point without 
twinning, one organism is ‘doing’ the developing. Based on a detailed 
review of embryogenesis, George and Tollefsen remark that,
at fertilization, a new and complete organism comes into existence – 
a distinct, actively self developing human organism – for he or she 
exhibits internally directed, complex development between fertiliza-
tion and the last point in time at which twinning may occur.
(2011, 239)
Lastly, as discussed briefly in Chapter 6, early human development is a 
highly integrated activity that belies the supposition that the pre-twinned 
embryo is merely an unidentifiable mass of cells. So (2) is likely not true 
and the argument is unsound.
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DeGrazia presents a second twinning argument that considers identi-
cal twin adults. If each adult came into being at conception, then each 
twin is identical to one zygote. DeGrazia rightly notes that this is inco-
herent. “For the two twins are numerically distinct, so they cannot both 
be identical to a single earlier zygote” (DeGrazia, 2005, 248). But from 
this observation he concludes that “neither identical twins nor chimeras 
could have come into existence at conception” (2005, 248). The only 
intervening premise DeGrazia mentions concerning twins is “and the 
twins were not individuated until twinning occurred” (2005, 248). This 
argument is slightly different than the one presented above because this 
one capitalizes on our intuitions concerning identity (specifically, the 
transitivity of identity), and not strictly on contentious biological claims 
about the pre-twinned embryo.
It is certainly correct to say that for identical twins, both did not come 
into being at conception. It is plausible to say, however, that one came into 
being at conception, and the other at the point of twinning through a 
form of asexual reproduction.9 The twinning argument would be success-
ful if its conclusion were limited to showing that not all human beings 
came into being at conception – some of us, namely twins, came into 
being at the point of twinning (George and Tollefsen, 2011, 54ff.). As 
to showing that none of us came into being at conception, the argument 
fails. For it is a logical fallacy to move from ~[(O1 = E) & (O2 = E)] to 
~ [(O1 = E) ∨ (O2 = E)]. The intervening premise DeGrazia offers is really 
the conclusion of the argument (i.e., that the pre-twinned embryo is not 
individuated), but he does not supply the vinculum needed to establish 
that neither twin is identical to the parent zygote from the simple obser-
vation that both cannot be identical to it.
Some other comments are worth noting. First, in the many cases in 
which twinning does not occur, there is a strong intuition that one and 
the same organism develops beyond the 14-day point. We can identify 
it and point to it up to and through the 14-day point. DeGrazia wishes 
to argue, however, that the mere possibility of that one embryo dividing 
into O1 and O2 entails that the embryo is not an individual in the actual 
world (2005, 279ff.). DeGrazia has us consider a non-twin scenario with 
an adult human S and S’s zygote Z in the actual world. He says,
But that zygote [i.e., Z] could have split spontaneously, resulting 
in identical twins. If it had, presumably I [i.e., S] would not have 
existed, because it is implausible to identify me with either of the 
twins in that counterfactual scenario. If that is right . . . it follows 
that I am not numerically identical to that zygote.
(DeGrazia, 2005, 248)
DeGrazia seems to be arguing as follows. Assume that S = Z. Now 
suppose that there exists a possible world Wi in which S has a twin. 
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DeGrazia supposes that in that world, it is not the case that S = Z. The 
necessity of identity, however, tells us that if S = Z, then necessarily, 
S = Z. Consequently, it follows that both ~(S = Z) and (S = Z). I share 
DeGrazia’s sympathies with the necessity of identity. But this argument 
assumes that in Wi S is not identical to Z. As just argued above, the argu-
ment that S is not identical to Z involves a fallacy. At the very least, we 
cannot know whether S = Z in Wi.
What is more, the intuition that the organism maintains its identity in 
the non-twinning world cannot easily be ignored. To avoid the fallacy 
noted above, the proponent of the twinning argument would have to 
argue against the plausibility of asexual reproduction. But any argument 
for the implausibility of asexual reproduction must include premises 
whose intuitive plausibility overrides or outweighs the intuitive plausibil-
ity that in the non-twinning world the organism maintains its identity 
through development. None of the proponents surveyed here are success-
ful in this regard.
These reflections apply equally to proponents of fusion. Cases of 
fusion are the mirror image of fission, in which two embryos fuse or coa-
lesce early on at the morula or blastocyst stage of development resulting 
in one human being – they are called genetic chimeras, not to be confused 
with human–animal chimeras. One may have the intuition that prior to 
the possibility of fusion, there is no identifiable individual human organ-
ism. Two points are noteworthy in reply. First, the chimera results from 
the fusion of two distinct individuals: that’s what makes it a chimera. 
When sodium is combined with chloride, one gets table salt; but sodium 
and chloride are individually identifiable prior to the fusion. Second, in 
cases in which fusion does not occur, the intuition is that two distinct 
organisms develop alongside each other. Cases of fusion are interesting 
but they do not challenge the individuality of the early human organism.
To conclude this sub-section, it may help to identify the loadbear-
ing propositions. I have used the possibility of asexual reproduction 
as a riposte to the twinning argument. The proponent of the twin-
ning argument would have to argue that organisms capable of asexual 
reproduction are not individuals or that the asexual-reproduction inter-
pretation is false. The former way of saving the argument entails that 
every organism that can asexually reproduce is not an individual organ-
ism. But numerous organisms are capable of asexual reproduction at 
some point in their development and yet we consider such organisms 
individual organisms prior to the reproductive event (imagine brain fis-
sion cases, Parfit (1971, 4ff.), or cloning). It makes sense to ask what is 
it that reproduces? Any answer will refer to an organism of some sort. 
I am unaware of an argument for the second disjunct, but the prospects 
appear dim. Arguing against the asexual-reproduction interpretation 
must show not only that it is false, but that it must be false. The reason 
is as follows. Consider a possible world in which asexual reproduction 
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occurs. In this world it is true that E = O2 for example (they are the same 
organism in that the asexual reproduction of O1 preserves the identity 
of the reproducer E →O2). So, assume ♦(E = O2). It follows from the 
necessity of identity10 that ♦(E = O2). To defend the twinning argument 
then, the proponent needs to argue either that the necessity of identity is 
false or that it is not even possible for (E = O2). Both arguments would 
be tough to make out, and I am unaware of any plausible attempt to do 
so. There may be objections to the necessity of identity but it is used by 
proponents of the twinning argument (DeGrazia, 2005; Kuhse & Singer, 
2009). Consequently, the proponent is saddled with the task of arguing 
that ~ ♦(E = O2). I conclude that there is nothing plausible about the 
twinning argument.11
The Totipotency Argument
Whereas the twinning argument aims to show that the pre-twinned 
embryo is not an individual human being in virtue of its divisibility, the 
argument from totipotency aims to argue for a similar conclusion based 
on slightly different empirical facts and ontological assumptions.12 Both 
arguments argue that early human beings are not individuals; and both 
have a premise to the effect that the possibility of division precludes being 
an individual. But that premise is argued for on the basis of actual cases 
of twinning (which can take place up to 14 days), or by the totipotency of 
the cells (which is only characteristic of the zygote and morula, i.e., 5–7 
days of development). Since twinning can take place after totipotency 
and the arguments are distinguished in terms of the empirical facts which 
putatively motivate a key premise, the two arguments are distinct.
As with the twinning argument, the totipotency argument begins with 
an empirical claim, namely, that the cells constituting the early embryo 
are each totipotent – each can form an individual human being. The sec-
ond premise is some claim to the effect that being constituted by cells 
each of which can become an individual entails that the whole is not 
one organism but a cluster of collocated organisms or a heap. Whereas, 
for the twinning argument, the potential for divisibility blocks inferring 
that the pre-twinned embryo is an individual, the totipotency argument 
claims that the early embryo is a cluster of potential individuals. Another 
difference between the arguments is that the twinning argument focuses 
on the fact of twinning, whereas the totipotency argument depends on 
the nature of the cells that constitute the zygote and morula. The factual 
premises are distinct even if the conclusions and metaphysical premises 
are similar.
According to the totipotency argument, to be an individual organism 
one must be constituted by cells that are differentiated. Since the cells of 
the early embryo are undifferentiated, it cannot be an individual. Smith 
and Brogaard state the argument this way:
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At the stage of the multi-cellular zygote-bundle the zygote is most 
properly conceived of as a sticky assemblage of 8 or 16 entities rather 
than as a single entity. They are not one but many. Although they are 
surrounded by a thin permeable membrane, this membrane merely 
helps to keep the cells together in a spatial sense.
(Smith & Brogaard, 2003, 60)
Each of the cells at this early stage is totipotent, meaning, roughly, that 
each can develop into a human being.13 This seems to be why Smith 
and Brogaard say that the multi-cellular zygote is not one organism but 
many. They go so far as to say that the multi-cellular zygote “cannot 
even lay claim to the type of unity possessed by colonial organisms, such 
as certain forms of yeast, whose parts are connected via an exchange of 
fluids or signal molecules” (Smith & Brogaard, 2003, 60).
Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer endorse a similar argument, saying, “It 
is now believed that early embryonic cells are totipotent; that is . . . an 
early human embryo is not one particular individual, but rather has 
the potential to become one or more different individuals” (Kuhse & 
Singer, 2009, 342). The argument here refers to each cell’s property of 
totipotency, and these cells constitute the multi-cellular embryo at an 
early stage of development. Kuhse and Singer (2009, 342) entertain what 
would happen if these cells were separated one from another. At the 
four-cell stage of human development, each of the cells is totipotent. Let’s 
call the four-cell embryo Adam. Adam is constituted by cells A, B, C, 
and D. Suppose that the four cells are extracted and placed into distinct 
zonae pellucidae following which each has “the potential to develop into 
babies” (2009, 342). Call this scenario S1. After the extraction, we have 
Andy, Bill, Charles, and David. Kuhse and Singer conclude from this set-
up that those who object to human embryo destructive research because 
it destroys an identifiable human being “would be on much safer ground 
were they to argue that a particular human life begins not at fertilization 
but at around day 14 after fertilization” (Kuhse & Singer, 2009, 343).
The totipotency argument appears to rest on one of two intuitions. It 
could rely on our intuitions regarding part–whole relations. A heap of 
undifferentiated cells whose role or function is not specified cannot be said 
to be a part of the whole. Parts are identified by their function vis-à-vis 
their contribution to the survival and growth of the whole; no differentia-
tion suggests no function. This part–whole intuition as it is applied to early 
embryogenesis is inapposite. If totipotent cells were entirely undirected 
causes, generation of an individual would be an accident; but development 
is far too regular and ordered to be the result of chance (Henry, 2008, 
48–49). Though totipotent cells are still undifferentiated when they sepa-
rate into one of the three primary germ layers, one cannot conclude that 
they are without functions vis-à-vis the teleological development of the 
Embryo Destructive Stem Cell Research 143
organism (Condic, 2013, 49ff.). A second intuition, invited by Kuhse and 
Singer’s example of Adam, is that a thing which is constituted by potential 
individuals entails that the thing is not an individual.
The totipotency argument suffers from three main defects.14 The early 
embryo is made up of either four actual individuals or four potential 
individuals. If they are four actual individuals then the totipotency argu-
ment cannot be used as a defense of embryo destructive research since 
doing so would kill four individuals at once. The totipotency argument 
must say that the four totipotent cells are each potential individuals. But 
that there are four potential individuals tells us nothing about the actual 
individuality of the early embryo. One can take each of my millions of 
cells and clone me. Each cell is potentially, in the same sense required by 
the totipotency argument, numerous individuals. But that hardly entails 
that I am not an individual.
A second defect is a misunderstanding of totipotency. Totipotency is 
a disposition like fragility. To say that a vase is fragile means that if it 
were dropped it would break apart (Contessa, 2013; Bonevac, Dever, & 
Sosa, 2011; Aimar, 2018).15 But vases do not simply break apart willy-
nilly without being in the conditions in which the disposition to break 
is actual. Totipotent cells are dispositions to form, by normal cell dif-
ferentiation, whole organisms. Just as it is absurd to say that a vase is 
broken (when it clearly is not) simply on the basis that it has a disposi-
tion to break; so it is absurd to say that the four-cell embryo is really 
four individuals (or four cells that can enter into identity relations with 
individuals) simply on the basis that each cell has a disposition to form a 
human individual. Importantly, when the vase is broken it is no longer a 
vase. The vase has a disposition to be broken, but not to exist as broken. 
Likewise, when a totipotent cell comes to constitute a developing (and 
later, differentiating) human organism, it is no longer what it was, i.e., 
a totipotent part. Importantly, the totipotent cell does not survive long, 
but the organism it constitutes does. Understood as a disposition, the 
totipotent cell cannot be identical to an organism that develops from it 
since these are two different kinds of things. Having such a disposition is 
compatible with it being part of a whole.
The chief problem with the totipotency argument is the apparent infer-
ence from ‘the embryo has the potential to develop into individuals’ to 
‘the early embryo is actually not one human organism.’ David Oderberg 
explains that,
potentiality is not actuality. The potential of each cell in an embryo, 
early in its development, to become a distinct human individual is 
not the same as each cell’s being a distinct human individual while it 
subserves the embryo of which it is a part.
(Oderberg, 1997a, 280)
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To avoid this modal fallacy, the proponent of the totipotency argument 
is forced to inject intervening premises such as ‘the presence of totipoten-
tial cells impugns the unity sufficient to be an organism,’ or ‘it impugns 
the coordinated activity characteristic of an organism,’ or ‘it impugns the 
“unified causal interaction” (Smith and Brogaard, 2003, 49ff.) character-
istic of individual organisms.’ Whatever property the intervening premise 
points to as being absent, the claim remains that the mere potential to 
become an individual entails the actual absence of such properties. This 
just backs up the modal fallacy one more step. In what sense does the 
mere potential (of a cell) to form an individual entail the actual absence 
of whatever property the intervening premise references?
I conclude that the totipotency argument is either not an argument at 
all for the permissibility of embryo destructive research, since, on one 
understanding, it is an argument against the individuality of the morula, 
but not the cells constituting the morula; or it fails to understand totipo-
tency as a mere disposition; or it commits a modal fallacy.
Rescue Cases
The next two arguments aim to rebut the claim that early human beings 
may not be killed because they have low moral status or worth. The con-
clusion of the arguments discussed in this section are that it is permissible 
to kill young human beings (even if they are living individuals) because 
they lack some feature of worth. The difference between the next two 
arguments and features of worth highlighted to justify abortion (e.g., 
interests) pertains to different moral intuitions: those concerning harm 
and those concerning saving. In relation to abortion, it is often argued 
that if a thing cannot be harmed (because it does not have interests or it 
does not yet exist), then no wrong can be occurring. But for the present 
issue, if a thing need not be saved, its moral status is diminished – even 
though that entity not only exists but may even have welfare interests. 
The arguments here aim to show that early human beings do not have 
moral status sufficient to protect them from research harms. As we shall 
see, the specific circumstances in which human embryos are stored, han-
dled, and manipulated lend themselves to thought experiments which 
highlight our intuitions on who is worthy to be saved.
Suppose an IVF clinic catches fire. You have the choice to save a cryo-
preserved embryo or a six-year-old child. You only have time to save 
one. Which one do you choose? Most people would be inclined to 
save the child. Proponents of embryo destructive research then conclude 
that the embryo does not have the ‘moral status’ or ‘moral worth’ equal 
to that of a child, for otherwise we would not be so clearly inclined to 
save the child.
The case aims to justify an asymmetry between the moral worth of 
a child and the worth of a nascent human being. On closer inspection, 
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such cases do not justify an asymmetry. There are important enthymemes 
in the argument which will emerge on inspection. The first premise is a 
statement of our intuitions on the rescue case:
4 Our intuitions tell us to save the child (all else being equal).
To get the conclusion that the embryo lacks the same moral worth 
as the child, we need to import the following premise:
5 If our intuitions tell us to save the child instead of the embryo, then 
the embryo lacks the same moral worth as the child.
From (4) and (5), it would follow that,
6 The embryo lacks the same moral worth as the child.
Since the conclusion is that it is permissible to destroy the embryo 
for research purposes an additional premise is needed.
7 If an entity E (the embryo) does not have equal moral worth to 
another entity A (the child), then it is permissible to kill E for research 
purposes.
Once (7) is made explicit, the proponent of the embryo rescue 
argument can draw the conclusion,
8 It is permissible to kill the embryo for research purposes (from (6) 
and (7)).
My own impression of this argument is that the premises on which it 
rests are clearly false. Premise (4) is a statement of fact about our intui-
tions regarding whom we would save (all else being equal). The argument 
appears valid, (6) and (8) follow from the stated premises. That leaves 
(5) and (7) open to dispute. Consider premise (5) for the moment.
This premise says that if our intuitions tell us to save x instead of y, 
then y does not have moral worth equal to x. Suppose, however, that x 
in this case is an embryo that is yours.16 That is, suppose you and your 
spouse underwent an IVF procedure and the embryo you had the oppor-
tunity to save was your own. And next, suppose that instead of a child, 
you had the choice to save either your own embryo or someone else’s 
embryo. Most of us in that situation would choose our own, hoping to 
have an opportunity to implant the embryo and subsequently rear our 
own child. But, given (5), your embryo has greater moral worth than 
the other embryos that are not your own. But this is an odd result, for if 
moral worth means anything, it must relate in some way to the embryo 
and not simply to your interests or desires or someone else’s interests 
or desires. Therefore, the moral worth of the two embryos should be 
equal since they are similar, except for the fact that one is related to the 
rescuer and the other is not. Whom one chooses to save does not tell us 
much about the moral worth of the person who is not saved. This is no 
more apparent than in reasoning about pandemic-flu scenarios or any 
triage mechanism in the setting of scarce resources. Many state and hos-
pital protocols concerning responses to a pandemic flu outbreak specify 
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a triage or order of treatment preference.17 But no one would say that 
those citizens that end up further down the list lack moral worth. These 
examples further undermine (5).
What about premise (7)? The important point is to observe that hav-
ing an obligation to prevent the suffering of the child hardly entails that 
it is permissible to kill an embryo.18 Likewise, an obligation not to kill 
an embryo is certainly consistent with having an obligation to prevent 
the unjust suffering of the child. Having unequal worth does not entail 
permission to kill the thing with lesser worth.
Of course, the way to avoid this inference is to explain one’s intuitions 
outlined in (4) differently. One may explain such an intuition as being 
rooted in a belief that the embryo lacks moral worth because he or she 
lacks developmental maturity. On this story, the intuition outlined in (4) 
is based on a belief that one’s moral worth increases as one develops. The 
problem with this story is that it recapitulates the conclusion drawn from 
the case. If one already believes that embryos lack moral worth compared 
with a further developed child, then the embryo rescue case can at best 
illustrate one’s own beliefs, but not justify them.
Most of the critical points made so far coalesce around the same two 
ideas: x not having equal moral worth to y does not entail a permission 
to kill y (ad (7)); and preferring to save x instead of y does not entail 
either a diminution in worth or a permission to kill y (ad (5)).19 The most 
the rescue argument shows is that it is permissible to forego saving the 
embryo given the exclusive choice between child and embryo with all else 
being equal. Not much else can be derived from it.
There is more to consider here in that another version of the embryo 
rescue case does not rely on the enthymemes outlined above. This sec-
ond version is fleshed out in sufficient detail by Charles Hinckley II. 
I will call the example ‘Sophie’s choice’ as it is a permutation of the 
popular case outlined in William Styron’s eponymous novel. Styron tells 
the story of a Nazi soldier who captures a Polish woman Sophie and 
her two children. In an insidious exchange, the soldier demands that 
Sophie choose between the lives of her two children in that she has to 
choose which one is to be killed. If she refuses to choose, both will be 
killed. Of course, the point is that Sophie’s choice between her children 
is a bitter one she initially refuses to make, but facing the death of both, 
she chooses her daughter with dire emotive consequences. The permuta-
tion Hinckley adds is that instead of choosing between one of her two 
children, she is given a choice between an embryo and her daughter. 
Hinckley observes, “If Sophie had to choose between one of her children 
and a blastocyst, embryo, or fetus, her choice ought to be much easier” 
(Hinckley, 2005, 129). The suggestion is that, if we agree, we are com-
mitted to the idea that the embryo bears lesser value. This latter version 
is what I will refer to as Sophie’s choice.
Sophie’s choice is a case where the choice is not whom to save, but 
whom one allows to be killed even if one does not intend this. The example 
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works best assuming Sophie’s complicity in the killing. The choice is easier 
when it is between the embryo and the mother’s grade-school-aged daugh-
ter. This example purports to show that embryos do not bear moral worth 
sufficient to protect them from being killed. Hinckley concludes, “But we 
have reason to think the level of biological and cognitive development of 
embryos makes them expendable whereas children are not” (Hinckley, 
2005, 130). The argument seems to be as follows:
 9 We do not feel the same remorse or similar emotional state in 
response to the embryo being killed versus the daughter being killed.
10 Our having no remorse or similar emotive response to x being killed 
indicates that x does not have moral worth.
11 Therefore, the embryo does not have moral worth.
This argument rests on the fact that it would be ‘easier’ to make the 
choice. And this ease of conscience is taken to indicate that the embryo is 
‘expendable.’ Though more interesting than the previous version of the 
rescue argument, I do not find it any more plausible.20
My first criticism is that there are clear counterexamples to (10):
 I One life is lost in an earthquake on some obscure island in the South 
Pacific.
Our response to this is not remorse, or a similar emotional state, but may 
even be relief: we may say ‘at least only one was killed.’ Clearly, though, 
that one life has full moral worth in spite of our lackluster emotional 
response to the case.
It may be objected that (I) is not analogous to Sophie’s choice because 
there is no act of killing on anyone’s part, and no reference to a choice that 
is comparatively easier. This is not a plausible reply because it would seem 
to undermine the purpose of the embryo rescue case, which is to justify 
embryo destructive research.21 Sophie’s choice itself is not analogous 
to embryo destructive research where there is nothing comparable to a 
soldier threatening the lives of all of those closest to you (the disease/
illness might be threatening, but the embryo certainly isn’t). Any coun-
terexample to (10) is permitted, then, so long as the disanalogies are 
not greater than the disanalogies between Sophie’s choice and embryo 
destructive research. In any case, a more analogous case can be generated.
II A madman goes on a rampage in a mall in China but miraculously 
ends up killing only one person.
Here, there is deliberate killing by human agency, just as in Sophie’s 
choice. Our emotive response to this case maybe one of relief again: ‘only 
one person was killed.’ No remorse or similar emotive state is invoked 
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in us, and yet we would all have to admit that this one adult person is a 
proper bearer of moral worth, even intrinsic moral worth.
These counterexamples aim only to show that our emotional response 
to some cases is not an accurate indicator of someone’s moral worth 
because in many cases remorse or a similar emotive state is never 
invoked. Reflecting on these cases illustrates that our intuitions track not 
the intrinsic moral worth of the persons/objects involved, but rather our 
attachment to the persons/objects involved. Even so, we may consider a 
more analogous counterexample to (10),
III A commandant offers Sophie a choice between two people: (i) her 
daughter or (ii) the Nazi soldier who arrested her, but who is sched-
uled to be killed by a firing squad because he later conscientiously 
objects.
This case is analogous in many respects to the original except that instead 
of Sophie’s embryo and her daughter, the choice is between the man who 
arrested her and her daughter. Intuitively, Sophie has an ‘easy choice’ in 
(III) in the sense that her daughter is clearly more precious to her than 
the very soldier who arrested her. But granting this in no way defends the 
unjust killing of the conscientious objector or entails that he bears any 
less moral worth than her daughter.
There is, however, a disanalogy between Sophie’s choice and case (III). 
(III) has us take the perspective of Sophie herself. Once we put ourselves 
in her shoes, it is obvious that we would not think twice about choosing 
to save our daughter. From our perspective, however, we can empathize 
with the soldier’s plight in being unjustly killed, since he is trying to escape 
the Nazi system and not be part of its atrocities. We would still choose to 
save the daughter, but the choice would not be as easy as Sophie’s choice 
to save her daughter. But this disanalogy is a backhanded confirmation 
that our intuitive responses to the cases suggest that our intuitions track 
our social attachments, and not someone’s intrinsic moral worth.
The basic lesson learned from this critique is that the arguments infer 
from whom we choose to save (or allow to be killed in a tragic dilemma) 
a conclusion as to whom we may intentionally kill for research pur-
poses. But our basic moral obligations governing whom we save are 
certainly different from our moral obligations not to kill. Inferring from 
our intuitions on such cases to the case of embryo-destructive research 
commits a categorical error and, therefore, the arguments are invalid. 
Moreover, in tragic dilemmas, it is unclear what our moral obligations 
are at all.
Concluding this sub-section, I have argued against a widely utilized 
argument for there being a moral asymmetry (sufficient to justify kill-
ing) between the worth of a born person and an incipient human being. 
The arguments constructed from rescue cases fail to show either that 
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human embryos lack moral worth, or that, even if they did, such a 
diminution in worth would be a sufficient reason to permit killing them 
for research purposes.
Natural Loss Arguments
The basic structure of natural loss arguments is to point to commonly 
known facts about how embryos can die due to natural causes. But if 
embryos matter morally, then incidences of natural loss should be 
considered tragic, and health care resources should be devoted to pre-
venting such loss. But no one, not even pro-lifers, thinks this. Therefore 
the embryo does not matter morally. To my knowledge there are two 
main academic versions of this argument, one from Toby Ord (2008) 
and another from Jeff McMahan (2007). I consider McMahan for two 
reasons: Ord’s argument has already been subjected to criticisms,22 and 
McMahan’s argument seems to be more intuitively persuasive. I will 
explain why after presenting his case.
McMahan begins his argument with a description of twinning. He 
then moves to the conclusion that in the typical case, twinning results in 
the ‘parent’ embryo dying:
What the phenomenon of twinning shows is that some of us begin to 
exist at a different time and in a different way. Monozygotic twins, 
on this view, begin to exist not at conception but when an embryo 
divides . . . [W]hen an embryo divides to form twins, if the division 
is symmetrical, the original embryo also ceases to exist.
(McMahan, 2007, 177)
McMahan concludes,
when symmetrical twinning occurs and an embryo ceases to exist, 
this should be tragic. . . . [W]e should ensure that all instances of 
twinning are asymmetrical division [take place at different times], so 
that no one ceases to exist. But these suggestions are absurd.
(McMahan, 2007, 178)
The conclusion of the argument is that the embryo does not matter as 
you and I do. Properly understood, this is not a version of the twinning 
argument that concludes that the pre-twinned embryo is not an indi-
vidual. McMahan’s presentation of the twinning argument aims to show 
that the pre-twinned embryo has little moral worth.23 If the embryo dies 
in cases of twinning, we should mourn the fact that there are twins. But 
we do not, much less do we think that such events ought to be prevented 
from happening and that health care resources should be devoted to 
preventing twinning.
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This argument has more purchase than Ord’s presentation since 
McMahan’s argument only requires us to admit that twinning is some-
thing that we need not stop or try to prevent through health care resources. 
This is an intuitively plausible concession; twinning is not something we 
ought to stop. In contrast, Ord’s argument requires us to accept that 
health care resources need not be devoted to preventing spontaneous 
abortions (this is what we need to accept to find his ‘conclusion’ absurd). 
The problem is that many of us do not accept that claim, and, factually 
speaking, there are important resources devoted to prevent spontaneous 
abortion (Marino, 2008, 26).
There are two routes by which one could attack this natural loss argu-
ment. The first is to resist the conclusion that the embryo dies. The second 
is to accept the interpretation that the embryo dies, but resist the moral 
lesson McMahan would have us learn from it. I have already critiqued 
twinning arguments above. Interpreting twinning as a case in which the 
originating embryo dies requires assuming that a necessary condition for 
survival is the existence of an ostensible closest continuer.24 Such a view 
is problematic for a number of reasons (Hawley, 2005; Wiggins, 2001, 
57ff.), the chief of which is that it violates the ‘only a and b’ rule. David 
Wiggins states the idea this way:
In notionally pursuing object a in order to ascertain its coincidence or 
non-coincidence with b, or in retracing the past history of b to ascer-
tain its identity link with a, I ought not to need to concern myself with 
things that are other than a or other than b . . . But the identity of a 
with a, of b with b, and of a with b, once we are clear which things a 
and b are, ought to be a matter strictly between a and b themselves.
(Wiggins, 2001, 96)
The basic idea is that whether or not a is identical to b depends on what 
a and b are and the relevant relations between them. Katherine Hawley 
further observes that there is “something especially objectionable about 
making identity through time contingent upon the (non) existence of 
a rival” (Hawley, 2005, 605). Therefore, I focus my comments on the 
moral lesson McMahan intends.
First, the premise of the argument against human embryo destructive 
research is that nascent human beings are vulnerable human subjects 
(Napier, 2009) with, at least, a modicum of moral ‘status’ or ‘value’ that 
protects them from being intentionally killed as part of scientific research. 
Human beings in the context of research enjoy an initial stance of pro-
tection according to which the researcher must justify why she wants or 
needs to conduct this research (Jonas, 1969, 245; Emanuel, Wendler, & 
Grady, 2000). McMahan’s moral lesson though is that we would have an 
obligation to save the pre-twinned embryo if it matters “in the way you 
and I do.” Properly understood, my argument aims only to show that the 
embryo may not be killed as part of a research project, because he or she 
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is vulnerable. An obligation to save, however, may require more in terms 
of moral worth or status (i.e., for those who view human beings as having 
unequal status) and at any rate, it will require opportune circumstances. I 
cannot be expected to save a drowning victim if I am wheelchair-bound. 
While there may not be an obligation to save everyone, there is an obliga-
tion not to kill anyone. We have an obligation not to kill embryos in virtue 
of the vulnerability they have qua research subjects. As such, I think that 
the embryo ‘matters in similar ways as you and I do’ to the extent that nei-
ther embryos nor adult persons may be killed as research subjects. Because 
of the limited scope of my argument against killing nascent human beings 
for research purposes, a proponent of it can be unperturbed by the fact 
that the embryo dies in the course of a natural and quite uncommon event.
Furthermore, even if twinning involves the demise of the parent zygote 
who matters in the way you and I do, it does not follow that this is 
‘tragic;’ nor does it ground a ‘serious moral reason’ to try to stop twin-
ning from occurring. Twinning is a natural event that is rare. It is not 
known what causes twinning; much less could it be reliably predicted in 
each individual case. What kind of monitoring device would be used to 
predict twinning? How could such predictions be empirically grounded 
given the size of the zygote, its location, and the complex internal work-
ings of the zygote which may generate twinning? The point is that a 
serious moral reason to prevent the death of X may not exist even if X 
matters “like you and I do.” Consider the use of proportionate or dispro-
portionate means of sustaining life (Panicola et al., 2011, 277ff.). Such 
means are not morally required even if they forestall death, and even if 
the patient is the proper bearer of moral worth. Devoting health care 
resources to a rare and largely inscrutable event is not a just allocation of 
those resources, given other pressing needs for such resources, even if the 
pre-twinned embryo matters “like you and I do.”
Perhaps McMahan intends by the use of the term ‘tragic’ that we ought 
to mourn or be horrified upon discovering that twinning has occurred. 
But this does not follow either in that mourning makes sense when it is 
a loved one who dies, someone for whom we have built up an emotional 
bond. But a pre-twinned embryo does not enjoy such bonds with others 
except perhaps for particular situations such as IVF where parents are 
aware of their embryos’ existence, very much wanted them to live, and 
can indeed mourn their deaths. We should expect, then, that our emotive 
response to a pre-twinned embryo dying will normally be less even if he 
or she matters as a vulnerable human subject who ought not to be killed.
The Argument from Epistemic Diffidence
Indexing the Burden of Proof
The structure of the argument is like that outlined in the previous chap-
ter. Moral risk indexes the burden of proof. Specifying what the moral 
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risks are gives us a sense of whether the risks are asymmetrical or not. So 
in this section I outline the respective risks. For simplicity and coherence, 
(p) represents the proposition that it is permissible to destroy human 
beings at the embryonic stage of life for research purposes – thus distin-
guishing it from the abortion issue. Not-(p) will simply be the claim that 
such an action is not permissible.
As with the abortion issue, if a researcher believes (p) and is wrong, 
then that researcher would be destroying nascent human life. The puta-
tive justification that the embryo will die anyway does not avoid this 
cost. Many patients in the ICU will die anyway, but it would still not be 
justifiable to kill them for research purposes (hereafter, every instance of 
‘killing’ is understood as for research purposes unless otherwise noted). 
The ‘they will die anyway’ argument only works if one implicitly assumes 
that nascent human beings have little moral status. Assuming that they 
do have moral status, the argument becomes inert.
What are the costs in being wrong that not-(p)? The answer requires 
specifying what the benefits are in the setting of alternative ways to pro-
cure those same benefits without killing. As remarked in the introduction 
to this chapter, the benefits are clinical effectiveness in regenerating 
organ function. There are many sources of pluripotent stem cells, how-
ever, which can be utilized to realize these benefits that do not involve 
intentionally destroying nascent human beings. Blastomeres are already 
removed from human embryos in the setting of preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) – though in saying this, I do not endorse PGD for a num-
ber of reasons separate from issues of killing. Presumably, individual cells 
at the blastocyst stage of human development could be extracted without 
significant risk or harm to the human being, and the cells would be pluri-
potent stem cells. Human embryos in IVF clinics that are thawed and are 
organismically dead might have viable individual stem cells remaining.25 
In a process called altered nuclear transfer, one might do what would 
otherwise amount to cloning a human being but modify the nucleus prior 
to insertion into the mitochondria such that a headless entity would be 
developed (Mosteller, 2005). Stem cells from hydatidiform moles would 
not involve the destruction of the human being since such moles are bet-
ter described as clusters of human tissue but not a human organism. 
Again, stem cells from miscarried embryos/fetuses and human embryos 
removed by salpingectomy for ethically legitimate reasons (e.g., resolv-
ing an ectopic pregnancy) would yield pluripotent stem cells without the 
intentional destruction of those human beings. Certain sources of stem 
cells in the developed adult body show pluripotent characteristics as well, 
as do umbilical cord blood stem cells (Chen et al., 2001; Carlin et al., 
2006; Xiao et al., 2005). Final mention should be made of induced pluri-
potent stem cells (iPSCs), though this list is not exhaustive (Kwak et al., 
2018). Not all would agree that all of these options are morally accept-
able, but certainly some are, and some are in clinical use.
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Since there is not much appeal in extending the functionality of one’s 
bodily organs without also regenerating brain function if one suffers 
from severe dementia, one of the more important aspects of regenera-
tive medicine is finding sources of stem cells that are able to differentiate 
into neural tissue. Sources of multipotent neurological cells (Martinez-
Morales et al., 2013) include neural crest stem cells (from human hair/
teeth), olfactory cells (Murrell et al., 2005), and adult dental pulp stem 
cells (Arthur et al., 2008; Kiraly et al., 2009). Mesenchymal stem cells 
from bone marrow (Crain, Tran, & Mezey, 2005; Jiang et al., 2002), 
adipose tissue (Sun et al., 2009),26 and umbilical cord blood show pluri-
potent properties. Cells from these ‘adult’ sources demonstrate abilities 
to differentiate into neural cells and have been used successfully in stroke 
patients (Chen et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2007). Neural stem cells exist in 
the adult brain, particularly in the sub-granular and sub-ventrical regions 
(Gage, 2000). Finally, ventral mesoencephalic stem cells for the treat-
ment of Parkinson’s (Kim & de Vellis, 2009) can be derived from fetuses 
without intentionally killing them in cases of spontaneous abortions, or 
salpingectomies to resolve ectopic pregnancies, etc. (Ishii & Eto, 2014).
What about the potential for clinical effectiveness? The iPSCs and 
multipotent adult-derived stem cells largely bypass immune rejection 
issues (Condic & Rao, 2010, 1124) because they are considered autol-
ogous (from the patient’s own body) stem cell sources.27 Furthermore, 
autologous hematopoietic stem cells are “standard practice” (Rao, 
Ahrlund-Richter, & Kaufman, 2012, 55) for a variety of hematologic 
disorders, thus undercutting a significant need to explore other types of 
cell transplantation therapies. Of the trials listed on Clinicaltrials.gov 
that involve stem cell transplantation “all . . . were dominated by use 
of adult SCs [stem cells], primarily hematopoietic SCs, with some trials 
using umbilical cord blood derived SCs. There were an increasing number 
of trials using mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs) from 2007” (Bubela et al., 
2012, 138). Bubela et al. go on to note that “[n]ewspaper articles focused 
mainly on human embryonic SCs and neurological conditions . . .” 
(Bubela et al., 2012, 5) inferring that the promise the media presented 
to the public about embryonic derived stem cell sources was significantly 
inflated. All in all, clinically usable stem cells are almost entirely from 
non-destructive sources. And since there exist sources of pluripotent stem 
cells that do not suffer from immune rejection issues (iPSCs) and can be 
modified without genetic change (Warren et al., 2010), there is no clini-
cal reason for thinking that barring human destructive research would at 
all compromise the development of regenerative therapies.
What are the moral costs in being wrong about (p)? Answering this 
question requires specifying the source of wrongdoing. One could object 
to scientific research because it is not valuable (Emanuel, Wendler, & 
Grady, 2000). In explaining value, Emanuel, Wendler, and Grady note 
that non-valuable research would be research that has “non-generalizable 
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results, a trifling hypothesis, or substantial or total overlap with proven 
results” (Emanuel, Wendler, & Grady, 2000, 2703). If human embryonic 
stem cell research were to be translated into the clinic, the cellular trans-
plantation would be allographic and would be subject to typical immune 
rejection issues; whereas using the patient’s own cells, as with adult sources 
or via direct reprogramming, is theoretically more relevant for transplan-
tation (and, indeed, this happens already). As such one could argue that 
human destructive stem cell research is not scientifically valuable in that 
other more stable and ‘proven results’ exist. Bonnie Steinbock (2005, 
26) appears to endorse the same idea saying, “if it were easy to come up 
with an alternative source of ES [embryonic stem] cells, there would be 
no question that this should be done.” If we understand her conditional 
to require the creation of pluripotent stem cells – embryonic stem cells 
are not necessary – then we have numerous alternatives already, as can-
vassed above. Furthermore, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC) says that human embryo destructive research “is justifiable only 
if no less morally problematic alternatives are available for advancing the 
research” (NBAC, 1999, 53, emphasis original).
The other moral costs to being wrong about (p) can simply be that 
human destructive stem cell research involves the destruction of nascent 
human beings for research purposes, where such research also holds out 
little hope of benefiting people more than what is available already. The 
burden of proof is entirely on the side of defending (p).
The Argument from Epistemic Diffidence
The Preface introduced the bare outline of the argument that is dupli-
cated in most every chapter of this volume. Starting at the very top of the 
dialectic we can substitute for (p) the belief that human embryo destruc-
tive research is permissible.
12 Belief (p) is subject to epistemic diffidence.
13 If belief (p) is subject to epistemic diffidence, it should not be acted 
upon.
14 Therefore, (p) should not be acted upon.
The defense of premise (12) is that none of the arguments typically 
offered for the permissibility of such research meets the burden of proof. 
Arguments for either the no-individual or the non-valuable conclusions 
suffered from severe defects. To take only one example, at best, twinning 
arguments have to say that we do not know which one of the continu-
ers is the same individual as the original embryo. Given that the burden 
of proof is on the proponent of destructive research, an argument from 
ignorance is insufficient. Each of the four arguments can be thought of 
as a justification J for (p). Descending down the dialectic, we discover 
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sub-justifications for J; for example, to make valid the totipotency argu-
ment, one must understand a totipotent cell as a potential individual. 
But understanding totipotency as a dispositional power undercuts claims 
that the cell is identical in kind to the individual to which it may give 
rise. A vase is able to be broken, but it goes out of existence when it is 
broken. If a totipotent cell were to develop and differentiate qua separate 
organism, it would go out of existence (Burke, 1996). Claims, then, that 
totipotent cell B can be identical to a human being in some possible world 
misunderstand what totipotency is. So, to defend the totipotency argu-
ment, one would have to understand totipotency not as a dispositional 
property. But that would be arbitrary and would depart from a common-
sensical understanding of the term. Since the proposition ‘totipotency 
is not a dispositional property’ is being used to defend the totipotency 
argument, which is used to defend acting on (p), it is a load-bearing 
proposition the justification of which hardly meets the burden of proof. 
Because there exist viable alternatives to human destructive research, and 
the arguments I have canvassed here prove tenuous or fallacious, belief in 
(p) should not be acted upon.
Notes
 1 Stem cells can also be distinguished in terms of their potential to become other 
cells. The normal pathway to cellular differentiation is: totipotent  pluripotent 
 multipotent  fully differentiated. A totipotent stem cell is a cell capable of 
becoming any cell in the body, or of becoming a new individual of that species. 
A pluripotent stem cell is a cell capable of becoming any tissue or organ within 
specific organ systems of the body. A multipotent stem cell is a cell within an 
organ system capable of becoming any tissue or organ within that system. Fully 
differentiated cells are the cells that form the specific tissues and organs of our 
body; these are the cells that actually carry out the metabolism of the body. 
Only the cells of the zygote and morula are totipotent. The cells of the blas-
tocyst and gastrula are pluripotent (the trophoblast and inner cell mass of the 
blastocyst, and the three primary germ layers of the gastrula). Then, from these 
three germ layers (ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm), all the organ systems 
of the body will form (multipotent cells). Multipotent cells can differentiate into 
cell types within the cells’ generic kind, e.g., mesenchymal stem cells can differ-
entiate into heart tissue or blood cells but not liver tissue which is endodermal.
 2 See the dated but relevant analysis of alternatives (President’s Council on 
Bioethics, 2005) and an updated commentary (Condic & Rao, 2010).
 3 Adult stem cell research is an erroneous designation because umbilical cord 
blood stem cells have been used to treat various diseases, and fetal stem cells 
from miscarriage do not involve an intentional killing but can be used to treat 
various diseases as well.
 4 I do not think that such an action is permissible. My aim is merely to show the 
independence of the research ethics issue.
 5 For the Nazi experiments, an additional source of dehumanization was, of 
course, Nazi ideology itself. See Vetlesen (1994).
 6 For more clarifications, see Napier (2016, 79).
 7 Nozick’s use of the example is slightly different than the one I make here. His 
use is to motivate discussion of the closest continuer theory.
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 8 I owe this example to Helen Watt.
 9 This explanation was first posed to me in conversation by Rev. Alfred Cioffi 
PhD (Genetics) – per request.
 10 (x) (y) [(x = y) →  (x = y)]. A proof of this is offered by David Wiggins 
(2001, 114–116). See also, Wiggins (1974, 343ff.) Following Wiggins in this 
regard, E and O2 (and O1) refer to members of a substance-sortal, in this 
case, human being. Thus, E = O2 is simply saying that E and O2 are the same 
human being considered at t1 and t2 respectively.
 11 For more see the exchange between Oderberg (2008b), Persson (2009), and 
Oderberg (unpublished).
 12 Since my chief goal is to articulate the argument from epistemic diffidence 
I proceed in a summary fashion here. For more detailed discussion of both 
twinning and totipotency arguments, see Oderberg (1997a), George and 
Tollefsen (2011), and Napier (2010).
 13 Another interpretation of Smith and Brogaard is that they think that the 
multi-cellular zygote is not one organism not because of totipotency, but 
because of the non-differentiated character of the cells that constitute the 
zygote. This interpretation may or may not be correct, and I think my criti-
cisms below are apt even allowing for this distinction. But I would caution 
against this interpretation anyway. The standard definitions of totipotency 
make essential reference to non-differentiation. Merriam-Webster defines 
totipotent as “capable of developing into a complete organism or differentiat-
ing into any of its cells or tissues,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 11th 
ed., s.v. “Totipotent.” Available at: www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
totipotency (accessed April 15, 2010). Consequently, the non-differentiated 
character of the cells cannot be considered a problem separate from them 
being totipotent.
 14 One defect not discussed here is the description of the early embryo as a 
mere cluster (Smith & Brogaard, 2003, 55). For a more accurate description, 
consult Condic (2008, 2013). If the early embryo were merely a collection of 
totipotent cells with no communication and coordination of activity, it is a 
sheer miracle that only one human being develops in most cases. Advocates 
of the totipotency argument owe us an explanation as to why a mere cluster 
of cells consistently and almost invariably develops into one human being 
without prior coordination and communication. Their argument could be 
understood to involve the claim that the coordination is not enough to be 
considered an organism. As Condic points out, however, the coordination is 
teleologically ordered in that the organism is preparing for developmental 
events that occur later and these events are crucial for the growth and survival 
of the organism. (See, for example, Condic’s discussion of meiosis, 2008, 3ff., 
and fns 14 and 26).
 15 Simona Aimar (2018, 3–5) proposes a possibility view which departs from 
the simple counterfactual account I endorse in the text. For the possibility 
view, X is fragile if and only if there is a possible world in which X breaks. I 
do not find this view plausible enough to supplant the more commonsensical 
counterfactual view. When I say that Bill is irascible, I mean more than that 
in some possible world Bill gets angry. I mean to say that Bill has a tendency 
to get angry – he gets angry easily in this or that circumstance. The possibility 
view does not capture this meaning. Furthermore, the possibility view does 
not appear informative since it does not distinguish commonsensical differ-
ences. I might say that a class A chess player and a master level player have 
a disposition to defeat a grandmaster on Aimar’s account since, in some pos-
sible world, either scenario obtains. But clearly, I do not mean merely that 
in some possible world or other a master level player defeats a grandmaster 
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player. The distinction is more than the frequency of possible worlds in which 
the master beats the grandmaster for it is the likeness of ability that explains 
the increased frequency. Lastly, the possibility view does not account for some 
teleological orientations that are towards very unlikely events (e.g., each 
sperm is very unlikely to fertilize an ovum; nonetheless, that is what sperm 
are for). It appears that on the possibility view, each sperm does not have the 
disposition to fertilize since it would fertilize in only a few possible worlds.
 16 I owe this counterexample to Matthew Liao (2006, 142) but I draw different 
conclusions from it.
 17 See, for example, State of Tennessee Department of Health Pandemic 
Influenza Response Plan: April 2009. Available at: http://health.state.tn.us/
CEDS/PDFs/2006_PanFlu_Plan.pdf, 143ff.
 18 Here I might be conceding too much. I do not think that one is obligated to 
save the child, but it is certainly permissible to prefer the child over the embryo. 
If the embryo is my own, implantation and gestation is guaranteed, and nor-
mal development is certain, etc., I am inclined to think that I am permitted to 
save my own embryonic child. My intuitions here are not unorthodox either, 
since they show up in triage discussions when, for instance, triage protocols 
favor those patients that stand the best chance of surviving the longest (White 
et al., 2009). In any case, no one concludes that those who are in a more seri-
ous condition may be intentionally killed for research purposes.
 19 Sandel (2005) is sensitive to the idea that the embryo need not be equal in 
moral worth to the child in order to be a proper object of respect or “awe.” 
Sandel fails, however, to explain how the rescue case suggests that the embryo 
may be killed for research purposes and how this is consistent with the 
embryo being a proper object of respect and awe.
 20 One might see similar intuitions highlighted by McMahan’s frozen child case 
(2007) but with a few differences. McMahan supposes that if we were to 
come across a civilization in which they had frozen their children, we would 
make the sacrifices required to unfreeze them and raise them. The fact that 
we don’t do that for human beings frozen in IVF clinics indicates the lower 
moral status we think they have compared with children. In reply, there are 
people who adopt human beings from IVF clinics – though the practice is con-
troversial for reasons independent of moral status. Furthermore, there is an 
implicit inference being made by McMahan in drawing out the lessons of the 
frozen child case. I think that all Iraqi citizens have equal inherent dignity and 
that their country should not be invaded. But I did not have an obligation to 
ward off the United States’ military actions in 2002. Prisoners have inherent 
dignity and I believe they should not be killed, but I do not thereby have an 
obligation to save someone from death row. Obligations to save are context 
specific, such that the absence of an obligation to save S can be compatible 
with S having full moral status. Saving nearly 500K frozen embryos is a prac-
tically impossible task, and moreover, many of those who believe the embryos 
have full moral status would see the genetic mother as the only person with 
the moral right or duty to gestate them (Watt, 2006).
 21 Researchers using human embryonic-derived stem cells often use them from 
existing cell lines. The argument I endorse in this chapter is limited to the 
conclusion that no new lines should be created. An argument that one is 
appropriating evil (Kaveny, 2000) is the only but plausible prospect for argu-
ing against all use of human embryonic-derived stem cells.
 22 See the articles following Ord’s article on the same issue, especially Sarah-
Vaughan Brakman (2008) and Dodson, Toth-Fejel, and Stangebye (2008).
 23 McMahan explicitly rejects the typical conclusion drawn from the twinning 
argument saying that the fact an embryo can undergo division “is no reason 
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to think that it is not a unique individual. It is no reason to think that an 
ameba is not an individual ameba, that it can divide, or that any other cell 
is not a unique individual object because it can undergo fission” (McMahan, 
2007, 177).
 24 For a discussion see Parfit (1971); Nozick (1981, 29–70); Noonan (1985); 
Shoemaker (1984).
 25 Here too, I do not endorse the use of such sources for a number of reasons. 
The embryos here would die ‘naturally’ only as a result of being treated 
inhumanely by freezing them. Moreover, it is too easy to justify deliberately 
thawing them so that they die; and if they are viable, they would have to be 
transferred to a mother. For more discussion see President’s Commission on 
Bioethics (2005).
 26 The reference here is to adipose cells being reprogrammed into a pluripotent 
state and thus are better classified as iPSCs. However, this deserves separate 
mention because cells from adipose tissue are more easily reprogrammed 
than somatic cells – though they might also count as ‘somatic’ insofar as they 
are cells easily accessible in the human body. Further, the reprogramming 
was done in the absence of a feeder culture, thus bypassing likely sources of 
contamination.
 27 For cells sourced from an adult, this is not a controversial claim. For iPSCs, 
there is some debate (Zhao et al., 2011; Okita, Nagata, & Yamanaka, 2011; 
Condic & Rao, 2010). Whereas all pluripotent stem cells can form terato-
mas when transplanted, this effect is lessened when differentiation of the 
cells is done prior to transplant (Okita et al., 2011). Furthermore, the tera-
tomas formed from iPSCs are typically less complex than those formed from 
embryo-derived stem cells (Condic & Rao, 2010, 1123).
8 Euthanasia
For the previous two issues discussed, the personhood of that which is 
killed (Warren, 1973, 1992) is one key issue. For the euthanasia debates, 
however, the personhood of those killed by voluntary euthanasia is not 
in question. Even some candidates for non-voluntary euthanasia, such 
as infants and the demented elderly, are persons on McMahan’s (2002) 
and Baker’s (2000) accounts. Furthermore, numerous moral traditions 
tolerate very narrow criteria for permissibly killing persons such as kill-
ing in self-defense, just war, or an insane gunman – all of which involve 
an aggressor.1 Yet those killed by euthanasia are not threatening the lives 
of others so the justification for killing someone in self-defense, etc., is 
not applicable. These two opening observations suggest that the issue of 
euthanasia is whether it is permissible intentionally to kill someone who 
is not threatening the life of another (hereafter, the innocent).
The issue is whether the scope of permissible killing extends beyond 
only killing those who are unjust aggressors. Whatever that argument 
may be, it cannot entail that killing an innocent patient is obligatory. 
The reason why is because we have the intuition that physicians may 
conscientiously object to participation in euthanasia. As such euthanasia 
proponents (e.g., Young, 2018) argue that euthanasia is permissible but 
not obligatory. So, whatever it is that makes euthanasia permissible, it 
cannot be that a patient has a claim right2 to it, but a right that others not 
intentionally interfere with one’s choice.
If euthanasia is permissible, the killing involved might count as an 
exception to the prima facie prohibition against killing innocent persons. 
Understood as an exception to a right not to be killed (like Feinberg’s 
notion of waiving my rights (1978, 114ff.)), the issue of euthanasia is 
whether there are reasons sufficiently weighty to offset the prima facie 
prohibition on killing innocent persons. Are there good reasons for the 
exception (hereafter, I refer to this simply as ‘the exception’)?3
The format of this chapter is different from the previous ones in that 
the argument from epistemic diffidence spans the entire chapter. Crucial 
premises in that argument are motivated along the way, particularly in 
defining the issue. The next section canvases the requisite definitions such 
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as means, ends, intentions, etc. In the third section I aim to define the 
issue and comment briefly on what values can be presumed at the front 
end of the discourse. The fourth section outlines the relevant arguments. 
And the fifth section critically evaluates the arguments for an exception.
Definitions and Clarifications4
Euthanasia is the intentional killing of a patient by a health care pro-
fessional because death is thought to benefit the patient.5 Euthanasia is 
distinguished from murder in so far as death in the former case is thought 
to benefit or be good for the patient. Even involuntary euthanasia will 
be a case where death is thought to be in the objective interests of the 
patient, and therefore does not necessarily count as murder.
Passive and Active
Euthanasia is typically divided into passive and active to distinguish 
between how the doctor accomplishes the end of killing the patient. For 
passive euthanasia, a doctor intends to have a patient die by withhold-
ing or withdrawing a means of sustaining the patient’s life. If the patient 
lives after withdrawing treatment, such as a respirator, the doctor’s 
action plan is considered unsuccessful. For active euthanasia, a doctor 
intends to have a patient die by injecting lethal drugs, typically those 
that cause cardiac cessation. For both passive and active, the intention 
is the same, i.e., the death of the patient. The aim/target/plan is to render 
the patient dead.
Intention, Means, Side Effects
It is important to be clear that, by intention, I mean one’s reason for act-
ing (Shaw, 2006, 2015), which includes one’s beliefs about the goodness 
of a certain state of affairs and the means to achieve it. But intention also 
specifies that towards which one’s will is oriented. I may have any num-
ber of reasons for acting in any number of ways. But doing this action on 
this occasion involves a reason for doing so and my “will is set on achiev-
ing it” (Pilsner, 2006, 12). Intention includes both an intellectual and 
volitional component. As part of the intellectual component, it includes 
both one’s chosen means and end.6 Intention is one’s plan of action that 
requires beliefs about cause–effect relations (i.e., that this means brings 
about this end) and what states of affairs are good – one sets out to obtain 
an end one apprehends as good. At the same time, intentions should be 
distinguished from cause–effect relations themselves, from what an agent 
may know, and from the agent’s desires and motivations (Pellegrino, 
1996). Lastly, chosen means should be distinguished from accepted or 
tolerated side effects. I explain such distinctions presently.
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If I pound a nail I am bringing about two states of affairs: making 
a noise and securing two objects. I cause both, but only intend the lat-
ter. I may know that both effects will occur, but I intend only one of 
them. The next two examples illustrate how desire and intention are 
distinguished. If I have a social phobia, I may not desire to be around 
crowds of people, but I would intend to do so as part of what I believe 
is beneficial psychotherapy. I may desire to watch lowbrow television 
programming in the evening, but instead I intend to read and study for 
an upcoming exam. The action I do in cases of conflicting desires must be 
intended.7 With regard to the distinction between intention and motiva-
tion (Masek, 2009), one’s actions may be motivated out of fear, altruism, 
and hatred, etc., but the actions partly informed by such motivations may 
include lying, stealing, and murder. Intentions partly specify or define 
actions; fear, hatred, and altruism are species of motivations. Hatred, for 
example, is not an action, but murder is. Murder is an act of intending 
someone’s death to deprive the victim of a good (i.e., life). Explaining 
why I have the intentions I have may involve appeal to one’s motivations. 
But the explanans and explanandum cannot be conflated.
Lastly, one’s chosen means cannot overlap with accepted or toler-
ated side effects. Suppose I stand to earn a lot of money from my uncle 
Charlie’s life insurance policy. In one scenario I choose to kill him in 
order to obtain that money; in another scenario I do not intend his death 
but he dies of natural causes and I inherit the money. In the first case his 
death is a means to my intended end, but in the second it is clearly not 
a chosen means. (Strictly speaking, it is not a side effect either since it is 
not an effect of my actions.) Suppose I have cancer and ingest chemother-
apy which causes both the destruction of cancer cells and hyperemesis. 
Hyperemesis is a side effect of my action plan even if it occurs before my 
healing. Side effects are those effects of my actions that occur outside 
of what I specifically intend. The spatial metaphor of ‘outside’ is meant 
to capture the idea of aiming at states of affairs I apprehend as good. 
Side effects might be accepted, tolerated, or downright repudiated, but 
in neither of these options do I intend a side effect. This is not to say 
that I cannot be held morally responsible for any evil side effects of my 
actions. A scientific researcher doing a phase I first-in-human trial might 
intend to find a cure for a rare disease and choose appropriate means 
for doing so, but because of negligence in reviewing preclinical evidence 
she can be held morally responsible for serious adverse events that were 
not intended.
Even so, there are very good reasons to believe that intentions figure 
prominently in a moral analysis. Garcia (1997, 171ff.) observes that the 
applicability of terms in our moral vocabulary such as ‘lie,’ ‘rape,’ or 
‘kidnap,’ require that the agent has certain intentions such as to deceive, 
to coerce, etc. Intentions partly fix what moral action-types there are. 
More importantly, intentions matter morally because they are a “form of 
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morally significant favoring, a form of response to something – such as 
life or death – that has positive or negative value” (Garcia, 1997, 174). 
Similarly, Lynn A. Jansen (2010) comments that since intentions are 
one’s reasons for acting, they infuse one’s actions with reason. The inten-
tions of an agent “condition the meaning of his action . . . The reason 
that guides his action conditions the meaning of what he does . . . And 
the meaning of his action, both to himself and to others, is an ethically 
significant factor in assessing his conduct” (Jansen, 2010, 28).
Dworkin et al. (2013) appear to agree when they say
it is morally permissible for a doctor to deny an organ to one patient, 
even though he will die without it . . . But it is certainly not permis-
sible for a doctor to kill one patient in order to use his organs to save 
another.
(Dworkin et al., 2013, 664)
They go on to observe correctly that the distinction here is not between 
act and omission. Given Garcia’s and Jansen’s reflections, the reason is 
that the second doctor takes a stance against the worth of the person. 
Dworkin et al., however, locate the difference in whether the patient wants 
to be killed. They say “[w]hen a competent patient does want to die, the 
moral situation is obviously different” (Dworkin et al., 2013, 665). The 
Meiwes-Brandes case – discussed in more detail in Chapter 10 – rebuts 
the plausibility of this claim. Armin Meiwes posted an advertisement on 
a website devoted to cannibalism that said he was looking for someone to 
slaughter and be consumed. A few months later Bernd Brandes consented 
to being slaughtered and eaten. Jonathan Haidt comments on this case 
that “if your moral matrix is limited to the ethic of autonomy, you’re 
at high risk of being dumbfounded by this case” (Haidt, 2012, 146). 
If our commitment to the value of autonomy is exclusive, we have no 
grounds for opposing Meiwes’s actions. Our opposition to consensual 
slavery, slaughter, or cannibalism cannot be chalked up to “squeamish-
ness” (Brandt, 1975, 110) or conservative alimentary restrictions, but to 
the fact that someone intentionally destroyed someone’s life.
The chief reason for thinking that intentions figure prominently in a 
moral analysis is that they fix what our response to a good is. If I intend 
to speak falsely, that flags how little I value knowledge for the person to 
whom I lie. If I intend to save another person’s life (knowing certain risks 
in doing so to my own life), that flags how much I value that person’s 
life. Intentions signal how I value certain states of affairs. So, if I were to 
intend someone’s death, that intention signals how much I value that per-
son’s existence. In lying, I am setting out to keep my hearer from acquiring 
knowledge. But if knowledge is a good thing for my hearer to have, I am 
doing something wrong by lying – likewise for intending death. Because 
intention involves an intellectual and volitional component, intending 
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death entails taking a stance against another’s existence – I must will the 
person’s non-existence. If it turns out that the patient’s life is intrinsically 
worthwhile, setting out to destroy it would be doing something wrong. 
Having such an intention signals a disordered will and false apprehension 
of the true worth at stake.8
Finally, intentions are morally important because we can control 
them, but we cannot necessarily control every foreseen side effect of our 
actions. John Keown notes that “we can always avoid intending bad 
consequences, [but] we cannot always avoid foreseeably bringing them 
about” (Jackson & Keown, 2012, 105). Since we should be held morally 
responsible only for what we can control (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998), 
intentions index that for which we are morally responsible.
Understood as both involving an intention that the patient be dead, 
passive and active euthanasia are identical in this respect. Hence, much of 
the discussion on euthanasia – which assesses whether a moral distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia exists (Foot, 1967; Rachels, 1986) – 
is misguided. Suppose I intend to kill uncle Charlie for his inheritance. 
Upon entering his house I notice that he is drowning in his bathtub. I 
do nothing. I have intended an omission, and my omission is subject to 
moral appraisal. Christopher Tollefsen comments that,
when I see my rich uncle drowning in the tub, if I fail to go to his aid 
in order that he drown, so that I might collect the inheritance, my 
action is one of willful murder, regardless of the fact that it is partly 
constituted by an omission. It is no less an action than anything else 
that is performed intentionally.
(Tollefsen, 2006, 456)
Conversely, not all forms of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment can be understood as passive euthanasia since the intention can 
be restricted to ‘relieving the patient of futile or overly burdensome treat-
ments’ (see Cavanaugh, 2006). Henceforth, ‘killing’ or ‘to kill’ should be 
understood as intentional.
Voluntary, Non-Voluntary, Involuntary
Whereas the passive–active distinction applies to how the doctor accom-
plishes his/her end, the next set of distinctions apply to how things look 
from the patient’s viewpoint. Euthanasia may be ‘voluntary,’ ‘non- 
voluntary,’ or ‘involuntary.’ Voluntary euthanasia is defined as an act of 
euthanasia (whether passive or active) on a competent patient who has 
requested it, which includes requests through a valid advance directive.
Because voluntariness comes in degrees,9 there appears to be a prob-
lem. Being voluntary in a strong sense means, at least, being free from 
undue influence (think back to Sophie’s choice; she clearly did not 
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voluntarily choose to have her daughter killed). Since pain and suffer-
ing are likely undue influences, requests for euthanasia because one is 
suffering unbearably are likely not voluntary requests in this strong 
sense. Alfonso Gómez-Lobo observes that terminally ill patients “may be 
depressed and under various forms of psychological pressure, especially 
if the view that the terminally ill should die and thus stop wasting medical 
resources . . . becomes socially accepted” (2002, 108). An autonomous 
decision in this strong sense is unlikely in such circumstances. Take away 
the pain or depression, and patients withdraw their requests for dying in 
98%–99% of cases (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2006, 2.4).
A request to be killed may be voluntary in a weak sense, which requires 
an understanding of the consequences, an ability to reason (Appelbaum, 
2007), and being free of “external” influences (Appelbaum, Lidz, & 
Klitzman, 2009, 33ff.). But not all weakly voluntary requests for eutha-
nasia should be honored, as when I request euthanasia because I have a 
headache or am moderately depressed – i.e., not enough to exert undue 
influence. In such cases I understand the consequences and can reason. 
Because I am not subject to excruciating suffering or an unbearable 
condition, my choice would be less influenced by external factors. But 
because such conditions are bearable, by hypothesis, my request loses its 
moral urgency.
Non-voluntary euthanasia is defined as an act of euthanasia (whether 
passive or active) on a patient who is not able to request it (such as a 
baby or demented patient). And involuntary euthanasia is defined as an 
act of euthanasia (whether passive or active) performed on a competent 
patient who does not want to be killed, but the medical staff thinks it is 
in the best interest of the patient to be dead. Involuntary euthanasia is 
still conceptually distinct from murder, but most people agree that it is a 
form of wrongdoing nonetheless.
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is defined as an act whereby a phy-
sician intentionally assists a patient to commit suicide by providing a 
prescription of lethal drugs. Unlike euthanasia, the final act which causes 
the patient’s death is performed by the patient rather than the doctor. It is 
widely agreed that assisting in an evil act with the intention to see the evil 
act performed is itself an evil action. Planning and facilitating an immoral 
act is also an immoral act. So, if killing someone were wrong, PAS would 
be wrong as well. Conversely, if killing someone were permissible, aiding 
in the patient’s death would be as well. Although euthanasia and PAS are 
conceptually distinct, their moral status is correlative.
What Can Be Presumed
As with any dialogical context, answers to the question ‘is euthanasia 
an exception to the general prohibition on intentional killing?’ make use 
of presumptions. As discussed in Chapter 2, presumptions are defined 
with reference to a point in a dialectical exchange and in relation to a 
Euthanasia 165
specific challenger such that P is presumed if and only if the challenger 
is obliged to concede P at that point in the exchange. Presumptions in 
moral discourse are a function of what values may be taken for granted. 
On the issue in question, Joel Feinberg grants that prior to encounter-
ing arguments for voluntary euthanasia, all innocent human beings, in 
virtue of being human, have a right not to be killed. He remarks that, “it 
is hard to shed the intuitive conviction that there is somehow something 
that is ‘absolute’ in the natural or human right to life” (Feinberg, 1978, 
98).10 It is safe to presume that killing innocent persons is impermissible, 
especially when it is not necessary to save others. So, the ethical question 
for euthanasia is not whether suffering can have redemptive value. The 
question is simply whether euthanasia is an exception to the prohibition 
on killing innocent persons.
The apparent anodyne quality of this presumption is belied by the 
discourse on euthanasia. A predominant feature in this discourse is to 
construct criteria that makes it impermissible to kill another person. The 
background assumption for this discourse to make sense is that permissi-
ble killing is the default position. Richard Brandt appears to endorse this 
understanding of the dialectic when he asks “can this view that all kill-
ing of innocent human beings is morally wrong be defended, and if not, 
what alternative principle can be?” (Brandt, 1975, 106; emphasis added). 
Brandt thinks that the onus of proof is on the claim that killing an inno-
cent human being is sufficient for wronging that person. One must argue 
that one’s criteria for impermissible killing is a necessary condition; one 
must find that property or feature that makes it wrong to kill someone. 
The implication is that failing these projects, killing is permissible. Once 
these assumptions are made apparent, it is clear that they get things back-
wards. We do not need a reason not to kill, we need a reason to kill.
There are serious doubts, therefore, that the permissibility of killing 
innocents – even those who want to die – can be presumed. Although 
more is said below about the putative value of autonomous choices, spe-
cifically the choice to die, I note here that there are numerous values on 
offer which help to index presumptions. They include the values of life, 
health, and the healing ends of medicine.
Before proceeding, let us consider two objections to the claim that life 
and health function as presumptive values. Alan Goldman (2010) men-
tions that we do not place life and health as having “top priority.” He 
states that, “if our primary goals were always to minimize risk to health 
and life, we should spend our entire federal budget in health-related areas. 
Certainly such a suggestion would be ludicrous” (Goldman, 2010, 76). 
Suitably circumscribed, his point is correct; but the claim that life and 
health have presumptive value in moral discourse avoids his objection. It 
would follow that we should spend our entire federal budget on health-
related areas if health were the only value. But it is not part of one’s 
understanding of the ends of medicine, or one’s opposition to euthanasia 
for that matter, that health and life are the only values. Rather, they are 
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values that we cannot aim to eliminate, destroy, or diminish. This latter 
claim is compatible with there being any number of important values for 
which it would also be impermissible to will against, and the promotion 
of which is justifiably weighed against the promotion of health given the 
resources at hand.
Furthermore, Goldman’s observation cannot be used to illuminate the 
issue of euthanasia. An absolute prohibition on torture does not entail 
having to spend the federal budget promoting or defending bodily health 
and integrity. Likewise, an absolute prohibition on euthanasia does not 
entail any privileging of values in our fiscal decisions. The position only 
states which values cannot be acted against; as to which values should be 
promoted, it remains open.
Further on, Goldman claims that there is no difference between exist-
ing in an irreversible coma and death. He concludes that our lives have no 
intrinsic value. “It is plausible to maintain that life itself is not of intrinsic 
value, since surviving in an irreversible coma seems no better than death” 
(Goldman, 2010, 77). It is true that being permanently unconscious rules 
out having good experiences and engaging in worthwhile life projects. In 
relation to having good experiences, the irreversibly comatose person and 
the dead person are alike. But it does not follow that there is no intrinsic 
value to one’s life. The ‘no better than’ relation is flanked by the relata of 
having good experiences: not having good experiences in a comatose state 
is no better than not having good experiences while dead. One cannot infer 
the absence of intrinsic value from this jejune observation because, if life 
has intrinsic worth at all, it is going to have that kind of worth independ-
ent of good or bad experiences. So, observing that there is no difference 
between the comatose and the dead person along one axis of evaluation 
does not tell us much about intrinsic worth. There is no reason, then, not 
to presume the values of life and health. Arguably, the healing profession 
cannot make sense without understanding these values as remaining, if 
you will, even in the setting of disease and disability (Sulmasy, 2008).
The Arguments
Arguments Against
The basic argument against euthanasia can be understood as follows. 
Euthanasia is the intentional killing of an innocent human being. It is 
impermissible to kill an innocent human being – certainly in contexts 
where such killing does not involve saving the lives of others.11 Therefore 
euthanasia is impermissible. To the question ‘can life itself be so good that 
it cannot be rational or moral to end it?’ the opponent to euthanasia can 
answer that if ‘life itself’ refers to you, or me, or Ladmaker then it cannot 
be rational ever to intentionally kill us. But if the ‘it’ in that question refers 
to one’s bad experiences, the opponent to euthanasia can consistently hold 
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that it would be rational to end those experiences. The distinction between 
my life and my experiences is discussed in more detail below and was 
addressed in Chapter 5.
Additionally, arguments against euthanasia emphasize the equality of 
all human lives, from which it follows that no one should be discriminated 
against. However, in legalizing assisted suicide, one
sets up a double standard: some people get suicide prevention while 
others get suicide assistance, and the difference between the two 
groups is the health status of the individual, leading to a two-tiered 
system that results in death to the socially devalued group. This is 
blatant discrimination.
(Not Dead Yet, 2018)
When the most frequent reason for requesting euthanasia is loss of 
autonomy or independence (Jones, 2015, 8) – i.e., one is disabled in some 
way – and the fundamental justification for euthanasia is that death will 
benefit the person, one cannot but conclude that being disabled is a reason 
for killing someone; they are better off dead. This conclusion is contrary 
to our ethical commitment to equality and to numerous commentators 
in the disability rights literature. Kittay (1999, 150), for example, offers 
the following reflection on discovering her daughter’s intellectual dis-
abilities. “Sesha would never live a normal life . . . Yet throughout this 
time it never even occurred to me to give Sesha up, to institutionalize 
her . . . She was my daughter. I was her mother. That was fundamental.” 
The point is that disability does not detract from someone’s worth. She 
concludes, “[t]hat which we believed we valued . . . the capacity for 
thought, for reason, was not it, not it at all” (1999, 150).
Might the cost in being wrong in accepting these arguments be that 
patients would be left to writhe in pain and suffer? The opponent to 
euthanasia does not see the issue as involving the choice between, on 
the one hand, opposing the killing of patients while letting them writhe 
in pain or, on the other hand, permitting the killing of patients while 
risking abuses – such as granting the request for euthanasia of a clin-
ically depressed 80-year-old who could have a quality life were he to 
be treated (Arras, 2010, 575). Dworkin et al. (2013, 665) appear to 
endorse this dichotomy when they motivate their position by discussing 
patients who feel “anguish . . . at remaining alive, but intubated, help-
less, and often sedated near oblivion.” This understanding of the issue is 
embarrassing. If they are intubated and the respirator is not conferring a 
reasonable hope of benefit, one can do a palliative wean without intend-
ing the patient’s death. Depending on the circumstances and wishes of 
the patient, such an action would not necessarily involve an intentional 
killing of the patient. If they are “sedated near oblivion,” then in what 
sense can they feel anguish?
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Part of their misunderstanding can be attributed to a misunderstand-
ing of palliative care. The root meaning of the term ‘palliative’ stems 
from the Latin term palliare which means to cover over something – a 
pallium is a noun and refers to a cloak. Palliative care aims to cover over 
symptoms of disease and illness. Understood as such, it can begin as soon 
as the first responders arrive and can span someone’s entire hospital stay. 
It can begin on a newborn as well as the elderly. When palliative care is 
understood not as a last resort or as synonymous with hospice or end-of-
life care, but rather as distributed throughout someone’s entire exposure 
to health care delivery, symptom management and quality of life signifi-
cantly improve.12 It does so because palliative care focuses on pain and 
symptom management, setting goals of care, prospective care planning, 
and emotional and spiritual support.
Viewing palliative care as distributed throughout one’s care improves 
that care. Casarett et al. (2008) followed 524 patients, 296 of whom 
received palliative consultation plus usual care and 228 who received 
just usual care. On a 32-item survey (i.e., FATE), those receiving pallia-
tive care showed significantly better scores (typically by a factor of 10+ 
points) with the greatest discrepancy on “Care around the time of death” 
in which the scores were 63 vs 45 respectively. In terms of receiving ade-
quate symptom management, a four-point Likert scale was used: 0 = 
always, 1 = often, 2 = sometimes, 3 = never (thus, higher scores equaled 
better outcomes). Those receiving palliative care showed a mean of 2.15, 
versus 1.88 for usual. The biggest difference pertained to the incidence of 
PTSD, with 1.92 and 0.77 respectively. The highest satisfaction for the 
palliative care group concerned the absence of unwanted treatment and 
being admitted/residing in the facility of the patient’s choice.
Palliative care improves quality of life, lowers depressive symptoms 
and incidences of PTSD, and reduces the use of burdensome and point-
less treatments. It can also improve survival from a mean of 8.9 months 
for usual care, to 11.6 months for palliative plus usual care (Temel et al., 
2010). Lastly, inpatient palliative care requests frequently identify prior 
unrecognized problems and unmet needs (Manfredi et al., 2000), and 
they result in lowering the following: length of stay in ICUs (Norton 
et al., 2007), likelihood of dying in an ICU (Elsayem et al., 2006), and 
costs of care (Penrod et al., 2006). How often is it that patients are receiv-
ing intensive care, chemotherapy, or some other high dose treatment in 
their last week of life, with all the side effects associated with that level 
of care? Given the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of palliative 
care, and the personal testimony that many physicians are not adequately 
trained to meet a patient’s goals of palliation, opting for euthanasia does 
not solve the underlying problem. Better medicine, not easier killing, 
appears to be the more parsimonious prescription (Keown, 2009).
So, there are principally two justifications for prohibiting euthanasia. The 
first is that the prohibition against killing innocents does not admit of excep-
tions; and the second is a commitment to the equality of all human lives.
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Arguments For
Dan Brock (1992) is typically cited as providing the most straightforward 
justification for euthanasia. Brock presents an argument for the permissi-
bility of euthanasia based on two fundamental values: self-determination 
and individual well-being. His argument can be read as providing two 
arguments – one based on each value – or as one argument where well-
being is understood to morally justify the key premise in the argument 
from self-determination. I interpret the argument in the latter way for 
reasons of charity – motivating euthanasia based on one value or another 
strikes me as handcuffing the proponent’s case by letting one value bear 
the burden of proof.
Consider first the value of self-determination. Brock rightly consid-
ers self-determination a value and asks whether this value extends to 
include choosing the “time and manner” (1992, 11) of one’s death. In 
answering this question, he appeals to the inherent variability in peo-
ple’s thresholds for what counts as a meaningful life. Brock states that 
“there is no single, objectively correct answer for everyone as to when, if 
at all, one’s life becomes all things considered a burden and unwanted” 
(1992, 11). Because there is no single objectively correct understanding 
of when one’s life becomes “a burden and unwanted” Brock moves to 
conclude the following: “If self-determination is a fundamental value, 
then the great variability among people on this question makes it espe-
cially important that individuals control the manner, circumstances, and 
timing of their dying and death” (Brock, 1992, 11).
The value of self-determination – or its cognates such as autonomy 
or personal interest – functions as a principal value in arguments for the 
permissibility of euthanasia. Dworkin et al., for example, say that,
A person’s interest in following his own convictions at the end of life 
is so central a part of the more general right to make “intimate and 
personal choices” for himself that a failure to protect that particular 
interest would undermine the general right altogether.
(Dworkin et al., 2013, 662)
From these quotations, we can piece together the argument that euthana-
sia is permissible because self-determination is a value.
1 Self-determination/autonomy is a fundamental ethical value.
2 The value of self-determination ‘extends’ (or includes) choosing the 
time and manner of one’s death.
3 Euthanasia involves choosing the time and manner of one’s death.
4 Therefore, euthanasia is consistent with a fundamental ethical value.
To derive the conclusion that euthanasia is permissible requires a few 
more premises to the effect that choices consistent with a fundamental 
value are permissible and there are no other values that might be impugned 
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by the choice for euthanasia. A choice to die might be rational from the 
perspective of the sufferer, but euthanasia might remain inconsistent with, 
for example, the healing ends of medicine. So, even if an autonomously 
made choice to die has value, the permissibility of euthanasia does not 
necessarily follow.
One could avoid additional premises by understanding the value of self-
determination in premise (1) strongly such that an autonomous choice to 
die is a sufficient condition for that choice being permissible. There are two 
issues with this understanding. First, the stated value is the value of a specific 
autonomous choice not autonomy understood as a power or an ability to 
make decisions. But for any given choice, it is not obvious that the choice is 
valuable, even if being autonomous is a presumptive value. Simply choosing 
x does not itself morally justify doing x; we have to know what x involves 
(Keown, 2009; Oderberg, 1997b, 239ff.). That I autonomously choose vol-
untary slavery or to be killed and eaten hardly justifies such choices.
Second, the strong interpretation would force proponents of an excep-
tion to hold that autonomy is the only relevant value. Proponents could 
claim that other values, such as the healing ends of medicine, are not suf-
ficiently weighty to offset the value of one’s autonomous choice to die. 
But how would one argue for this claim? Suppose for simplicity that there 
are two values at stake, the value of protecting medical practice as a heal-
ing art on one hand (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1988, chs 5 and 10) and 
the value of respecting one’s autonomous choice to die on the other. On 
this strong understanding of (1), the latter value is weightier. The argu-
ment as to why, however, cannot appeal to the value of an autonomous 
choice to die itself since that would be viciously circular. And it cannot 
appeal to the value of a choice to die in other contexts since that value 
would no longer be incompatible with the healing ends of medicine. The 
prospects are dim, then, for defending a strong understanding of premise 
(1) in a way that avoids dogmatism or irrelevance.
Therefore, the argument for euthanasia being permissible needs to 
include a separate premise. I suggest the following, or something trivially 
different.
5 There are no other fundamental values impugned by euthanasia and 
any action consistent with fundamental values is permissible, all 
things considered.
It follows that,
6 Euthanasia is permissible.
Premises (2) and (5) are the premises needing further justification. 
Opponents to euthanasia could accept premise (1) but reject the con-
clusion since self-determination might not be the only value, but rather, 
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a value along with the inherent and irreplaceable worth of the person. 
That observation alone puts pressure on premises (2) and (5).
The value of well-being, as Brock understands it, is meant to motivate 
premise (2). By well-being, Brock wants to accept that life can go well 
for some people, but poorly for others. He says that “continued life is 
seen by the patient as no longer a benefit, but now a burden” (Brock, 
1992, 11). And this may be especially true in the terminally ill or dying 
patient. The notion of well-being is, then, one’s own subjective assess-
ment of how one’s life is going in terms of its worth and quality. If life 
can become burdensome, one’s well-being is low. If a patient judges 
that nonexistence is better than terminal and intractable suffering,13 then 
choosing to be killed is rational.
Why think that it would be rational? Brock argues that this is what 
we do already, when we honor a patient’s request to forego means of 
life-sustaining treatment.
But when a competent patient decides to forgo all further life- 
sustaining treatment then the patient, either explicitly or implicitly, 
commonly decides that the best life possible for him or her with 
treatment is of sufficiently poor quality that it is worse than no fur-
ther life at all.
(Brock, 1992, 11)
The same type of reasoning is present in requests for euthanasia. If a 
patient judges that her life can be “of sufficiently poor quality,” inten-
tionally ending that life is no different than what we do now – if forgoing 
life-sustaining treatment is permissible for the reason that the patient’s 
life is of sufficient poor quality. The key is to understand that the patient 
must make this judgment. So, in the settings in which the patient is suf-
fering in ways she or he deems unbearable, it appears consistent with 
the value of autonomy to desire ending one’s life. Therefore, the value of 
self-determination extends or includes choosing the time and manner of 
one’s death.
The defense of premise (5) appeals to similar ideas. In rebutting 
claims that life has inherent worth, arguably a value incompatible with 
the value of choosing to be killed, proponents typically make a dis-
tinction between biological life and biographical life (see Chapter 5). 
The basic idea is that life ‘itself’ is not inherently or intrinsically 
worthwhile, only one’s overall experiences are. Shelly Kagan (2018) 
helpfully refers to this view of life’s worth as the “neutral container 
view.” Biological life itself merely enables me to have a good (or bad) 
life (experiences).
How do these distinctions work to support (5)? Brandt says that 
the “person who is contemplating suicide is obviously making a choice 
between future world-courses; the world course that includes his demise, 
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say, an hour from now, and several possible ones that contain his demise 
at a later point” (2006, 391). Further on he says that
the basic question a person must answer, in order to determine which 
world course is best or rational for him to choose, is which [one] he 
would choose under conditions of optimal use of information, when 
all of his desires are taken into account.
(2006, 391)
To the objection that few people can know with certainty future world 
courses, the situations in which we can be certain are those facing a 
terminally ill patient. Furthermore, we should understand these world 
courses to include principally experiences; and whether these world cour-
ses are good or bad depends upon whether these experiences satisfy 
one’s desires and preferences overall (Brandt, 2006, 392). Consequently, 
a neutral container view of life’s worth justifies there being ‘no other 
fundamental values.’
In an interesting twist to the development of pro-euthanasia argu-
ments, Emily Jackson (Jackson & Keown, 2012, 38–39) appears to reject 
the neutral container view (though critical analysis below suggests that 
this cannot be the case). She observes that such a theory “involves making 
a quality of life judgment that some believe to be irreconcilable with the 
principle that all lives are of equal value” (2012, 38). If my experiences 
are incongruent with my preferences and desires, then my world course 
is going poorly. On the neutral container view, my life has lower worth. 
Someone else whose desires and preferences are being satisfied appears 
to have a more worthwhile life. Such a result violates the principle that 
all human lives are of equal worth.14 Her response is to accept that her 
view involves a judgment that someone’s life has ceased to benefit him, 
but she rejects inferring from this that the person has no worth. Instead 
she holds that wanting
to be there when someone we love dies and to be able to comfort 
them in their final days and hours, is prompted by love and compas-
sion, and does not entail subscribing to the view that the person’s life 
has become worthless.
(Jackson & Keown, 2012, 39)
But this concession cannot be a plausible feature of a pro-euthanasia 
argument. First, the scene Jackson describes in the second quotation is 
that respect for the person’s worth is compatible with allowing someone 
to die sans intentional killing; but she has not argued that such respect 
is compatible with euthanasia. It may be, but it is unclear how the argu-
ment would go. If I respect knowledge, that is, if I think that knowledge 
is worthwhile to have in myself or others, I am not going to lie to others, 
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and I will be wary of self-deception. If I think that someone’s reputation 
is worthwhile, I am not going to calumniate that person. If I think that 
someone has inherent worth, I am not going to eliminate him or her – 
consider my reflections on the Charles–Ladmaker narrative (Chapter 5).15 
Henceforth, I take the more canonical route and understand the defense 
of (5) as requiring something like a neutral container view of life’s worth. 
What makes life valuable is having valuable experiences; valuable world-
courses in Brandt’s terminology.
Appraisal of the Arguments
We began the penultimate section with an outline of what can be pre-
sumed, namely, the prima facie prohibition on killing an innocent 
human person. If there are any exceptions to this prima facie prohibi-
tion, there must be positive reasons in favor of them. I address in this 
section whether the arguments in favor of an exception are plausible. 
I also address whether the values appealed to in such arguments could 
plausibly function as presumptions. The argument that follows can be 
understood as two-tiered. The first tier argues that the values proponents 
of an exception appeal to cannot be presumed. Having leveled the dia-
lectical exchange, the second tier argues that the standard arguments in 
favor of euthanasia are not good arguments.16 If there are no good argu-
ments for that exception the prohibition against killing innocent human 
persons stands.
Ad Premise (5)
The first critical point is that the distinction between biological and bio-
graphical life is not exhaustive. It ignores the idea defended in Chapter 
5 that you and I have inherent and irreplaceable worth. In that chapter 
I did not argue against interest or biographical accounts of life’s worth. 
What I argued is that these accounts are not comprehensive; they do not 
capture the many vectors by which we can assess the worth of a human 
being. What needs ending in certain clinical circumstances is the suffer-
ing, and what morally justifies ending that suffering is that it is bad. 
What is decidedly not bad is the person him- or herself. Ladmaker never 
becomes bad, even though his experiences are horrible. Just as intelli-
gence remains good even if I come to know horrible events or come to 
hold false beliefs; so life itself remains good even if I experience suffering 
(Gómez-Lobo & Keown, 2015, 70). One cannot move from someone’s 
suffering being bad to the life of the person him- or herself being bad.
Observing that there are other views of life’s worth does not argue 
against the container view. The argument against the neutral container 
view is, however, simple and conclusive. We need merely to ask who is it 
that judges whether one’s biographical life is good or not? The answer of 
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course is that the person is judging the quality of his or her experiences. 
The experiencer and the experiences cannot be the same. The chief idea 
reached in the previous chapter on dignity was that the experiencer has 
inherent worth; the evaluator of one’s quality of life has inherent worth. 
I am not a mere container for experiences, and yet, it is impermissible 
to kill me. Furthermore, there is the point already noted that the neutral 
container view violates our commitment to the equality of all human life. 
So, even if S is suffering and suffering is bad, and it is permissible to end 
bad things, it still does not follow that it is permissible to kill S.
Some proponents of an exception might claim that suffering is undig-
nified, or that having a low quality of life renders one’s life not worth 
living. In response, if suffering compromises or lessens our dignity then 
by killing the person we are not ‘respecting’ or ‘upholding’ their dig-
nity. By hypothesis, they do not have dignity and therefore such worth 
cannot be upheld or respected. If all that makes one’s life good is one’s 
biographical life and one’s biography is poor, killing that person would 
be inconsequential because what is killed has little value. Furthermore, 
if suffering makes us lose value, why try to save a person or restore her 
to health? Health care is a proper moral response to illness and disease 
because the people who are ill are valuable. Daniel Sulmasy captures this 
point the following way.
It is in recognition of that [intrinsic] worth that we have established 
the healing professions as our moral response to those of our kind 
who are suffering from disease and injury. The plight of the sick 
has little instrumental value, rarely serving the purposes, beliefs, 
desires, interests, expectations of any of us as individuals. Rather, 
it is because of the intrinsic value of the sick that healthcare profes-
sionals serve them.
(Sulmasy, 2008, 478)
Providing health care to disabled and diseased human beings makes sense 
only if those human beings have intrinsic dignity. If one loses her value 
because she is suffering, then her claim on our moral response to that 
suffering diminishes. Instead of taking one’s suffering as a reason for 
thinking that the sufferer’s worth is lowered, I am suggesting that the 
suffering cannot be viewed as bad unless we first view the sufferer as 
inherently good. It is because the sufferer has inherent and undiminished 
worth in the setting of suffering that we abhor the suffering so much. 
Suffering does not lessen one’s dignity but shines a light on it.
Ad Premise (2)
Regarding the value of self-determination and autonomy, it is common 
to all commentators on the debate that autonomy qua power or ability 
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is a value. Whereas my ability to choose is valuable, each of my choices 
do not necessarily have value. When we think of what choices are valu-
able, everyone agrees that choices about our associates, our career, our 
life plans and projects, are valuable. I shall refer to this class of choices 
as ‘intra-life choices.’ But there is the class of choices concerned with 
killing oneself. This action class I will refer to as ‘contra-life choices.’ 
What is uncontroversial is the value of making intra-life choices; what is 
controversial is whether the value of contra-life choices, if they have any, 
is sufficient to displace the presumption against killing innocent people.
Premise (1) tells us that autonomy is a fundamental value. If by auton-
omy one means the ability to make choices, the argument to (6) does not 
follow since the latter references a specific choice. If by autonomy one 
means to refer to intra-life choices the argument to (6) again does not 
follow since the latter refers to a contra-life choice. I might add that (1) 
is quite plausible if it is referring to the value of one’s intra-life choices. 
If the value of autonomy in premise (1) is meant to include the value of 
contra-life choices it is begging the question. Premise (2) is true only if the 
choice is contra-life. What this means is that the success of the argument 
depends upon arguing that the value of one’s intra-life choices ‘extends’ 
in some way to include contra-life choices in a way that is neither question-
begging nor equivocating.
As noted above, the first tier of my procedure assesses whether the 
value of a contra-life choice can be presumed. The importance of doing 
so can be appreciated by the following argument. If the value of a contra-
life choice is presumed, the value of ending one’s life would function as a 
value we can take for granted. On such a scenario, one would not need 
to argue for an extension.
The value of a contra-life choice, however, cannot be presumed. Even 
on the neutral container view of life’s worth, life needs to be going badly 
before one is justified in ending it. If contra-life choices have presumptive 
value one would not need to have a bad biography, to use Rachel’s term, 
before one is justified in ending one’s life. What we need is an argument 
for an exception, not a presumption in favor of it.
What can be presumed is that bad experiences are not valuable. As 
argued above, it would not follow from this that I am worthless, nor 
would it follow that ending my life is valuable. So, the value of choos-
ing to end my life cannot be a presumed value. (It certainly is not on an 
epistemic par with other presumptions such as that a person missing for 
more than eight years is dead, or that a child under eight has no criminal 
intent (Rescher, 2006)).
We can now turn to the second tier of my procedure and argue that 
premise (2) is likely false. At this point in the dialectic the question is 
whether choosing to end one’s life is a value sufficient to motivate an 
exception. To avoid circularity, one would need to argue that such 
choices are valuable. But one cannot use the value of intra-life choices to 
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argue that contra-life choices have value, or even that they have presumed 
value. One cannot, for example, infer that determining the time and man-
ner of one’s death is valuable because choosing to be a professor is a 
value. The choices are categorically different. Furthermore, since premise 
(2) is true only if contra-life choices have value, the argument also risks 
equivocation if premise (1) is interpreted as referring to the value of intra-
life choices – unless that which makes intra-life choices valuable is the 
same feature that makes contra-life choices valuable. Given the difference 
in content between these two choice types, the only feature common to 
both might be that they issue from the same autonomous will. But again, 
what one wills does not morally justify what one wills. So, the ‘extension’ 
that premise (2) claims is not only not likely, but categorically false.
These reflections provide a riposte to Dworkin et al. (2013, 662ff., 
quoted above) where they make two claims. One claim is that the choice 
to have one’s life ended is a personal choice. The second is that we have a 
right to make personal choices. It follows that we have a right to choose 
euthanasia. With the distinction between intra- and contra-life choices in 
mind, we can understand the dialectical burden this argument inherits. 
The argument that we have a right to make all personal choices must be 
argued for on one of two grounds. The first ground is to suggest that we 
have a right to make personal choices that are intra-life and infer from 
the value of intra-life choices the value (and right) to make contra-life 
choices. (As already noted, one cannot just assume that contra-life choices 
have value since that is exactly what is at stake). The other ground is to 
suggest that we should be allowed to make personal choices because we 
are the only ones who bear the effects of those choices.
We have already considered the first ground and there are at least 
two ripostes to the second. Daniel Callahan observes that this notion 
of autonomy is one among many values since we can easily “imagine a 
good for others beyond that which they imagine for themselves” (1984, 
41) and we can persuade them that their moral choices are wrong. More 
importantly, the notion that my autonomy and personal choices are 
hermetically sealed is a notion corrosive of friendship and community. 
Callahan states,
This understanding of autonomy is hazardous to moral relationships 
and moral community. It buys our freedom to be ourselves, and to 
be free of undue influence by others, at too high a price. It estab-
lishes contractual relationships as the principal and highest form of 
relationships. It elevates isolation and separation as the necessary 
starting point of human commitments.
(Callahan, 1984, 41)
If my friend is considering killing himself, an act with which I disagree, 
the notion of personal choice appealed to by Dworkin et al. suggests 
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that I lack any philosophical justification for intervening in his choice to 
die. It is his choice and he is the sole bearer of its effects. To be sure, the 
intuitions that inform pro-euthanasia arguments can be made consistent 
with the good of friendship (i.e., compassion in alleviating the suffering 
of another). My point is only that in arguing for the permissibility of 
euthanasia, the notion of autonomy appealed to is not obviously con-
sistent with the good of friendship. It is entirely too strong, and I doubt 
whether it is at all relevant (compassion for the sufferer seems more 
dominant).
The second riposte is to observe that the moral permissibility of one’s 
choice does not immediately follow from the fact that the chooser is the 
only bearer of the choice’s effects.17 Such a view would entail that I can-
not do wrong to myself. But of course, I can treat myself poorly, such as 
making choices that frustrate my objective interests.
The Groundless Objection
I suspect that compassion for the sufferer is the principal idea that 
motivates the permissibility of euthanasia. If we focus on the good of 
ending suffering, without entirely abandoning the relevance of self-
determination, we can understand the pro-euthanasia argument as 
follows. First, we can define the circumstances in which one might 
entertain killing an innocent person.
(Cir):  S is suffering in a way such that S is neither harmed by nor 
deprived of overall good experiences by the killing.
And the conclusion of the argument is,
(Perm): It is permissible to kill S in (Cir).
With this initial set-up, we can ask what substitution instance for justi-
fication J permits inferring from (Cir) and J to (Perm)? The defense of 
premise (5) suggests the following.
Jnec:  It is impermissible to kill S only if (i) S is harmed by or (ii) 
deprived of overall good future experiences.
Jsuff:  If S is neither (i) harmed by nor (ii) deprived of future overall 
good experiences, then it is permissible to kill S.
(Jnec and Jsuff are equivalent by transposition.) The relevant notion of 
harm is acting against one’s considered interests. So, if killing the person 
is not against the person’s considered interests, killing would not harm 
the person. Beauchamp and Childress write, “if a person freely elects and 
authorizes death . . . active aid in dying at the person’s request involves no 
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harm or moral wrong” (2001, 148). The relevant notion of deprivation is 
the absence of future overall valuable experiences. Emily Jackson remarks
[i]f someone was [sic] to ask me what is valuable about my life, I 
would talk about my friends, my family, my work and the things I 
enjoy doing . . . There is nothing independently valuable about being 
alive, other than that it enables me to live a life.
(Jackson & Keown, 2012, 42)18
The derivation to (Perm) can take one of two routes. (Cir) paired with 
Jnec entails (Perm) by modus tollens; and (Cir) paired with Jsuff entails 
(Perm) by modus ponens. The permissibility of euthanasia is simply 
(Perm), according to which it is permissible to kill S when S is neither 
harmed by nor deprived of future good experiences by the killing.
What is the argument for excluding a third condition, namely, (iii) S 
is innocent, as a necessary condition for impermissible killing? Suitably 
added, Jnec reads,
Jnec+: It is impermissible to kill S only if (i) S is harmed by or 
(ii) deprived of overall good future experiences, or (iii) S is innocent. 
(And by transposition, Jsuff+).
One can see that if Jnec+ is true, (Perm) is not since those killed by 
euthanasia are innocent. The easiest way to rebut Jnec+ is to assert that 
euthanasia is permissible (i.e., Perm) as a premise and derive ~(Jnec+) 
by modus tollens. Of course, the easiest way is also the most obviously 
question-begging way.
Suppose we try a more inductive route. At issue is whether condi-
tion (iii) functions as a necessary condition for impermissibility. Consider 
cases involving innocents who are killed, for example, killing the POW, 
the concentration camp victim, or the depressed patient, all of whom 
might be suffering and they might want to die (call these ‘the alterna-
tives’). These cases provide intuitive inductive evidence for condition 
(iii) – assuming that killing the alternatives is impermissible. Yet, they 
putatively satisfy the negations of (i) and (ii) as do patients for whom 
euthanasia proponents think it is permissible to kill. It looks as if Jnec or 
Jsuff entails that killing one of the alternatives is permissible.
Either killing the alternatives is permissible or it is not. If not, a pro-
ponent of euthanasia has an adjustment decision to make – discussed in 
Chapter 3. She may reject the permissibility of euthanasia or not. If she 
continues to accept (Perm), she must reject (iii) to preserve (Perm), and 
add other conditions to Jnec/Jsuff to ground or justify the impermissibil-
ity of killing the alternatives. The goal of the latter conjunct is to find a 
feature that is present in the alternatives but is not present for those in 
euthanasia-permitting circumstances (or vice versa). Justifying this dis-
tinction is to ground a reason for dividing the class of innocents into 
those for whom it is permissible to kill, and those for whom it is not. 
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How is one to proceed? Before answering this question, it is necessary to 
understand an elementary epistemological distinction
Beliefs are divided broadly into basic beliefs and non-basic beliefs.19 
Non-basic beliefs are justified on the basis of other beliefs. Basic beliefs 
can either be justified or not, but not on the basis of other beliefs. If they 
are justified, then they are justified on the basis of non-doxastic states, 
such as an experience or intuition. Whether the experience or intuition 
is veridical, e.g., produced by a reliable faculty, will dictate whether the 
non-doxastic state in question can justify the basic belief. Though the 
following examples are controversial, they illustrate the point behind this 
technical language. Perceptual beliefs based on visual sensing at medium 
distances in good lighting are examples of justified basic beliefs since they 
are justified on the basis of perceptual experiences which are not other 
beliefs. My belief that the piano I see has fewer than 88 keys is justified, 
however, on another belief, namely, that I am at a concert purporting to 
use period instruments.
We can now answer what justifies the distinction between killing a 
terminally ill patient and killing one of the alternatives. Either the distinc-
tion is a basic belief or it is inferred from another belief. If the distinction 
is basic, this would amount to saying that it is permissible to kill the 
terminally ill patient, but not permissible to kill the concentration camp 
victim or the POW, full stop, no reason. If the distinction is a basic belief, 
(Perm) just is true with an additional conjunct that the killing of the alter-
natives is impermissible.20 This disjunct is clearly unsatisfactory.
If it is a non-basic belief, it must be justified on the basis of other 
beliefs. What other beliefs? One feature that is different between the two 
classes of innocents might be that the cause of suffering for the terminally 
ill patient is internal (i.e., disease), and for the POW it is external (i.e., 
captors). Why think that the internal/external distinction provides a suf-
ficient reason for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible 
killing? Again, this is either a basic belief or a non-basic one. If it is basic, 
it is wholly unconvincing. There is nothing apparent about causes of suf-
fering that are internal that would justify killing me; likewise, causes of 
suffering that are external is hardly the reason for not killing me. If the 
defense of euthanasia depends on making it, the argument from epis-
temic diffidence follows easily given the cost in being wrong in the setting 
of peer disagreement. If it is non-basic, it must be justified by another 
belief. Again, we can ask what other beliefs? If that other belief just is the 
conjunction of (Perm) with the belief that it is impermissible to kill the 
alternatives, this would be circular reasoning.
Must the rejection of Jnec+ be justified by circular reasoning? That S 
is innocent is either a sufficient reason for making it impermissible to kill 
S or it is not. If it is a sufficient reason, then ~(Perm) follows. If it is not 
a sufficient reason, then the category of permissible killing explodes. The 
default position or presumption is that if S is innocent, it is impermissible 
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to kill S. Therefore, the reasons for denying condition (iii) as a suffi-
cient condition must have started with certain privileged beliefs about 
which innocents it is permissible to kill. The previous paragraph argued 
that any reason for thinking that killing S is permissible either reduces to 
unconvincing grounds, or circularity threatens. My point here is that a 
likely scenario is this: an intuition that suffering patients may receive aid 
in dying comes first and reasoning second (Haidt, 2001), namely, Jnec. 
Putative counterexamples to Jnec, such as cases of killing the alterna-
tives, are absorbed in a way that preserves the starting intuition. Given 
the psychology of moral belief formation outlined in Chapter 2, the only 
motive for rejecting condition (iii) is an intuitive conviction that (Perm) 
is true. After all, why not simply reject (Perm) when confronted with 
an inductive case for Jnec+? The answer is simple: (Perm) is held with 
a greater intuitive conviction. As argued in Chapter 2, that fact is tenu-
ous epistemic comfort. Given the cost in being wrong, and the presence 
of peer disagreement, one should hold (Perm) with epistemic diffidence.
One can do this exercise for any dialectical encounter on euthanasia. 
The recipe is straightforward. Identify the conditions under which it 
is permissible to kill P. Next, show that those conditions entail that it is 
permissible to kill S when it clearly is not. One can either reject the neces-
sity of the original conditions (and thereby reject (Perm)), find a further 
specifying feature that distinguishes the two cases, or reject the intuition 
that killing S is impermissible in the counterexample. Choosing one of 
the latter two options instead of the first option must be a function of 
one’s starting intuition that it is permissible to kill P. What must ground 
this adjustment decision in a commitment prior to the adjustment deci-
sion itself, that it is permissible to kill P. Hence my suspicion that (Perm) 
is groundless.
Does this recipe apply equally to arguments opposing euthanasia? It 
does not since the presumption is that no innocent person may be killed; 
and this was argued for in Chapter 5. Even so, anomalies to Jnec+ can 
be constructed; the spelunker case might be one of them in which it may 
be permissible to kill a very small subset of innocents. But the dialecti-
cal burden is not merely to point out anomalies. One must say that such 
anomalies invalidate Jnec+ in circumstances that patients face. It is sim-
ply a quantificational fallacy to infer from ‘it is permissible to blow the 
big man to bits’ to ‘euthanasia is permissible.’21 I have argued that there 
can be either no argument at all or no good argument for why innocent 
patients count as an exception to Jnec+.
At the beginning of the dialectic, what we wanted was a reason for 
thinking that there is an exception to the prima facie prohibition against 
killing innocent persons. We have canvassed two principal arguments for 
thinking that there should be such an exception specific to circumstances 
(Cir). I have argued that both arguments are inert in terms of motivating 
such an exception. The self-determination argument is inert principally 
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because it either assumes that contra-life choices are valuable, or such 
choices are valuable because intra-life choices are. The former route begs 
the very question at stake, and the latter commits a categorical error. The 
argument from suffering is inert principally because the neutral container 
view is not an exhaustive appreciation for the worth of persons. And, 
grounds for accepting a moral principle that permits inferring the per-
missibility of killing in euthanasia is epistemically circular. The ground 
for making adjustment decisions in the setting of putative counterexam-
ples is to maintain coherence of one’s beliefs with the permissibility of 
euthanasia. So far, we have no good argument for an exception to the 
prohibition against killing innocents. Since that prohibition functions as 
a presumption in the argument, we have no reason for displacing it.
It will not do for the critic to respond by pointing out that the oppo-
nent to euthanasia does the same thing; she has her own stock set of 
assumptions and the potential counterexamples are absorbed in such 
a way as to preserve the belief that killing innocent patients is wrong. 
The example that I have in mind are putative counterexamples to the 
intention/foresight distinction. As noted above, such examples are either 
unilluminating, or they confuse the intention/foresight distinction with 
its causal cousin, viz., the active/passive distinction (Hershenov, 2008b). 
The justifications I have surveyed for why there should be an exception 
have themselves proved inert or are non sequiturs. Even if my interlocu-
tor disagrees about my assessment of the strength of such justifications or 
their logical relevance, the epistemic significance of disagreement, espe-
cially in the setting of epistemic circularity, strongly suggests moderating 
the strength of one’s belief that euthanasia is permissible.
Conclusion
In a large-scale study on patients who requested assisted suicide, all suf-
fered from depression or hopelessness (Breitbart et al., 2000). Add to this 
evidence from Herbert Hendin’s work according to which, “No group 
of suicidal patients has been more ignored than those who become sui-
cidal in response to serious or terminal illness” (Hendin, 1999, 558). 
To understand the problem of ignoring seriously ill patients, Gregory 
Hamilton and Catherine Hamilton point out that there are basically two 
approaches to the suffering of terminally ill patients: the treatment model 
and the competency model.
The treatment model aims to treat what has gone wrong. In the con-
text of euthanasia, what needs ‘treating’ are the feelings that give rise to 
requests for suicide. Hendin states that the goal of the treatment model is 
to “understand and relieve the desperation that underlies the request for 
assisted suicide” (Hendin, 1999, 553). On this model, suicidality is seen 
as a disturbance in the normal mental functioning of a patient. Hamilton 
and Hamilton note that such
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patients often suffer from feelings of worthlessness, demoralization, 
or guilt and may be making a plea for reassurance . . . Exploring 
such feelings and fantasies and whatever other concerns arise can 
be reassuring and validating for the patient and can go a long way 
toward dispelling feelings of demoralization and worthlessness.
(Hamilton & Hamilton, 2004, 3)
So, the treatment model sees behind the requests to the underlying pathol-
ogy or problem. If the request for euthanasia or PAS is animated by 
depression and fear, the treatment model focuses on treating depression 
and fear. Think of the treatment model this way: it recommends loving 
patients the way Charles loved Ladmaker, by seeing through Ladmaker’s 
suffering to his undiminished humanity.
In contrast to the treatment model, the competency model is the domi-
nant model employed in settings where euthanasia or PAS is legal. On this 
model, the goal is not to treat an underlying pathology or mental condi-
tion, but to test for competency. And competency is present if the patient 
understands the consequences of his or her choice to receive euthanasia 
or a lethal medication. The guidelines for health care professionals who 
receive requests for PAS in Oregon state that “[i]f the mental health pro-
fessional finds the patient competent, refusal of mental health treatment 
by the patient does not constitute a legal barrier to receiving a prescrip-
tion for a lethal dose of medication” (Ganzini & Farrenkopf, 1998, 
31, emphasis added). Since the competency model focuses narrowly on 
whether the patient understands the consequences of his/her decision, few 
patients (only 5%) are referred for a psychiatric evaluation prior to receiv-
ing a lethal prescription (Oregon Health Division, 2004). Clearly, this 
is not treatment but rather is ignoring the clinically significant problems 
that patients encounter when they get seriously ill. As noted above, when 
patients who request euthanasia/PAS are treated for their depression, 
98%–99% revoke their request (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2006).
The debate on euthanasia takes place within the following context. 
Patients already have access to technical and competent palliative care, 
and they can withhold or withdraw treatments that they deem to be 
burdensome. What is being refused in these cases is the treatment, i.e., 
the treatment is judged worthless not the patient’s life (Keown, 2006, 
110ff.).22 Furthermore, for the euthanasia debate both sides agree that 
the potential subjects of euthanasia are unqualifiedly persons – at least 
for those who defend voluntary euthanasia. And the patients whom pro-
ponents of euthanasia think it is permissible to kill are not threatening 
the lives of anyone. Considering the arguments addressed above, there 
is not a sufficiently persuasive reason to offset the presumption against 
killing innocent and likely vulnerable people. The proposition that eutha-
nasia is permissible should be held with diffidence and, therefore, should 
not be acted upon.
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Notes
 1 For the moral tradition I find most plausible, even here the killing cannot be 
intentional (Rhonheimer, 2011; and Cavanaugh, 2006, ch. 1).
 2 A claim right to x generates duties on the part of others to provide x, or for 
others not to interfere with one obtaining x. See Feinberg (1978, 95ff.). If S 
has a claim right to life, we incur an obligation not to kill S and not to let him 
die if we can easily save him. So, a claim right to euthanasia would obligate 
a doctor to perform it. Feinberg prefers to understand the right to die (which 
includes the right to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide) as a discretion-
ary right. Feinberg states, “just as my right to live imposes a duty on others 
not to kill me, so my right to die . . . imposes a duty on others not to prevent 
me from implementing my choice of death” (1978, 121).
 3 The issue is not whether there is a class of actions that count as an exception, 
but whether euthanasia is a member of that class. One could construct a logi-
cally possible scenario in which our moral intuitions suggest that killing the 
innocent person is permissible (for what it is worth I cannot think of any); 
but to function as a reason for the permissibility of euthanasia, there must be 
a reason for why euthanasia counts as one of those scenarios.
 4 The form and content in this section follow closely Keown (2009).
 5 By specifying a health care professional, I am requiring that the act of eutha-
nizing the patient must be a voluntary act so as to rule out zombies killing 
patients on a euthanasia ward (Wreen, 1988).
 6 For further discussion on these opening points, see Michael Bratman (1981, 
2000), Robert Audi (2001, Part II), Elizabeth Anscombe (2000), Cavanaugh 
(2006), and an under-appreciated though informative work by Eric D’Arcy 
(1963).
 7 There might be cases of knowingly performing action A but without intent 
to do A. Consider cases involving duress where it is clear the agent does not 
desire to do X, but does X under threat. My own intuitions are hazy on 
whether acting under duress to do X must involve intending X. Fortunately, 
this complication does not affect the doctor’s action in euthanasia (except in 
cases where a conscientious objection is overridden).
 8 This is not the place to defend the existence of moral absolutes (see Shafer-
Landau, 2005 and Kramer, 2009), or to specify their content (see Rhonheimer, 
2011, Part III). As can be gleaned from the text, I consider moral absolutes 
as action-types which are specified in part by one’s first-person intentions. 
Putative counterexamples might describe a case in which one intentionally 
kills but does so permissibly. The big man in the cave example (Foot, 1967) 
is one such case according to which spelunkers are trapped in a cave and it 
is filling with water. A big man makes a run for the only aperture and gets 
stuck. The only option of getting out is to light one of the sticks of dynamite 
and blow the big man to bits, effectively reopening the aperture. Cases like 
this are unilluminating because they invite intuitions on at least four different 
issues at once: (1) Is the action of blowing up the big man permissible? (2) Is 
that action best specified by one’s intentions to blow him up? (3) What could 
be one’s intended end versus the merely foreseen side effects? (4) Is there an 
absolute prohibition on intentionally killing innocents? If one answers ‘yes’ 
to (4), she will likely answer (1) in the negative. Or, if one answers ‘yes’ to 
(1) and (4), she will say about (2) and (3) that the intention is something like 
‘removing an obstruction so that the spelunkers are saved.’ These answers 
are all consistent with the case description. I can go on, but my point is to 
illustrate that the case description cannot adjudicate our different intuitive 
responses to it.
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 9 Because inducements come in degrees, financial, emotional, degree of pain, or 
suffering, and because inducements affect the voluntariness of one’s choices 
(Appelbaum, Lidz, & Klitzman, 2009, 34), voluntariness comes in degrees.
 10 By a human right, Feinberg (1978, 97) understands it as one of the rights we 
have “in virtue of their fundamentally important, indeed essential, connection 
with human well-being” and belong equally to all human beings in virtue of 
being human. By a right to life, Feinberg understands it as a right not to be 
intentionally killed (1978, 94)
 11 I reserve the right to say that is not permissible in these contexts either, but 
that is a context different from the one in which euthanasia might be enter-
tained. In any case, the context as described refutes Brandt’s (1975, 108ff.) 
understanding of the issue. Brandt thinks that it is sufficient to set aside the 
strong prima facie obligation not to kill innocents by entertaining the famous 
spelunker example noted above. Brandt thinks that it is permissible to blow 
up the big man. In addition to the problems highlighted by this example and 
others like it, this is clearly a duress situation in which the killing could only 
be justified, if justified at all, with reference to saving the many spelunkers. 
No proponent of euthanasia argues for the permissibility of euthanasia, how-
ever, because it would save the lives of others. So, Brandt’s exception to our 
obligation not to kill would still not at all justify euthanasia.
 12 Sean Morrison, the director of the National Palliative Care Research Center, 
notes that in his entire medical education, including medical school and resi-
dency, he received a 30-minute lecture on pain management (Morrison, 2010, 
at 17:50ff.), and even then, it only focused on how the opioids are metabo-
lized in the kidney!
 13 The condition that the suffering be intractable is morally required since, if it 
were manageable, resolving it by eliminating the patient is a killing that no lon-
ger obviously benefits the patient. If modern palliative care can mollify one’s 
suffering – thereby providing a benefit the lack of which putatively justifies 
euthanasia – but I kill the patient instead, I must take a stance on the patient’s 
life that looks more like malice than mercy. Suppose two options X and Y lead 
just as well to an end E, and that I know this. If I choose X instead of Y, there 
must be something about X itself or its other effects that I am willing.
 14 Jeff McMahan observes correctly that most of us have the intuition that kill-
ing innocent persons is equally wrong. He also observes that his time-relative 
interest account for the wrongness of killing delivers a different result thus 
clashing “with most people’s intuitions” (McMahan, 2002, 238). It is interest-
ing to point out that instead of rejecting the time-relative interest account, 
McMahan rejects these “common intuitions as errors of moral phenom-
enology” (2002, 238). But this is a tenuous strategy since the arguments for 
questioning our equality intuitions may also apply to McMahan’s intuitions 
that motivate his time-relative interest account.
 15 Brett Wilmot (in conversation) has suggested to me that recognition of some-
thing’s worth and ending that thing’s life are compatible as can be appreciated 
when we euthanize our beloved pets. The analogy with pets is not meant to 
say that we euthanize pets, therefore we may euthanize people. His point is 
to show the compatibility between loving something and intending to end its 
life. Care should be exercised in exploiting this analogy nonetheless. I think 
Wilmot is correct to point out that one can have the psychic state of loving x, 
and at the same time the psychic state of intending to end x’s life. Understood 
as motivating the compatibility of two psychological states, Wilmot is cor-
rect. But a moral claim to the effect that it would be permissible to kill x 
does not necessarily follow. Wilmot does not want to exploit the pet analogy 
to derive moral conclusions on how to treat humans – since doing so would 
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be subject to a number of disanalogies. To take just one disanalogy, dogs are 
euthanized if they have attacked human beings on multiple occasions. But 
persons guilty of battery are not candidates for the death penalty. Here’s 
another, we undress in front of our pets but not generally in front of others! 
So, if the pet analogy is limited to motivating a psychological claim, no moral 
conclusions follow. If the analogy is meant to derive moral conclusions, it 
becomes a bad analogical argument.
 16 The standard of a good argument I accept here is that the argument is valid, 
and that the premises are more plausible than their negations.
 17 Factually speaking, unless one is a hermit, all of one’s choices have effects on 
others. I entertain this claim only because it shows up when defending both 
legally permitting euthanasia and allowing for conscientious objection.
 18 Here we see Jackson’s endorsement of the neutral container view rendering 
her treatment implicitly inconsistent.
 19 See Audi (2001, 32ff.).
 20 This appears to be Lachs’s position when he considers aiding in the suicide of 
a lovelorn teenager and a terminally ill patient. He says, “Many observers of 
no more than average sensitivity . . .” (2010, 562) can see the difference and 
“Even people of ordinary sensitivity understand that . . .” (2010, 565) there is 
a difference. No reasons are offered for why we should prevent the lovelorn 
teenager’s suicide and yet aid in the terminally ill patient’s suicide.
 21 For an instance of this fallacy see Brandt (1975, 108).
 22 Commenting on his clinical experience, Baruch Brody (1996, 99) thinks 
that the common refrain of “Mama wouldn’t have wanted to live this way” 
should be taken to mean that death is the intended means to avoid contin-
ued suffering. His interpretation does not follow the logic of such refusals. 
If the treatment does not correct the patient’s condition, it is not doing what 
was expected; viz., it fails to confer a benefit. Ineffective treatment is futile. 
Refusing it need not require judging the worth of the one who is doing the 
refusing. This is not gerrymandering intentions. Consider the treatment being 
effective and the refusal no longer makes sense. When it is ineffective, it is 
refused. The difference maker is the effectiveness of the treatment. The logic 
of such refusals, then, refer to the worthlessness of the treatment.

Part III
Balancing Dignity and 
Autonomy

9 Decision-Making for Patients with 
Suppressed Consciousness
The previous two parts aimed to argue that one ought to have epistemic 
diffidence towards acting on the belief that intentionally killing a human 
being is permissible. This diffidence applies to abortion, human embryo 
destructive research, and euthanasia. In this part I explore whether the 
argument can be extended to cases that are not obvious cases of inten-
tional killing but are intentional omissions so that the patient will die. 
In this chapter and the next, I argue that the same epistemic diffidence 
applies to certain cases of removing life-sustaining means. The judgment 
about which we should hold epistemic diffidence is that the patient’s 
wishes (in the cases addressed) are morally sufficient for the clinician 
to act on them. The cases I have in mind in this chapter are patients in 
a minimally conscious state (MCS) who have refused tube feeding in an 
advance directive. In the next chapter I consider patients who are appar-
ently lucid and competent but have refused therapy that could obviously 
benefit them with clearly manageable burdens. And the final chapter con-
siders whether a research subject’s consent is enough to justify doing 
more than minimal-risk research on him or her. More broadly under-
stood, the argument over the next three chapters aims to rebut the trend 
in contemporary bioethics that takes the autonomous patient’s wishes 
or a research subject’s consent as morally sufficient for acting on them.
In the present chapter, I proceed as follows. In the first section I 
explain what the condition MCS involves and the specific clinical circum-
stances to which my argument applies. There are basically two morally 
sufficient reasons to justify withholding means of sustaining life from the 
patient: (a) the patient’s applicable advance directive (whether written or 
oral), and/or (b) the patient’s best interest. The second section explains 
and defends the first part of my argument according to which neither 
(a) nor (b) function as a morally sufficient reason to withhold tube feed-
ing from MCS patients. The third section intercalates between the two 
parts of my argument a rebuttal to the first part: in arguing that advance 
directives are not morally sufficient, I may be accused of unjustified pater-
nalism. The third section rebuts this and related objections. The fourth 
section initiates the second part of my argument according to which 
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MCS patients should not have tube feeding withheld. Dialectically, it 
is one task to argue against arguments for W (section two), but quite 
another to argue for not-W (section four).
The Minimally Conscious State
The minimally conscious state is a “condition of severely altered con-
sciousness in which minimal but definite behavioral evidence of self or 
environmental awareness is demonstrated” (Giacino et al., 2002, 350–
351). Patients in MCS are conscious and aware. They retain some or 
all of the following abilities: (a) being able to follow simple commands, 
(b) being able to respond to yes/no questions, (c) intelligent verbalization, 
and (d) purposeful behavior such as responding appropriately to the seman-
tic content of a question (Giacino et al., 2002, 351). Large-scale neural 
activity in the ‘higher-cortices’ is a feature of MCS that distinguishes it 
from the vegetative state. Through various neuro-imaging techniques, we 
know that MCS patients show neuroanatomical activity strongly indicat-
ing conscious awareness and higher-order cognition including semantic 
and emotional processing (Laureys et al., 2005a; and Schiff et al., 2005). 
Specifically, Laureys et al. observed that “cortico-cortical functional con-
nectivity between auditory cortex and a large network of temporal and 
prefrontal cortices was more efficient in 15 MCS patients than in 15 veg-
etative state patients” (Laureys et al., 2005a, 730–731). The importance of 
these findings is that MCS patients evince functional integration between 
different processing centers, which suggests higher-order cognition, but they 
lack the ability to express such processing fully or consistently. These results 
were confirmed via metabolic studies using FDG-PET (fluorodeoxyglucose 
with positron emission tomography) in which brain regions associated with 
language processing and possibly volition were notably active (Bruno et al., 
2012, 1096). On the basis of these studies and in particular imaging studies 
of cortical activity, MCS patients should not be viewed as lacking a ‘self’; 
they are conscious, by behavioral criteria, and likely retain reasoning 
abilities on the basis of neuroimaging data (Braddock, 2017).1
I emphasize ‘likely’ here because of a concern about the reverse infer-
ence fallacy (Nachev & Hacker, 2010). The reverse inference fallacy occurs 
when one reasons as follows: if subject S is given a task T under fMRI, for 
example, we may see that brain region r shows activity. From this observa-
tion, one may infer that brain region r grounds/causes cognitive function 
for task T, namely, if brain region r shows activity, then S is engaged in task 
T. Reverse inference is a fallacy because it is an instance of affirming the 
consequent of a conditional to infer the antecedent. If I am in Chicago, then 
I am in Illinois. But, if I am in Illinois, it is not necessarily the case that I am 
in Chicago, I could be in East St. Louis. So, the reverse inference fallacy is a 
fallacy if one is constructing a deductive argument. If, however, one under-
stands the consequent as evidence for the antecedent being true, there is no 
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fallacy (Nachev & Hacker, 2010, 71). Being in Illinois is evidence for being 
in Chicago, even if it is not strong evidence. Maybe a better example is to 
contrast the following inferences. If I am in Chicago, then I am in Cook 
County. I am in Chicago. Therefore I am in Cook County. This much is 
deductively valid. Conversely, if I am in Cook County, that is evidence – 
stronger evidence than simply being in Illinois – that I am in Chicago. I 
interpret neuroimaging studies to say that certain brain region activation 
is evidence for, not a deductive proof of, certain cognitive functioning. 
Therefore, I am not committing the reverse inference fallacy.
Several therapeutic modalities are effective for improving MCS 
patients’ cognitive abilities. Deep-brain stimulation (DBS) has been effec-
tive for increasing arousal, limb control, and oral feeding (Giacino et al., 
2012; Chudy et al., 2018). Notably, the subjects in Giacino et al.’s study 
were chronic MCS patients with no signs of improvement in the two 
months preceding enrollment. Dopaminergic agents, specifically aman-
tadine, have improved acute MCS patients significantly (Whyte et al., 
2005). Recently, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has been 
used with some evidence of benefit (Bai et al., 2017). Bai et al., though, 
only measured cortical excitability and not behavioral effects. Clinical 
response to tDCS was noted in a subgroup of MCS patients who had 
grey matter preservation and metabolic activity in the dorsal-lateral and 
medial pre-frontal cortexes, precuneus, and the thalamus (Thibaut et al., 
2015). Additionally, the following modalities have shown some benefit 
in subjects satisfying the vegetative state criteria: zolpidem, median nerve 
stimulation, extradural cortical stimulation, spinal cord stimulation, and 
intrathecal baclofen (Georgiopoulos et al., 2010). Lastly, outcomes of 
patients in MCS show a positive trend that is not temporally restrained – 
the length of time being minimally conscious is not correlated with lower 
outcomes (Voss et al., 2006). Nakase-Richardson et al. (2012) followed 
traumatic brain injury patients who had a Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) of 
3 on ED admission (3 is the lowest score compatible with life). Sixty-eight 
percent regained consciousness, 19.6% achieved functional independ-
ence, and 18.7% demonstrated employment potential. It is important 
to emphasize that the inclusion criteria were also unconsciousness and a 
GCS of less than 6 (worse than MCS) upon admission to a rehabilitation 
center. Of course, more evidence and research would be illuminating, but 
part of the tendency my argument aims to resist is what Joseph Fins refers 
to as the “societal neglect syndrome” (Fins, 2015). The point is to resist 
the urge to assume a static picture of the patients on whom one provides 
ethical commentary. Any ethical commentary on a specific MCS patient 
should at least tell us whether therapeutic interventions were attempted.
Lastly, most MCS patients require artificially delivered nutrition and 
hydration – typically, PEG tube feeding. The clinical circumstances to 
which my argument applies include MCS patients who require tube 
feeding to survive. I focus on tube feeding since its purpose is merely to 
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nourish and hydrate, i.e., to provide basic necessities.2 Whether one is 
sick or healthy, we need nutrition and hydration. Furthermore, tube feed-
ing (via PEG) is typically quite easy to administer, once placed. Further 
acuminating the scope of my argument, I focus on MCS patients whose 
refusals of tube feeding are based on a judgment that MCS involves a low 
quality of life (QoL).3 My argument assumes these features of a patient’s 
setting. If the critic imports into this setting other complicating features,4 
such as other pathologies, that would not be a criticism of my argument.
Undercutting the Argument from Advance Directives
End-of-life decision-making should focus on the question of whether a 
clinician is morally justified to withdraw a means of sustaining life from 
the patient in the actual clinical circumstances the clinician faces. The 
reason for this emphasis is that the clinician is the agent of the action. 
The key question I answer in this section is whether a clinician is mor-
ally justified in withdrawing tube feeding from a patient who is in MCS. 
Broadly construed, there are two ways in which this judgment can be 
justified. The first is if the clinician is justified in believing that S would 
want PEG feeding withheld or withdrawn in the present circumstances. 
The second is if the clinician is justified in believing that it would be in S’s 
best interest to have PEG feeding withheld in the present circumstances. 
I address only the former justification presently.
Consider the following train of thought (Davis, 2009). Suppose S 
decides at some point in the past that she would not want PEG feeding 
if she were in MCS because that would involve what, in her assessment, 
is a low quality of life. Suppose also that S is no longer competent to 
make decisions for herself. Advance directives are morally sufficient to 
act upon only if5 those directives are applicable; and to count as applica-
ble there must be justification for moving from ‘S decided to refuse PEG 
feeding’ to ‘S would decide to refuse PEG feeding.’ The argument from 
advance directives would hold, then, that a clinician is justified in with-
drawing PEG feeding from S only if the clinician is justified in believing 
that S would not want it. And the clinician’s evidence for believing this 
comes from what S had decided in the past (when she was competent).
My task in this section is to argue that this line of reasoning suffers 
from an undercutting defeater. In particular, I argue that one cannot 
move from
(Past) S decides at some time in the past to refuse PEG feeding in 
MCS because this would involve a low quality of life.
to
(Present) S would decide to refuse PEG feeding in MCS because this 
involves a low quality of life.
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In a typical clinical scenario, (Past) supplies sufficient evidence for 
(Present).6 I shall argue that it does not for patients in MCS. There are 
basically two empirically informed reasons for blocking this inference in 
the case of MCS patients. The first is what I refer to here as the ‘disability 
bias.’ The disability bias is the trend by third parties to devalue or rate the 
quality of life of those who are disabled as being significantly lower than 
how the disabled themselves judge their lives. I argue that the evidence 
for the disability bias applies as well to MCS patients. The second reason 
comes from research by Sehgal et al. (1992) showing that, for certain 
classes of patients, a significant percentage of them would not want their 
advance directives followed.
The Disability Bias
The present task is to argue that third-person QoL judgments are unreli-
able. The reason for focusing on third-person judgments is because we 
issue advance directives from that very standpoint. The future patient 
does not know what it is like to be disabled. The argument herein does 
not argue that being minimally conscious is a quality way to live. I do not 
know whether it is or is not. Thus, my argument aims only to block the 
inference from a third-person QoL judgment to one’s actual first-person 
QoL judgment.
Quality of life studies performed on those with severe motor disabili-
ties show that the patient’s own assessment is at or slightly below the 
quality of life scores of normal controls. What is more, when non-disabled 
controls are asked what the disabled think of their own quality of life, the 
non-disabled rate it significantly lower than the disabled actually do. This 
serves as evidence for a disability bias. The disability bias is a judgment 
about a disabled person’s quality of life and it counts as a bias because it 
does not reflect what such persons actually judge about their own quality 
of life. After presenting this evidence, I address why the evidence, which 
focuses on those with severe motor disabilities, is applicable also to those 
with cognitive disabilities, such as MCS.
Consider first patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS). Locked-in 
syndrome is a disorder typically caused by a stroke to a portion of the 
brainstem, commonly the pons. We can think of the brainstem like a 
two-way highway with multiple lanes. For LIS patients, all lanes are open 
going into the brain; they can see, think, hear, and understand. All lanes 
going from the brain are closed. They are completely paralyzed but, in 
classical LIS, retain voluntary control over blinking and eye movement.
What is it like to be fully conscious and fully paralyzed? Apparently, it 
is not as bad as one might think. Steven Laureys et al. (2005b) summarize 
much of the literature on this topic considering quality-of-life measures, 
end-of-life decision-making, and suicidal ideation. In all three areas, the 
conclusions may strike some as surprising. Ghorbel (2002; see also Doble 
et al., 2003) administered self-reports on mental and physical well-being. 
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Self-scored perception of mental and physical health were not signifi-
cantly different than age-matched normal controls. Leon-Carrion, van 
Eeckhout, and Dominguez-Morales Mdel (2002) discovered that, of 44 
subjects, 48% regarded their mood as good whereas only 5% regarded 
it as bad. Thirteen percent noted that they were depressed, 73% enjoyed 
going out and 81% met with friends at least two times a month. Of 
note, suicidal ideation was correlated with perception of pain, indicating 
that proper pain management might decrease the incidence of depression 
generally and suicidal ideation specifically. A subset of patients in the 
Ghorbel (2002) study suffered total LIS, but very few had suicidal idea-
tion even after being locked-in for six years. On a scale from 0–10 (never 
to constantly), only four patients experienced suicidal ideation more than 
3 on the scale, compared with eight who never had suicidal ideation and 
only four who rarely had it. Regarding treatment choice, 80% wished to 
receive antibiotics if they were to contract pneumonia and 62% elected 
to be full codes.
Bruno et al. (2011) explored QoL assessments with 91 LIS patients. Of 
these, 47 patients expressed happiness, with only 18 expressing unhap-
piness. Unhappiness was associated with lack of integration into social 
life, anarthrea, and lack of recreational activities. Bruno et al. conclude:
Our data stress the need for extra palliative efforts directed at 
mobility and recreational activities in LIS and the importance of 
anxiolytic therapy. Recently affected LIS patients who wish to die 
should be assured that there is a high chance they will regain a 
happy meaningful life.
(Bruno, 2011, 1, emphasis added)
Lulé et al. (2009) discuss the “disability paradox” that this evidence 
suggests. Severely disabled patients, like those in LIS and amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), adapt to their disabilities as indicated in higher 
QoL scores the longer they have experienced the disability. Important for 
my purposes is the following observation, “Preliminary results from our 
study on clinicians’ perception of LIS show that in 97 interviewed health-
care workers the majority (66%) considered that ‘being LIS is worse than 
being in a vegetative or minimally conscious state’” (Lulé et al., 2009, 
347). This assessment is clearly incongruent with what LIS patients them-
selves think.
Research involving ALS (a motor degenerative disease leading to pro-
gressive paralysis) patients shows the same mismatch between clinicians’ 
and patients’ QoL judgment. A common sequelae of ALS is ventilator 
dependence. On the Life Satisfaction Index (using a Likert scale 1–7), 
ventilator users reported a mean score of 4.98. For perspective, normal 
controls reported a mean LSI of 5.33. The remarkable finding in this 
study was not only that ventilator users had near equivalent LSI scores as 
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normal controls but also that health care professionals’ assessment of the 
ventilator users’ life satisfaction was 2.42 – far below the patients’ own 
assessment of their life satisfaction (Bach, 2003, S25).
Similar findings on quadriplegics secondary to high-spinal cord injury 
(SCI) were reported by Gerhart et al. (1994). Quality of life measures 
were administered to SCI patients and their health providers for compari-
son. Ninety-two percent of patients reported that they were glad to be 
alive; whereas only 18% of the health professionals imagined that they 
themselves would be glad to be alive if they were quadriplegic. Eighty-six 
percent of the patients rated their QoL as average or better (than pre-
SCI). Only 17% of their medical staff thought that SCI patients could 
have an average or better QoL.
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis patients themselves seem to experience 
the same mismatch between their pre-paralysis/vent dependence period 
and when they need respiratory support on a regular basis. Again, Bach 
notes that, when queried early on in the development of ALS, patients 
refuse respiratory support if they were in need of it. However, their 
minds change when they become dyspneic and non-invasive respiratory 
aids prove effective. (In many cases, general QoL judgments by ALS 
patients match normal controls throughout the illness. This again illus-
trates adaptation, see Lulé et al., 2012.) Notably the “patient’s attitude 
toward the use of ventilatory aids seems to reflect his/her physician’s atti-
tude and the nature of the treatment options being presented rather than 
his/her own informed rational decision” (Bach, 2003, S26–S27, emphasis 
added). Bach’s research on ALS patients shows rather vividly the mis-
match between clinicians’ and patients’ QoL judgments and even QoL 
judgments between healthy and disabled patients.
Laureys et al. (2005b) comment that the results here run contrary 
to what many health professionals think. Many clinicians are involved 
with the patient populations discussed here only on a short-term basis 
when the patient is at his or her worst. Because of this, clinicians may 
simply assume that the patient would refuse further support and would 
want to die.
As a result, debates about cost, daily management, quality of life, 
withdrawal or withholding of care, end-of-life decisions and eutha-
nasia often go on with prejudice and without input from the con-
scious but mute and immobile patient. . . . Clinicians should realize 
that quality of life often equates with social rather than physical 
interaction and that the will to live is strong when struck by an acute 
devastating disease.
(Laureys et al., 2005b, 506–507)
Several themes emerge from considering these studies. First, clinicians’ 
assessments of their patients’ quality of life are typically much lower than 
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what the patients themselves judge. Second, lower QoL assessments by 
patients do not correlate with the level of disability, and higher QoL 
assessments are associated with higher integration into the patient’s 
social network. They are taken on walks, read to, etc. Third, there is 
usually a period in the early stages of severe disability with acute onset 
that patients report unhappiness. After a period of adaptation and re-
integration, patients return to QoL judgments on par with or slightly 
below normal controls. Because of this, Bach (2003, S23) notes that, for 
ALS patients, advance directives are inappropriate because such patients 
are typically ill-informed about non-invasive respiratory aids, and they 
suffer from a bias against being disabled inherited from their physician.
The conclusion I wish to draw from these studies is that our assess-
ment of what it is like to be disabled is radically incongruent with that of 
those who experience the disability first hand.7 Consequently, we should 
be skeptical of our quality of life judgments from the third-person stand-
point. But it is just from this standpoint that we issue advance directives. 
So the distortion that infects the third-person standpoint applies to one 
issuing an advance directive that will be applicable to their future disa-
bled self. We think LIS would be a bad way to live, LIS patients do not 
think so. We think MCS would be a bad way to live. It may be the case 
that they do not think so (to the extent that they can understand).
The Lability of Advance Directives
Sehgal and colleagues (1992) studied whether and to what extent 
patients want their advance directives followed. Sehgal et al. chose 
dialysis patients since they are already receiving a form of life-sustaining 
treatment and therefore are more informed of what that involves. 
Subjects were given a hypothetical scenario in which they envision suc-
cumbing to Alzheimer’s disease. They were asked several questions 
two of which are pertinent for my purposes. First, they were asked 
whether they would want dialysis continued or stopped in the context 
of Alzheimer’s disease. Second, subjects were asked how much leeway 
they would give their physician and surrogate to disregard their stated 
wishes if their physician or surrogate thought that disregarding those 
wishes would be in the subject’s best interests. Leeway was defined on a 
four-point scale ranging from no leeway, a little leeway, a lot of leeway, 
and complete leeway.
Overall, 52% of the subjects want dialysis continued in the context 
of Alzheimer’s disease. For all subjects, 39% of them elected no leeway 
to their decision, followed by 19%, a little leeway, 11%, a lot of lee-
way, and 31%, complete leeway. That is to say, more than 42% gave at 
least a lot of leeway to their own advance directive. Sixty percent of the 
subjects with prior written directives wanted their advance directives fol-
lowed strictly (no leeway). Only 33% of those with no written directive 
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elected no leeway. Other demographics of those who elected no leeway 
include 44% of those under 65 years of age compared with only 28% 
over 65 years of age. Only one of 11 subjects with a history of cancer 
wanted their directive followed strictly. And only one of 12 with a his-
tory of stroke wanted their directive followed strictly. These last two 
trends indicate that those familiar with health care delivery were either 
more amenable to best interest judgments than their own preferences, 
or they simply did not have strong preferences to refuse dialysis. The 
authors conclude that “following all advance directives strictly may not 
reflect patient preferences” (Sehgal et al., 1992, 62). And, more impor-
tantly, “over half the subjects [61%] would allow very specific advance 
directives to be overridden. Thus, even very specific advance directives do 
not provide physicians with a complete understanding of patient prefer-
ences” (Sehgal et al., 1992, 62).
In concluding the previous two subsections, it is important to under-
stand the epistemic work this evidence is meant to do. Suppose we want 
to know whether a particular drug is toxic and that there is a theoreti-
cal reason for thinking that it is lethal (for example, it has a molecular 
composition similar to known lethal drugs). There is, yet, no evidence 
for its actual safety. So, we perform experiments on some macaque 
monkeys and they all survive. That all the monkeys survive is evidence 
(though not sufficient evidence) that the drug is safe for humans. But 
suppose also that the monkeys all survived high doses of other drugs 
known to be lethal to humans. This evidence clearly undercuts the ini-
tial, albeit paucious, evidence we had for thinking that the drug is safe. 
If we bring the drug to market anyway, we would be doing something 
careless and irresponsible – even if, by luck, no one dies from the drug. 
Why? The cost of being wrong is high (numerous human lives might be 
killed by the drug), and our original reason is no longer a reason (the 
drug may be lethal and our evidence base would look just the same). An 
undercutting defeater (Pollock & Cruz, 1999) is a reason for thinking 
that the evidence for a proposition no longer functions as evidence for 
it (Chapter 1 considered the example of the widgets looking red even if 
they were not).
The evidence canvassed so far functions as an undercutting defeater 
to the judgment that MCS patients would not want PEG feeding. The 
reasons upon which such a judgment is based are undercut. The evidence 
for the disability bias tells us that third-person QoL assessments about 
the disabled are not evidence for the claim that the disabled patients 
themselves would judge their life as having a low quality; just as ‘the 
widgets are under red lamps’ undercuts the evidence that the widgets are 
red, and ‘the monkeys did not die from known lethal drugs’ undercuts 
the evidence that the drug is safe for humans. The evidence from Sehgal 
and colleagues suggests that a patient’s own specific preferences are not 
held strictly. Having a written directive appears to be associated with 
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‘no-leeway’ but only for 60% of those subjects. If we make the choices 
binary (follow strictly (no-leeway) versus not strictly (a little, a lot, com-
plete)), having a written directive predicts no-leeway only slightly above 
chance since 40% of those with written directives elected to have their 
preferences followed with at least some scope of leeway.
What Follows from this Evidence?
It is important to say why the disability bias for motor disabilities applies 
to those suffering a disorder of consciousness. The inference from ‘the 
disability bias infects QoL judgments for patients with motor disabilities’ 
to ‘the disability bias infects QoL judgments for those with disordered 
consciousness’ is mediated by three interrelated points.
a We do not know what it’s like to be compromised in the way MCS 
patients are. This lack of knowing ‘what it’s like’ is present in any 
third-party assessment of a disabled person’s quality of life. Certainly, 
one reason why the QoL judgments by the non-disabled and the dis-
abled diverge is because the non-disabled lack the ‘what it’s like’ 
aspect about living with a disability. In fact, skepticism about what 
it’s like to be minimally conscious is irremediable since MCS patients 
typically cannot communicate to us what it’s like to be disabled as 
they are.
b Another feature of third-party QoL judgments about the disabled 
is that they likely issue from an ‘I wouldn’t want to live like that’ 
sentiment. The skeptical effect of this sentiment is the plausibility of 
change. On this point, Michael Wreen is entirely correct when he 
says, “a clear-thinking and rational person . . . realizes that, however 
certain he may be of his values and desires now, they could change 
radically under desperate, life-threatening circumstances, and some 
provision should be made for the possibility of such a change” (2004, 
328). Sehgal and colleagues demonstrate the likelihood of this lability.
Furthermore, this sentiment is not indexed to a type of disability. Any 
severe disability falls under the sentiment when issued from a third-
person standpoint. The evidence canvassed in this section indicates that 
such a sentiment changes in the case of motor disability, and there is no 
positive reason to think that it does not change for cognitive disabilities. 
Arguing that being in a minimally conscious state is objectively worthless 
fairs no better. Any justification for such a judgment must fall back on 
a third-party assessment of an MCS patient’s experiences, but it is just 
these judgments of which we should be suspicious. The empirical evi-
dence indicates that being disabled is not correlated with a lower quality 
of life judgment.
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An analogy may help understand the skeptical effects to which I’m 
drawing attention. Suppose I discover that the drug I have taken can 
affect one’s vision such that one conflates similar objects – I see what 
looks like a dog, but it really is a fox, or a raccoon for a cat, etc. Suppose 
I come to see what looks to me like a dog. Knowing that I have taken this 
drug, I should be skeptical of this judgment. Evidence of the disability 
bias functions as a reason for being skeptical of one’s third-person qual-
ity of life judgments similar to how knowing the drug’s effects functions 
as a reason for being skeptical of my perceptions of putative canines.
Continuing with the example, the scope of skepticism extends to any 
judgment where the object shares similarities to other objects within a 
similarity; if I see what looks to me like a hyena, I should also be skepti-
cal. Conversely, if I see what appears to be a dog, I know that what I 
am really looking at cannot be an anaconda. But if I come to see what 
appears to me as a platypus which really is a platypus, knowing that the 
drug confuses similar images but not by how much – I should still be 
skeptical that what I see is a platypus. It might be a beaver or otter even 
though the differences here are more pronounced than between a dog 
and a fox. We know that the ‘I wouldn’t want to live like that’ sentiment 
and ‘not knowing what it’s like’ are reasons for being skeptical of third-
person QoL judgments for severe motor disability and they may likely 
extend to ground a similar skepticism for MCS patients.
c The functional abilities of MCS patients may be underestimated since 
it is likely that treatment modalities (amantadine or DBS) are not even 
tried before withdrawal decisions are made, often due to prejudices 
(Fins, 2015). Neuroimaging studies have taught us at least one thing 
about MCS patients, they are more cognitively active than what can 
be demonstrated through spoken communication (see page 190). A 
general epistemological dictum is apropos here: absence of evidence 
does not entail evidence of absence. In general, whether someone is 
conscious and to what degree of consciousness the person attains 
is a different question from whether he can demonstrate that he is 
conscious or the degree to which he is conscious. We cannot infer 
from ‘patient M cannot demonstrate that she is conscious and aware 
through spoken communication’ to ‘patient M is not conscious or 
aware’. Consequently, the inference from ‘the disability bias infects 
QoL judgments for motor disabilities’ to ‘it infects QoL judgments 
for cognitive disabilities’ is more continuous if we take seriously the 
neurobiological evidence that minimally conscious patients retain 
cognitive function and that the disability bias issues from a feature 
common to both QoL judgments for motor and cognitive disabilities, 
i.e., a third-person assessment informed by either a lack of knowing 
what it’s like or an ‘I wouldn’t want that’ sentiment.
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My argument against the advance directive argument aims to ground 
the disparity between first- and third-person judgments when those judg-
ments pertain to one’s quality of life. A third-person judgment that MCS 
involves a low quality of life is not a strong enough reason for thinking 
that the first-person judgment would involve the same assessment. The 
evidence would look just the same even if the first-person judgment did 
not correlate with the third-person judgment. The reason is that the evi-
dence in this case just is the third-person judgment, and we have seen 
that it is not discriminating evidence for what the first-person judgment 
would look like.8 The widgets may really be red, the drug really safe, and 
MCS patients may really not want PEG feeding. But because the evidence 
upon which we base these judgments is compatible with the widgets not 
being red, the drug not being safe, etc., we cannot rely on it.
Furthermore, the typical reason for thinking that an advance directive 
of an MCS patient should be respected is that it is an informed refusal by 
the patient when she was decisional. But the disability bias tells us that 
it may not have been informed insofar as it was rendered from the third-
person standpoint with no knowledge of what it’s like to be in a minimally 
conscious state. Add to this the evidence that quite a few patients view 
advance directives not as irrefragable commands (Sehgal et al., 1992) but 
as guides to their general value commitments, and the argument from 
advance directives is effectively undercut. Rudner’s guidance (Chapter 3) 
suggests further that if there is a high cost to being wrong that an MCS 
patient would want tube feeding withheld, an undercutting defeater is 
sufficient – with no other justification – for continuing tube feeding.
The cost in being wrong in thinking that (Past) provides sufficient 
evidence for (Present) in an MCS patient is that one lets a conscious 
patient dehydrate to death, plausibly going against what the patient’s 
actual wishes may be and withholding an easy means of sustaining his 
or her life. The burden of proof is on those who would argue to remove 
PEG feeding. To say that the disability bias is not ubiquitous is not 
sufficient to override the burden. The evidence for the disability bias is 
strong enough to undercut the inference from (Past) to (Present) in any 
given case.
The following is a summary of my argument in this third section. The 
scope of ‘disabled populations’ in the premises should be interpreted to 
include MCS patients as well as LIS, SCI, etc.
1 Advance directives (specifically, refusals based on quality of life judg-
ments) are issued from the third-person perspective.
2 For certain disabled patient populations, third-person quality of life 
judgments (including best-interest judgments) do not provide evi-
dence for what the patient’s actual quality of life judgment might be. 
(Disability bias and lability of advance directives premise.)
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3 Therefore, for certain disabled populations, advance directives do 
not provide evidence for what the patient’s actual wishes might be.
4 If an advance directive does not provide evidence for the patient’s 
actual wishes, it is not applicable.
5 Therefore, for certain disabled populations, advance directives are 
not applicable.
Objections
Because my argument says that it is impermissible to act on a patient’s 
previous refusal when she or he was decisional, an obvious moral con-
cern is that I am ignoring the presumption in favor of advance directives 
having moral authority. The purpose of this section is to deflect this and 
related concerns.
One practical consequence of my argument may be that a minority 
of MCS patients would have their wishes not fulfilled. Some commen-
tators might take that to be a symmetrical cost. But, again, this would 
ignore the clinical scenario my argument is indexed to, namely, PEG 
feeding is a fairly easy means to deliver and receive,9 and – per the lesson 
learned from QoL studies on LIS patients – treating disabled patients 
as the persons they (still) are is imperative (see my concluding remarks 
below). In point of fact, far from ignoring a minority of patient’s wishes, 
my argument is that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
evidence of disability bias is strong enough to undercut the inference 
from (Past) to (Present) in most cases. All of what I have argued for is 
to act in accordance with what the patient presently wants. A patient’s 
wishes retain moral authority on my view. Here is how to see the point. 
The reason why past wishes are important is because they are supposed 
to provide evidence for what the patient would or presently wants (but 
cannot communicate it). This fact is normatively relevant only because 
what the patient presently wants (or would want) is morally important. 
My argument is compatible with this line of thought. I wish only to say 
that, in the case of disability, past wishes are likely not indicative.
A few other parries are sufficient to deflect concerns about paternal-
ism. The first is that the conclusion of my argument is technically not 
paternalistic at all. The bad kind of paternalism requires one agent A 
going against another fully autonomous agent’s choice and A justifies 
the act on the basis that the agent is benefited (Wreen, 2004). Since MCS 
patients are likely not fully autonomous, the bad form of paternalism 
does not even apply.
Is going against a precedent fully autonomous choice so bad? The 
badness of paternalism correlates with the goodness of the choice being 
impugned. And it is unclear what normative weight a precedent autono-
mous choice bears, especially when it may be subject to a bias. That I have 
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chosen X does not by itself justify doing X. To justify a choice, one needs 
to cite the goods realized by the choice. And in the case at hand, one of the 
goods at stake is keeping a conscious patient alive through simple means 
and the choice might be biased anyway. Autonomy considered qua ability 
strikes me as extremely valuable. Autonomy qua discrete choice is valu-
able only as a function of the goods such a choice realizes.
Some other important objections may now be addressed. Walter 
Glannon (2013) takes the position that tube feeding should not be given 
to MCS patients. Specifically, he discusses patient M who was minimally 
conscious and the English Court of Protection ruled that it would be 
impermissible to withhold tube feeding from her. Glannon thinks that 
the English court erred in its reasoning and in its conclusion. Glannon 
summarizes his reasoning as follows, “[t]he poor prognosis for MCS 
patients, the fact that M was regularly in pain and likely suffering from it, 
her complete dependence on others, and the lack of restorative therapies 
made the burdens outweigh the benefits for her” (Glannon, 2013, 2). 
Glannon seems to think that tube feeding would only be worthwhile 
in conjunction with effective therapies aimed to restore cognition and 
physical mobility “to beneficial levels” (Glannon, 2013, 2). On some 
points I tentatively agree with Glannon, and so properly understanding 
the borders of my argument requires limning where Glannon and I agree 
and where it appears we disagree.
I tentatively agree on the following items: (1) Glannon notes that 
patient M was in intractable pain. If true, this might be a reason for 
withholding tube feeding. My agreement is cautious since it is unclear 
what kind of palliative care the patient was receiving. If it were known 
that the patient was in pain, proper pain management should address 
the issue. In any case, truly intractable pain is typically a sign that some 
other pathology is inflicting the patient (e.g., stomach cancer), in which 
case my argument does not apply. (2) Glannon notes that death does 
not always harm the one who dies. Technically speaking, if harm is 
understood as violating someone’s interests and it is not in someone’s 
interest to continue living, then death is not a harm – on this definition 
of harm.10 My agreement is cautious since it would be a mistake to think 
that the category of harm exhausts the category of wrongdoing. It would 
be wrong, for instance, to push a suicidal teenager off a tall bridge but 
that would not be violating his interests. Consider raping a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS), or using PVS patients for car safety test-
ing (Watt, 2000) or for orthopedic surgical practice. All of these actions 
would be seriously wronging the patient, but arguably not harming the 
patient (if harm is indexed to interests).11 (3) Glannon notes that, if the 
clinicians improve the conscious awareness of an MCS patient “with-
out a corresponding improvement in pain management” (2013, 2), one 
would be doing more harm than good. My agreement is cautious because 
it hardly seems relevant. No one would argue for improving cognition 
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without improving pain control. In fact, improving cognitive function 
could improve pain management because we could then ask the patient if 
she or he were comfortable.
As for the likely disagreements, Glannon notes that “a reasonable 
level of quality of life implies a sufficient degree of pain control and a 
sufficient degree of functional recovery, such that the patient is not com-
pletely dependent on others.” And he repeats the point a few lines later, 
claiming that a source of suffering is not only from physical pain but 
“[t]hey could also suffer from the experience of being completely depend-
ent on others” (Glannon, 2013, 2, emphasis mine). These comments 
clearly demonstrate the disability bias articulated above. On Glannon’s 
reasoning, LIS patients, quadriplegics, and advanced ALS patients do 
not have a “reasonable level of quality of life” since they are completely 
dependent upon others and they lack a “sufficient degree” of functional 
recovery – whatever that can mean. Would Glannon hold that we should 
dehydrate them to death even if they indicate that they want to live (as 
most do)? If he answers ‘no,’ then what exactly is this notion of a “rea-
sonable level of quality of life” doing in his argument? Is not such a 
notion endorsing a particular conception of the good which might not 
be congruent with the patient’s own conception? Furthermore, what is 
to count as a “sufficient degree” of functional recovery? Answering these 
questions appears difficult if one wants to avoid the disability bias.
Lastly, one might say that my argument proves too much. It entails 
that it is impermissible to withhold or withdraw any means of sustaining 
life that is minimally burdensome (objectively considered). My posi-
tion is that a patient may refuse a means of sustaining life even if she or 
he were perfectly functional. What is required before honoring such a 
wish, however, is that the patient give us a reason for doing so, and that 
reason has to be something more than just citing the patient’s own con-
dition. Suppose a patient refuses dialysis simply because she is in renal 
failure. That does not give us a reason to withhold dialysis. If anything, 
it explains why she needs dialysis. If she says that dialysis is too burden-
some for her (e.g., she lives three hours away from the center) or is too 
expensive on her insurer, she has given a reason. Likewise, refusing tube 
feeding because one would be minimally conscious and cannot swallow 
is not a reason to withhold tube feeding. That would simply be an expla-
nation for why the patient needs tube feeding.
The conclusion reached after the first argument is merely that an argu-
ment for respecting a patient’s advance directive suffers from empirically 
informed undercutting defeaters. Showing that there is insufficient evi-
dence for P is not itself an argument against P. In this case, P represents 
the clinician’s judgment that she may act on the belief that S would want 
some means of sustaining life withdrawn at present. The second task of 
this chapter is to argue that the clinician may not act on the belief that S 
would want some means of sustaining life withdrawn at present.
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Epistemic Diffidence and the Argument for Not Removing 
PEG Feeding
The argument I defend in this section is that a clinician should have epis-
temic diffidence toward the belief that it is permissible to withhold tube 
feeding from an MCS patient – in the circumstances I described in the 
first section. Consistent with the thread of argument in this book, if a 
belief is subject to epistemic diffidence, it should not be acted upon.
Let’s assume that a reason for withholding tube feeding from an MCS 
patient, in the circumstances I defined in the second section, are either 
that the patient in question has issued a precedent refusal, or it is judged 
to be in the patient’s best interest not to receive tube feeding. In the third 
section I argued that both reasons suffer from undercutting defeaters. As 
the drug case illustrates, however, pairing an undercutting defeater with 
a judgment that has a high cost to being wrong suggests that one should 
not act on that judgment.
To formulate the question I aim to answer in this section as succinctly 
as I can, the following nomenclature is necessary. Let R stand for
R = A patient S’s precedent refusal of tube feeding, in the context of 
MCS, should be respected.12
And let not-R simply be the negation of R according to which S’s prec-
edent refusal should not be respected. We can now ask whether there is a 
higher cost to being wrong about R compared with not-R. In this section, 
I argue that there is. Specifically, the form of the argument in this section 
may be summarized as follows:
6 If the cost of being wrong about R is higher than not-R, one may act 
on R only if R enjoys stronger justification than not-R.
7 The justification for R is not stronger than not-R, and the cost of 
being wrong about R is higher than not-R.
8 Therefore, one may not act on R.
On the assumption that the precedent refusal is based on a quality 
of life judgment, (8) entails,
9 It is impermissible to withhold tube feeding from an MCS patient 
who has refused it based on a quality of life judgment.
The key premise in this argument is (7). The third section argued for the 
first conjunct of (7). The second conjunct of (7) might be defended along 
the following lines. A patient who is in MCS, in the clinical scenario I am 
assuming, can be kept alive easily through PEG feedings, and they are 
consciously aware of their surroundings. Furthermore, some therapeutic 
modalities are successful in improving functionality. The cost here is 
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letting a consciously aware patient dehydrate to death when we could 
improve her functionality. And if we cannot improve her functionality, 
she is still minimally conscious and able to experience her environment. 
We could still include her in social activities and recreation. A cost for 
being wrong about not-R is that we go against what the patient had 
wanted; and if my argument in the third section is plausible, the prec-
edent refusal is likely biased anyway.
In arguing that the costs in being wrong about R are high, however, 
it appears I am relying on an implicit premise according to which liv-
ing while in MCS can still involve a quality life. This is not the way to 
argue for premise (7). I harbor a third-person quality of life judgment 
that being in MCS would involve a severe diminution in my current qual-
ity of life. Rather, I prefer to defend (7) from the standpoint of how 
clinicians should treat such patients; not whether such patients are really 
living quality lives. It is rather admirable, and quite virtuous, to love and 
care for someone whose experiences and circumstances involve a very 
low quality of life. The admirability of our moral actions is not solely a 
function of whether the beneficiaries of our actions have a high quality of 
life; but is more so a function of our own disposition towards the weak 
and vulnerable. I can argue for (7), then, by citing the cost to the clinician 
if she were to discharge opportunities to love and care for patients who 
are particularly vulnerable and disabled.
In Chapter 5, I related the story of Charles and Ladmaker per Primo 
Levi. Narratives like the one Levi bequeaths are revealing on two 
accounts. The first is that Charles’s actions are clearly admirable. What 
accounts for our admiration is that Charles’s love went so deep. Our 
admiration is parasitic on Ladmaker’s immense vulnerability and need. 
We can see the value of Charles’s actions in virtue of the fact that he 
loved and cared for someone who is particularly decrepit, malodorous, 
and woebegone. The admirability of his actions are in proportion to the 
suffering and vulnerability of Ladmaker. (Though Charles’s actions are 
not condescending – see the second point.) With this first point, I am 
suggesting that we flip the traditional way of assessing moral actions in 
the clinical setting. Charles’s love and care for Ladmaker was admirable 
precisely because Ladmaker had a low quality of life. Rather than under-
cutting one’s reasons for engaging in sacrificial acts of love, a low quality 
of life calls for them with a more stentorian tone.
The second lesson is orthogonal to the first – understanding quality of 
life on the horizontal plane of one’s experiences, and inherent dignity as 
‘vertical.’ The admirability of Charles’s actions invite us to see through 
affliction and disability to the irreplaceable worth of the sufferer. What 
did Charles see; to what did he respond? A plausible explanation is that 
he saw clearly that the suffering of Ladmaker was bad; but with greater 
acuity he saw that Ladmaker retained inherent worth.13 I argued in 
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Chapter 5 that we should look more closely at the irreplaceable person 
as being animated with inherent value, which is consistent with being 
immersed in affliction or disability.
For MCS patients, their quality of life might be low in our opinion, 
and possibly in theirs. But there is something admirable about lov-
ing and caring for them and seeing them as Charles cared for and saw 
Ladmaker. Their irreplaceable value remains despite their suppressed 
consciousness. In fact, it would be surprising if one’s irreplaceable (and 
ineffaceable) value waxed and waned depending on whether the person 
is able to demonstrate to others that she can think. The proper response 
to MCS patients is to love them without condescension, and this point 
places the onus of proof on those who wish to withhold an easy means 
of sustaining life.
To summarize, the cost in being wrong about R is that the clinician in 
acting on R would be discharging an opportunity to engage in admirable 
care and love for the patient whose quality of life might be particularly 
low. Rather than seeing a low quality of life as a reason to withhold easy 
means of sustaining life, we should see it as a reason to care more deeply, 
as illustrated in the exchange between Charles and Ladmaker. A further 
cost is that the clinician would be ignoring the irreplaceable and inherent 
worth that remains in an MCS patient, obscured as it is by a low qual-
ity of life. The cost in being wrong about not-R might be the existential 
suffering an MCS patient might experience in not having his wishes hon-
ored. But this risk is one for which we have no evidence; I have taken 
pains above to argue that a low quality of life is evidentially inert to 
justify believing that the patient would not want to live. Considering all 
moral costs, the cost in being wrong about R is higher than the cost of 
being wrong about not-R.
Conclusion
What is the scope of my conclusions in this chapter? Does my argument 
entail that advance directives for demented or Alzheimer’s patients are 
not applicable? At the risk of a frustrating response the answers are 
both yes and no. My principal concern is to challenge the prevailing 
orthodoxy that makes two questionable assumptions. The first is that 
advance directives are accurate portraits of the patient’s mind; the sec-
ond is that our prospective quality of life judgments are accurate. I have 
provided evidence here that both assumptions are empirically unsup-
portable. What follows from my argument is that advance directives 
that are based on third-person QoL judgments are a precarious source 
of information on what the patient might really want. It does not follow 
that advance directives are useless sources of information. Hence, they 
can be used for cognitively challenged patients, but only very carefully 
(Wreen, 2004, 322ff.).
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We would do better to do two things that would redeem the relevance 
of advance directives. The first is for clinicians who work with disabled 
populations to check their own potential prejudices on how valuable 
their patients’ lives could be. In their work on deep brain stimulation, 
Giacino et al. (2012) have received criticisms, not for the fact that they 
are doing neurosurgery on the non-consenting, but that they are even 
trying to develop therapeutic interventions for MCS patients. Their col-
leagues complain that MCS would be a state worse than death. To which 
they reply that such comments,
[r]eflect . . . the aforementioned biases that . . . nothing can or should 
be done to them. However, this stance immediately becomes prob-
lematic if one considers that these patients are conscious and that 
some of them might have degrees of awareness that suggests that they 
are cognizant of the isolation that our collective societal neglect has 
imposed upon them. In our view, there are moral and fiduciary obli-
gations to intercede and attempt to remediate their potential sense 
of isolation.
(Giacino et al., 2012, 346)
The proper response to severe disability and dependency is a deeper and 
more involved care, i.e., love without condescension. A state that would 
be worse than death is to be disabled, dependent, and ignored or treated 
with the disability bias.
The second is for more efforts at advance care planning, especially 
with diseases that have fairly predictable courses and timelines, such as 
Alzheimer’s and certain causes of dementia. If we do at least those two 
things my conclusions in this chapter become much more circumscribed 
around a small set of patients; and possibly much more palatable to oth-
erwise critical readers.
Notes
 1 Error rates in diagnosing patients as in a vegetative state (VS), when they 
are really minimally conscious or locked-in, are quite common (see Andrews 
et al. (1996) where 43% were misdiagnosed, and Gill-Thwaites (2006) where 
45% were misdiagnosed). And some in VS modulate brain activity in light 
of external stimuli (Monti et al., 2010). Because of these facts, my argument 
should be understood to include patients who appear in VS, but are really 
covertly conscious (Owen, 2013); they cannot demonstrate (to us) that they 
are conscious, but they likely retain cognitive and volitional abilities.
 2 See Meilaender (1984).
 3 I disagree with the language of ‘quality of life’ judgment for the simple reason 
that it is not theory neutral. It invites the idea that one’s value is determined 
solely by how that person sees her value. This language endorses subjectivism 
without arguing for it. A second reason is that even proponents of this lan-
guage really do not mean to refer to the quality of someone’s life. They mean 
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the quality of one’s experiences or circumstances. With these confusions in 
mind, I capitulate and use such language throughout.
 4 One such feature might be that the patient has refused tube feeding if in 
MCS based on the burdens, financial or otherwise, to their family. I have no 
principled objection to honoring that wish, but I am suspicious of the anti-
communitarian assumptions informing it.
 5 For advance directives to count as applicable other necessary conditions that 
together may be sufficient are that the patient was informed (the patient has 
considered the relevant medical information), voluntary (is not being coerced), 
and rational (has made inferences based on the relevant information). And 
that the specific decision fits the actual clinical circumstances. My argument, 
however, is only to challenge whether the applicability condition is satisfied.
 6 This assumption is problematic mainly because patients for whom advance 
directives are needed typically do not have present wishes since they might 
be unconscious or unable to process any relevant information. But this is a 
problem for all advance directives no matter what their content is. For a host 
of other philosophical problems affecting advance directives, see Vogelstein 
(2017), Dresser and Robertson (1989), Kuczewski (1997, 125ff.), and May 
(1998). I assume in this chapter that advance directives are morally relevant 
without explaining why (see Davis, 2009, sect. 4.4).
 7 See Goering (2008) for an effective response to those who wish to contest the 
veracity of these QoL judgments by the disabled.
 8 Justifying the removal of tube feeding from MCS patients with reference to 
best interest does not fare any better. The reason is that best interest judg-
ments are, by definition, made from the third-person perspective. For best 
interest judgments we are no longer asking ‘what would the patient decide?’ 
but ‘what should we decide given our knowledge of the patient’s clinical 
circumstances?’
 9 Potack and Chokhavatia (2008) observe certain complications. Most of the 
major complications occur in fewer than 2.5% of cases, and some complica-
tions are with the surgical procedure itself. Once placed, it is usually tolerated. 
Peristomal wound infection appears highest but is also manageable and 
occurs in patient populations other than the MCS population.
 10 Beauchamp and Childress appear to hold such a view. “These arguments [for 
what counts as wrongdoing] suggest that causing a person’s death is morally 
wrong, when it is wrong, because an unauthorized intervention thwarted or 
set back a person’s interests” (2001, 148).
 11 To accommodate these examples, one would have to understand interests 
more objectively. But then it is questionable whether not existing can be in a 
living thing’s objective interests.
 12 I set aside considering best interests since, if there is a high cost to being 
wrong about R (where the patient’s wishes are known), so much more is it the 
case when the patient’s wishes are not known.
 13 This is part of the reason why I object to quality-of-life language. Such lan-
guage does not encompass what is most essential about our worth.
10 Decision-Making for Patients with 
Apparent Competency
In the previous chapter I argued that a patient’s previously stated 
wishes are not applicable to cases involving severe disability partly 
because those wishes are issued from the third-person standpoint. In 
this chapter I focus on patients whose first-person wishes are clearly 
known, but we should still be epistemically diffident in following them. 
Specifically, I’m concerned about patients who refuse a life-sustaining/
saving measure that promises to work and does not present obviously 
onerous burdens to the patient. Refusals of low burden/high benefit 
treatments require a more fastidious analysis of whether the patient is 
rendering a competent refusal. Absent reasons for thinking the patient 
is offering a competent refusal, one should be epistemically diffident 
about honoring such refusals.
Consider the following case. A 30-year-old female is admitted with 
a chief complaint of lower extremity immobility with an unremarkable 
past medical history. She is diagnosed with lower-leg compartment syn-
drome with onset of gangrene. The patient had been sitting in a yoga-type 
position – sitting on her heels – and she fell asleep. Although a fasciotomy 
was considered, it would not arrest the infection. The patient required a 
bilateral below-knee amputation (BKA) to save her life. The patient was 
alert and oriented and refused a BKA after having this option explained 
to her. A psychiatric assessment was done in which the consultant indi-
cated that she retained competency to make health care decisions. Her 
social history includes being single, and her mother and father lived in the 
region. Her employment history included some theatre work, modeling, 
and she is pursuing a career in singing.
It is common in clinical ethics to frame this type of case as a question 
of competency: is the patient competent to refuse or not? If she is, then 
the physicians should respect her refusal. Although I find this reasoning 
sufficient for many cases, it fails to handle the complexities of this particu-
lar case. In this case, I was consulted by an attending physician who was 
confused about what to do even after a psychiatrist declared the patient 
competent. What makes this case ethically difficult is that the procedure 
in question promises a significant benefit, not just objectively speaking 
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in terms of medical probability and magnitude, but from the patient’s 
perspective as well – she had well-developed life plans and aspirations. 
Although a BKA can be considered burdensome, the burdens can be com-
pensated for by prostheses and supportive rehabilitation. Situations in 
which the procedure is life-saving (or life-preserving) and does not exces-
sively compromise the patient’s quality of life, and yet the patient refuses 
it, are what I call ‘high-stakes cases.’1
Such cases are high stakes for both the patient and the clinicians. The 
stakes for the patient are obvious. The stakes for the clinicians are that 
rendering a judgment that ‘the patient is making a competent and auton-
omous decision’ morally entails respecting that decision – at least, I will 
assume this principle here. Respecting a refusal of a life-saving/preserv-
ing procedure typically involves the patient’s death; and the other option 
involves saving the patient’s life with little to no diminution in her quality 
of life or it subjects the patient to manageable burdens.2 Consequently, 
the cost of being wrong that the patient is competent is high and, cor-
relatively, the justification for that assessment must be strong. Therefore, 
epistemic pressure is placed on the judgment that ‘the patient is making 
a competent and autonomous decision.’ This chapter concerns, chiefly, 
the epistemic stakes as they pertain to the clinicians’ assessment that the 
patient is rendering a refusal that should be respected. Specifically, I out-
line features of a patient’s decision that supply adequate justification for 
the clinician to judge that a patient’s refusal in a high-stakes context may 
be respected. Absent such justification, the judgment that the refusal is a 
competent one should be held with epistemic diffidence.
There are two basic routes by which clinicians have addressed cases 
like this one.3 The first route is to have the patient declared incompetent 
simply in virtue of rendering the ‘wrong’ decision; and what counts as 
wrong is determined by the clinicians. This option would involve doing 
the BKA. A second option is to follow the wishes of any patient who 
demonstrates certain intellectual abilities. This option would involve dis-
charging the patient to hospice. The former option is too paternalistic; 
the latter option ignores the moral gravity of the situation. The route I 
canvas here aims to countenance the moral gravity of such cases, but also 
allows for respecting a high-stakes refusal.
What is original about my analysis is twofold. (i) It is typical to assess 
competency with reference to the patient evincing certain intellectual abil-
ities (Appelbaum, 2007, 1836). But, as the case above illustrates, such an 
analysis is not ‘deep enough’ to tell clinicians what to do in high-stakes 
cases – for the patient was clearly competent. We need more than merely 
an assessment of the patient’s abilities; we also need to know whether 
those abilities are being exercised by the patient in the token instance 
of rendering the refusal. In this regard, I exploit the distinction between 
being competent (which asks whether the patient retains certain abilities) 
and rendering a competent refusal (which asks whether the judgment the 
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patient makes in refusing a life-saving/preserving procedure is informed 
by good reasons). (ii) My focus is on the clinicians’ judgment that the 
patient has offered a refusal that may be respected. Specifically, I address 
the question, ‘what epistemic features of the clinician’s judgment that 
“P’s refusal is a competent one” must be present before he or she acts on 
that judgment?’ Since the focus is on the quality of the clinician’s judg-
ment, a discussion of certain epistemic properties that judgment must 
evince is relevant.
The outline of the chapter is as follows: I begin with a brief descrip-
tion of the epistemic principles relevant to justification in high-stakes 
contexts. I then describe current standards for assessing competency and 
argue that stricter standards are necessary in those contexts. I end with 
some clarifications and application to cases.
The Basing Condition
I believe a lot of things: I believe that Bigfoot does not exist, that it is 
currently sunny outside, that it will be sunny outside tomorrow – given 
the testimony of a meteorologist – etc. The basing relation is the relation 
between my beliefs on one hand (it will be sunny tomorrow) and my rea-
sons for those beliefs on the other (the meteorologist is reliable and she 
said it will be sunny). More specifically, it is not enough that I have other 
beliefs that may support or provide reasons for the target belief, but that 
the target belief is based on these other beliefs. Consider some examples.
The detective believes that Jones is the murderer. He accepts the 
contents of a forensic report indicating that DNA evidence strongly 
points to Jones. But the detective believes that Jones is the murderer 
not on the basis of the report but rather solely because he infers this 
from his delusional belief that Jones confessed to the killings. The 
standard and proper verdict in this case is that the detective does not 
know that Jones is the murderer.
(Warfield, 2005, 411)
In this example, the detective bases his belief in Jones’s guilt on the wrong 
evidence, namely, his delusional belief. Common sense (“the standard 
and proper verdict”) tells us that Jones does not know. His delusional 
belief is not the right evidence because it has no connection to or does not 
otherwise support the belief that Jones is guilty. (I leave the terms ‘con-
nection’ and ‘supports’ as primitive here given the clarity of the example.) 
The basing condition requires that the evidence supporting my belief that 
p really supports p. I may believe that the meteorologist is reliable, that 
she has told me that it will be sunny outside tomorrow; but if I base my 
belief that it will be sunny tomorrow on the basis of what a shaman told 
me, my belief is not justified.4
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The intuitions informing the basing condition are most strong when 
we are answering specifically epistemological questions, i.e., what is 
a necessary condition for having a justified belief? But when a patient 
refuses a means of sustaining or saving life (hereafter L), in what sense 
is the refusal a justified belief? Viewed in one way, it clearly is not since 
a patient’s refusal of L is not simply a belief. It is better classified as a 
decision; in particular, a decision to refuse L based on a belief that L is 
not worth it.
However, the same intuitions apply to both justified belief and 
reasoned decision-making. Consider a decision-making case that is anal-
ogous to Warfield’s. Suppose a patient believes correctly that she has 
severe mitral valve prolapse and that without open-heart surgery she will 
likely die. Suppose that she refuses, not on the basis of the burdens of 
open-heart surgery, but rather on the basis of a delusional belief that her 
husband – who is supposedly an angelic power – will heal her. Intuitively, 
if the decision to refuse is based on a delusional belief, it is not a strong 
reason to refuse. And this is enough to highlight the importance of the 
basing condition as it pertains to reasoned decision-making as well. 
(Whether we actually respect the refusal is a more difficult question. I 
deliberately selected a heart surgery case because such surgery is quite 
burdensome objectively considered. There are good reasons for refus-
ing the surgery, just as there are good reasons for thinking that Jones is 
guilty. But because the refusal is not based on those reasons, we view the 
refusal with suspicion.) Conversely, if she were relatively young with a 
good prognosis otherwise, but she refuses because the burdens of heart 
surgery and rehab are ‘not worth it,’ then she has rendered a competent 
refusal. The point is that when we focus on the source of the belief or the 
decision, we find ourselves having the same intuitions: both a belief and 
a decision must satisfy something like a basing condition. In regard to 
decisions, the decision to refuse L must be based on true beliefs about the 
medical facts, and the reason for refusing must be relevant to or support 
the judgment that ‘L is not worth it.’5 The patient must cite a burden, 
financial cost, or lack of benefit and issue a value judgment according to 
which the burden, cost, or lack of benefit ‘is not worth it.’6
Another popular intuition in epistemology was discussed in Chapter 3, 
namely, the epistemic effects of risk. Suppose you are a juror in a capital 
case. The cost of being wrong about p is that you would send an inno-
cent person to his death – you know that the judge has no scruples about 
capital punishment. You would not rely on, say, the testimony of one 
eyewitness as being sufficient for guilt. You would want a substantial 
amount of strong evidence.
I pause here to note the importance of these ideas to our present issue. 
The basing condition is relevant to assess the quality of a patient’s judg-
ment to refuse a procedure in a high-stakes context. If the 30-year-old 
female stated that she did not want the BKA, this may not be enough to 
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morally justify respecting her refusal. Clinicians need more than a dislike 
for something – after all, no one really wants her ankles cut off. Viewed 
in one way, not wanting the BKA is a sign of reasonableness, but it is still 
not a reason for refusing the BKA. If the refusal is not based on a reason, 
it does not satisfy the basing condition. Because the cost of being wrong 
is so high, we need the patient to assess the procedure’s burdens or costs 
paired with her value preferences. The high cost in being wrong requires 
clinicians to know that she has satisfied the basing condition by citing 
reasons, for example: ‘the burden of losing my bodily integrity is, in my 
view, too onerous.’ The risk condition captures the idea that clinicians 
should protect patients from their own ill-considered decisions.7 Another 
reason why we need a reason is that a patient’s value preference paired 
with an accurate understanding of the sequelae of the procedure/treat-
ment is typically more stable than a desire or emotional reaction to the 
procedure/treatment.
Atul Gawande offers an anecdotal story to illustrate the importance 
of stability. The patient had undergone abdominal surgery. Several days 
post-op he spiked a fever, his heart rate sped up, and he became short of 
breath (SOB). His SOB was only mildly addressed by wearing an oxy-
gen mask on full O2. He had pneumonia which very likely could be 
addressed. However, it would take a few days and the patient would 
need ventilator support for that time. Upon hearing this, the patient ada-
mantly refused intubation. Over the next few moments he eventually 
tired of his labored breathing and passed out. At that point, the chief 
resident and Gawande intubated the patient. Over the next 24 hours the 
patient improved significantly, and was ready for extubation. Gawande 
describes the extubation thus:
I cut the ties and deflated the balloon cuff holding the tube in place. 
Then I pulled it out, and he coughed violently a few times. “You had 
pneumonia,” I told him, “but you’re doing just fine now.” I stood 
there silent and anxious for a moment, waiting to see what he would 
say. He swallowed hard, wincing from the soreness. Then he looked 
at me, and, in a hoarse but steady voice, he said, “Thank you.”
(Gawande, 2010, 97)
I assume that intubating the patient was the correct action. The patient 
did not offer a reason for his refusal, and likely refused out of fear or 
misunderstanding. His ‘truest’ and ‘deepest’ desires, to use a common 
metaphor, have the feature of being ‘deep’ because of their stability and 
possibly because of their proximity to the patient’s self-identity and self-
understanding. We want reasons because reasons implicate the person at 
a more fundamental and stable level.8
Because the stakes are high for the clinicians, and some putatively com-
petent patients can make refusals that do not satisfy the basing condition, 
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a more sensitive criterion for honoring a patient’s refusal is required. 
What we need to know is not merely that the patient is competent, but 
also that she has rendered a competent refusal. What is this distinction 
and why is it relevant?
Competency Assessments9
What counts as being competent? Paul Appelbaum (2007) and Berg, 
Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) have provided what I take to be the most 
comprehensive and conceptually clear account of competency (under-
stood as giving an account of the necessary abilities a patient must 
manifest in being declared ‘competent’). They identify four conditions 
which constitute the notion of competency: “(i) ability to communicate 
a choice, (ii) ability to understand relevant information, (iii) ability to 
appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences, and 
(iv) ability to manipulate information rationally” (Berg, Appelbaum, & 
Grisso 1996, 351).
A few comments are noteworthy as Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso 
offer helpful explanations of each, and I consider the latter three. The 
ability to understand relevant information involves comprehending the 
concepts that described the patient’s clinical situation. Berg, Appelbaum, 
and Grisso do not give examples, but I suspect they would include the 
notions of diagnosis and prognosis, and concepts specific to the treat-
ment option. For example, if the option involves general anesthesia, the 
patient needs to understand that this means complete unconsciousness. 
However, the ability to understand is different from appreciating the 
information, as Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso rightly observe. The abil-
ity to appreciate information is a more advanced cognitive ability than 
the previous two. It requires that a competent patient must be able to 
evaluate or assess the gravity or seriousness of the patient’s situation. It is 
important to note that this assessment must be true; there is an embedded 
alethic component to the appreciating condition.
That an alethic component is required can be illustrated by consider-
ing cases discussed by Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso, such as In re Roe.10 
For this case, the court ruled that a man with schizophrenia was not 
competent to refuse his medication because he denied that he was men-
tally ill. In calling this a failure to appreciate the medical evidence, the 
appreciation criterion includes an alethic component according to which 
the patient must have some true beliefs about his clinical status – he must 
believe that he has a serious problem. But how many true beliefs or which 
beliefs have to be true? In answer to this question, Berg, Appelbaum, and 
Grisso consider a patient who believed truly both that she had a cancer-
ous uterus and that she would die without treatment.11 However, she 
preferred faith healing over hysterectomy and she believed falsely that 
her husband was a faith healer. The court declared, and apparently Berg, 
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Appelbaum, and Grisso concur, that the patient was competent since she 
did have the necessary true beliefs, even if her false ones were both obvi-
ously false and they were the ones upon which she based her treatment 
decisions. The appreciation criterion includes an alethic component, but 
this component is limited to true beliefs regarding one’s general status 
and the consequences of not receiving treatment.
The fourth criterion Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso canvas is the ability 
to manipulate information rationally. They note that the courts have not 
recognized the importance of this criterion in competency assessments 
and this is likely because it is the hardest one to measure objectively. 
Nevertheless, they offer the following informative description:
It addresses the patient’s reasoning capacity or ability to employ logi-
cal thought processes to compare the risks and benefits of treatment 
options. This criterion does not look at the outcome of a decision, 
but, like understanding and appreciation, it is concerned with the 
patient’s decision-making process.
(Berg, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1996, 357)
One way to capture this criterion is that, if a patient demonstrates logi-
cally valid reasoning, then she has satisfied this criterion; the reasoning 
need not be sound (by ‘validity’ and ‘soundness’ I mean what every logic 
textbook means by these terms). In this regard, they state,
As we define the rational manipulation criterion, a patient need not 
be able to give objectively “rational” reasons for her choice as long 
as she can demonstrate that the final decision follows logically from 
whatever reasons are offered. . . . Our reasoning criterion would 
allow a patient to rest on any premises (even a false one) as long as 
the conclusion drawn follows logically from those premises.
(358, emphasis added)
The Argument for Stricter Conditions
Each of these conditions is sensible and clear. My argument in this section 
is that clinicians need to know more than that certain abilities fulfill-
ing these conditions are present. To see why, consider a case offered by 
Jonsen, Seigler, and Winslade:
Mr. Cure, a 24-year-old white graduate student, has been brought 
to the emergency room by a friend. Previously in good health, he is 
complaining of a severe headache and stiff neck. Physical examina-
tion shows a somnolent patient without focal neurologic signs but 
with a temperature of 39.5 C and nuchal rigidity. An examination 
of spinal fluid reveals cloudy fluid with a white count of 2,000; a 
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Gram’s stain of the fluid shows many gram-positive diplococci. A 
diagnosis of bacterial meningitis is reached. . . . He is informed that 
he needs immediate hospitalization and administration of antibiotics. 
He refuses treatment and says he wants to go home. The physician 
explains the extreme dangers of going untreated and the minimal 
risks of treatment [intravenous antibiotics]. The young man persists 
in his refusal. Apart from this strange demand, he exhibits no evi-
dence of mental derangement or altered mental status.
(2002, 14, 58)
Most of us would say that the mere desire not to have the antibiotic treat-
ment is not enough to justify not giving it to the patient. The case illustrates 
that we need more than just an assessment of his reasoning abilities – for 
he obviously retained these – we need his reason for refusing. A simple 
desire not to have the antibiotic is insufficient justification for respecting 
the refusal. A refusal based on an irrational fear of needles, for example, 
does not by itself merit respect. We need reasons and these reasons must 
advert to the benefits, burdens, or costs of the treatment modality and 
whether L is worth it. And we need to know whether the refusal is based 
on those reasons that support the judgment ‘L is not worth it.’
Now a reason is constituted by two features. The first is a belief about 
the benefits (or lack thereof), burdens, and financial costs of L. In regard 
to this belief, Appelbaum (2007) and Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) 
are correct to note that such beliefs must be true. Second, these beliefs 
must be paired with an evaluative judgment about the burdens, costs, or 
lack of benefit, and this judgment should reflect the patient’s value com-
mitments. That evaluative judgment takes into account the probability 
and magnitude of the burdens, financial costs, or lack of benefit and how 
important or meaningful those benefits or burdens are to the patient.12
A case offered by LaPuma and Schiedermayer (1994, 143–145) illus-
trates nicely the nature and importance of this evaluative judgment. The 
case involved a 27-year-old female with advanced Friedrich’s ataxia, 
cardiomyopathy, scoliosis, and respiratory depression. She was admitted 
due to shortness of breath and required intubation. Although her fam-
ily wanted her to have a DNR order, the patient herself, through yes/
no questioning, indicated that she wanted CPR in the event of a cardiac 
arrest. For such a patient, the likelihood of success is exceedingly low and 
CPR involves significant burdens – chest compressions and shocks. The 
patient made an evaluative judgment that the low likelihood is worth it, 
and that the burdens were not so bad as not to tolerate them. Evaluative 
judgments are of course subjective – I may not assess the value of 
CPR the same way – and it requires that the patient ask ‘is it worth it?’ 
Only the patient can answer that question since it is only the patient who 
is the patient of the treatment. It is important to note that the evaluative 
component of a reason for refusing is not an expression of a desire or an 
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emotion; it is an assessment – it is what the patient considers worthwhile. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a report about how one feels, but rather 
what one believes. The latter implicates the person’s fundamental beliefs 
about what counts as valuable. A feeling towards x may indicate that 
a person values x. Of course the worry is that feelings and emotional 
reactions are fleeting. What a clinician needs, then, is a value judgment 
since we are searching for that which expresses the person’s enduring 
and fundamental self.
To illustrate the importance of issuing a value judgment, consider 
Rufus, a 70-year-old male who is recently diagnosed with myelodysplas-
tic syndrome (MDS) (a pathology of the blood cells leading to a lack 
of either white or red blood cells). The patient is not a candidate for 
stem cell transplantation, but Azacitidine may work. The patient, how-
ever, requires red blood cell (RBC) and plasma transfusions. The patient 
refuses, thinking that blood from another person is gross – he does not 
fear it, he just thinks receiving it into one’s body is gross. Contrast Rufus 
with Jed, who is an age- and disease-matched Jehovah’s Witness who 
refuses blood because of his religious beliefs. Even if we rule out mis-
understanding and any other psychopathology, I am still inclined to 
override Rufus’s refusal; whereas Jed’s may be respected.13 In what sense 
does one offer a competent refusal and the other one not?
Jed’s refusal cites a significant burden if he were to receive the blood, 
namely, the loss of eternal life. Even if we think that the causal belief 
of ‘receiving another’s blood causes the loss of one’s salvation’ is false, 
the value judgment cites the loss of something of significant value, i.e., 
eternal life. As such, Jed’s refusal is a competent refusal. Rufus does not 
cite a significant value that would be lost upon receiving the blood. He 
just thinks that it is gross. If we ask him, ‘what would happen if we gave 
you the blood?’ he only responds, ‘I just think that’s gross.’ He does 
not cite, for example, the probability (albeit very low) of contracting an 
infectious disease, the fatigue and malaise that can follow upon receiving 
another’s blood, or a concern about saving a scarce health care resource. 
Because his refusal is a statement of his repugnance, it is not a value 
judgment strictly understood; Rufus is reporting his feelings but is not 
issuing a judgment that L is not meaningful, important, or worthwhile. 
Permutations of these cases illustrate the principal point. For example, 
suppose Jed continues to self-identify as Jehovah’s Witness but is very 
unreflective about those beliefs. He mentions the resulting loss of salva-
tion but cannot say anything further about it, and it looks like Jed doesn’t 
understand that aspect of his religion. Even though our intuitions in this 
permutation might be different than the original, we are still looking for 
the same thing, namely, does Jed offer a competent refusal which requires 
basing his refusal on beliefs that he has. Does he really believe that he’ll 
lose his salvation? And, if not, the reasons for refusing are not based on 
reasons that are his.
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The 24-year-old male who refused an antibiotic did not, let us suppose, 
offer a reason for refusing; there was no judgment expressed regarding 
the burdens or costs of the IV antibiotics, much less was there an evalua-
tion of those burdens as being too onerous or not worth it. In such a case, 
the clinicians have no reason to respect the patient’s wish since there is 
not a competent refusal of the antibiotic.14
In general, what accounts for our ethical worries in high-stakes cases 
is that the patients are refusing something that could clearly contribute 
to their overall well-being and health. And yet, we cannot just ignore 
a patient’s refusal when she can communicate and reason about her 
clinical situation. What we care most about patient autonomy, how-
ever, is that we are respecting a patient’s stable self. To do that we 
need to know the patient’s reasons for refusing since it is only in offer-
ing a reason that the patient’s own fundamental value commitments 
are implicated. Respecting a patient’s reasons respects the patient. 
Typical assessments of competency, however, focus on one’s abilities. 
Since these assessments do not consider the quality of a patient’s judg-
ment, they risk ignoring the patient’s more stable self. Consequently, 
in high-stakes contexts, we need to move from assessing a patient’s 
‘competency to refuse’ to assess her ‘competent refusal.’
Clarifications and Application to Cases
Though my argument extends the discussion on the ethics of com-
petency assessment, it remains consistent with what previous authors 
have noted. My argument is largely consistent with Appelbaum’s and 
others’ approaches since they countenance the importance of there 
being a process of reasoning (i.e., rational manipulation). In one 
important respect, my argument is stricter. Berg, Appelbaum, and 
Grisso require a reasoning process that must be logically valid, but 
the reasons can be ‘whatever’ (1996, 358, quoted above). I think the 
‘whatever’ criterion is too permissive. Suppose the patient in Jonsen, 
Seigler, and Winslade’s example cites a fear of needles as a reason to 
refuse the antibiotics. This looks like it satisfies the ‘whatever’ crite-
rion, but clearly it is not a competent refusal on my account and should 
not be respected. Of course, this may be an uncharitable interpretation 
of what Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso mean by ‘whatever’ since they 
do not think any reason is a respectful reason either; for example, 
they do not think that refusals based on delusions should be respected. 
It may be, then, that my argument is consistent with Berg, Appelbaum, 
and Grisso’s and Appelbaum’s approach but more would need to be 
said on their part.
Thomas May offers informative reflections on what we should take 
competence to mean, namely, “‘competence’ is used to denote the 
eligibility to assume responsibility for decision-making that affects 
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one’s own welfare” (May, 1998, 250). He goes so far as to say that 
“Competence . . . should not focus on the patient’s abilities as such, but 
upon the patient’s eligibility to assume decision-making responsibility” 
(May, 1998, 256, emphasis added). May does not tell us how to deter-
mine who is eligible – he is suggesting only that we should not focus on 
the patient’s rational abilities as such to determine who is. May correctly 
observes that competent people can make bad decisions and that there 
are other societal values that encroach upon the exercise of one’s auton-
omy. However, his fundamental point is that we should resist defining 
into the notion of competency these other societal values as, by doing 
so, we preempt a discussion on just which of these values in which cir-
cumstances justifiably encroach autonomy. For example, May notes that 
competent people make ill-advised financial decisions which ruin their 
lives, why should people “not be allowed to ruin their lives through simi-
lar medical decisions” (1998, 254). He then suggests that there should at 
least be a discussion here and intimates that there is no principled distinc-
tion between the two.
I have a few points in reply to situate my argument alongside May’s. 
First, there is a relevant distinction between damaging one’s financial 
standing and damaging one’s health and life. Money and wealth are 
instrumental goods, whereas health and life are more fundamental and 
basic. So, indeed, we should have stringent standards on just how ill-
advised a patient’s high-stakes decisions are in health care. I doubt May 
would disagree with this. (To repeat, he only suggests that we need to 
discuss the issue, and defining competency so that such a discussion is 
preempted is wrongheaded). Second, and more importantly, my argu-
ment is simply that there is a conceptual distinction between having 
certain abilities and rendering a reasoned judgment. In applying the bas-
ing and moral risk conditions to high stakes contexts, we need to know 
both whether the patient has certain abilities and whether she is exercis-
ing them in a token instance. Nothing May says appears to challenge 
this idea. After all, it would be an odd argument for respecting compe-
tency to ignore whether the capacities that constitute competency are 
being exercised in token instances. Of note, I agree with May that one is 
eligible to take responsibility for her decision-making when she retains 
certain rational abilities.15 The question I set out to answer is, ‘What 
justifies a health care professional’s judgment that the patient has ren-
dered a competent refusal of L? Has the exercise of the patient’s rational 
abilities informed her refusal?’ And, to repeat, the reason we need to ask 
these further questions is because of the basing condition as it applies to 
patients, and the moral risk condition as it applies to clinicians insofar as 
they are tasked with acting on high-stakes refusals.
Because of my emphasis on providing a reason in high-stakes refus-
als, one may charge me with intellectualism or elitism. The critic may 
note that, even if I am correct, implementing my thesis in the practical 
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setting would be impossible because many people do not have the medi-
cal expertise or the philosophical training to think through and justify 
their high-stakes refusals. Consider an actual case from my own experi-
ence: a patient suffering from early-stage vascular dementia and a medical 
history of diabetes-mellitus was admitted with a chief complaint of a gan-
grenous foot. He needed a unilateral BKA to stave off a life-threatening 
infection. He refused. When the ethics team arrived and we asked him for 
his reasons he remarked, “I came into this world with two legs, I’m goin’ 
to leave with two legs.” We took that as sufficient. Given my argument 
so far, did we respect a patient’s competent refusal of L? It seems not 
since the reason appears to show little reflection on the values at stake.
In defending our assessment, I would say that he did offer us a reason, 
namely, bodily integrity. Bodily integrity was an important value to him 
and he believed correctly that a unilateral BKA is incompatible with the 
preservation of this value. In general, my requirements for a competent 
refusal are no more intellectualist as Appelbaum’s requirements for com-
petency. A competent refusal must include true beliefs about the disease/
pathology, the benefits, burdens, and costs of the proposed treatment; and a 
value judgment that such burdens, costs, or lack of benefits are not worth it.
But this case, suitably revised, invites us to probe further regarding 
whether clinicians should respect any value judgment. Consider a case 
entertained by Michael Wreen (2004) of a man named Albert H. Albert 
who is
[H]opelessly but happily senile who needs antibiotics in order 
to survive. Years before, when competent, Albert executed an 
advance directive that said that were he to become seriously men-
tally impaired, he should not be given any life-sustaining treatments, 
including antibiotics. It’s now against Albert’s past wishes but in 
keeping with his present interests—Albert’s current life does have 
value for him—to receive antibiotics. His son pleads that he should 
be given the antibiotics.
(Wreen, 2004, 322)16
At least as here described, I am inclined to side with Wreen that, all else 
being equal, the patient should receive antibiotics – pace Mappes (2006). 
But suppose that the patient foresaw that being happily demented was 
a distinct possibility and that he would enjoy life. But he refused any 
treatment even on this contingency, reasoning that ‘anything less than 
full competency is not a life worth living.’ Is the value judgment that 
‘any degree of mental disability entails that no life-sustaining measure is 
worth it’ a judgment that clinicians should respect?
Before answering this question, consider for comparison the follow-
ing case. The patient, call her Jane, was a 34-year-old female with a past 
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medical history of diabetes. She needed a unilateral BKA secondary to 
stubbing her left toe and did not know it until the toe became gangre-
nous. She was in good health otherwise. She refused, and in the initial 
report to me, the infectious disease doctor described her as a “diva” and 
that she has “huge issues with physical appearance.” In speaking with 
Jane, she refused the amputation because it would make her “look bad.” 
She also offered some comment to the effect that she would not be able 
to put on her new Ugg boots. I thought she was joking, but in the course 
of talking with her for over an hour, it became clear she was not. Here is 
a patient with radically shallow and puerile value commitments who was 
not acutely depressed and understood the medical information well. Did 
she offer a competent refusal on my view?
Before attempting to answer this question, one must bear in mind that 
the cases of Albert and Jane pose problems for any clinical ethics analy-
sis. Any argument for, say, respecting the refusal versus not respecting it 
can only enjoy a modicum of plausibility.
Having said that, I am inclined to judge that Albert should receive the 
antibiotics, even in my permutation; and Jane should be discharged home 
with hospice care, unless or until she changes her mind (which she did). 
Albert should receive the antibiotics because his previous judgment that 
life would have no value to him is false since it presently does – insofar 
as he is clearly enjoying it.17 The value judgment by Jane is not false, 
rather it is shallow and puerile. She is making the correct judgment that 
amputation is incompatible with something she values considerably – 
i.e., maintaining her current physical appearance. We may disagree with 
such a judgment, but it reflects the patient’s stable and enduring self. 
Respecting Jane’s refusal respects Jane – tragic as it is.
Conclusion
Standard competency assessments are not sensitive to what is morally 
required in high-stakes refusals since they only test for the presence of 
certain intellectual abilities and not whether the refusal is based on rea-
sons. But, if the clinician does not have justification for believing that 
the patient is refusing based on reasons, the practical interest condition 
tells her not to act upon such a refusal. In this regard, my account takes 
seriously the moral gravity of such situations. What is required is that the 
patient offers a competent refusal. In order for clinicians to judge that the 
refusal in question may be acted upon, they need the patient to offer a 
reason for refusing. A reason for refusing includes a value commitment, 
and we should tolerate a broad range of such commitments unless they 
are obviously erroneous. If a patient offers a competent refusal, it should 
be respected. In this regard my account allows for respecting a person’s 
considered high-stakes refusal.
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In the interest of helping clinicians implement what I am suggesting 
here, consider the following decision-tree:
 • Is the patient competent (on Appelbaum’s (2007) criteria)?
 • If yes: is the proposed treatment (L) objectively beneficial to the 
extent that it is life-saving or sustaining, and does it promise man-
ageable or even low burdens?
 • If yes: does the patient refuse L?
 • If yes: does the patient understand the medical details accurately? 
(It may be helpful to invite the patient to discuss any fears, possible 
skepticism of the plan of care, and past hospital experiences.)
 • If yes: does the patient cite a burden, cost, or lack of benefit of L?
 • If yes: does the value judgment involved support the judgment ‘L is 
not worth it’?
 • If yes: respect the refusal.
Of course, there are a number of clinically important hurdles affecting 
the implementation of my argument (Howe, 2014). For instance, my 
argument appears to suggest that, if the clinician cannot make sense of 
the patient’s refusal, she should determine whether the patient is issuing 
a competent refusal. In the context of the 30-year-old female’s refusal of 
the BKA, matters are much more complicated. Twenty-four hours ear-
lier, she was able-bodied, and her life plans and projects were largely 
made assuming that she can walk on her own two feet. Now she is being 
told that we are going to cut her legs off below the knee. How would you 
feel? Would you consent immediately with no questions, no stress, or 
no traumatic feelings? John Briere and Cheryl Langtree observe in their 
work on treating trauma that a patient’s activated stress may diminish 
“in the presence of acceptance, validation, and nurturing. . . . The more 
positive and supportive the relationship . . . the greater the amount of 
positive emotionality available to counter condition previous negative 
emotional responses” (Briere & Langtree, 2011, 117; quoted in Howe, 
2014, 181). My argument should not be interpreted as simply a justi-
fication for ignoring a patient’s wishes. Properly situated, it should be 
understood as an opportunity to love our patients more deeply by, for 
example, validating the patient’s fears and helping the patient problem-
solve by canvassing information on what life might look like after the 
amputation, etc. Simply respecting her refusal shortcuts this important 
opportunity to love the patient better.
Notes
 1 An important feature of high-stakes cases is that the patient stands to ben-
efit from the procedure or treatment that is being refused and the refusal is 
from the first-person standpoint – i.e., they are currently alert and oriented. 
The more significant the benefit, the higher the stakes. And the notion of a 
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‘benefit’ should be understood in this chapter as not just preserving some-
one’s life, but as enabling him to realize his plans and projects.
 2 It is fairly well known that amputees and even bilateral BKA amputees adapt 
quite well. Consider Hugh Herr, Oscar Pistorius, and Aimee Mullins. See espe-
cially Mullins (2010) for a critique of the idea that amputees are ‘disabled.’
 3 In the actual case, the patient consented to a BKA after a clinician listened to 
her concerns instead of telling her what to do.
 4 Epistemologists agree that the basing relation is a necessary condition for jus-
tification (see Pollock & Cruz, 1999, 35; and Korcz, 1997). More technically 
stated, a belief that p is justified for S only if S believes p on the basis of other 
beliefs or experience.
 5 The concepts of relevance and support are key components of the basing con-
dition, but I leave them undefined. Analytical philosophers may consider this 
a cop-out. Consequently, a brief comment on my philosophical method is in 
order. The first point is that the cases used to illustrate these notions seem clear 
enough – we know supportive reasons when we see them. Second, analytical 
philosophers (of which I consider myself) are predisposed to define key terms, 
and the definiens must be in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Definitions are typically in the form of, for example, ‘A supports B if and only 
if . . . [an outline of conditions follows].’ However, the stipulation of such con-
ditions is often motivated by entertaining cases or thought experiments – cases 
that, if well-described, highlight our intuitions on what counts as A being a 
supportive reason for B. Since the generation of these conditions appeals ulti-
mately to our intuitions (i.e., to what we ‘see’ with our mind’s eye, or worse, 
to our gut reactions) the analytical method is a roundabout and complicated 
way of saying ‘you will know it when you see it.’ There is no reason to take a 
detour into the land of thought experiments when we rely on our intuitions all 
along. Consequently, I circumvent such a discussion here.
 6 Below I recapitulate how Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) address the 
difference between a refusal based on delusional beliefs and refusals based 
on “unconventional” religious beliefs. I agree largely with their analysis, 
though there are additional issues to consider. For instance, it is uncontro-
versial that refusals based on unconventional religious beliefs (for adults) 
may be respected, but refusals based on delusional beliefs should not be. 
What task remains is to explain why this is so. What properties do delu-
sional beliefs have (or lack) that unconventional religious beliefs have (or 
lack) such that we may respect one but not the other? Fortunately, answer-
ing this question is not necessary for my argument. My point is limited to 
argue that typical competency assessments are not morally sufficient to tell 
us whether clinicians may respect a putatively competent patient’s refusal of 
L in a high-stakes context.
 7 Both Wreen (2004, 321) and the President’s Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983, 
121–122) endorse this commitment.
 8 Terence Ackerman (2010) recapitulates examples of putatively competent 
patients who refuse in high-stakes scenarios due to misunderstanding, denial, 
acute depression, fear, or social role (see especially 80–81). In each case, the 
patients retained their intellectual abilities but Ackerman points out, correctly, 
that such refusals should not be respected.
 9 Readers already familiar with Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) and 
Appelbaum (2007) may proceed to the next section. I say nothing new here.
 10 In re Roe, 583 N.E. 2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992).
 11 This is the case of In re Milton 505 N.E. 2d. 255 (Ohio, 1987) which is 
discussed by Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996, 357).
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 12 One may think that there is an omission here in that I do not mention desires. 
The reason for the omission is that desires alone are not the kinds of things 
that can function as normative reasons. Expressing one’s desire not to have 
L is like the detective in Warfield’s example who believes that the criminal is 
guilty, not on the basis of the evidence, but instead on a delusion, or, we may 
add, a desire that Jones is guilty because, say, the detective does not like him. 
Wishes/desires, superstitious beliefs, and delusions do not function as norma-
tive reasons for our moral judgments. If they were, the patient in Jonsen et al.’s 
example should not receive the antibiotic, period. But the whole reason why 
the case gives us pause is because there is no reason cited for the refusal, 
only an expression of his desire not to have the antibiotic. So desires are not 
the kinds of things which I am including in my notion of a competent refusal.
 13 By ‘override Rufus’s refusal’ I mean that I (as the clinician) could not morally 
justify respecting the refusal. Legally, restraining him and doing the transfu-
sion anyway might very well amount to battery instead of health care delivery. 
One point of presenting cases like Rufus is to fix our moral intuitions on a 
continuum of cases where the borders between battery and health care deliv-
ery are porous. A slight permutation of this case might suggest that it is both 
morally and legally permissible to provide the treatment that is being refused, 
as in the case of a severely anorexic patient continually refusing tube feeding 
(see Hebert & Weingarten, 1991).
 14 As to how the clinicians should administer the antibiotic given the refusal of 
an IV, one may try an oral preparation or an intramuscular injection with 
an anesthetic first, even if such modes may not be ideal from a strict clinical 
standpoint.
 15 Though it is unclear whether May’s understanding of eligibility entails that 
clinicians must follow the decision-making of a patient who retains rational 
abilities.
 16 Wreen notes that the case originated with Thomas Mappes (2006, 355) and 
Mappes’s assessment is that the past wishes take precedence.
 17 Speaking of a ‘false’ value commitment is a delicate matter. I would only 
judge a value commitment false if it is obviously not applicable in the circum-
stances. Albert’s present enjoyment of life renders the previous judgment that 
life would not have value for him false. Jane’s judgment, however, involves 
weighing values, namely, the value of putting on Ugg boots is more important 
than life itself. And we may tolerate a diversity of such weighing. Albert’s 
judgment is not a matter of weighing or ranking a seemingly unimportant 
value over one that is obviously more important. Rather, it is that his sub-
junctive judgment ‘were I to decline mentally, life would have no value for 
me’ is simply false because he has declined mentally but his life is of value. Of 
course, my answer would change if Albert were not happily senile but were 
instead belligerent and delirious.
11 Risky Research on Competent 
Adults
Justice and Autonomy
The previous two chapters addressed issues in clinical medicine. At a 
certain level of abstraction, the argument is the same: one should have 
epistemic diffidence concerning the claim that it is permissible to honor a 
patient’s refusal of certain life-sustaining interventions. This chapter aims 
to extend the basic structure of my argument to research on competent 
adult subjects. The principal reason for allowing research that involves 
more than minimal risk without expected benefit is that we should 
respect the autonomy of competent subjects. In this chapter I argue that 
we have additional moral intuitions stemming from commutative justice. 
Specifically, I argue that commutative justice serves as an additional cri-
terion for assessing permissible research. Integrating my specific goal in 
this chapter into the overall argument of this book, I aim to justify hav-
ing epistemic diffidence for the claim that ‘risky research on competent 
adults is permissible because the subjects consent to it.’
The purpose of research is to obtain knowledge, not to provide ther-
apy. Because of this, research looks like a case of using people. People may 
disagree about whether this use is immoral in itself, but everyone seems 
to agree that research on human subjects is an ethically risky activity, 
though justifiable in many cases. The ethical risks become more obvi-
ous when discussing vulnerable populations such as children. Most of us 
have the intuition that pediatric subjects should enjoy greater protection 
from wrongdoing in research than research on competent adults. Call 
this the ‘pediatric intuition.’ I argue that this intuition conflicts with the 
virtue of commutative justice and specifically with what we take to jus-
tify one agent (i.e., a researcher) exposing another agent (i.e., a subject) 
to a risk of harm. I argue that all human subjects, including competent 
adult subjects, should enjoy the same protections from wrongdoing in 
research as pediatric subjects enjoy; therefore, the latter should not enjoy 
greater protection. A key objection to my conclusion is that the pediatric 
intuition is plausible because of the ethical role informed consent plays in 
justifying risky research on competent subjects. My argument, then, is to 
circumscribe the importance of informed consent and situate it alongside 
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concerns of justice. The conclusions reached can function as a first step 
toward rebutting the important ‘anti-paternalistic’ arguments developing 
in research ethics (Miller & Wertheimer, 2007).
As ambitious as my argument sounds, its scope is limited enough so 
as to avoid obvious counterexamples. My argument has in mind stud-
ies that present more than minimal risks to competent healthy adult 
subjects, and, in some cases, competent sick adults. These studies both 
do not offer a direct benefit to the subjects and it is arguable whether 
they offer knowledge of vital importance.1 Examples of such studies are 
airway insult studies on healthy or asthmatic adults, and studies using 
transbronchial biopsy on healthy adults.
Of course, the notions of ‘benefit’ and ‘vital importance’ are degreed 
and case-specific concepts. It is plausible to suppose that any knowledge 
of disease pathophysiology where the disease in question has no known 
cure and afflicts a large population may be considered vital, but not for, 
say, a less serious and rare disease. And obviously, the knowledge gained 
has to be weighed in relation to the magnitude and probability of the 
research risks. Consequently, I do not offer the following reflections 
without acknowledging the central importance of practical wisdom in 
reviewing the ethical quality of research. Acknowledging this does not 
reduce my reflections to the jejune. Rather, I offer my arguments here as 
prima facie challenges to certain types of research, challenges which can 
be overridden; but, at the same time, the challenge I offer is novel and, I 
shall argue, important.
Another limitation on my conclusion is that some randomized con-
trolled trials (RCTs) should be judged permissible on the account I give 
of morally sufficient reasons. On my understanding, a morally sufficient 
reason for allowing harm is that, for more than minimal risk research, 
there must be a prospect of direct benefit even for research on competent 
adults. However, the requirement of a direct benefit is waived for stud-
ies that satisfy clinical equipoise. The reason is that, if clinical equipoise 
is satisfied, the researchers do not know whether or not subjects in the 
intervention arm will be exposed to risks of the drug with no compensat-
ing benefit or whether subjects in the placebo arm will be deprived of 
a beneficial new drug. My argument should be understood to focus on 
cases where there is knowledge of risk, or at least strong evidence of risk 
paired with weak evidence of benefit.
The present argument improves upon previous work which supports 
a similar conclusion (Kong, 2005) in that the present work focuses on 
the virtue of commutative justice, which is certainly relevant for mor-
ally assessing research. Commutative justice is the virtue that perfects 
the relationships between individuals. To date, criticisms of certain 
types of research have focused on specific trial designs, arguing that 
such designs evince an unreasonable risk/benefit ratio (Anderson & 
Kimmelman, 2010); or the language of justice has been used to justify 
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limiting autonomy, but the notion of justice used seems utilitarian.2 I do 
not think these approaches are wrongheaded, but they are incomplete. 
The goal of this project is to take the critique deeper. Both pediatric and 
adult subjects should enjoy the same level and kind of research protec-
tion, not by lowering the bar for pediatric subjects, but by raising it for 
competent adults. I argue for this claim by focusing on what can count 
as just interaction between persons where one agent harms the other.
Consistent with the argument in this book, concerns about justice 
impresses epistemic diffidence onto the belief that risky research on con-
senting adults is morally permissible. It may be morally permissible, but 
I argue that mere consent hardly suffices to justify it.
Children Actually Enjoy Greater Protection
The regulations governing human subject research were developed to 
ensure the ethical conduct of research both on competent adult subjects 
and on vulnerable3 populations, e.g., pregnant women/fetuses, prison-
ers, and children.4 These vulnerable populations enjoy further protection 
(i.e., subparts B, C, and D respectively) in that such subjects are or may 
be compromised with respect to their capacity to give informed consent.5 
Richard Behrman notes, “because of the inherent vulnerabilities arising 
from their immaturity, infants, children, and adolescents need additional 
protections beyond what is provided to competent adults when they 
participate in research” (Field & Behrman, 2004, xiii). The traditional 
reason given for these extra protections is that competent subjects can 
judge whether the risks are worth taking, but non-competent subjects 
cannot. Therefore, the justification for exposing non-competent subjects 
to risks focuses on whether there is a compensating benefit.6 On the tra-
ditional account, informed consent can turn an otherwise immoral act 
into one that is permissible.7 So, too, a compensating benefit can turn an 
otherwise immoral act (of exposing a child to significant risks) into one 
that is permissible.
This line of thinking is reflected in the DHHS regulations, subpart D. 
The regulations give us a matrix of risk/benefit categories. If the research 
is permissible, it must fall into one of four categories. The first category 
of approvable research for children (and adults) is research presenting 
no more than minimal risk to the child. Since the ethical protections 
are the same between adults and children here, discussion of it is not 
needed for my ultimate conclusion (which is that both adults and chil-
dren should enjoy the same level of moral protection).8 Even if serious 
harms were to occur in minimal risk studies, the harms would be unex-
pected and a commutatively just researcher (discussed below) cannot be 
held culpable for what is entirely improbable or atypical given current 
medical knowledge. The next category, however, is the chief focus of 
this chapter because most risky research on children is approved via 
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this category. Research that exposes subjects to greater than minimal 
risks is permissible if the interventions hold out a prospect of direct 
benefit. The following quotation is from section 405 of 45 CFR Part 46,
HHS will conduct or fund research in which the IRB finds that more 
than minimal risk to children is presented by an intervention or pro-
cedure that holds out the prospect of direct benefit for the individual 
subject, or by a monitoring procedure that is likely to contribute to 
the subject’s well-being, only if the IRB finds that:
(a) The risk is justified by the anticipated benefit to the subjects;
(b) The relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk is at least as 
favorable to the subjects as that presented by available alterna-
tive approaches; and
(c) Adequate provisions are made for soliciting the assent of the 
children and permission of their parents or guardians, as set 
forth in §46.408.
(US Code of Federal Regulations, 2009)
Now consider the following quotation from section 111 of 45 CFR Part 
46, which outlines criteria adult research must satisfy:
(a) In order to approve research covered by this policy the IRB shall 
determine that all of the following requirements are satisfied:9
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated ben-
efits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge 
that may reasonably be expected to result. In evaluating risks 
and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and ben-
efits that may result from the research (as distinguished from 
risks and benefits of therapies subjects would receive even if not 
participating in the research).
(US Code of Federal Regulations, 2009)
The key concepts governing pediatric research are “direct benefit,” 
“anticipated benefit,” and a risk/benefit ratio that is “favorable” in rela-
tion to alternatives. Furthermore, the risks must be “justified by” the 
anticipated benefits. Concepts governing adult research do not explic-
itly mention “direct benefit,” but section 111 includes the requirement 
that the risks must be “reasonable” in relation to the anticipated ben-
efits. In the next section I address what is meant by direct benefit since 
that concept marks a key difference between 46.405 (children) and 
46.111 (adults). My aim is to argue that the fundamental reasons sup-
porting a direct-benefit requirement inform all research that is more 
than minimal risk.
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Children Should Not Enjoy Greater Protection: Direct 
Benefit and Theodicy
A research project does not satisfy the contours of category 405 until 
it presents more than minimal risk and a prospect of direct benefit. 
Following closely here Nancy King (2000) and Field and Behrman 
(2004), I take the term ‘direct’ to be a causal notion and ‘benefit’ as 
referring to specific types of benefits, not the degree of magnitude for the 
benefit in question. A direct benefit is a benefit “arising from receiving 
the intervention being studied” (King, 2000, 333). Typically, this benefit 
will be related to the overall health of the subject in question. Suppose 
that the risks of the intervention are the toxic effects of the test drug. If 
the benefits are caused by the very intervention, i.e., administering the 
drug, they are of the same sort as the risks – they improve the health of 
the subject such as, for example, reduction in tumor size. Likewise, pain 
from a biopsy can be justified by improved liver function. In general, 
where the risks are to one’s health (mental or physical) a direct benefit 
must be to one’s health as well. This does not mean that for each risk 
there must be a distinct offsetting benefit; rather, cumulative risks can be 
offset by cumulative benefits (Weijer & Miller, 2004).
Considering ‘direct benefit’ as a causal notion is not only conceptually 
sensible –that is what we typically understand by ‘direct’ – it satisfies 
important ethical criteria as well. Those working in research ethics 
typically eschew the idea of ‘extra’ benefits compensating for risks of 
harm due to the research intervention. Supporting this point Friedman, 
Robbins, and Wendler (2010, 3) quote the Kenyan guidelines on the ethi-
cal conduct of research,
Extraneous benefits such as payment, or adjunctive medical services, 
such as the possibility of receiving a hepatitis vaccine not related to 
the research, cannot be considered in delineating the benefits com-
pared with the risks, otherwise simply increasing payment or adding 
more unrelated services could make the benefits outweigh even the 
riskiest research.10
In order to count as a justifying benefit, the intervention being tested 
must cause it.
We can glean from this analysis of direct benefit an underlying moral 
intuition according to which subjecting someone (who cannot consent) 
to risks of harm can be justified only if there is a (likely) compensating 
benefiting. What I wish to argue for now is that this intuition remains 
even when we negate the parenthetical ‘who cannot consent.’ I focus on 
how an agent exuding the virtue of commutative justice would behave 
when she causes or allows harm to another. Arguing for why commu-
tative justice is important in the setting of strong intuitions that favor 
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autonomy requires highlighting a different set of moral intuitions that I 
think we hold just as strongly. These other intuitions are displayed most 
clearly in discussions on the problem of evil.
A caveat before continuing: I offer these reflections on theodicy to be 
read in one of two ways corresponding to two different moral epistemol-
ogies. Read the first way, my aim is simply to highlight our intuitions on 
what counts as just treatment of another. This does not require an analogi-
cal argument. My strategy is similar to how Gettier-type counterexamples 
function in epistemology (Gettier, 1963). Gettier-type counterexamples 
are thought experiments that aim to highlight our intuitions on what 
counts (or does not count) as knowledge. They function solely as intui-
tion highlighters. Similarly, the present excursion into theodicy is offered 
as an intuition highlighter on what counts as just treatment of another in 
settings where one agent causes/allows suffering on another.
A second way to read my reference to theodicy is through the lens 
of moral exemplar or ideal observer (IO) epistemologies. The basic 
approach for such epistemologies is to envision a moral exemplar and 
test a norm or action against what we would expect the exemplar to do. 
Linda Zagzebski explains,
The reason that moral judgments can be defined by the responses of 
an IO is that we see when exposed to an IO that those are the judg-
ments that we ultimately would make ourselves if we assumed the 
standpoint at which we are implicitly aiming. The features that make 
a being an IO are therefore the features that make him a judge who 
judges in such a way that those who experience his judgment want to 
assume his point of view.
(Zagzebski, 2004, 353)
The moral exemplar in the theodicy case is, of course, God, or our idea 
of how God (as defined by classical monotheism) would behave toward 
others. And the key aspects of the IO I wish to draw attention to are the 
benevolent dispositions and motivations the IO would have towards oth-
ers for whom the exemplar allows suffering. Read in this way, reflection 
on theodicy can paint a partial but informative picture of what the virtue 
of commutative justice looks like.
Now we can turn to my intuition highlighter. The problem of evil arises 
when we recognize that the existence of an omni-benevolent, omnipo-
tent, and omniscient God is in tension with what appear to be gratuitous 
evils. If God is all-powerful, God could prevent evils, and being all- 
loving, God would want to prevent all evils – unless such evils are necessary 
for a greater good. Gratuitous evils are evils for which there is no greater 
good that could justify God in allowing them. Solutions (and replies to 
solutions) abound. A principal issue in this debate is whether there really 
are gratuitous evils and how would we know that they are gratuitous.
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It is not my task to adjudicate this principal issue, but rather to note 
the assumptions on which both theist and atheist alike agree. Most par-
ties agree that a morally sufficient reason for allowing suffering is that 
there is (i) outweighing compensation (sometimes called a greater good), 
(ii) to the sufferer.11 The second restriction is pertinent for my purposes in 
that a just God would not use someone for the greater good of another. If 
the sufferer is suffering desolation or loneliness, for example, the greater 
good might be to bring about in the sufferer a greater sense of com-
munion with others or with God. Furthermore, we should understand 
the benefit to the sufferer to be more than merely making up for one’s 
suffering but it must also provide a reason for it. In connection with the 
Kenyan guidelines quoted above, financial compensation, for example, 
does not justify the exposure to harms caused by the test article even if it 
might make up for it.
The thought experiment on theodicy has us ask the question: ‘what 
would a wholly-just being’s relationship to suffering look like?’ A justify-
ing reason for allowing suffering must meet strict criteria. Weaken the 
criteria and the problem of evil evaporates. An exemplar of justice would 
not expose someone to suffering to benefit others.
Consequently, what justifies a virtuous agent in causing or allowing 
another to suffer must involve a compensating benefit that accrues to the 
sufferer and is a function of the suffering itself. An exemplar of commu-
tative justice would not use persons for the good of others without any 
compensating benefit to the sufferer. If this is correct, we can understand 
why justifying the risks in relation to the benefits is an independent ethical 
criterion governing the permissibility of any research project (Emanuel, 
Wendler, & Grady, 2000). Even if subjects give informed consent to a 
study that does not meet a direct-benefit requirement, the study remains 
impermissible. This is important in regard to my thesis that the regula-
tions governing pediatric research should not afford greater protection 
than what ought to be afforded competent adults. My point so far is that 
a moral exemplar would not cause or allow suffering in another without 
a compensating benefit to the sufferer. This is what an agent with com-
mutative justice would do, and since commutative justice is the virtue 
that perfects relations between two or more persons, these reflections 
apply to the researcher’s actions on human subjects. Risky research with 
no prospect of a direct benefit is prima facie unjust.
Objections
The previous section outlined my core argument for why adult subjects 
should receive moral protection equivalent to that which pediatric sub-
jects enjoy. This section takes on several objections to this argument, chief 
of which is that adult subjects can consent. A second objection is that 
my argument would require radical changes in how research is actually 
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practiced. A third objection considers discrete cases where my argument 
would appear to deliver the wrong judgment. Finally, I address a techni-
cal difference between 46.405 and 46.111 which putatively undermines 
my argument. I take these in turn.
Consent
My conclusion entails, roughly, that even for adult research, a prospect 
of direct benefit is required in the setting of risky research. The critic may 
note that consent turns otherwise immoral actions into moral ones: it 
“turns a rape into love-making, a kidnapping into a Sunday drive, a bat-
tery into a football tackle, a theft into a gift, and a trespass into a dinner 
party” (Hurd, 2005, 504).
I agree with Hurd and others (Dempsey, 2012) that consent does 
something to one half of an action dyad – making one action permis-
sible and the other not. But there are other cases in the neighborhood 
which complicate matters. These latter cases include prostitution, dwarf 
throwing, voluntary slavery, and the actual and rather macabre case of 
Armin Meiwes. Meiwes posted an advert on an internet site devoted 
to cannibalism saying, “[S]eeking well-built man, 18–30 years old, for 
slaughter” (Finn, 2003). Bernd Juergen Brandes accepted the invita-
tion and, after several email exchanges, Brandes visited Meiwes’s home 
where the consensual killing took place. Initially Meiwes was convicted 
of manslaughter and not murder because, his defense argued, the victim 
consented. Germany’s highest court eventually charged him with murder 
and sentenced Meiwes to life.12 For some cases, then, even if the recipient 
of harm consents (hereafter, the inflicted), the action by the agent of the 
harm (the inflicter) is left without justification. I shall argue that the dif-
ference consent makes in Hurd’s cases and the irrelevance of consent in 
the cases just enumerated is not a function of the degree of harm, but is 
a categorical difference.
The cases Hurd mentions have a common feature vis-à-vis consent. 
For each dyad (e.g., theft vs borrowing), consent is part of the definition 
of the action dyad.13 Theft is taking another’s property without the own-
er’s permission; borrowing is taking another’s property with the owner’s 
permission. ‘Love-making’ is sexual intercourse with the other’s consent; 
rape is sexual intercourse without the other’s consent. Consent functions 
as an essential feature that identifies the action-types in question. But 
there are other action-types that can be specified without reference to 
consent. The Meiwes case suggests that murder is one of them; maiming, 
torture, enslavement, and possibly bullying are other examples. One may 
consent to being bullied but the act of bullying remains wrong – even 
when the consent is altruistic, for example, the inflicted is distracting 
the bully away from one’s younger sibling. These reflections suggest that 
there are two classes of action in relation to consent. There are actions for 
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which consent changes the action-type, as, for example, taking another’s 
property is theft without consent and is borrowing when done with con-
sent. And there are actions for which consent does not function to specify 
or define the action-type in question. Under this second category there 
is a further subset for which consent does not justify harmful actions. 
Hurd’s cases are ones where consent does not perform the function of 
justifying the action in question, but changes the action-type because of 
the specifying or defining role it plays.
To bring out the distinction between consent’s role in specifying 
action-types and its irrelevance in justifying action-types, consider first 
a logical point. Victor Tadros provides numerous and welcome insights 
on the relationship between consent of the inflicted and the inflicter’s 
actions. But on at least one point he slips, though in an instructive and 
not uncommon way. He notes at one point that “It is often wrong to 
harm a person as a means to the greater good without that person’s 
consent. If the person consents, however, it is permissible to harm the 
person as a means to the greater good” (Tadros, 2011, 30). Suppose A 
performs a harmful action H on S, and that H being performed on S is 
a means to a greater good. Tadros appears committed to making the 
following inference:
(P) If S does not consent to H, then H is not permissible.
And,
(Q) If S consents to H, then H is permissible.
Clearly, however, if we deny the antecedent in (P), we cannot derive 
that H is not permissible – that would involve the fallacy of denying 
the antecedent.
Tadros offers us an enthymeme linking (P) with (Q) according to 
which performing H on S (in the case of consent) “shows respect for 
her end-setting capacities, and hence we do not treat her as an object” 
(Tadros, 2011, 30). But there seem to be numerous ways in which S 
can be wronged in addition to being used as an object, and respect for 
someone’s end-setting capacities would at most obviate only the wrong 
of treating the person merely as an object. But even this reply grants 
too much. S’s consent does not entail that A must no longer view S as 
an object. S’s consent has no apparent causal link with how A sees S; 
it does not entail that A must now respect her end-setting capacities. 
On a related point, S’s consent fails to change the action-type of A’s 
action H. H could still be an action of the type using S as a means; it 
is certainly logically possible that S consents to being used or to being 
harmed by another. S’s consent alone neither specifies nor justifies A’s 
action H.
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A similar inference should be resisted when discussing the relevance of 
consent in research. Consider a research study that presents more than 
minimal risks to subjects without a prospect of direct benefit. Label the 
action-type of performing this study R~DB. One cannot infer from,
(Ped):  If R~DB is done on incompetent subjects (who cannot consent 
to it), then R~DB is not permissible.
To,
(Comp):  If R~DB is done on competent subjects (who do consent to it), 
then R~DB is permissible.
This inference, as well, is an instance of the fallacy of denying the 
antecedent.
But what we find plausible in this inference is instructive. The plausi-
bility stems from conflating consent’s specifying role in defining certain 
action-types, Hurd provides a nice list of examples, and consent’s puta-
tive justifying role in justifying another agent’s action. Consider again 
the criteria for a successful theodicy. Even if a sufferer S consents to 
God using her for the good of another, the action of using S still requires 
justification. Neither goods in the afterlife nor goods to the ultimate ben-
efactor justify God using S. The theodicy thought experiment brings into 
relief the distinction between justifying an agent’s act of using S and S’s 
consent to being used; consent to H does not morally justify H itself.
One may object noting that, for example, borrowing is justified but 
theft is not, and the only difference between them is consent. Consent, 
therefore, justifies borrowing. I agree that consent may play a justifying 
role when it serves to specify certain action-types. The two roles need 
not be mutually exhaustive. But granting this does not affect my argu-
ment since research is not specified by consent. If consent is not part of 
the definiens for research activities, it cannot define otherwise immoral 
research actions into moral ones. Even so, it is doubtful that consent 
justifies an action even when consent specifies it. To justify an action 
requires reference to the goods to which the action is ordered. An own-
er’s consent in borrowing does not justify that act when one borrows a 
weapon to be used on an innocent person. Conversely, borrowing money 
to support one’s starving children is justified by reference to the goods at 
stake. What justifies (or fails to justify) the act of borrowing in both cases 
makes essential reference to the goods or evils the act is ordered to, not 
to consent of the owner.
But suppose what Tadros and others mean to say is not that there 
is an inference from (Ped) to (Comp), but that (Comp) is plausible on 
its own – consent is sufficient justification. I think our moral intuitions 
go in the other direction. The principle criterion on what counts as a 
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morally sufficient reason for allowing evil is compensation to the suf-
ferer, getting informed consent is an additional requirement. Stump 
notes, “Undeserved suffering which is uncompensated seems clearly 
unjust; but so does suffering compensated only by benefits to someone 
other than the sufferer” (Stump, 1996, 66). She then gives the example 
of the US military’s LSD experiments on soldiers. Assuming this study 
was well-designed and promised to deliver knowledge worth having, 
we still think that it was a violation of justice. Part of an explana-
tion for this injustice is “a consequence of the fact that the end aimed 
at did not directly or primarily benefit those who suffered to achieve 
it” (Stump, 1996, 66). It is important to note that this explanation 
functions as an independent reason for the injustice. Assume that the 
soldiers voluntarily consent to high doses of LSD, and you still have a 
reason for thinking that the study is unjust; the benefits, if any, do not 
accrue to those suffering the harms.
The idea that consent cannot provide a sufficient reason for the per-
missibility of a study can be shown by another (modified) example of 
Stump’s (1986). Consider a large chemical corporation that aims to test 
a new technology for cleaning up toxic chemical spills. It plans to spill 
chemicals into a particularly poor part of India and then release their 
‘clean-up chemical.’ Subsequently, they follow-up with residents of the 
area testing for toxic effects secondary to consuming the drinking water. 
They promise to compensate every injured resident 1,000USD (a small 
fortune for such residents); in return the residents indemnify the com-
pany against any future compensation. The townspeople consent to the 
spill considering the money as sufficient compensation. It appears that 
here, too, an injustice would be committed against the residents, even in 
the setting of consent and in spite of what they view as sufficient com-
pensation. Uncompensated harm (the proffered 1,000USD is not directly 
linked to the harm accrued) stands by itself as a reason against the study. 
If consent procedures were adequate and ensured understanding, the study 
would meet that ethical requirement; but it would fail the requirement 
not to cause uncompensated suffering or harm.
Could consent function as a form of permission to do to the sub-
ject what would otherwise be impermissible? One could appeal to Neil 
Manson and Onora O’Neill’s understanding of consent as a waiver of 
rights, according to which,
Informed consent transactions are typically used to waive important 
ethical, legal and other requirements in limited ways in particular 
contexts. . . . In consenting we waive certain requirements on others 
not to treat us in certain ways . . . or we set aside certain expecta-
tions, or license action that would otherwise be ethically or legally 
unacceptable.
(2007, 72)
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In the research context, it is often the case that researchers do things to 
subjects that expose them to serious risks of injury, harm, or even death. 
Manson and O’Neill wish to say that informed consent functions as a 
waiver – it is meant to license action on oneself or to say ‘okay’ to the 
researcher allowing her to do something that would be immoral without 
such consent.
I think this is a very plausible understanding of informed consent and 
how it is meant to function in the research context. I do not think it effec-
tively obviates the concerns I am raising. The first point to note is that not 
all waivers are created equal. Manson and O’Neill recognize that the con-
sent of a subject in the grips of suicidal ideation is not a legitimate waiver, 
neither is consent to torture, serious bodily harm, or being eaten! If con-
sent motivated by suicidality destroys it as a legitimate waiver, not all acts 
of consent can function as legitimate waivers. To function as a legitimate 
waiver, the consent must be well-motivated; there must be good reasons 
for consenting to the research activity with its attendant risks.
Suppose there are good reasons for giving consent, such as altruism or 
self-sacrifice for others who are sick. Do we now have sufficient ethical 
justification for risky research? I think we could have such a justifica-
tion, but the typical preoccupation with autonomy stops the argument at 
just this point where more justification is needed. Altruism may render 
the subject’s action laudable, but that says little about the researcher’s 
actions. Consider again the idea that suffering must be compensated by 
benefits accruing to the sufferer and that these benefits cannot merely 
make up for the suffering. Rather, compensating benefits must function 
as morally sufficient reasons for the suffering.
What these reflections mean for the actions of the researcher are as 
follows. Consider a high-risk study. Such risks require some form of com-
pensation; such compensation must refer to a reason for exposing the 
subjects to such risks, and not merely to things that may ‘make up for’ the 
suffering.14 What could count as a reason for permitting the study makes 
reference to its net benefit/burden ratio, namely, whether the risks ‘are 
reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.’ If a justifying reason 
for the study cannot be articulated with reference to the benefit/burden 
ratio, then no amount of monetary compensation or consent waiver can 
justify it. These latter would, at best, merely ‘make up for’ the suffering 
inflicted, but do not advert us to a justifying reason for the study.
How do altruistic motives fit within this reasoning? Consider the follow-
ing two cases involving consent to something risky out of altruistic motives.
1 A spectator to a dangerous plane crash in the Potomac River dives 
into icy water to save a child.
2 A military commander consults with a subordinate about a mission 
because it is a particularly dangerous mission promising little by way 
of advancing the country’s military objectives. The subordinate is 
eager to engage in the mission out of love for his country.
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The research setting is more like 2 than 1. Case 1 is clearly a case where 
altruistic motivations are present in the setting of high risks, but noth-
ing is morally problematic about it. It counts as a paradigm example of 
the supererogatory. Case 2, however, is more like the kind of research 
I am questioning in that it involves someone (the military commander) 
doing something dangerous to someone else (sending the soldier on a 
dangerous mission), and this someone else consents. Furthermore, the 
feature in Case 2 that the mission promises little in terms of military 
objectives is analogous to research that lacks a compensating benefit 
or does not promise knowledge of vital importance.15 Research that 
involves these features is immoral on my account. Intuitions may vary, 
but the actions of the military commander in Case 2 seem at best mor-
ally questionable, at worse, immoral. And this is partly a function of 
the risks and benefits of the mission. The soldier’s laudable motivation 
(assume a just war) does not itself justify the commander sending him 
on said mission. This is partly why the focus on autonomy is limited; 
it fails to morally assess the actions of the researcher when assessing 
research protocols.
What ethical role does a well-motivated waiver play then? It permits 
involvement of a subject in a study that has already been judged reasona-
ble – a morally sufficient reason is given for the risks. ‘Justifying’ the risks 
on the basis of subjects consenting to them simply is not a justification 
for the risks. A subject’s waiver permits doing to him what the (already 
ethically permissible) study involves doing.
The root of my skepticism that consent can function as a justifier is 
that consent is a mental state – e.g., I agree to x. Typical justifiers for 
moral actions, however, refer to goods (such as health and friendship) 
or the satisfaction of desire – though goods are more fundamental as 
desires can be good or evil. Mental states are not even the right kinds 
of things that can function as a justifier for a moral action. Mental 
states, such as an agent’s intentions, can specify or define a moral 
action (Chapter 8). But mental states appear inert as a justifier for an 
action – especially someone else’s action. At the very least, proponents 
of an autonomy approach need to explain the vinculum between the 
inflicted’s mental state of consent and justification for the inflicter’s 
action of harm.
Before leaving this section, I wish to acuminate my approach to con-
sent even further to avoid the charge of being overly strict. Hans Jonas’s 
famous commentary on research (Jonas, 1969, 236) notes that the only 
way to right the wrong of doing research on human subjects is to require, 
not just consent, but “devotion.” The subject must will the same thing as 
the researcher in order to grant morally valid consent. Many commenta-
tors think that Jonas’s standard of consent is too strict, and I concur. 
In this respect my argument does not entail overly strict criteria on consent 
since my argument does not address such standards at all. My argument 
attempts to answer a different set of questions: is the research permissible 
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per se? Is the subject consenting to be treated in morally permissible ways? 
The previous and present sections motivate why these questions are inde-
pendent of any criteria-for-valid-consent questions.
Changes in Actual Practice
So, even in the ideal scenario, where the subjects are able to give informed 
consent and researchers intend knowledge that is important for disease 
management, the justification for the study may still be undermined. The 
goal of important knowledge is not sufficient, as indicated above with the 
examples of the LSD experiments and the exploitation of the Indian vil-
lage. The waivers the subjects give are not themselves morally sufficient 
reasons for performing particularly harmful activities on them even for 
the potential good of others.
But would not adoption of the argument so far require wholesale 
changes in the way research is actually done? And would not those changes 
involve a potential loss of effective therapies thereby placing a burden of 
proof on my argument that it cannot meet? The first question assumes 
that actual practice is the default position and changes in it require strong 
argument. But actual practice is obviously not morally normative and there 
are numerous critiques of it that are almost universally accepted. There 
is, for example, the widely studied ‘therapeutic misconception,’ which is 
fairly ubiquitous, especially for subjects who have relatively intractable 
diseases (Appelbaum et al., 1987). Subjects (especially healthy ones) are 
often motivated primarily by the compensation associated with the study, 
not altruism (Almeida et al., 2007). Waivers motivated by compensation 
are morally inert since greater compensation does not itself render the 
research risks ‘reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.’
Consider a particularly risky study without payment.16 If Almeida et al. 
(2007) are correct, very few people would enter the study.17 That few 
would consent to such research is a backhanded indicator of where the 
research stands from a rational choice18 perspective. Since the study’s 
risks and benefits which the IRB must weigh preclude considering ben-
efits in the form of payments,19 the risk/benefit ratio of the study is what 
provides the chief ethical justification for it. But if it is inconsistent with 
rational choice to enter the study sans payment, then the study itself pre-
sents risks that are not ‘reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.’ 
Therefore, the study would fail 46.111(a) (2).
Another aspect of actual practice that is morally questionable is the 
ambiguity regarding ‘benefit.’ Audrey Chapman observes that the term 
benefit can refer to widely disparate effects, not all of which either justify 
the study or are even promised by the study:
Potential benefit to an individual subject is usually conceptualized 
in the form of an improvement in health status derived from the 
agent being tested, but often there is disagreement as to what kinds 
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of milestones constitute a therapeutic benefit. For oncology patients, 
for example, does an improvement in the quality of life qualify or 
does benefit require a clinically relevant shrinkage in the size of the 
tumor, a remission, or an extension in life expectancy?
(2011, 3)
Actual practice does not disambiguate these different benefits, only some 
of which may function as justifiers in light of the risks.
Lastly, there are the likely motivations behind the research which fail 
to justify the study. Motivations range from curiosity to market com-
petitiveness – e.g., a pharmaceutical company trying to develop a me-too 
drug (Garattini & Bertele, 2007; Gagne & Choudhry, 2011). In this 
regard, Kong observes the following plausible motivations behind some 
research,
Research is also the pursuit of knowledge for personal curiosity, 
career advancement, and prestige. . . . [M]edical research is a com-
mercial activity, the aim of which is to create new markets, maximise 
profits, and satisfy shareholders.
(Kong, 2005, 206)
These reflections suggest that actual practice should not be considered 
normative and changes in it may be welcome.
If my argument is acted upon, would that mean a loss of potentially 
effective therapies? My short answer is no (see Light, Lexchin, & Darrow, 
2013). My ultimate conclusion is that pediatric subjects should not enjoy 
greater moral protection from research harm than adults, not by lower-
ing the moral bar for children, but by raising it for adults. Adults should 
enjoy the same protections as pediatric subjects currently enjoy, i.e., the 
protections outlined in subpart D. To date, few have argued20 that the 
ethical principles governing subpart D are overly restrictive, thereby pre-
venting potentially important therapies from being tested on children. I 
see no reason why such an objection would apply to adults if the same 
ethical principles are common to each.
A clarification is in order to avoid overstating my case. Some stud-
ies on adults do not offer a direct benefit, but they are well-designed 
and promise knowledge of vital importance. Such studies are not ruled 
out by my argument. Current principles governing pediatric research 
recognize that “knowledge of vital importance” can justify more than 
minimal-risk/without-direct-benefit research (see subpart D category 
406). Pediatric subjects enjoy a risk cut-off: the risk cannot be more than 
a minor increase over minimal. But conditions outlined in 46.406 reflect 
the basic ethical commitment that risks must be justified by the value of 
knowledge promised, once direct benefit drops out as a possible justifier, 
there is only so much risk that we may tolerate in the context of no direct 
benefit. There is no reason to suppose that these ethical commitments 
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should not apply equally to adults, much less is there reason to suppose 
that a prudential application of these commitments would block impor-
tant medical advances. Such advances often occur in pediatric research.
Conversely, there are some adult studies that involve more than min-
imal risk and do not offer knowledge of vital importance (e.g., some 
airway toxicity studies). We know enough about the adverse effects of 
air pollution on the lungs (for both sick and healthy persons) that fur-
ther studies are superfluous. Enough knowledge is had to inform public 
policy and encourage individual responsibility in relation to decreasing 
pollution.
A case-by-case analysis may be the only way to answer fully whether 
my argument entails cutting off important medical advances, but the two 
considerations just offered suggest that either the study in question would 
meet the ethical principles informing pediatric research or, if it does not, 
it is not an obviously permissible study and, therefore, cannot be used as 
a counterexample to my argument.
Case-Specific Objections – The Marshall 
Case and Living Donation
A few years ago, a researcher named Barry Marshall drank a solution of 
bacteria which formed an ulcer in five days. He then ingested an antibi-
otic proving that ulcers are caused by bacteria and, therefore, respond to 
antibiotics. He won a Nobel Prize for his discovery (Marshall, 2005).21 
The case has two features that are morally relevant to challenge my 
arguments above and one feature that is not, but can easily be changed. 
The essential features of the case involved inoculating the subject (the 
researcher himself) with a disease for which he was previously naïve. He 
then experimented with a possible treatment (i.e., antibiotics). Deliberate 
inoculation of a potentially serious disease on a subject is obviously a case 
of exposing someone to more than minimal risk. Furthermore, the ben-
efit of resolving the disease through the experimental treatment does not 
compensate for the initial inoculation. Although I find myself thinking 
that what Marshall did to himself was permissible, my arguments above 
would seem to rule differently. The one easy change to the case involves 
supposing that, instead of using himself, Marshall enrolls another person 
who understands completely the science of what he is doing, is motivated 
to advance science, and voluntarily consents to the risks. And, just as 
in the actual case, the ulcers respond to antibiotics. What can be wrong 
with this?
I must admit that I have no reply that would be convincing to some-
one with strong consequentialist intuitions. Part of the reason why we 
think either case is permissible is due to how things actually occurred: the 
disease responded to treatment, it did not debilitate the subject, and 
the experiment delivered knowledge that was universally recognized as 
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vitally important for medicine. We should be cautious, however, in trusting 
our intuitions on cases where the outcomes are grand. Max Bazerman 
and Ann Tenbrunsel (2011) have presented evidence that our ethical 
judgments succumb to an outcome bias. They presented subjects with 
two sets of actions. In one set, a pharmaceutical researcher does some-
thing immoral (e.g., makes up data points); the drug goes to market 
and benefits many. In another set, a researcher does not do anything 
immoral, but breaches the protocol in a minor way. The drug goes to 
market and has to be withdrawn due to risks and serious adverse events. 
Subjects judged the second researcher’s actions more reprehensible than 
the first, but Bazerman and Tenbrunsel note correctly, in my opinion, 
that the actions of the first researcher are much worse than the actions 
of the second. Their research is directly relevant to our moral assess-
ment of the Marshall case. We should be cautious of our intuitions on 
the Marshall case given Bazerman and Tenbrunsel’s research that our 
intuitions can latch on to arguably morally irrelevant features – the good 
consequences that happen to follow.
I think that is precisely what is occurring when we consider the Barry 
Marshall case, whose success obfuscates some morally pertinent details. 
Suppose that your best friend is a very ambitious scientific researcher 
working at the dawn of cancer research. He proposes to ingest live cancer 
cells of a very dangerous cancer but also to ingest a radioactive isotope on 
the theoretical possibility that the isotope will kill the cancer cells. Would 
you, being his best friend, encourage him on this dangerous endeavor or 
would you recommend that he not do this? Viewing the Marshall case 
through the lens of friendship draws our moral attention to other moral 
goods at stake. Absent any knowledge of what cancer cells and isotopes 
can do in vivo, I would recommend that my friend engage in less risky 
endeavors. Clearly, my researcher friend should not administer cells and 
isotopes to others.22 And the latter intuition comports well with the overall 
argument in this chapter.
Live kidney donation has been used as a moral analog to risky research 
(Miller & Joffe, 2009). Live kidney donation exposes the donor to sig-
nificant risks with no compensating medical benefit. Not only do we 
consider such acts permissible, they are laudatory in most every circum-
stance. But, if this is so, my argument that there must be a compensating 
benefit to any risk (with both being of the same type) suffers from a clear 
counterexample.
Two points can be made in reply. First, there is a relevant disanalogy. 
The causal connection between risk to donor and benefit to recipient is 
not duplicated in the research context, and this disanalogy is morally rel-
evant. It is not duplicated in the research context because research aims 
for knowledge, not therapy. It is not, therefore, intrinsically ordered to 
benefit others. Research that benefits others means that the experimental 
drug, device, or surgical procedure worked, and, therefore, benefited the 
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subjects as well. It is hard to find in the research context a pure example 
of a high-risk study with no prospect of direct benefit to subjects and, at 
the same time, a high promise of benefit to others. Since this is the case 
in donation, the risk/benefit schema in donation is not duplicated in the 
kind of research I wish to challenge here.
Is this a morally relevant difference? Viewed from one perspective, it 
is obviously so. The risk/benefit schema in donation guarantees benefit 
to the recipient, and the risks to the donor are part of a causal chain 
leading to such benefits. The risks to the donor are necessary and jointly 
sufficient – along with graft placement – for benefiting the recipient. 
Part of why we think donation laudable is that there are few intervening 
steps between the self-sacrifice of the donor and benefit to the recipi-
ent. Imagine intervening steps that reduce the probability of benefiting 
the recipient – the recipient has, for example, several comorbidities that 
are life-threatening as well. Even if we still think that donation in such 
circumstances is permissible, we would certainly need additional infor-
mation to make the case; it is prima facie impermissible. The only change 
in this case from the typical high-benefit case is the reduced likelihood of 
benefit. So, the causal connection between risk to donor and benefit to 
recipient is a morally relevant one; and this connection is absent in the 
research I wish to challenge.
Even if it can be argued that donation and risky research do not differ 
in morally relevant respects, it is not obvious that we should still hold 
that donation is permissible. Our intuitions on the permissibility of dona-
tion are not unrevisable. Carl Elliot (1995) makes a case along this line 
by focusing, not on the actions of the donor, but on the recipient and the 
one doing the extraction.
To get at what is troubling about a person who knowingly and will-
ingly consents to a harmful medical procedure, it is necessary to 
look not simply at the person making the decision to participate, 
but beyond him to the other people involved in and affected by the 
exchange.
(Elliot, 1995, 93)
It is easy to admire someone’s self-sacrifice for others, but at the same 
time we should not honor the person who takes advantage of that self-
sacrifice. Elliot notes, “while we admire the person who undergoes harm 
to himself for the sake of another, we do not necessarily admire the 
person who inflicts harm on one person for the sake of another” (Elliot, 
1995, 95). And these reflections apply equally to donation or research. 
Although morally important analogs may exist between donation and 
research, we should not assume organ transplantation involves permis-
sible actions by everyone involved; and the same assessment applies 
to research.
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Conclusion
To summarize the argument, certain kinds of research on adults involve 
a researcher knowingly inflicting harm on subjects. A plausible principle 
of just treatment of another says that, if A knowingly inflicts harm on B, 
A must compensate B. And A compensates B only if A has a morally suf-
ficient reason for inflicting harm. Exploiting an analogy with theodicy, 
our intuitions on what counts as a morally sufficient reason for inflicting 
harm on someone must involve a compensating benefit to the one who is 
harmed. Since our moral intuitions in the theodicy case apply to any just 
agent for which the agent causes/allows suffering on another, our intui-
tions ground an ethical requirement governing risky research on human 
subjects, i.e., there must be something like a prospect of direct benefit 
in the setting of more than minimal risk. The principal challenge to this 
conclusion focuses on the ethical role of consent. I argued that consent 
itself cannot justify a risky study – it is a categorical error to suppose 
that a subject’s consent can justify an action by a researcher who does 
not have a morally sufficient reason for causing/allowing harm in the first 
place. Thinking that it would justify suffers peer disagreement, and the 
justification canvassed above is not sufficient to offset the cost in violating 
commutative justice.
Notes
 1 For a good description of “vital importance” see Field and Behrman (2004, 134).
 2 Kong (2005, 206) notes the following, “Medical research is a social activity 
whose principle justification is medical progress for which the assumed ben-
eficiary is society.”
 3 Vulnerable populations are ones for whom informed consent is severely 
compromised through developmental immaturity (fetus, children), degen-
erative disease (mentally disabled/Alzheimer’s), or through environmental 
factors which may be coercive (prisoners and the economically/educationally 
disadvantaged).
 4 A new subpart and/or Guidance document is being considered for adult 
subjects who do not have decision-making capacity. In this category would 
be advanced Alzheimer’s patients, or the mentally disabled/mentally ill. See 
SACHRP (2008–2009).
 5 There are, however, other sources of vulnerability; see Coleman (2009, 15ff.).
 6 The Belmont Report, for example, states, “The principle of respect for per-
sons thus divides into two separate moral requirements: the requirement to 
acknowledge autonomy and the requirement to protect those with diminished 
autonomy” (emphasis mine). Reprinted in Bankert and Amdur (2006, 482).
 7 Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill (2007, 72ff) note that a subject’s consent 
has the effect of waiving her rights not to be harmed or experimented upon. 
For a related though more radical account, see Hurd (1996).
 8 There are, however, problems with the concept of ‘minimal risk.’ According 
to Wendler et al. (2005), IRBs are too strict in their interpretation of mini-
mal risk. They point out that the statistical prevalence of injury and death 
from ‘daily life’ are fairly high and yet people tolerate such risks. But Wendler 
(2005) points out that daily life risks are not analogous to research-induced 
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risks. First, many risks of daily life cannot be controlled, but choosing to be 
a research subject is. Second, we tolerate risks of certain activities because 
of the joy or pleasure we derive from competitive activity, this includes even 
risky sports like football. But research that presents the risk of broken bones 
or torn ACLs does not always supply, on its own, a compensating benefit. 
Instead, Wendler (2005) settles on a “charitable participation” standard.
 9 The other requirements pertain to scientific design, equitable selection of sub-
jects, informed consent issues, and safety monitoring.
 10 Friedman et al. quote from the National Council for Science and Technology 
(2004, n. 6).
 11 See Stump (2010, 378). I should note here that the sufferer is one who suffers 
undeservedly. Self-inflicted harm, of any sort, is a species of wrongdoing and 
suffering caused by one’s own wrongdoing is not considered a problem for 
theism. I should also note that I disagree with the typical framing of this issue, 
but my objections do not affect the point about commutative justice I wish to 
extract from this frame.
 12 This case is discussed by many, notably Bergelson (2008) and Tadros (2011). 
Most commentators on this case assume that consent does not justify Meiwes’s 
act of killing. I use this case, not to draw an analogy with what researchers do, 
but to explore the ‘moral magic’ of consent.
 13 A possible complication with my analysis is her example of getting a tattoo. 
My reading of this is that tattoo-giving is a service and qua giving a service it 
depends on consent insofar as service-giving typically involves a request for the 
service. Taking a needle with ink on it to a non-requesting person is not the giv-
ing of a service but is rightly categorized by Hurd as an instance of maiming.
 14 The notion of harm I am assuming here overlaps with suffering. Harm 
involves damage to one’s health broadly construed (including psychosocial 
health so as to include risky behavioral research). I do not hold to an interest 
account of harm strictly, see Chapter 5.
 15 Recall that, although my argument emphasizes the need for a compensating 
benefit, I would add that knowledge of vital importance can function as a jus-
tifier for causing or allowing harms on another. But adding this feature does 
not impugn my overall thesis because justification of risky pediatric research 
countenances knowledge of vital importance as a legitimate justifier as well. 
If both adult and pediatric research are justified in virtue of the same ethical 
considerations, pediatric subjects do not enjoy greater protection.
 16 To tether my reflections here to a particular case, I am thinking of the TGN 
1412 trial which offered subjects ~3,500USD. Now, consider the study with-
out such a payment offer. It is apparent that no one would consent to it. See 
Emanuel and Miller (2007).
 17 Resnik and Koski (2011) recommend having a national registry of health vol-
unteers since quite a few of them participate in numerous trials. The worry is 
that some do not wait for the required ‘wash out’ period which may magnify 
the risks to their health.
 18 I relegate to a footnote what is likely a key premise in my argument here 
only because this is not a chapter on rational choice or human action theory. 
Following Talbot Brewer (2009), I consider a rational action as involving, 
at least, an apprehension of something good or worthwhile. Intentional 
actions must involve reasons, and the motivational force of such reasons 
is explained by an apprehension of something good. In a discussion on the 
desire-satisfaction theory of rational action, Brewer notes in response: “One 
does not count as an agent simply in virtue of consistently behaving in ways 
that effectively bring about certain describable state of affairs [affairs seen as 
desirable]. . . . To be an agent is to set oneself in motion . . . on the strength of 
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one’s sense that something counts in favor of doing so. That performing some 
action would bring about some state of affairs cannot intelligibly be regarded 
as counting in favor of performing the action unless one sees the state of 
affairs, or the effort to produce it, as itself good or valuable. . . . Desires can 
figure centrally in the rationalizing explanation of actions only if they involve 
a sense of the point or value of acting in the way they incline us to act, and 
only if they motivate us by inducing us to act on the strength of this evalua-
tive outlook” (2009, 28). On Brewer’s view, apprehending an end as good is a 
necessary condition for rational action. Returning to the example of entering 
into a study with risks grossly overriding any benefits, it is hard to appreciate 
any reason for entering the study focusing just on the benefits and burdens the 
study promises.
 19 The Office of Human Research Protections (n.d.) give the following guid-
ance, “Direct payments or other forms of remuneration offered to potential 
subjects as an incentive or reward for participation should not be considered 
a ‘benefit’ to be gained from research. . . . Although participation in research 
may be a personally rewarding activity or a humanitarian contribution, these 
subjective benefits should not enter into the IRB’s analysis of benefits and 
risks” (emphasis added).
 20 For a potentially representative voice see Rosenfield (2008). I say only ‘poten-
tially’ since, although Rosenfield says he thinks that subpart D is a “barrier” 
to good clinical research, he never argues for this claim. His only protestations 
concern the extended review process of his own study, which was reviewed 
under category §46.407. No discernible challenge to the ethical standards of 
subpart D is presented.
 21 Cited in Resnik (2012).
 22 Instead of functioning as a counterexample to my argument, the Barry 
Marshall case might just as well illustrate that I might be permitted to do to 
my own body what somebody else is not permitted to do.
12 Conclusion
Suppose you and I are crystal ball gazers in which our respective crystals 
bequeath moral judgments. Your crystal ball churns out the judgment 
that it is permissible to kill X, and mine delivers the opposite judgment. 
Suppose further that our crystals are the only means by which we form 
moral judgments. We do not know that they are reliable, and we can-
not use their very outputs to confirm their reliability for that would 
be circular. Suppose, finally, that there are significant goods that would be 
compromised if one is wrong that it is permissible to kill X; and only 
somewhat significant goods would be compromised if one is wrong that 
it is impermissible to kill X. Our crystal balls represent our moral per-
ception. That we cannot confirm their reliability refers, of course, to the 
argument in Chapter 2, and the presence of competing outputs from our 
crystal balls represent the epistemic significance of peer disagreement 
(Chapter 3). Continuing with the analogy, it is clear that acting on what 
your crystal ball tells you to do is incongruent with intellectual humility 
regarding the reliability of your own crystal ball, and incongruent with 
intellectual justice vis-à-vis the outputs of my crystal ball.
Of course, this is merely an analogy, or rather a heuristic to illustrate 
the basic epistemological points upon which this project relies. The 
advance my project wishes to make is that it is ecumenical in nature. 
What I mean by that is that my interlocutors need not adopt the posi-
tions I defend in favor of, for example, the substance view of the person. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that my argument in Chapter 4 
ended by pointing out that the psychological account of the person is 
underdetermined as a justification for abortion rights. It was no part of 
that argument to adjudicate who has the better account of the person 
(substance view versus functional brain view). It is agreed that they are 
different theories; but both can accommodate the intuitions highlighted 
in the thought experiments typically understood to motivate the func-
tional brain view. Since only one such account provides a reason for the 
permissibility of abortion, and the other arguably does not, the justifi-
cation for abortion suffers underdetermination. This is an ecumenical 
conclusion because I am not arguing there that the functional brain 
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view is false – I do not necessarily do so earlier in the chapter given 
my suspicion that McMahan and I are answering different questions 
(see Chapter 4, pages 68–69).
A second reason for understanding my argument as ecumenical is that 
my overall conclusion is that one should not act on judgments of permis-
sible killing, not that one should not have those beliefs at all. I will say, 
however, that my arguments are strong enough for the conclusion that 
those with whom my interlocutors may disagree are epistemic peers – with 
a nod to the epistemic effects that disagreement exerts. The arguments 
are also strong enough to set the burden of proof. But, again, agreement 
is not required to grant presumptions in a dialectical exchange. A pros-
ecuting attorney does not believe that the defendant is innocent but crafts 
her case considering the presumption in favor of innocence.
My project aims first to push us out of ourselves, so to speak, and 
look at human moral cognition and the multiple non-alethic affects to 
which that cognition is susceptible. Taking seriously how we typically 
think (Chapter 2), and that others may be just as morally attuned as we 
are (Chapter 3) in the setting of serious risk in being wrong on judgments 
of permissible killing, grounds a local skepticism on those very judg-
ments. The basic idea in the chapters which followed are that coherence, 
or wide reflective equilibrium, is still tenuous epistemic comfort given the 
original epistemological lessons learned. Again, the conclusion reached 
here is ecumenical in nature. One can grant that she has a widely coher-
ent network of beliefs in favor of a moral position, and yet acknowledge 
the tenuous comfort that coherence provides (Depaul, 1993).
In light of these points, my hope is that this work will be viewed with 
the same intellectual disposition from which it is offered, namely, an 
ecumenical discourse on how we should inquire on matters involving a 
serious moral risk in being wrong.
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